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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Matthew E. P. Eddy 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Sociology 
 
September 2013 
 
Title: Recalibrating Conceptualizations of “Cultures of Peace”: A Cross-National Study 
of Nonviolent Attitudes 
 
 This dissertation pursues three broad questions. First, what are the correlates of 
nonviolent attitudes around the world? Second, which nations exhibit characteristics of 
robust “Cultures of Peace”? Third, are there signs that history and collective memory 
shapes attitudes, i.e., do cultures “learn” from experiences of war, peace, or nonviolence? 
A multi-method approach sought to further our understandings of propensities for peace 
at both the national and individual levels. First, an analysis of nation-level Gallup World 
Poll data (N=136 nations) identifies correlates of nonviolent attitudes and advances a 
critique of the Global Peace Index (GPI), grounded in the observed disconnect between 
structural and attitudinal indicators of peace in many nations. The Gallup World Poll 
analysis suggests that many forces of modernization instill forms of “callous cruelty” 
while failing to cultivate pragmatic nonviolent attitudes. For example, poor nations and 
nations with recent successful nonviolent revolution are more likely to affirm that 
nonviolence “works” than wealthier nations ranking high in the GPI. Moreover, it is 
argued from Gallup data that the accumulation of “peace capital” is quite specific, with a 
frequent disconnect between forms of principled and pragmatic nonviolence. Second, 
survey data were collected from two “maximally different” cases, university students in 
the U.S. (N=403) and Costa Rica (N=312), which have starkly divergent structural and 
 v 
 
 
historical relationships to peace and militarism. Utilizing a new survey instrument, factor 
analyses helped to identify cross-national variations in respondent adherence to 
ideologies of violence and nonviolence: militarism, realism, just war, or nonviolence. The 
results show Costa Ricans were significantly more peaceful than U.S. respondents on 48 
out of 52 items. Susceptibility to “elite cues” was tested in an experimental section. Tests 
revealed gaps in historical knowledge of nonviolence offering support for the theory that 
“ideology has no history.” Finally, a cross-national sample of state-approved history 
textbooks from 8 nations (Germany, Norway, Ghana, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Costa Rica, and the U.S.) were analyzed as outcomes of collective memory processes. 
The relative neglect of significant nonviolent revolutions and campaigns in the majority 
of these textbooks suggests formidable obstacles to the proliferation of nonviolent 
ideology around the world.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION – THE SEARCH FOR NONVIOLENT ATTITUDES  
AND CULTURES OF PEACE 
 In 2000, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) launched the International Decade for a Culture of Peace. Although 
contradictions and inadequacies mar the conception of peace and peace movements in 
this relatively high-profile U.N. initiative (Ilcan and Phillips 2006, de Rivera 2004, 
Adams 2000), it was followed by a number of scholarly attempts to theorize and compile 
indicators of a “culture of peace.” Of particular note, the annual release of the World 
Peace Index (WPI) began in 2000 and was joined by the better known Global Peace 
Index (GPI) in 2007. At the same time, large cross-national public opinion surveys 
probing violent/ nonviolent attitudes have recently emerged, offering researchers the 
chance to test long-held theories and assumptions about the relative presence of 
belligerent or pacific attitudes among mass publics throughout the world.      
 The present project grew out of preliminary analyses of the GPI and WPI. Both 
indexes employ objective socio-structural criteria for measuring the levels of peace 
among nations, and both largely fail to employ subjective, attitudinal indicators of peace. 
Historical factors are also largely neglected in the GPI, as the GPI only measures the past 
five years of each nation’s internal and external conflicts. Most significantly, when 
national scores in the 2008 GPI are compared with their national mean scores in peaceful 
attitudes (using data from the 2008 Gallup World Poll and the 2007 Pew Global Attitudes 
Survey), inconsistent and often negative correlations between objective and subjective 
measures of peace emerge, raising questions about what constitutes a “culture of peace.” 
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For example, nations (e.g., New Zealand, Sweden, Denmark, Czech Republic, and 
Singapore) scoring highly in the peace indexes (employing objective-structural indicators 
of peace), often fail to score highly in nonviolent attitudes (subjective indicators of 
peace), while nations lacking structural peace and some of the most war-torn nations 
(e.g., Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Nicaragua, and Colombia) often score well-above 
the global mean in nonviolent attitudes. These initial findings motivated further research 
and will frame an initial critique of the GPI and WPI. 
 All cultures reproduce some elements of peace culture, and international travelers 
with fresh and discriminating eyes often bear testimony of this as they return from travels 
abroad. About ten years ago when backpacking through Ladakh, a Tibetan Buddhist 
region of northern India, I was taken with the notion that in the contemporary world, this 
region most closely resembles Hilton’s (1933) mythical land of peace,Shangri-La (Hilton 
portrayed his mythical kingdom, isolated and surrounded by mountain ranges, as vaguely 
Tibetan Buddhist, and having no military). Surely, I thought, Buddhist and mountainous 
cultures must be among the world’s most peaceful. The present analysis shows that I was 
wrong on both counts: On average, mountainous nations and Buddhist nations tend to 
hold less peaceful attitudes. But Ladakh is a region, not a nation, and this suggests some 
of the difficulties with the nation-level of analysis. When we average attitudes at the 
nation-level, are any nations markedly more peaceful in their attitudes – and if so, why? 
 Recently, an acquaintance who learned of my project asked me where Thailand 
ranked in peace. She explained that on a recent trip to Thailand she had been truly 
amazed at the peaceful dispositions of the Thai people. Even in the big cities, people 
seemed calm and relaxed in the midst of traffic jams. She suggested a theory that this 
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inner calm might be linked to the longstanding tradition in which Thai boys go to live in 
a Buddhist monastery for several months. She was very surprised when I told her that 
worldwide, Thailand ranked near the bottom in the Gallup World Poll’s measures of 
peaceful attitudes. Because it is the largest cross-national survey to data, analysis of the 
Gallup World Poll data is likely to turn up newinsights about peaceful attitudes around 
the world. 
 This project hones in on three Gallup World Poll questions because they tap 
beliefs about the effectiveness of nonviolent methods and the moral acceptability of 
terrorism and state terrorism (i.e., cases in which the military targets and kills civilians). 
The three questions serve to operationalize forms of pragmatic nonviolence (i.e., does 
nonviolence work?) and principled nonviolence (i.e., moral objections to violence at a 
low threshold, amounting to a “just war” orientation). However, the three questions are 
quite specific and limited in scope and methodology. For instance, rather than Likert-type 
questions they are essentially forced either-or choices. In this project I test whether these 
Gallup questions might serve as “keystone” indicators of violent/ nonviolent attitudes. 
 In short, this dissertation project pursues three broad questions. First, what are the 
correlates of nonviolent attitudes? Second, where are cultures of peace? Third, are there 
signs that history and collective memory shapes attitudes, i.e., do cultures “learn” from 
experiences of war, peace, or nonviolence? More specifically, the research questions 
are:1) Where are “cultures of peace” in the world today, and what factors explain their 
emergence and reproduction? Do some nations display both structural and attitudinal 
indicators of peace propensities? 2) In large cross-national datasets, at the individual-
level, what are the correlates of nonviolent attitudes?At the nation-level, which cultural 
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and structural characteristics tend to be associated with peaceful attitudes?3) In the U.S. 
and Costa Rica, two nations with very different historical and structural relationships to 
war and peace, how do ideologies of violence and nonviolence differ?On the individual 
level, what are the correlates of nonviolent attitudes in these two nations? What 
demographic groups and personality types are most likely to embrace nonviolent 
attitudes?4) Given the widespread success of nonviolent revolutions and campaigns in the 
20th and early 21st Centuries, why is confidence in “peaceful means alone” not more 
robust around the world?5) Do collective memory processes play a role in attitude 
formation? How are significant cases of nonviolent movements remembered in 
government-approved secondary school history textbooks around the world? What do 
these textbooks, as outcomes of collective memory processes, suggest about prospects for 
the proliferation of nonviolent ideology around the world? 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 Several scholars have theorized “cultures of peace” in terms of both socio-
structural and attitudinal/ cultural dynamics, and accordingly, urged the employment of 
objective as well as subjective indicators in the measurement of cross-national levels of 
peace (Anderson 2004, de Rivera 2004, Basabe and Valencia 2007). Advancing a holistic 
understanding of peace, Boulding (2000) defined the subjective element of a culture of 
peace as involving “a mosaic of identities, attitudes, values, beliefs, and institutional 
patterns” that support distributive justice, equality, human development/ nurturance, and 
nonviolent means of conflict resolution (p.196). A few qualitative case studies of single 
nations (Milani and Branco 2004, Morales and Leal 2004) have suggestively analyzed the 
relative presence of a culture of peace while employing de Rivera’s (2004) template of 
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objective and subjective indicators.Still more helpfully for our purposes, Diener and Tov 
(2007) examined the relationships between subjective and objective indicators of peace, 
but their subjective indicator was less than ideal as it was limited to the World Values 
Survey (WVS) question “willingness to fight in a war for your country.” 
 Similarly, Basabe and Valencia (2007) compiled an impressive array of objective 
and subjective indicators of peace culture from existing cross-national datasets. However, 
in measuring beliefs and attitudes they turned to national scores on value indexes (e.g., 
Hofstede’s (2001) Individualism-Collectivism index, Schwartz’s (1994) Hierarchy index) 
and to World Values Survey data (Inglehart et al. 2004), all of which offer less than ideal 
indicators and proxies for violent/ nonviolent attitudes. For example, national means were 
used from WVS questions probing “willingness to fight in a war for your country,” 
tolerance/ justifiability of homosexuality, sense of interpersonal trust, and a self-
perceived quality of democracy index.  Moreover, Basabe and Valencia (2007), like 
Diener and Tov (2007), only tested relationships among the variables, rather than ranking 
nations in overall peace or dimensions of peacefulness.   
 By far, the most comprehensive attempts to assess levels of peace cross-nationally 
are encompassed in the GPI and WPI. However, both of these peace indexes have 
significant flaws. One weakness is that they largely neglect to employ subjective 
indicators. The GPI includes only two measures of the subjective/ attitudinal dimension. 
The first measure is furnished by the Corruption Perception Index for each nation, 
compiled from public opinion surveys conducted by Transparency International. The 
second measure, “Level of distrust in other citizens” stems not from survey data, but from 
qualitative assessments of each nation by the GPI research team, and while this indicator 
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of social capital may be a proxy for the perceived threat of violence, it only applies to 
domestic peace and tells us little about the wider scope of violent/ nonviolent attitudes at 
the individual or cultural level. Similarly, the WPI’s only subjective indicator is the 
Corruption Perception Index.   
  Clearly, the subjective indicators employed by these peace indexes do not 
approach the substantive core of nonviolent attitudes outlined in prominent 
conceptualizations of cultures of peace (e.g., UNESCO 1995, Boulding 2000). The 
appearance of a large-scale public opinion data set, the Gallup World Poll, offers new 
opportunities to measure more precisely the subjective culture correlates which, by 
definition, should be salient in a “culture of peace.” Building from analyses of the Gallup 
World Poll, the present study will critique the GPI and WPI and sketch out routes 
towards improving conceptualizations, measurement, and theorizing of cultures of peace.  
 Taking advantage of recently released data sets, the present analysis will help 
further our knowledge of the global distribution of violent/ nonviolent attitudes.It has 
been common for peace scholars to argue, somewhat flippantly and with little empirical 
support, that every war creates new anti-war contingents (e.g., Kurlansky 2006).Chalmers 
Johnson (2004) argues that the intensity of combat during World War II, with 6,639 U.S. 
soldiers killed per month over forty-four months, made Americans “skeptical about future 
wars, particularly those in which there was no immediate threat to the United States or in 
which the United States had not been attacked” (p.55). Others contend that “the myth of 
redemptive violence” is alive and well, and that ideologies of violence are difficult to 
dislodge (Wink 1992). Likewise, for generations intellectuals have debated whether 
democracy tames state violence through the influence of peaceful citizens as in Kant’s 
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theory of the democratic peace, or whether it allows the “belligerence of the masses” to 
emergeas Max Weber expected (Cortright 2008). Similarly, we can ask whether 
particular religious traditions or “civilizations” are more likely to reproduce peaceful 
attitudes. 
 Over recent decades, our abilities to test such assumptions have grown, as 
scholars have compiled large-scale survey data and historical event data sets (e.g., the 
Correlates of War Data, Uppsala Conflict Data Program) organized by taxonomies of 
conflict types, regime types, and war outcomes. The present project will utilize these 
tools in attempting to specify whether extended experiences of war or peace, or dramatic 
nonviolent successes (such as nonviolent revolutions) might significantly influence 
attitudes about violence and nonviolence. We will test whether nonviolent attitudes tend 
to become generalized across many domains, whether “cultures of peace” exist at the 
nation level, and why. 
 What has been lacking in the peace studies literatureis a large-scale cross-national 
analysis which takes nonviolent attitudes as the dependent variable, and analyzes the 
impact of relatively parallel historical events, such as traumatic war and successful 
nonviolent revolutions.As the number of democracies and the number of successful 
nonviolent revolutions proliferated in the 20thCentury, and especially after World War II 
and the end of the Cold War (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008, Cortright 2008, Kurlansky 
2006, Sharp 2005, Schock 2005, Schell 2003, Ackerman and DuVall 2000; Zunes, Kurtz, 
and Asher 1999;Ackerman and Kruegler 1994), we might expect to find evidence that 
conflict resolution attitudes are robustly nonviolentin many nations.If not, it raises serious 
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questions about the capacities for cultures to “learn” and to embed lessons in collective 
memory. 
 The Gallup World Poll 2008, sampling from over 100 nations, is the largest cross-
national survey to date which has probed violent/ nonviolent attitudes. Up to this point, 
peace scholars have possessed few empirical grounds for making global generalizations 
on the violent/ nonviolent attitudes of mass publics. Previously, although some other 
relevant poll data existed, scholars (Basabe and Valencia 2007, Diener and Tov 2007, 
Dowley and Silver 2000, Inglehart 1990)analyzingviolent/ nonviolent attitudes in large 
cross-national polls have honed in on only one questionin the European Values Surveys 
(waves 1981 through 1999) and World Values Surveys (waves 1981 through 2005), 
which asks: “Of course, we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it were to 
come to that, would you be willing to fight for your country?” Like the key questions in 
the Gallup World Poll, the hypothetical framing of thisWVS question probes what can be 
called a “generalized attitude” (Cohrs and Moschner 2002), presentingweaknesses as well 
as strengths for interpretation and theory-building.   
 In the “willingness to fight” survey question (WVS and EVS), the way 
respondents imagine “another war” in their country will likely vary by national context – 
contingent upon the kinds of wars the nation has recently experienced.That is, following 
theories of schematic reasoning (Kegley and Raymond 1999, Sewell 1996),it seems 
reasonable to assume that respondents reflexively use past conflicts as a template and 
project them onto wars in the hypothetical future.The “willingness to fight” question, at 
least in the English version, also carries the connotation that a future war would only be 
undertaken as a last resort (Diener and Tov 2007), perhaps leading respondents to 
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imagine a war of self-defense or a “just war.”In addition, it is easy to imagine that elderly 
cohorts, females (where national traditions exclude them from military service), or adult 
cohorts with dependent children, will say they are not willing to fight, though they may 
actually hold militaristic attitudes. Thus, the WVS questionpresents challenges for 
interpretation,only taps one circumscribed level of conflict, and precludes generalizing to 
otherviolent/ nonviolent attitudes associated with the wide variety of inter-state, intra-
state, communal, or interpersonal conflicts that mark the social world.  Fortunately, 
additional data is available. 
 The Gallup World Poll data can help further our knowledge of the global 
distribution of attitudes and moral values associated with conflict resolution as well as the 
violent/ nonviolent strategies employed by social movements and military forces. The 
Gallup World Pollincludes three measures of violent/ nonviolent generalized attitudes, 
one of which operationalizes a “pragmatic nonviolent” orientation, and two of which 
operationalize minimal thresholds for a “principled nonviolent” orientation – in the sense 
that not targeting and killing civilians is a minimal principled opposition to violence (or 
at least a constraint on violence), one which rejects “total war” and which is enshrined in 
international law (i.e., the Geneva Accords).Of course, to say that individual attacks on 
civilians and military attacks on civilians are “never justified” is in harmony with “just 
war” ideology.   
 The Gallup World Poll questions are general and abstract, but there are empirical 
grounds for asserting that such generalized attitudes are important in shaping individual 
views of particular wars and other forms of violence. Some studies have found that 
“general attitudes toward war predict opinions about specific military actions” (e.g., 
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McAlister, Orpinas, and Velez 1999, p.254). Cohrs and Moschner (2002) surveyed 
German university students and found that “generalized political attitudes,” including 
attitudes falling on a spectrum of militarism-pacifism, played a greater role than “specific 
antiwar knowledge” in shaping evaluations of NATO’s intervention in Yugoslavia 
(p.139). 
 Anderson (2004) has called for the measurement of “peace” through both 
objective and subjective indicators including survey data measuring nonviolent attitudes 
as they interface various micro and macro levels – self, interpersonal, local community, 
national, and international. At the level of power politics, some scholars write of a 
militarism-pacifism ideological continuum (Cohrs and Moschner 2002), but the key 
points along the spectrum of violent/ nonviolent beliefs might be better specified as 
militarism, realism, just war, or nonviolence (Megoran 2008).  
Defining Nonviolence: Principled and Pragmatic 
 Principled nonviolence is Gandhian nonviolence. It designates attitudes which 
affirm the unity of means and ends, which accept self-suffering (rather than violent 
retaliation), which hold that nonviolence is morally and strategically superior to violence, 
and which include the aim of “converting,” forgiving, and reconciling with opponents 
(Dudouet, 2008). Conversely, “pragmatic nonviolence” affirms that nonviolent action can 
be effective in some contexts, but the motivation for nonviolence is mostly strategic 
(Dudouet, 2008). Ideal typically, pragmatic nonviolent adherents do not condemn 
violence as immoral and they approve of the use of violence in some contexts (Eddy 
2011, Eddy 2012).  
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 It should be remembered that principled nonviolence subsumes pragmatic 
nonviolence under its umbrella, while the reverse is not the case (pragmatic nonviolent 
adherents will, at least in some contexts, justify the use of violence and/ or de-emphasize 
the moral superiority of nonviolence). In other words, only within Gandhian or principled 
nonviolence, is the moral and practical superiority of nonviolence equally affirmed.   
Defining Nonviolence: The Distinction Between Conventional and Nonviolent Action   
 Martin (2008)  helpfully distinguishes between violence, “conventional action” 
(whether it be political, economic, or social), and nonviolent action. Conventional 
political action is “anything that is routine within a society” and might include voting and 
lobbying, while nonviolent action “goes beyond routine behavior, often by challenging 
conventional practices” (p.236). But the boundaries between conventional and nonviolent 
action are context dependent. In the U.S., handing out a political leaflet is routine, but in 
nations with highly repressive governments it might be categorized as nonviolent action. 
Moreover, Martin argues that “in some places strikes are so common and widely accepted 
that participating in one might be considered conventional action” (pp.236-237).  
 I contend that compared with conventional action and pragmatic nonviolence, the 
distinctive emphases of principled/ Gandhian nonviolent ideology and its resonance with 
moral and spiritual traditions, help activists as well as journalists and historians to flag 
the role of nonviolence in movements. Another route, which facilitates the interpretation 
of nonviolent campaigns as nonviolent for movement participants, outsiders, journalists, 
and historians is to appeal to nonviolent action templates such as the Gandhian template. 
During the Montgomery bus boycott, the New York Times reported: “By emphasizing the 
Christian virtue of ‘love thine enemy’ the boycott was made a mass movement of passive 
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resistance – though it took months for the Gandhi similarity to be recognized” (Phillips 
1956, March 4, p.E6). Actually, historians widely acknowledge that Dr. King’s mentors 
in nonviolence, Bayard Rustin and Rev. Smiley, came on the scene in the first days of the 
boycott and heavily pushed Gandhian theory, which King eagerly adopted. But it is 
telling that the Times said it “took months” for the Gandhian parallels to be recognized – 
by the Times it would seem. This claim also exemplifies a challenge surrounding the 
perception of – and later collective memory of – nonviolence as nonviolent action, as 
opposed to conventional action.      
 I will contend that the reproduction of nonviolent ideology around the world is 
currently hampered by the failure of collective memory processes to explicitly name and 
theorize nonviolence. This collective memory challenge is not insurmountable. However, 
I believe the task for memory entrepreneurs becomes much easier when there is evidence 
that the distinctive logic, ideals, strategies, and motivations of principled nonviolence 
were an integral part of a nonviolent social movement or act of nonviolent resistance. The 
risk of forgetting historical campaigns of nonviolent action or of classifying it as merely 
conventional action is especially likely in campaigns which embrace pragmatic rather 
than principled nonviolence, because adherents of the former are likely to be less 
consciously strategic, ideologically distinctive, and disciplined in the use of nonviolence.  
AN HISTORICIST UNDERSTANDING OF NONVIOLENCE: NGRAMS 
  
 Utilizing the Google “Ngram” dataset, we can track the rise of the word 
“nonviolence,” its predecessor and cognate terms. This powerful new tool affords us the 
opportunity to analyze shifts in nonviolent conceptualizations over time. The significance 
of this rests in the notion that knowledge and thinking are processes of categorizing and 
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generalizing. The shifts in the names and political tactics of nonviolence represent shifts 
in the practice and ideological basis of nonviolence. With the recent eclipse of older 
terms like pacifism, by the word nonviolence, it seems likely that the stage is set for 
nonviolence to be increasingly named, perceived in the world, and theorized as a force in 
politics. 
 The Google Books Ngram Viewer dataset includes over 5.2 million books or 
about 4% of all books ever printed. However, the most complete data involves the 
English corpus between 1800 and 2000. Ngrams are single words or strings of letters or 
numbers (1-grams), e.g., “1880,” “love,” or “NAACP.” Ngrams can also be sequences of 
words, e.g., a phrase with three words is called a 3-gram. Only ngrams that appear in at 
least 40 books are searchable in the dataset. The dataset makes it possible to map changes 
in the lexicon through observing frequency counts of words appearing in published 
books, as well as to indirectly gauge changes in collective memory over time. Word 
frequency is “computed by dividing the number of instances of the n-gram in a given 
year by the total number of words in the corpus in that year” (Michel et al. 2011, p.176). 
That is, essentially results are “normalized” according to the number of books published 
each year. The “smoothing of 3” feature names how the yearly data is averaged with 
figures from 3 nearby years on either side of each yearly data point. These moving 
averages can make trends more clear.     
 The Ngram data is somewhat crude since the number of books published in any 
given year and their topical areas are subject to innumerable contingencies and even 
relative unknowns. For instance, how have authors and knowledge creators over the 
decades decided to publish a book rather than say, a magazine or a magazine article? 
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What determines the establishment or maintenance of a publishing stream within a small 
niche market? The data does not track the significance or readership of any book, so we 
are really tracking the decisions of authors, editors, and publishers to craft and market 
particular topics and ideas in the book format. The threshold of marketability, intellectual 
or pop cultural significance are likely to be quite low in some niche market publishing 
houses – including academic ones. Nevertheless, the data offers a glimpse into which 
ideas and people have gained relatively more traction within all of the decision-making 
mechanisms and other moving parts of the book publishing business. 
 N-gram searches revealed that the adjective “nonviolent” has been consistently 
utilized slightly more than the noun “nonviolence,” and similarly, “pacifist” is utilized 
slightly more than “pacifism,” and so in the n-gram searches reported below, we shall 
limit ourselves to the more commonly appearing versions of these terms.All of these 
terms, and still further cognate terms have their own histories and they are conceptually 
bundled with other context-specific meanings.  
 For example, the nonviolence of Gandhi and Tolstoy was closely linked to their 
spirituality and ascetic forms of spirituality (i.e., self-denial, and voluntary suffering). 
Hence, Tolstoy wrote, “To be good without fasting is as impossible as it is to walk 
without standing up” (Green 1978, p.19). As another example, perhaps the leading 
nonviolent activist of the U.S. in the 1800’s, William Lloyd Garrison, did not use the 
word nonviolence, instead he always employed the term nonresistance because for him, 
the key ethical concerns were avoiding coercion and the exercise of human authority and 
he viewed any form of resistance as failing on these counts (Chernus 2004, 
p.36).Garrison called himself a “nonresistant,” yet it has to be added that he “was not at 
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all passive” (p.37).Additional n-gram searches (not depicted here) revealed that 
nonresistance was employed more frequently than passive resistance from about 1802 to 
about 1818 and again from 1840 to 1845. In the intervening years, between 1818 and 
1840, the use of the two terms closely tracked one another. But after 1845, passive 
resistance was used much more frequently than nonresistance. This despite the fact that 
Adin Ballou’s important book Christian Non-Resistance was published in 1846 
(Chatfield 1972).Ballou’s book likely impacted Tolstoy. In his letter, “A Message to the 
American People” (1901), Tolstoy  credited Ballou as well as Garrison, Emerson, and 
Thoreau as influences. Three years later, Tolstoy wrote, “Garrison was the first to 
proclaim this principle [of nonresistance to evil] as a rule for the organization of man’s 
[sic] life” (Lynd and Lynd 1995, p.xi).  
 Passive resistance and nonresistance can be considered older terms for 
nonviolence, but today passive resistance often names a tactic. Thus, the Eugene, Oregon 
police department defines passive resistance in the process of setting forth policy on the 
use of pepper spray in crowd control efforts: 
 spray should not be used against persons engaged only in passive resistance. For 
 the purposes of this policy, ‘passive resistance’ means non-compliance with an 
 officer’s orders unaccompanied by any active or physical resistance. (An example 
 of passive resistance would be a person who was limp on the ground, and who 
 was not grasping onto an object or making other efforts to resist being taken into 
 custody). (EW 2011, p.7) 
  
 Clarence Darrow, “America’s foremost exponent of nonviolence in the years just 
prior to World War I” (Lynd and Lynd 1995, p.76), spoke and wrote of the “theory of 
non-resistance,” but he also used the terms“passive resistance” (p.81) and “peaceable 
force” (p.76). The latter is a clear echo of Tolstoy (who used the terms soul-force and 
love-force (Gandhi 2008)), the primary source of Darrow’s thinking on nonviolence. A 
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renowned lawyer of leftists and union leaders, Darrow’s interest in nonviolence was 
grounded in his observations of the criminal justice system. He characterized nonviolence 
as “the opposite to the theory of punishment, or the theory of vengeance” (p.75) and 
linked nonviolence to Jesus’s “turn the other cheek” teaching which explicitly rejected 
“an eye for an eye” vengeance. In a debate, circa 1910, with the Socialist Arthur Lewis, 
Darrow argued that the theory of punishment “is wrong” and does not reform criminals 
(p.78). Moreover, he contends the world is “steadily” moving towards embracing the 
theory of non-resistance, pointing to the abolishment or curtailment of the death penalty 
in “most civilized countries” (p.78).Darrow’s argument for passive resistance was both 
pragmatic (p.81, p.78, p.110, p.112) and principled (pp.114-115), positing that “you 
cannot “cure hatred with hatred” (p.82). He suggests that if workers undertook a general 
strike and “quit feeding the race,” it would be a powerful and effective form of “passive 
resistance – non-resistance” (p.81). The alternative path, of workers taking up armed 
struggle “cannot succeed” and never has succeeded, in part because only a “small 
minority” of workers would be willing to arm themselves and the power of the state is so 
much greater (p.81). He concludes: “The only force that can win is determination, non-
resistance, peaceable force. There is such a thing as peaceable force that is more forcible 
than forcible force” (p.82). 
 In Darrow’s toolbox of terms, “peaceable force” would likely have been less often 
misunderstood. Unfortunately, the phrase was not often repeated. As it was, in the 1910 
debate with Lewis, Lewis repeatedly chided Darrow for subscribing to the “theory of the 
non-resistance of evil” (Darrow and Lewis 1911, p.95). Lewis characterized this theory 
as “suicidal” (p.94), an “obsolete” and ancient “Oriental idea” which he says passed from 
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Buddha to Jesus, Jesus to Tolstoy, and Tolstoy to Darrow (pp.54-55). Hence, Lewis’s 
misinterpretation of non-resistance is explicitly linked to his misunderstanding of 
Buddhism and “the philosophy of the Orient” (p.60) as a “philosophy of resignation, 
renunciation, helplessness, submission and despair” (pp.60-61). For Lewis, pointing to 
these “Oriental,” backward, and religious origins for “non-resistance” are enough to 
refute their adequacy (p.90). Such misperceptions of Buddhism persists in the West, 
partly because of mistranslations into English of the second law of Buddhism (commonly 
rendered as “in order to end suffering cut off desire,” but which would be better 
represented by “purify desire”). For more than a century, probably very few cross-
cultural diffusions into English have been more plagued by misunderstanding than this 
Buddhist tenet. Similarly, few concepts have been more poorly named than “non-
resistance,” which implies refusing to resist, and “pacifism” which sounds like “passive” 
(Addams 2002, p.353). 
 In any case, in the debate, Darrow attempted to disabuse Lewis of his error of 
linking “non-resistance” to purportedly religious views that force is “always bad” (p.92), 
or that evil, including diseases, can only have spiritual cures (p.90). Darrow clarified, 
saying, “I do not understand non-resistance to mean that you cannot fight disease, or 
destroy bedbugs, or take baths, or indulge in passive resistance. I do not think that 
anybody who has ever preached or taught non-resistance understood such a thing” 
(p.103). Moreover, once definitions of terms were finally reconciled through three rounds 
of debate, it seems Lewis and Darrow were not so far apart, for Lewis claimed to believe 
in “non-aggression,” and thus, he was merely opposed to “the non-resistance of 
aggression” (p.93). 
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 Below in Figure 1, we see how the older term “passive resistance” was rapidly 
eclipsed by the word “pacifist” after it was coined in 1901 (Cortright 2008). But around 
1990, the word “nonviolent” superseded “pacifist” in common usage. Despite the rapid 
rise of the term “pacifist” and its widespread use, the word carried very misleading 
connotations which set up self-identifying pacifists for critique as spineless do-nothings. 
Indeed, the term best fit a small apolitical “quietist” subgroup of Anabaptists committed 
to withdrawal from the world (p.9), and though Anabaptists are an important originating 
source of nonviolent practice and theory, nonviolence has grown beyond those historical 
roots. Problems with the term are also recognized by Chernus (2004) who notes that there 
was a general trend in the Progressive era (1895 to 1920 (Norton et al. 1998)) toward 
“pacifism,” but this was different than principled nonviolence: “Because the mainstream 
Progressive peace movements were all called pacifist, it is useful to avoid that word when 
speaking of those committed to principled nonviolence” (p.77).   
 Of course, many observers have also pointed to the feebleness of the term 
“nonviolence,” as the negative formulation cued by the prefix non- is conspicuous for its 
failure to stake out a positive dynamic. The shining alternative is of course Gandhi’s  
 
Figure 1. N-Gram Search of Nonviolent Terms in English Corpus, 1800-2000, With 
Smoothing of 3. 
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masterful term “satyagraha.” Unfortunately, neither satyagraha nor the English 
translations of Truth Force, or Soul Force and Love Force (the latter two being names 
which Gandhi (2008) cites Tolstoy as coining (p.309)) have achieved wide currency in 
American English as can be seen in Figure 2 and Figure 3. Figure 3 shows how Gandhi’s 
term satyagraha rose to greater prominence in American usage in the 1940s and again in 
the 1960s, but its English translation of soul force has been consistently outcompeted by 
satyagraha since 1940. Hence, to some degree, what Jane Addams (1931) wrote about 
nonviolence early in the last century still seems to apply: “This modern manifestation has 
as yet no term which exactly defines it. Tolstoy’s non-resistance is a very inadequate 
name for overcoming evil with good, and Gandhi’s soul-force is slow to come into 
English usage” (p.440). Similarly, Meyer (2012) has argued, “Though the term 
‘nonviolence’ has long seemed negative to many, rehabilitating the phrase by reviving 
the more militant concept of ‘revolutionary nonviolence’ is also a process whose time has 
come.” 
 In the Spanish corpus, “pacifista” is more commonly used than “pacifism,” but 
“no violencia” appears more frequently than “no violenta.” Figure 2 below shows how 
cognate terms and related strategic traditions compare in popular usage in the corpus of 
American English from 1900 to 2000. As we see in Figure 3 below, unlike in English, in 
Spanish, the older term “resistencia pacifica” (for the English “passive resistance”) never 
gained currency in the 1800s or anytime thereafter (through the n-gram records in 2000). 
This may be because unlike English-speaking nations, Anabaptist immigrants did not 
come to Spain or Latin America. In fact, Lynd and Lynd (1995) write, “There is good  
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Figure 2. N-Gram Search of Nonviolent Terms in American English Corpus, 1900-2000, 
With Smoothing of 3  
 
 
Figure 3. N-Gram Search of Satyagraha in American English Corpus, 1900-2000, With 
Smoothing of 3  
  
 
ground for arguing that the Christian pacifism of the radical Reformation was kept alive 
from about 1650 to 1850 primarily by North Americans” (pp.xi-xii).  
 The term “huelga de brazos caídos” appears in the n-gram viewer in the Spanish 
corpus in about 1917. It was used to describe strikes from 1931 to 1961 in Chile, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Colombia (Parkman 1990, pp.14-15), and in Costa Rica 
(various Costa Rican high school textbooks use the term to describe the 1947 general 
strike). Of course, the n-gram Spanish lexicon is dominated by books published in Spain 
and the wealthier Latin American nations. Despite the significance of so many Central  
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Figure 4. N-Gram Search of Nonviolent Terms in Spanish Corpus, 1800-2000, With 
Smoothing of 3. 
 
 
American civil strikes of historical importance using this term, the poverty of Central 
America (and the anemic publishing industries in this region) surely contributes to the 
low frequency of “huelga de brazos caídos” in the lexicon. This term is translated 
variously as a “peaceful demonstration of protest,” “passive strike,” and strike with 
“fallen arms”/ “arms down” (Parkman 1990, p.15), “strike with arms at your sides” 
(Lakey 2012b), or simply “work stoppage” (Becker 2003, p.7). The term implies a 
“conscious choice of nonviolent action,” and the Spanish anarcho-syndicalist, Diego 
Abad de Santillán used it in a discussion of general strikes, contrasting techniques of 
“brazos caídos” with sabotage and fighting (Parkman 1990, p.15). In El Salvador in 1944, 
a “huelga de brazos caídos” played a key role in the successful movement overthrowing 
General Maximiliano Hernandez Martínez. This strike “of fallen arms” named “a 
movement not of the streets, but of hiding” (Ackerman and Duvall 2000, p.256). As a 
strategic label it meant “Nobody do anything. Simply stay [indoors] without going into 
the streets, so that there would not be possibilities for repression” (p.256). In Costa Rica 
in 1947, a “huelga de brazos caídos” (Arms Down Strike) played a key role in setting the 
stage for the 1948 Civil War.  
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 But again, for us the key problem is that while these types of strikes are common 
in Latin America, they are “rarely interpreted as examples of nonviolent movements” 
(Becker 2003, p.1). Rather, it seems they are interpreted as conventional action, and so 
observers and readers of the histories of these movements fail to generalize from these 
movements to nonviolent theory. That is, observers fail to make the link that says, yes, 
nonviolent methods alone will work, here is why, and here is an example. The failure to 
make this link to nonviolent theory can result in over generalizing from mass street 
actions and failing to recognize that even “limited violence” (e.g., rioting, stone throwing, 
pockets of armed resistance, etc.) in a campaign can reduce mobilization levels and 
increase state repression in ways that sometimes shut movements down, or reduce their 
participants to the small numbers who want to employ revolutionary violence. 
 Additional Spanish n-gram searches revealed that the term “huelga de brazos 
caídos” was used at roughly the same frequency as “no violencia” and “desobediencia 
civil” from 1917 to 1950. At that point “no violencia” became much more commonly 
used, and after about 1965, “desobediencia civil” also began to outcompete “brazos 
caídos” in the lexicon. By 1985, “desobediencia civil” had caught up to “no violencia” in 
frequency of usage, as they tied in usage with each appearing in roughly .00005% of 
Spanish books (a tiny percentage to be sure). Meanwhile, in 1985, “huelga de brazos 
caídos,” although it remained in usage at a steady but infrequent rate between about 1935 
to 2000, appeared about four times less frequently than these terms, showing up in less 
than .000012% of Spanish books. Moreover, as can be seen in the figure above, in the 
year 2000, “pacifista” appears about twice as often in the Spanish lexicon as “no 
violencia” and “desobediencia civil” respectively.  
23 
 Although Wink (1992) claimed that the word “nonviolence” was first used in 
1923, Google n-gram searches make it possible to check that assertion. An n-gram search 
revealed that an article by Alice Stone Blackwell,appearing in a Unitarian newspaper 
published in Boston, The Christian Register (November 2, 1922 issue), responded to a 
Rev. Vrooman who had argued that “the Moplah rebellion of 1921 (a violent insurrection 
by a small section of the Moslems) was ‘incited by Gandhi’s teachings.’” In defense of 
Gandhi, Blackwell (1922) wrote, “Every one who has made any study of Gandhi’s 
teachings knows that he has always preached against violence, even carrying his 
advocacy of love and nonviolence to a degree that most Westerners would regard as 
impracticable” (p.1052). In March of 1922, an article in The New Republic wrote of “the 
principle of nonviolence,” and “the nonviolence principle” as Gandhi’s “central 
principle”(p.125). But a search of Gandhi’s Collected Works revealed that Gandhi’s 
earliest use of the word “non-violence” came far earlier. In a letter he wrote in South 
Africa in March of 1914, Gandhi mentioned“the way of non-violence” (Gandhi 1999 
V14, p.114), and in February of 1915, he wrote of “non-violence” as one of the “five 
rules of life” (p.355).  
 In South Africa, Gandhi sponsored a contest to give nonviolence a name. The 
winner was “Satyagraha.” Gandhi expressed dissatisfaction with the older term of 
“passive resistance” and claimed to have abandoned it (Gandhi 1928, pp.109-110), but in 
actuality he continued to use it on occasion. Gandhi also adopted and then came to view 
Thoreau’s phrase “civil disobedience” as similarly incomplete (V67, p.400). Gandhi saw 
“passive resistance” as akin to what theoriststoday name “pragmatic nonviolence” and 
which he often termed “nonviolence as anexpedient”or merely a strategy, a concept he 
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also described as a “weapon of the weak” (V19, p.350). Thus,he writes of adherents of 
“passive resistance” such as suffragettes who have “admitted of violence” (V19, p.350). 
For Gandhi, the difference between satyagraha and passive resistance is that the former 
develops the “full logical and spiritual extent” of the “doctrine” of nonviolence, as 
marked by three distinguishing features: satyagraha is a “weapon of the strong,” rejects 
violence in all circumstances, and always “insists upon truth” (V19, p.350).    
 As Martin Luther King, Jr. led the Montgomery bus boycott, he spoke of “non-
violence,” but New York Times articles during this period summarized the methods of the 
Montgomery movement in a variety of terms, which mostly referenced older 
terminology: “the doctrine of passive resistance,” (Philips 1956, February 27, p.17), 
“passive resistance and love” (Rowland 1956, March 26, p.27), “nonviolence” and 
“passive resistance” (NYT 1956, December 10, p.20), “a policy of passive resistance” 
and “a Gandhi-like passive resistance” (Philips 1956, March 4, p.E6), “a policy of quiet 
resistance,” a “passive-resistance campaign,” and King is said to have “translated 
Gandhi’s philosophy of passive resistance into Alabaman terms” (Barrett 1957, March 3, 
p.196).In any case, the recent shift towards the term nonviolence is likely to result in far 
less conceptual confusion that “passive resistance,” as even here we see the Times adding 
the unhelpful synonym of “quiet resistance” for the Gandhian template. 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 The peace studies literature encompasses competing definitions of peace: peace-
as-the-absence-of-war and peace-as-social-justice (Kimball 1984). These are commonly 
termed negative peace and positive peace, respectively. The opinion surveys and world 
peace indexes considered in the present study tend to operationalize the former, but the 
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latter is vitally important as well. In fact, the present study focuses on attitudes towards 
nonviolence and violence partly because if the greatest root social problem, that of 
inequality or “structural violence,” is to be more fully and more adequately addressed, 
societies and social movements around the world need methods of pushing for social 
reform. Nonviolent action is one such method. 
 Zizek (2008) argues that to understanddirect physical violence requires looking 
away from the spectacles and tragedies of behavioral violence, to their structural causes 
(pp.1-2). We are well-advised to follow this analytical approach to war as well as 
homicides.Between 2001 and June of 2012, more black youth have been killed by guns in 
Chicago (about 5,000) than U.S. soldiers have been killed in the war in Afghanistan 
(about 2,000) (Daily Mail 2012). Around the world in 2005, about 17,400 people were 
killed by direct political violence, but 18,124 Americans were murdered during the same 
period (Pinker 2011, p.51). In a typical year, world-wide “homicides outnumber war-
related deaths, even if one includes the indirect deaths from hunger and disease” (p.221). 
But what murders and war have in common is a shared link to ideologies of violence, 
ideological and attitudinal orientations which legitimize violence, that mythologize 
violence as “redemptive” (Wink 1992) while discrediting nonviolent methods. 
 Turning away from the spectacles of violence, we confront still more carnage and 
tragedy. The UN reports that polluted water kills more people each year than all forms of 
violence including wars (Corcoran et al. 2010). The yearly death toll of polluted water 
includes over 1.8 children under five years-old, and what is more, “over half of the 
world’s hospital beds are occupied with people suffering from illnesses linked with 
contaminated water” (p.5). Similarly, summarizing a variety of domestic and 
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international studies (e.g., Kohler and Alcock 1976), Gilligan (1999) makes clear the far 
greater consequences of structural violence:  
The 14 million to 18 million deaths a year estimated to be caused by structural 
violence were about two orders of magnitude (that is, a hundred times) greater 
than the death toll from behavioral violence (including war and murder) in that 
same year…very few actual or hypothetical forms of even the most deadly 
military violence could begin to compare with structural violence…every single 
year at least two to three times as many people die from poverty throughout the 
world as were killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews. (p.232) 
 
Yet, in 1998, the UN estimated that only $40 billion a year would be enough to provide 
universal access to health care, adequate food, clean water, and basic education. At the 
time, the cost was “less than 4 percent of the combined wealth of the 225 richest 
individuals in the world…” or less than the amount Europeans spent on cigarettes every 
year (Gillian 1999, p.232).  
 Through its grounding in public opinion data, the present study can contribute to 
ongoing discourses which invoke strategic, ideological, and moral legitimations for 
violent/ nonviolent means. While President Obama’s 2009 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance 
speech articulated a version of political realism and explicitly questioned the adequacy of 
Gandhian and Kingian principled nonviolence, new life has been injected into the debates 
over the strategic efficacy of nonviolent action, with the recent publication of two crucial 
studies – both reveal that nonviolent campaigns have been more effective than violent 
campaigns. 
 First, Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) analyzed 323 conflicts between nonstate 
and state actors, covering the years 1900 to 2006, finding that nonviolent resistance 
campaigns achieved “success” 53 percent of the time, while violent campaigns were only 
successful 26 percent of the time. In other words, in more than 320 “…struggles for self-
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determination against colonialism, military occupation, and colonial rule over the past 
century…nonviolent struggles were more than twice as likely to succeed as armed 
struggles” (Zunes 2011, p.396). This finding is all the more significant since the vast 
majority of wars in recent decades have been intrastate wars (Cortright 2008, p.5).  
 We also now know that nonviolent campaigns are more effective at mobilizing 
participants: “the average nonviolent campaign has over 200,000 members—about 
150,000 more active participants than the average violent campaign” (Chenoweth and 
Stephan (2011, pp.32-33). Of the 25 largest campaigns (including violent and nonviolent 
resistance or revolution) in the world between 1900 and 2006, 20 have been nonviolent, 
and of these 70% succeeded as opposed to the 40% success rate of large violent 
campaigns (p.33).  
 Second, the NGO Freedom House conducted a study (Karatnycky and Ackerman 
2005), published as “How Freedom is Won: From Civic Struggle to Durable 
Democracy," which analyzed 67 nations where authoritarian governments have fallen 
since 1972. The study concluded that in 50 of the 67 political transitions, or over 70 
percent of countries where dictatorships fell, nonviolent civic resistance (including tactics 
such as mass protests, boycotts, strikes, and civil disobedience) played a major role in 
eroding support for authoritarian rulers, making regime change possible, and democracy 
viable. And, “transitions generated by nonviolent civic coalitions lead to far better results 
for freedom than top-down transitions initiated by elites” (Karatnycky and Ackerman 
2005). 
 In addition, revisionist historians have recently helped us see that nonviolence 
played pivotal roles in revolutions which our history textbooks have long led us to 
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believe were primarily violent revolutions. There is substantial evidence that the 
American, French, and Russian Revolutions all had key nonviolent stages (Kurlansky 
2006, Schell 2003). The case of for American Revolution as primarily a nonviolent 
revolution is hardly a stretch. John Adams, our second President, acknowledged precisely 
this point on several occasions (Kurlansky 2006, p.79; Schell 2003, pp.159-163). 
 Yet for all this mounting evidence on the efficacy of nonviolence, Gallup World 
Poll data reveals that many nations have near majorities of respondents claiming that 
“peaceful means alone” will “not work” for oppressed groups. Does this reflect a lack of 
historical awareness, a failure to “learn” from history, or are ideologies of violence so 
hegemonic in some cultures that the historical track record of nonviolence is almost 
imperceptible? How do structural levels of militarism/ peace and historical experiences 
interact with this hegemony? At the individual level, are the standpoints, value 
orientations, or personality types of some people so predisposed to violent ideology, that 
learning about nonviolent efficacy becomes difficult? This study can further our 
understanding of this theoretical puzzle. 
Chapter Summaries 
 Below I sketch out an overview of the dissertation. I begin by unpacking the 
theoretical context including long-standing debates over the meaningfulness of public 
opinion data, and the degree to which the public is influenced by “elite cues” or “policy 
cues.” Related to this, is the question of whether cultures “learn” from historical 
experiences, such as war or successful nonviolent revolutions. 
 Next, the methodological tools and challenges are highlighted. The project is 
framed around a multi-method approach employing three data collection and analysis 
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efforts. First, an original survey was designed incorporating replications of existing 
questions on violent/ nonviolent attitudes as well as indices of the Social Dominance 
Orientation and Schwartz Values. The survey was conducted in the U.S. and Costa Rica 
because they were theorized as “maximally different” cases based on their starkly 
divergent structural and historical relationships to peace and militarism. Second, to help 
identify correlates of nonviolent attitudes, a large cross-national data set was constructed 
merging several dozen hypothesized indicators and covariates of structural and attitudinal 
peace drawn from numerous nation-level data sets. Third, a strategic cross-national 
sample of state-approved high school history textbooks was collected with the aim of 
uncovering how nonviolent revolutions and significant nonviolent campaigns around the 
world are preserved in collective memory. This effort is the first of its kind. While peace 
studies scholars have written widely on cases of successful nonviolent campaigns, what 
has been neglected is an analysis of how these are remembered around the world in state-
approved history textbooks. Here I seek to help answer why confidence in nonviolence is 
not more robust globally, given the growing number of successful nonviolent revolutions, 
nonviolent campaigns, and democratic regimes. 
 Chapter II begins with a secondary data analysis of individual-level predictors of 
nonviolent attitudes. Surprisingly, published analyses of most large cross-national 
datasets have largely neglected to undertake any fine-grained analysis of individual-level 
correlates of nonviolent/ violent attitudes.Because the Gallup World Poll has not released 
individual-level data, this chapter helps to fill the gap in that level of analysis. The 
regression analysis of three attitudinal indicators offer a glimpse into the 
multidimensionality of nonviolence, as we observe inconsistencies across nonviolent 
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attitudinal domains. Here, I detail some of the consistent findings from the research 
literature on the social distribution of pro- and antiwar attitudes. 
 Next,I present the Costa Rican and UO survey samples, the respondent 
demographics, and the results sorted by national means. A core battery of 33 questions, 
developed for this project, tests respondent adherence to ideologies of violence and 
nonviolence on a spectrum theorized by Megoran (2008), but previously untested in poll 
data: militarism, political realism, just war, and nonviolence.  
 The next sub-chapter introduces the Schwartz Values and Social Dominance 
Orientation (SDO) indicators, which have been found to predict prowar attitudes in prior 
studies. Building on Stempel (2006), one additional expected correlate of hawkish 
attitudes is introduced, a sports fan variable, though this was only tested in the U.S. 
sample. A multiple regression analysis of the full slate of demographic and other 
individual-level variables is conducted, identifying the strongest predictors of peaceful 
scores on the nonviolence index and the militarism index. Here it is shown that among all 
variables nationality is the strongest predictor of peaceful attitudes, with Costa Ricans 
significantly more peaceful than U.S. respondents. Interestingly, the “UO football fan” 
variable offers some support for Stempel’s (2006) findings as well as Chomsky’s (1992b) 
theories of a spectator sport-tribalism link.  
 In the context of debates over the coherence and meaningfulness of public 
opinion, I test whether a generalized sense of ideals mediated through memories of heroic 
figures might shape opinions on violence/ nonviolence. In both the U.S. and Costa Rican 
surveys, open-ended questions solicited the names of national heroes especially admired 
and respected.  
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 Next, I explore the results from a few questions which were only asked of U.S. 
respondents. These include respondent views of the role of the U.S. military in 
international affairs, as well as respondent views of the wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and 
Afghanistan. In addition, a set of questions probing views of aerial bombing and un-
manned drone attacks were designed to test tensions and contradictions in how people 
think about the means and ends (i.e., strategic and ethical norms and goals) of deadly 
military technology.  
 Chapter III identifies correlates of war and peace, drawing primarily from the 
civil war literature (the dominant mode of warfare in the last several decades), as well as 
Pinker’s (2011) meta-analysis of trends in human conflict, but utilizes these variables to 
test the Gallup World Poll data of opinions on nonviolent efficacy and military attacks on 
civilians. Here, I test whether such factors as democracy, industrialization, predominant 
religious tradition, education levels, and mountainous regions are associated with more 
peaceful attitudes at the nation-level. The next sub-chapter hones in on the correlates of 
peaceful attitudes by gender, and the distribution of the cross-national gender gap in 
attitudes. 
 Chapter IV develops a critique of the Global Peace Index (GPI), and briefly 
compares the World Peace Index and the GPI. The heart of the chapter identifies 
contradictions between the GPI’s rankings and indicators of peaceful attitudes from the 
Gallup World Poll. One of the most important findings reported here is that some nations, 
including Costa Rica, reach a very high national mean threshold on both the principled 
and pragmatic nonviolent indicators of the Gallup World Poll. A regression analysis of 
the GPI and the Gallup attitude data is conducted to determine which better predicts the 
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peaceful behavior of nations whenthe outcome variables consist of the signing and 
ratification of important peace and disarmament treaties. The sub-chapter concludes by 
graphically showing how, for all of its weaknesses, the GPI does help to show how the 
U.S. is exceptionally militarized and lacking in peace compared to other established 
democracies, core nations, and post-industrial nations. 
  I continue to attempt to identify “cultures of peace” by drawing from a variety of 
cross-national poll data. Patterns are identified and tentative conclusions made based on 
the relatively smaller sample sizes, as compared to the Gallup World Poll data. Again, the 
multidimensionality of nonviolent attitudes is suggested as we observe that any one 
attitudinal indicator can offer an inadequate basis from which to generalize. The task of 
appropriately weighting objective and subjective indicators introduces significant 
challenges. A simple visual strategy is adopted through the presentation of a series of 
scatterplot graphs, helping us to identify possible candidates for “cultures of peace.” 
 Chapter V turns to qualitative methods, analyzing history textbook portrayals of 
significant nonviolent campaigns around the world. Case studies of major successful 
nonviolent events in the following nations are analyzed: Germany, Norway, Ghana, 
Chile, El Salvador, and Guatemala. I next explore salient events in Costa Rica’s history 
including nonviolent revolutions and the demilitarization process.Finally, I consider a 
crucial nonviolent history case in the U.S., the explicit nonviolent strategy of Branch 
Rickey and Jackie Robinson as they re-integrated Major League baseball. The final sub-
chapter offers a theoretical account of the textbook omissions of nonviolent campaigns 
documented throughout Chapter V.  
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THEORETICAL CONTEXT 
Defining Categories: Orientations Towards Violence and Nonviolence 
 
 Following Megoran (2008), it was hypothesized that many people adhere to one 
of four ideological orientations regarding violence and nonviolence: militarism, political 
realism, just war, and nonviolence (including both pragmatic and principled 
nonviolence). The survey instrument probed respondent adherence to these orientations 
which relate heavily to the international political arena, but can overlap with intra-state 
and perhaps even inter-personal levels of conflict and conflict resolution. Brief 
definitions of each ideological orientation follow below. 
 Militarism. Militarism is “a set of beliefs and values that stress the use of force 
and domination as appropriate means to solve problems and gain political power” 
(Kraska and Kappeler, 1997, p.1); Militarism valorizes warfare as “ethically positive in 
some circumstances” (Megoran, 2008, p.477), and thus it can be said to represent “the 
glorification of war as a good in itself, rather than simply as a means to an end” (p.476). 
In addition, militarism involves an “expressive or redemptive theory of violence, both 
religious and secular” (p.476). Militarism can potentially exist apart from states, a view 
accommodated by Michael Mann’s definition of militarism: “the persistent use of 
organized military violence in the pursuit of social goals” (cited in Lipschutz, 2000, 
p.175). Finally, Ceadel (1987) defines militarism as embodying a view that international 
relations are:  
...wholly anarchical, from which it follows that there is no possibility of any trust 
or cooperation between states, let alone reform of the international system, and 
that frequent wars are unavoidable: it welcomes this fact, since it regards war both 
as a positive good (rather than a lesser evil) and as essential for human 
development…war is not caused by moral or political mistakes but by man’s 
laudable drive to achieve his full potential. (p.21) 
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These definitions suggest that militarism takes the attitudes of political realism to a 
militant extreme, grounding belligerence in a Nietzschean/ Machiavellian ethical 
worldview that celebrates the quest for power if not domination as well. What these 
definitions overlook however, is the way in which contemporaryadherents of militarism 
almost always cloak their ideology in more mainstream and palatable frames such as 
humanitarian interventions or the general need to further “peace and security.” A great 
deal of survey research suggests that people are often reluctant to admit forms of 
prejudice. In a similar way, given that militarism represents an extreme attitude, social 
desirability bias was expected to come into play. For this reason, the survey sought to 
nuance this attitudinal orientation by operationalizing militarism with subtle questions. 
For example, re-working a question taken from Droba (1931), I asked whether 
respondents agreed with the following statement: “Military discipline develops good 
character in youth.”  
 Political Realism/ Realpolitiks. Political realism, or realpolitiks, portrays war as 
inevitable and “outside the sphere of ethical reflection” (Megoran, 2008, p.477). It has 
also been called the “reason of state” doctrine, associated with Machiavellian, amoral 
versions of political realism in which “moral factors are deemed to be irrelevant” while 
expediency, military necessity, national interests of survival and victory are central 
(Secrest, Brunk, and Tamashiro 1991, p.201). Adherents of this orientation focus on 
power to the detriment of a broader political analysis. As the historian of war Azar Gat 
(2006) contends, “Critics have long suggested that realists tend to confuse ends and 
means…their overall correct focusing on the quest for power has made them lose sight of 
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the underlying reality that explains why the struggle for power takes place” (p.668).It is a 
state-centric theory of international relations which posits that states naturally are driven 
to survive, to act rationally and protect their own interests (Megoran, 2008). The 
“anarchic” structure of international competition/ conflict of interests limits co-operation 
between states, and makes it “futile and unenforceable” to try and “prevent or regulate 
[war] through legal mechanisms” (Megoran, 2008, p.477). In the present survey, one of 
the items probing this orientation was the following statement: “There is nothing wrong 
with nations seizing territory or natural resources through war because nations should 
protect their own economic security and interests.” 
 One attempt to operationalize and test the prevalence of the realpolitiks 
orientation among U.S. elite groups revealed marked variation in agreement with the 
phrase “The only thing that matters in war is victory,” with 58.6% of military officers, 
42.3% of Congress members, 27.2% of journalists, 21.8% of diplomats, and 5.6% of 
Catholic Clergy agreeing with this item (Secrest, Brunk, and Tamashiro 1991). Obvious 
weaknesses in this study involved the use of just one item to test political realism, and 
similarly, the failure to test both positive and negative phrasings of the orientation to 
guard against agreement bias.  
 Just War. In the Just War tradition, war is “morally wrong but ethically 
permissible in some circumstances as the ‘lesser evil’” and as a last resort (Megoran, 
2008, pp.478-479). Just causes include self-defense against an unlawful attack, the 
righting of wrong, re-establishing peace, but not seizing territory or natural resources 
(Megoran, 2008). A second set of criteria involves “just conduct in war.” This includes a 
ban on the targeting of civilians (an issue operationalized in the Gallup World Poll), but 
36 
indirect, “collateral damage” is not a crime. Just War criteria also dictate a principle of 
proportional force: force used against military personnel must be proportional to the aim 
(Megoran, 2008). 
 One criterion is that a war can be just only if it has a“reasonable chance of 
success.” Here, we see again how principled and pragmatic concerns often necessarily 
overlap. Although the Just War tradition is clearly an ethically grounded tradition, within 
its core criteria is this pragmatic question: can “we”“win”? I contend that answering this 
question implicitly requires historical knowledge. That is, knowledge of history and the 
interpretation of that history provides some of the ethical content of the Just War theory 
itself. Only when we consider the previous history of counter-insurgency warfare can we 
even begin to adjudicate whether such a war in Iraq or Afghanistan can be “won” by a 
foreign occupying force.    
 Because the Just War theory technically only sanctions legitimate governments 
fighting external aggression, we can also speak of a “Just Revolution” theory which 
emerged as a coherent theological-ethical argument in places like Nicaragua and South 
Africa, as Christian theologians and movements focused on oppression within nation-
states (Lamola 1986, p.244). However, the Christian theological debate on violence 
shifted more broadly from Just War to Just Revolution following World War II, as wars 
of decolonization and North-South/ Cold War conflicts took center stage (p.244).  
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The “Tragedy of Culture” and Collective Memory/ Forgetting: The Relationship 
Between Ideology and History 
 Several of the open-ended survey questions in the present study probed for 
historical knowledge as well as knowledge of contemporary/ recent history. The poor 
performance of respondents on these questions is not terribly surprising. It illustrates 
what Georg Simmel called the “tragedy of culture” – the reality that individuals cannot 
keep pace with the developments of objective culture (history, art, science, philosophy, 
etc.). We cannot absorb all the insights, discoveries, and resources that humanity has 
created and stumbled upon. Thus, “We are doomed to increasingly less understanding of 
the world we have created” (Ritzer 2003, p.35). As discussed elsewhere, social scientists 
who specialize in nonviolence, understand better than ever before that nonviolent 
campaigns have been more effective in achieving their goals than violent campaigns. 
This discovery has been well absorbed by some academic specialists whose subfields 
overlap with nonviolence (e.g., social movements, revolutions, etc.), but not it seems by 
the political or military elites. Perhaps their ideologies of violence are well-shielded from 
new social scientific insights.  
 Hence, ideology can be termed a “strategy of containment,” as it is “a way of 
achieving coherence by shutting out the truth about History” (Dowling 1984, p.77). 
Because of our ideological blinders, we cannot perceive or take in new historical 
information. Thus, Jameson proposes a nuance beyond the Marxist view of ideology as a 
form of false consciousness, or a “premature closing-off of thought to the truth about 
History” (p.77). For Jameson, ideology assumes a Freudian and collective form, it is the 
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“political unconscious,” it is “the repression of those underlying contradictions that have 
their source in History and Necessity” (pp.77-78).  
 Similarly, Ollman (2003) contends that Marx “never criticizes ideology as a 
simple lie or claims that what it asserts is completely false. Instead, ideology is generally 
described as overly narrow, partial, out of focus, and/ or one-sided, all of which are 
attributable to faulty or...inappropriate abstractions of extension, level of generality, and 
vantage point...” (p.103). In the same way, Eddy (2012) showed how activists 
ideologically pre-committed to forms of limited violence co-opted Gandhi and King by 
over-generalizing from a few quotes or biographical incidents taken out of context. The 
core nonviolent messages of Gandhi and King, the overarching “spirit” of their life work 
was repressed through emphasizing the “letter” of a few carefully selected quotes (Eddy 
2012). Likewise, the historian Steve Paulsson has said, “Ideologues always try to 
shoehorn history into their own categories and read into the past things that serve their 
own particular purposes” (Geller 2013, p.A7). 
 For Jameson, apart from underlying social-historical contradictions, what is the 
object of collective denial and repression? It is primarily the potential for revolution that 
is repressed. What we so often see visible in history is “not-revolution,” and in these 
instances, all we have left to interpret is “the way the ideological structure registers the 
strain of having kept it repressed” (p.117).  
 In the present study, our data leads us to grapple with the possibility that the 
success of nonviolent methods and their successful utilization by the oppressed, must be 
repressed and forgotten for the health of the state – or more properly, the perceived 
interests of the elites. In addition, we must repress the insight that inequality is murder in 
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slow motion – that too is an “essential mystification” which allows the system to 
reproduce itself and repress revolution. It is likely that inequality is a contributing 
motivation in virtually all revolutions. The more that inequality can be legitimated 
through ideology and what Althusser called the “ideological state apparatuses” (Dowling 
1984, p.129), the less visible inequality becomes, and the more that revolutionary 
potential is successfully repressed.    
 The example of Just War doctrine. “Just war” ideology is one of the four 
ideological views tested in the survey of the present study. Even in traditional just war 
doctrine, not a full-fledged nonviolent doctrine but one which recognizes constraints on 
the use of force, we find overlap between principled and pragmatic norms as well as the 
need for historical knowledge. For instance, in the “jus ad bellum” (right to go to war) 
principles of just war doctrine, we read that one criteria for a just war is, in so many 
words, can you win? That is, if there is a high probability of success this criteria is met, 
but if the war is likely to be futile, or successful only through disproportionate measures, 
then the criteria is not met. This criteria can not be evaluated without knowledge of 
historical cases and an ability to categorize wars, categorize constraining features of 
particular wars, compare, and generalize without over-generalizing. 
 This criteria takes on supreme contemporary relevance when we hear military 
experts remark that counter-insurgency wars (such as the recent war in Iraq and the 
ongoing war in Afghanistan) have almost never been successful, or never been successful 
when some fill-in-the-blank dynamic was present – such as a neighboring nation giving 
sanctuary or supplies to insurgents (e.g., Gentile 2012), or a local populace who fears 
foreign occupation and supports the guerrillas, or an opponent who kills civilians by 
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bombing from the air and thereby fails to win the “hearts and minds” of the local 
populace (Eland 2009). Moreover, even military experts have conceded that the U.S. 
Military’s mechanisms of retaining institutional memory have failed, as David Donovon 
noted after attending a U.S. Army conference in 2006:   
The US military had had decades of counter-insurgency experience in Asia, Latin 
America and even Europe. Where were the lessons-learned manuals? Had no-one 
read them? Was no-one paying attention?... The conference was interesting but 
disheartening. It became clear from the presentations that many of the lessons 
learned in Vietnam and elsewhere had been lost from our institutional memory. 
General Petraeus acknowledged that and said the loss had occurred in the 1990s 
as the US military had been rebalanced after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Those old lessons were still having to be relearned in Iraq and Afghanistan, he 
said. That was hard for former advisors to hear. Lessons and principles that 
should have been learned, partly from our own sweat and blood, had been 
discarded like a pair of old shoes. (Donovon 2012) 
 
And so, without robust collective memory, the significant potential constraints of the 
pragmatic “can we win?” criteria recedes into inconsequentiality, and decisions to go to 
war plow ahead with ignorance, hubris, and ideology uninformed by praxis (i.e., a cycle 
of action, reflection, and strategic action informed by experience). Just war adherents risk 
embracing the ideology of the “political unconscious” (Jameson), built upon the 
repression of historical lessons. And so, the praxis of just war doctrine becomes severely 
compromised wherever collective forgetting occurs.  
 This means we must recognize how history, that is, historical learning, 
experiential capital, or praxis (a cycle of action, reflection, and strategically modified 
action) provides content for ethical reflection. The links between history, collective 
memory, ideology, principled and pragmatic concerns are closely intertwined. 
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Public Opinion Data: Confronting the “Ideological Stew” 
 Research on the U.S. public has suggested that the opinions, attitudes, beliefs, 
values, and ideologies of individuals do not fit into neat and consistent categories 
(Williams 1970, Rokeach 1973, Davis and Robinson 1996, DiMaggio et al. 1996). 
Instead, we are quickly confronted with an “ideological stew” (Snow 2004, p.397) when 
we probe attitudes using surveys (Converse 1964) as well as more qualitative methods 
(Blee 2002). Citizens often appear to be “muddle-headed” or “empty-headed” (Saris and 
Sniderman 2004, pp.337-38).This problem may be particularly salient in survey data. 
Because there is little at stake in surveys, survey-takers may feel little incentive for 
thinking deeply about questions and answers.    
 Among scholars questioning the meaningfulness of public opinion, a good deal of 
these critical views indict the faulty intelligence of the average person. Loewen (2007) 
sees rampant “nonthinking” in public opinion polls even among educated respondents 
(pp.350-351). Fromm (1965) argues that in modern society, the average person is likely 
to be either an “automaton” conformist or an authoritarian personality who both engage 
in forms of “pseudo thinking,” taking what they have read in the newspaper or what their 
parent believed as their “own” political opinions or thoughts (pp.215-217). They lack 
critical thinking skills and their opinions are not “a natural combination of experience, 
desire, and knowledge” (p.216). In addition, it can be argued that people tend not to think 
or care about what they can not change (Alinsky 1971), and that in many contexts of 
political alienation, it can be construed as a “rational choice” to remain uninformed about 
politics and to avoid forming stable ideologies or attitudes (Downs 1957).   
42 
 Habermas (1987) has argued that in the modern context, ideological legitimation 
of the status quo becomes less important, as “fragmented consciousness” replaces “false 
consciousness” (p.355). In this way, fragmentation becomes the “functional equivalent” 
of ideology (Delanty 1997, p.45).  
 Tying together several theoretical strains here, Adorno (1998a) writes that public 
opinion is “not due simply to people’s inadequate knowledge but rather is imposed upon 
them by the overall structure of society and hence by relations of domination” (p.121). In 
the modern period, relations of domination serve to inculcate and reinforce 
fragmentation. We catch glimpses of this process as we turn to the ultra-specialized labor 
of modern bureaucratic and capitalist systems (concerns of Weber and Marx), the anti-
union agenda of neoliberal globalization, or the recent decline of U.S. newspapers and the 
rise of hundreds of cable television channels broadcasting to niche audiences. We also 
see fragmentation in theoretical accounts which hold that modern people lack the 
inclination, resources, and time for remaining politically informed and do not make it a 
priority (Simon 1945, Lippmann 1997 [1922]).   
 We observe fragmentation in survey research which turns up responses expressing 
idiosyncratic ignorance, although some of these perhaps reveal mischievous sensibilities 
(whether due to indifference/ boredom with survey instruments, or to cover ignorance). 
Converse (1964) even describes respondents who he claims, were genuinely confused by 
the question of whether they were born in the United States (i.e., some said no, and gave 
the state of their birth), though one wonders if he is overlooking the potential 
formischievous respondents pulling the researcher’s leg. I would contend that survey 
researchers often underestimate the potential for mischievous respondents to engage in 
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monkey-wrenching the survey instrument. In the present study, several respondents 
offered bizarre answers to the open-ended question which asked them to name the two 
nations in which Gandhi personally led nonviolent movements. It is impossible to know 
if some answers expressed genuine ignorance or comical/ mischievous sensibilities, such 
as the UO respondents who answered this question by typing: “Mahatma and India,” 
“Burma,” “India and Saudi Arabia,” “India and Germany,” “India and Italy,” “India and 
Egypt,” “Ghana,” “India and Ghana,” “India and China” (which received two votes,), 
“Britain and French” [sic], “India and France” (which received two votes), “India and 
Nepal” (which received two votes), “India and Tibet” (which received four votes), and 
“India and the USA” (which received three votes, not including an additional respondent 
who ventured “Asia and North America”). However, perhaps answers from respondents 
motivated purely by a comical sensibility would have provided even more outlandish 
answers. It may also be that mischievous answers are more likely to appear in the more 
anonymous online survey mode, as opposed to face-to-face surveys.   
 Interacting with the political realm are values, perhaps deep-seated values, and 
some have asserted that values are more stable than political opinions on particular 
issues. But in the realm of religion, we also observe a lack of coherent beliefs as well as 
the inability to articulate grounds or justifications for belief, have been found in 
qualitative studies of the religious worldviews held by individuals (e.g., Smith and 
Denton 2005). Recent surveys have also shown that despite the high percentage of 
Americans claiming affiliation with Biblical religions, Biblical illiteracy is the norm in 
the U.S., and born-again Christians are only slightly more informed about the Bible than 
the general population (Prothero 2007).  Such patterns in religious belief seem likely to 
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be paralleled in the sphere of violent-nonviolent attitudes, since both spheres of belief 
rely on myths/ tradition/ narratives and heroes/ saints as well as elements of 
interpretation, perceived evidence, faith, and the prioritizing of values. Of course, 
attitudes of principled nonviolence in particular, have long found their source and 
justification in religious traditions, whether Hindu, Jain, Buddhist, Islamic, or Judeo-
Christian.   
 In any case, the potential for a respondent to be confused or to lack knowledge of 
the meaning of particular words should not be underestimated. As several recent viral 
YouTube videos document, a great many U.S. high school students will readily sign 
petitions to “end women’s suffrage.” Because suffrage sounds like “suffering,” students 
probably assume the meaning is similar or do not want to appear uninformed, so they 
bluff and hide their ignorance of the meaning of suffrage. Through pre-testing the present 
survey sought to avoid language that might be unfamiliar to the current generation of 
college students. For example, the language of “ends” and “means” was found to be 
unfamiliar to some students in pre-testing, so the words “goals” and “methods” were 
added (e.g., Q9_27, Q9_32).   
 There are also strong empirical grounds for doubting not just the stability of 
attitudes, but also the notion that attitudes impact behavior – and of course, behavior is an 
outcome that is arguably, more socially significant than mere attitudes. A generation ago, 
Wicker (1969) reviewed an extensive number of studies and concluded there is “little 
evidence to support the postulated existence of stable, underlying attitudes within the 
individual which influence both his verbal expressions and his actions” (p.75).But for all 
of the critiques against ascribing too much importance to survey data, there are still 
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instances in which it brings unique insights (difficult to obtain though other methods), 
perhaps especially where differences in the same survey responses are found over time or 
between cultures. 
 Although there are empirical grounds for asserting that opinions and belief 
systems are unstable at the individual respondent level, the point here is not simply that 
the mass of humanity is gullible, ignorant, or unreflective by the standards of systematic 
philosophers. Rather, these findings underline the complex nexus of factors shaping 
public opinions and their relative malleability.  Moreover, some studies suggest that the 
public is in fact, relatively rational, consistent, and stable in their opinions at the 
individual level, but the place where stability and slow change in response to “learning” 
are really found is at the national level (Page and Shapiro 1992, Page and Bouton 2006). 
If this research stream is correct, a cross-national investigation is well suited to 
investigating attitudinal patterns. 
 Attitude formation and elite cues/ policy cues. While many researchers appeal to 
an “elite cues” theory (Paul and Brown 2001, Lupia 1994, Mondak 1993, Carmines and 
Kiklinski 1990, Brady and Sniderman 1985), media influence (Joslyn 2003), or an “elite 
leadership hypothesis” (Kelley and Braithwaite 1990, Stack 2004, Zimring and Hawkins 
1986), there has been an unfortunate failure to specify distinctions between elite rhetoric 
and formally adopted social policies – or what I will term “policy cues”– which may be 
initiated or approved by elites (e.g., presidents, Supreme Court judges, etc.) or come 
about through national referendums. Of course, even in the latter case, elites but also 
moral entrepreneurs and activists lead mobilization efforts to get out the vote and shape 
the terms of debate. For instance, U.S. elites have heavily influenced the “knowledge-
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shaping process” on environmental policy debates through aggressive multi-pronged 
mobilization efforts (Bonds 2011).  
 In many cases, the mass public may forget how policies originally came to be 
adopted. Elites are also likely to stop referencing social policies that have gained broad 
public acceptance and as the political leverage provided by debates over the policy 
recede. Hence, the operative authority becomes legislation or court rulings which are the 
law of the land (policy cues), rather than elite cues per se. In addition, policy cues 
represent policies of the “winners” in a political contest. Hence they represent a stage in 
the opinion formation process in which norms are likely to become increasingly reified 
and naturalized, as opposed to the relatively contentious stage represented by “elite cues.” 
Although it is rarely noted in the literature, the “elite cues” model closely follows the 
Marxist dictum that the ruling ideas in any culture are the ideas of the ruling class (Marx 
and Engels [1848] 1955, p.30). 
 One of the most provocative cases of a positive “elite cue” influence which then 
turned into a “policy cue” concerns the abolition of the death penalty in West Germany in 
1948. The policy was adopted by political elites even though 74% of the public favored 
the death penalty at the time. By 1980, only 22% of West Germans supported the death 
penalty (Zimring and Hawkins 1986). Although West German society underwent 
numerous changes during this period, and the study failed to control for socioeconomic 
predictors of death penalty support (Stack 2004), it seems highly plausible that some of 
the attitude change might be attributed to elite cues and policy cues. Controlling for 20 
covariates, Kelley and Braithwaite (1990) found that residents of abolitionist states were 
only 5% less likely to support the death penalty. However, I would contend there is a 
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fundamental incongruency in comparing Australian state policies with West German 
national policies. State policies in a federalist system might carry much less weight as an 
authoritative cue than national policies. Much of the public is likely to be more aware of 
national policies, or even confused by hearing media reports about executions in other 
states.   
 Moreover, Stack (2004) analyzed data from 17 nations and found that, controlling 
for covariates, the number of years that the death penalty has been abolished in a nation 
significantly lowered the likelihood that a resident would support the death penalty: “each 
year of abolition lowered the odds of an individual’s death penalty support by 46%” 
(p.87). Hence, this offers general support for the elite leadership hypothesis, as well as 
my contention that there may be a distinctly powerful role for “policy cues,” as formally 
adopted social policies are more likely to become normatively reified and naturalized 
over time, assuming the role of solidified tradition.     
 The many well-documented studies of a “rally-‘round-the-flag” effect – though 
often greater for whites than nonwhites in the U.S. – suggests that policy cues are 
powerful shapers of public opinion (Baker and Oneal 2001, Burris 2008, Lindsay and 
Smith 2003). But Baker and Oneal’s (2001) analysis of U.S. militarized interstate 
disputes between 1933 and 1992 suggests that rallies are more likely when they are 
associated with assertive White House public relations “spin” and bipartisan support for 
the president’s policies (p.661). Loewen (2007) cites a strong policy cue effect during the 
Vietnam War:  
In late spring 1966, just before the United States began bombing Hanoi and 
Haiphong in North Vietnam, Americans split 50-50 as to whether we [sic] should 
bomb these targets. After the bombing began, 85 percent favored the bombing 
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while only 15 percent opposed. The sudden shift was the result, not the cause, of 
the government’s decision to bomb. (p.350) 
 
With evidence such as this, we are led to the conclusion that much of the U.S. public has 
highly malleable opinions on issues of war. 
Alternative Configurations of U.S. Attitudes Towards War 
 The present study tests Megoran’s (2008) theory that many people adhere to one 
of four ideological orientations regarding violence and nonviolence: militarism, political 
realism, just war, and nonviolence. Page and Bouton (2006) argue from U.S. survey data 
that “most” Americans are political “realists” who support high levels of military 
spending, U.S. maintenance of long-term bases around the world, and who prefer the 
U.S. to remain the world’s sole military superpower (p.100). Yet, they also observe that 
most Americans also prefer diplomatic methods and war only as a “last resort” (p.100) – 
in keeping with just war ideology. Moreover, they conclude that there “is no evidence 
that majorities of Americans are pacifist” (p.100).  
 Beyond Megoran’s (2008) ideological scheme, alternative accounts of U.S. 
attitudes are worth considering, especially given the substantial debate about the lack of 
meaningful opinions in much of the mass population. Feaver and Gelpi (2004) argue 
from poll data that the U.S. population is divided up into the following four orientations 
towards war: 30 to 35% are “solid hawks” (“relatively indifferent to stakes, costs, or 
prospects of victory”), 10 to 30% are “solid doves,” up to 20% are “casualty-phobic” 
(and the casualties specified here involve U.S. soldiers, rather than foreign civilians or 
soldiers, but see below), and 15 to 40% are “defeat-phobic” (p.186). Similarly, Joseph 
(2007) asserts that 15-20% of the population are “solid doves” (p.3), 25 to 30% are “solid 
hawks” (p.6), and the rest of the U.S. public (50 to 60%) comprises a large middle group 
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“that is pulled in different directions by war sensitivities [i.e., casualties and costs/ blood 
and treasure] and war support” (p.5, p.256). These configurations may well help to clarify 
the attitudinal landscape, but the present study suggests, at least among college students, 
that categorical ideological leanings as theorized by Megoran (2008) can be detected in 
survey data. Thus, we miss out on distinctive attitudinal orientation and predispositions if 
we group most of the public into an undifferentiated mass who are only pulled by 
pragmatic concerns of defeat and casualties.  
 Future research could seek to clarify how pragmatic concerns of defeat and 
casualties overlap with ideological leanings, but it may well be that these areas of overlap 
will vary on a case by case basis, and certainly over time. Indeed, below we consider how 
people think about means and ends, strategies and ideologies, are likely to interpenetrate 
one another and to change in changing contexts of conflict. For instance, we consider 
how respondents view drone attacks, a new technology which presents new challenges to 
moral and ideological views of war. While Joseph (2007) discusses the “casualty-phobic” 
(and the casualties specified here involve U.S. soldiers, rather than foreign civilians or 
soldiers) as one source of antiwar sentiments, some recent research suggests that 
sensitivities to casualties can not be generalized to the opponent. Cochran (2008) shows 
that: “concern for enemy civilians is only salient when U.S. casualties are low and when 
the U.S. is winning. When the U.S. casualties are high or when U.S. prospects for victory 
are dubious concern for civilian casualties takes a back seat.” Thus, we have reasons to 
doubt Joseph’s (2007) sweeping claim that the U.S. is becoming more peaceful. 
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Why is Confidence in Nonviolence Not Higher Around the World? 
 The short answer to this question is that ideology trumps all – it trumps history 
(Althusser 1971), it shapes historical perceptions and writings (White 1973), and it is one 
factor among others slowing the reception and integration of new social science research 
findings. Galtung (1995) proposes that the reason there is “not much more nonviolent 
struggle in the world” is due to the “uninformed” belief that “it does not work” (p.81). 
Indeed, a generation ago, Malcolm X argued,  
Christian? Gandhian? I don’t go for anything that’s non-violent and turn-the-
other-cheekish. I don’t see how any revolution – I’ve never heard of a nonviolent 
revolution or a revolution that was brought about by turning the other cheek, and 
so I believe that it is a crime for anyone to teach a person who is being brutalized 
to continue to accept that brutality without doing something to defend himself. If 
this is what the Christian-Gandhian philosophy teaches, then it is criminal – a 
criminal philosophy. (pp.8-9) 
 
But in early 2011, after the “Arab Spring”/ nonviolent revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, 
the Gallup World Poll question on whether “peaceful means alone” “will work,” if asked 
in early 2011 it would seem almost a proxy question for – have you been following the 
news lately? Tunisia and Egypt were largely nonviolent revolutions, though some limited 
violence (e.g., stone throwing) occurred among protesters. However, at the time of 
writing in early 2013, those who follow the news of the “Arab Winter” could just as 
easily conclude nonviolence does “not work.” Already by late 2011, the Egyptian 
revolution devolved into the messy business of a fledgling democracy and repression by 
the Egyptian military. Meanwhile, the string of revolutions sparked by those in Tunisia 
and Egypt, including those in Syria and Libya, while initially nonviolent often morphed 
into violent revolutions. The role of nonviolence, limited violence, and violence in many 
of these revolutions is up for interpretation. 
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 Hence, on the one hand, the pragmatic nonviolence question in the Gallup World 
Poll probes for an opinion, but in another sense it really probes for interpretations of 
history, as well as the historical knowledge and political and intellectual capital of 
respondents. Scholars now know that over the last century or so nonviolent campaigns 
(i.e., not always “peaceful means alone,” but many mass movements have been largely 
nonviolent) have been more effective than violent campaigns in achieving movement 
goals (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008), and in fostering nascent democracies (Karatnycky 
and Ackerman 2005).  
 Research is also mounting on the relative ineffectiveness of violent methods. In a 
cross-national analysis from WWI to the 1990 Gulf War, Robert Pape’s (1996) book 
Bombing to Win?: Air Power and Coercion in War showed that the attempt by states to 
coerce civilians through bombing has always failed, but military elites have tended to 
deny and obscure the reality of this outcome. Downs and Cochran (2008) pursue the 
same question, but more broadly analyzing civilian victimization in data from 1816 to 
2004, in a paper titled “Targeting Civilians to Win?” They conclude that in interstate 
wars, the strategy of civilian victimization has not yielded significantly better war 
outcomes, and the strategy has performed especially poorly in recent years. On the 
question of terrorism by nonstate actors, in a study of 28 of the most significant terrorist 
groups, Abrahms (2006) concludes that in over 90% of cases terrorism has not worked in 
achieving political goals. Yet, militant groups around the world have failed to learn this, 
as violent ideologies continue to reproduce faithful adherents. 
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Structural Factors Versus Psychocultural Orientations 
 
 In accounting for political violence, researchers and theorists have posited 
“structural” and “psychocultural” hypotheses, or syntheses of them (Ross 1986). The 
psychocultural approach can also be termed a “cultural heritage theory” (Oliverio and 
Lauderdale 2005, p.199). Bellah (2006) exemplifies this approach as he contends that 
Weber’s Protestant Ethic is even more general than Weber theorized. Bellah endorses a 
study by David Vogel finding that among the world’s top 21 richest nations, cultures with 
a Protestant religious heritage tend to have more vibrant economies, democracies, and 
environmental policies (pp.334-335). We might interject here a negative critique of this 
heritage, as some historians of Europe have seen in Protestantism an “elective affinity” 
(to borrow another concept from Weber) with militarism (see Ehrenreich 2006, pp.122-
124), and U.S. history furnishes a poster child for that dark side. In any case, Bellah 
suggests there are “cultural codes embedded in national cultures and that those cultural 
codes, however transformed over time, are ultimately derived from religious beliefs” 
(p.335). Here, Bellah turns to Clifford Geertz’s article “Religion As a Cultural System” in 
which Geertz (1973) wrote, “Culture patterns [are] sources of information that – like 
genes – provide a blueprint or template....” (p.92). For Geertz, religious symbols, beliefs, 
and practices “function to synthesize a people’s ethos,” making it appear “intellectually 
reasonable” and “emotionally convincing” (pp.89-90). An ethos is defined by Geertz as 
“the tone, character, and quality of their life, its moral and aesthetic style and mood – and 
their world view” (p.89). We should note here that Vogel, Bellah, and Ronald Inglehart 
all agree that religious heritage matters, shaping cultures even after a nation moves in 
secular or pluralistic directions (Bellah 2006, p.336).    
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 It is not an accident that Pennsylvania, with its pacifist Quaker heritage, in 1794 
was the first state to abolish capital punishment for all crimes except murder (Hood and 
Hoyle 2008, p.11). But the Quaker influence in Pennsylvania diminished over time, and 
by 1965 nine U.S. states, 24 of the 29 Mexican states, and 11 nations had abolished the 
death penalty for all crimes, but not Pennsylvania (p.12). 
 As another example, state violence in Latin America is often assumed to be linked 
to a “shared cultural legacy, a part of the cultural heritage of the region,” but 
counterarguments deserve consideration, such as those that arise through analysis of 
Costa Rican exceptionalism (Oliverio and Lauderdale 2005, pp.198-199). Several South 
and Central American nations, including Costa Rica (which abolished the death penalty 
for all crimes in 1877, only the third nation in the world to do so, after Venezuela (1863) 
and San Marino (1865)), have been world leaders in abolishing the death penalty, and 
recently the Vatican and the Catholic Church in Argentina have strongly affirmed 
abolitionism (Hood and Hoyle 2008, p.12, p.62, p.65).   
 As for synthesizing structural and psychocultural theories, an excellent example is 
research which finds that in many cases the adoption of social policies (i.e., changes to 
“structure”) fosters changes in public opinion. Stacks (2004) analyzed public opinion 
support for the death penalty in 17 nations and found that residents of retentionist nations 
are far more likely to support the death penalty, while each year of abolition reduced 
support for the death penalty in abolitionist nations. In sum, it seems that “people on the 
whole support what has been the norm in their culture” (Hood and Hoyle 2008, p.376). 
What is more, it seems that young people who grow up in a nation that has never had a 
death penalty are far less supportive of the death penalty than older cohorts (p.377). 
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Studies of northern Europe suggest that even when the homicide rate fluctuates, “once 
abolitionist policies become embedded in the national consciousness sentiments in favour 
of the death penalty gradually diminish in the general population” (p.377).  
 Hence, the theoretical argument is that public policies tend to produce consensus 
around social norms. The present study supports this line of argument, as Costa Rica’s 
policy of demilitarization, first solidified in 1948 and 1949, continues to be reaffirmed by 
the public. My 2010 survey of Costa Rican college students found that 91% supported 
Costa Rica’s demilitarization.  
 Analyzing attitudes toward the death penalty in Costa Rica is a good test of this 
structural theory, since Costa Rica abolished the death penalty over 130 years ago. In 
1994, only 36% of Costa Ricans favored a return to the death penalty. But just two years 
later in 1996, 58% of Costa Ricans said they would support a return of the death penalty 
(Sandoval-García 2004, p.157). The explanation? The shift may stem from dynamics 
unfolding when the racial composition of a nation/ local context begins to change, or is 
perceived as changing through the immigration of racialized “others.” Studies of the 
death penalty in the U.S. have found that racially prejudiced whites, especially those 
living in a context of black residential proximity, are more supportive of the death 
penalty (Soss, Langbein, and Metelko 2003). In recent decades in Costa Rica, Nicaraguan 
immigrants have served as the primary threatening racialized “other” (Sandoval-García 
2004). Accounts of crime by major media outlets in Costa Rica have exaggerated the 
impact of Nicaraguan immigrants on crime rates (pp.154-156) as well as their role in the 
“exhaustion of public services, especially health, education, and housing” (p.176). These 
twin discourses of the domestic impact of the racialized “other” have been called upon to 
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stabilize and maintain social inequality, and more specifically, to legitimate neoliberal 
policies (p.171), while shifting the nation’s emotional climate towards authoritarianism, 
as indicated by attitude shifts on the death penalty (p.157) and increased investment in 
prison terms while stripping prisoners of benefits (p.156).     
 However, as depicted in Table 1, the survey revealed robust support for a ban on 
the death penalty, as only about 30% of Costa Rican respondents expressed support for 
the death penalty in Q9.31. Hence, it may be that Costa Rican culture is beginning to 
recover its balance after years of otherizing Nicaraguans. Moreover, compared to U.S. 
respondents, about 25% more Costa Ricans said they “strongly disagree” with the use of 
the death penalty, and about 18% more Costa Ricans disagreed overall, as the total 
percentage of Costa Ricans disagreeing was 70.88% versus the 52.79% of U.S. 
respondents.  
 Sharply rising crime rates in the Dominican Republic (where the death penalty 
was abolished for “ordinary crimes” (typically, this category only excludes crimes against 
Table 1. T-Test on Death Penalty Views in the Cross-National Samples 
 
Item (question 
letter label/ 
Q9 label) and 
primary 
category 
Costa Rica (n = 312) USA (n = 403)  
x̄ - x̄² 
 
 
Dis-
agree 
Strong
-ly 
Dis-
agree 
Total 
(Dis-
agree) 
x̄ 
 
Dis-
agree 
Strong-
ly Dis-
agree 
Total 
(Dis-
agree) 
x̄² 
 
SD SD 
(ee/31) Death 
penalty (myth 
of redemptive 
violence): “The 
death penalty 
should be used 
for a person 
convicted of 
murder.” 
 
35.28 
 
35.60 
 
70.88 
2.93 
 
 
41.88 
 
10.91 
 
52.79 
2.51  
.42**** 
1.02 .85 
Notes: Two-tailed t-test of significance: **** = p < .0001; “Total (Disagree)” = “Strongly Disagree” + 
“Disagree”; On means: 4 is more peaceful; 1 is more violent; 2.5 is the midpoint; Values of answers: 
Strongly Agree (1); Agree (2); Disagree (3); Strongly Disagree (4); Questions in which “Disagree” or 
“Strongly Disagree” are the peaceful answers (percentages). These questions are positively worded for 
agreement by adherents of violent orientations. 
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the state in wartime) in 1924 and for all crimes in 1966), Peru (where the death penalty 
was abolished for ordinary crimes in 1979), and South Africa (where the death penalty 
was abolished for all crimes in 1997), saw increases in public support for the death 
penalty. Nevertheless, increases in crime in Brazil (where the death penalty was 
abolished for ordinary crimes in 1979) has not produced shifts in public opinion on the 
death penalty (Hood and Hoyle 2008, pp.374-375). All of this suggests that factors like 
racial prejudice and demographic shifts, trust in the government’s ability to fight crime, 
and the role of leaders who rally support for “tougher” punishments (as occurred in Peru), 
may be key mediating variables in explaining variation in support for the death penalty.     
Theoretical Models of Opinion Formation 
 Table 2 sets forth in condensed form a variety of theoretical models of public 
opinion formation which are salient for understanding political, foreign policy, and hawk-
dove attitudes.   
Table 2. Models of the Reproduction of Political/ Foreign Policy/ Hawk-Dove Attitudes 
 
Model Representative Theorists/ Researchers and Explanations 
Uninformed public Public opinion is theorized as (and some survey data supports)  unstable, malleable, and uninformed -  such 
that opinions are not meaningful and not coherent (Bartels 2008, Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, Converse 
1964). Similarly, Bourdieu (1972) contends, “Public opinion does not exist,” and Adorno (1998) writes of an 
“opinion delusion society.”  
Rational public Some theorists and researchers argue that the American public holds opinions which are rational, sensible, real 
(not meaningless or random “nonattitudes”), stable, coherent, and predictable (Page and Shapiro 1992, Page 
and Bouton 2006). Moreover, these opinions “make sense in terms of underlying values and available 
information” (Page and Shapiro 1992, p.xi). Similarly, Americans are said to hold “coherent, purposive belief 
systems” that shape policy preferences (Page and Bouton 2006, p.28). 
Values-based, 
Personality type 
models  
These models overlap with the above model. Research on the Schwartz Values and Social Dominance 
Orientation suggest respondents reliably select values that reflect their personalities.  
Ideological 
continuum models 
Megoran (2008) theorizes that many people adhere to one of four ideological orientations regarding violence 
and nonviolence: militarism, political realism, just war, and nonviolence. The classic left-right ideological 
continuum often correlates with particular political views, and ideological leanings can overlap with 
personality types (Haidt 2012a, 2012b). However, two cautions are in order. First, even where the left-right 
dimension reaches the .5 level of correlation with political issues (a somewhat common occurrence in Europe, 
but rare in the U.S.), the left-right variable explains less than 25% of the variance (Feldman 2003, p.478). 
Second, Converse (1964) found in open-ended questions that 37% of Americans could supply no meaningful 
definitions for the liberal-conservative distinction (p.220), 46% demonstrated “uncertainty and guesswork,” 
leaving only 17% with a firm grasp of this basic ideological distinction (p.223). Further, Converse determined 
that only 3.5% of the voting public were ideologues, 12% were near-ideologues, but 45% conceptualized 
political issues mainly according to group interests and this plurality of voters also depended on elite cues in 
forming opinions (p.218, p.216). Somewhat similar results were found by Dalton (2002).  
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Model Representative Theorists/ Researchers and Explanations 
Hawks, Doves, and 
Others I 
Feaver and Gelpi (2004) contend the U.S. population is divided up into the following four orientations 
towards war: 30 to 35% are “solid hawks,” 10 to 30% are “solid doves,” up to 20% are “casualty-phobic,” and 
15 to 40% are “defeat-phobic” (p.186). The latter two categories corroborate earlier research which found that 
much U.S. opposition to the Vietnam War was not moral or even sympathetic to war protesters, but rather 
related only to  pragmatic concerns such as the failure to win the war or “traditional isolationism” (Schuman 
1972).  
 
Hawks, Doves, and 
Others II 
Joseph (2007) asserts that 15-20% of the U.S. population are “solid doves” (p.3), 25 to 30% are “solid hawks” 
(p.6), and the rest (50 to 60%) comprise a malleable middle (p.5, p.256). 
 
Elite cues/ policy 
cues 
Although it is rarely noted in the literature, the “elite cues” model (Paul and Brown 2001, Lupia 1994, 
Mondak 1993, Carmines and Kiklinski 1990, Brady and Sniderman 1985) closely follows the false 
consciousness model/ Marx and Engel’s contention that the ruling ideas in any culture are the ideas of the 
ruling class. Of course, that notion is not a conspiracy theory – it is much too deep and systematic to be 
merely that. The idea here is that because people do not have enough information to hold meaningful 
opinions, they make the rational choice to save time and effort (to become informed) and take their cues from 
elites, or from official state policies. Elite messages are mediated and filtered by the news media which shape 
opinions (Russett and Graham 1989) and can even reshape personal memory of one’s earlier attitudes towards 
a war (Joslyn 2003). 
Ideological 
hegemony/ 
Education as 
indoctrination 
Althusser (1971) identifies institutions, including the educational system, media, family, and religious 
organizations which function as “ideological state apparatuses.” These institutions socialize citizens into 
ideological hegemony. Similar to the above model, this perspective proposes that education (organized and 
directed by elites) tends to reproduce patriotism and to avoid controversial, critical views of national history 
(e.g., Loewen 2007). A variation of this model notes that textbooks are produced by profit-seeking 
corporations who want to avoid controversy in order to facilitate bookselling to large markets. The result is 
that we fail to reproduce critical attitudes towards war, even towards the Vietnam War (Griffen and Marciano 
1979, Leahey 2010).  
 
Socio-structural 
models 
When peaceful structures exist within a nation (e.g., very low amounts of military spending), we are likely to 
find dovish attitudes. Alternatively, where large military-industrial complexes exist and compulsory military 
service, attitudes are likely to be more hawkish. There is overlap here with the “policy cues” model, but the 
socio-structural models include broader institutional and socialization factors shaping a given culture.   
 
Allegiance and 
socialization model 
Where deep forms of stratification and divisions of labor exist, those who are rewarded by the system are 
likely to express more social solidarity and conformity to official government policies, while those who do not 
benefit as greatly will be more critical. Loewen (2007) names the reproduction of “allegiance” and 
socialization through schooling during the Vietnam War era, explaining how U.S. citizens with more 
schooling (i.e., those with more wealth and who benefitted more from the U.S. economic and political system) 
were more hawkish and patriotic, while those with less education were more dovish and critical on the 
Vietnam War. Thus, ideas and attitudes are theorized as having a “material basis” in the Marxist sense – it is 
the material interests behind the ideas that generate ideology (Gregg 2003, p.166).  
 
Standpoint model/ 
Group-based 
differences model 
(Burris 2008) 
Here scholars seek to track demographic variables including gender, education levels, race, ethnicity, income, 
and class. This model overlaps with the above model. Political and foreign policy attitudes vary with 
differences in social position (Halle 1966) and socialized role-taking positions. Different life experiences and 
social conditioning produce different attitude tendencies (Cortright 2008, p.256). Thus, females socialized into 
nurturing, mothering roles have tended to be more dovish as well as opponents of policies furthering 
dominance and inequality. It is well-established that women in the U.S. tend to be more liberal (ANES 2004). 
And, many racial and ethnic minorities in the U.S. have been more dovish (Burris 2008). 
 
Nations/ Individuals 
“Learn”: Historical/ 
Experiential/ 
Generational 
Cohorts Models 
Several scholars (e.g., Inglehart 1977, 1990; Mannheim 1952; Moors 2007) have advanced a socialization by 
generations model, such that generational replacement produces gradual changes in political culture. In 
addition, Pinker (2011) joins Kant in proposing a theory of “peace-through-learning”: antiwar sentiments 
seem to grow through painful experiences of war (p.293). Similarly, Page and Bouton (2006) suggest that the 
U.S. public has “learned” lessons from history including war history, but some are ambiguous lessons and still 
contested (p.13). They argue: “most Americans, ordinary citizens as well as politicians and experts, have 
learned certain lessons from our national experiences...History has helped inform Americans’ views of what 
sort of foreign policy the United States should pursue...U.S. public opinion...should be taken seriously: it is 
rooted in historical experience” (p.16). At a higher level of abstraction, Bauman (1973) theorizes “culture as 
praxis,” meaning that culture fundamentally involves the ongoing assimilation of new events and ideas (the 
polar opposite of Althusser’s model below), but he suggests there is a right-wing praxis and a left-wing praxis 
(pp.155-156). Tilly (2001) depicts transformative historical events that alter relations through cognitive, 
relational, and environmental mechanisms. In the present study of attitudes towards violence/ nonviolence, the 
following experiences are likely to be salient: a) experiences of successful nonviolent movements; b) 
experiences of war trauma/ suffering on the territory of the nation; c) experiences of military defeat/ victory in 
war. The present study is focused on factors shaping the accumulation of “peace-specific capital” (Hegre and 
Sambanis 2006, p.515).  
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Model  Representative Theorists/ Researchers and Explanations 
Nations/ Individuals 
Do Not “Learn”: 
“Ideology has no 
history” (Althusser 
1971, p.160) 
Ideology tends to trump new historical developments. Our ideological blinders prevent us from perceiving or 
taking seriously historical counter-evidence. We cannot synthesize new historical information because 
ideological leanings lead us to perceive and interpret history through the biased lenses of tradition and other 
preconceived assumptions. And the problem is much deeper because the corollary of Althusser’s claim is that 
history is infused with ideology. Historians emplot their writings on the basis of ideology (White 1973). Even 
history (i.e., written records) that could potentially challenge or revise our worldviews is already subjectively 
tamed, slanted, and cherry-picked to support our pre-existing, pre-assumed ideological worldviews.  
 
Psychocultural 
models, Religious/ 
Symbolic 
orientations, “Social 
cosmologies” 
(Galtung 1981, 
1997), Cultural 
“ethos” (Geertz 
1973) 
“Civilizations” 
(Huntington 1996) 
There is some evidence from political poll data that unstable individual opinions co-exists with strong 
consistency at the collective/ cultural level (Page and Bouton 2006, p.22). Hofstede (2001) and Inglehart at al. 
(e.g., Inglehart and Carbalio 1997, Norris and Inglehart 2004) have documented cross-national differences by 
nation, cultural region, level of development, and religious culture on several values dimensions. Similar to 
Althusser’s de-historicized ideology above, religion is a symbolic orientation that tends to produce reified 
conceptualizations which obscure, mask, and repress historical change and development (Berger 1967). But 
religion also grounds values and motivations in a uniquely powerful way, partly because reified 
conceptualizations/ cosmologies perceived as stemming from divine revelation are difficult to reform. Thus, 
Geertz (1973) defines religions as symbol-systems which clothe worldviews/ a group’s “ethos” with a “aura of 
factuality” and “establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations [that]...seem uniquely 
realistic” (p.90). Galtung (1997) argues that the world can presently be divided into seven spheres or regions, 
each headed by a hegemonic power: the U.S., the European Union, Japan, Moscow, Beijing, India, and Islam. 
Galtung proposes that the culture of a civilization involves “motivational syndromes” or “social cosmologies” 
that “program nations in general and national leaders in particular for patterns of international behavior” 
(pp.188-189). Civilizations are shaped by their sense of “chosenness, their myths, and their traumas” (p.188). 
Huntington’s (1996), by now, infamous “civilizations” hypothesis has been challenged by numerous scholars, 
including Fox (2004) who finds evidence that religion has a greater impact on civil wars than does 
civilization.  
Belligerent public/ 
Modern 
Bureaucratic 
“Callous Cruelty” 
(Collins 1974) 
The cultural-political hegemony of violent methods of conflict resolution is such that Wink (1992) describes 
the “myth of redemptive violence” as the world’s real religion, or dominant religion. In this view, much of the 
public is likely to assent to at least some ideologies of violence (e.g., just war, militarism, etc.). Theorists also 
propose that certain forms of social organization such as modern bureaucracies reproduce higher levels of 
“callous cruelty” (Collins 1974), and forms of otherizing discourse and moral legitimation can produce “moral 
disengagement” (Bandura 1990, 1996). 
Peaceable public/ 
Democratic peace 
Numerous theorists of nonviolence assert that the “general population” in most, perhaps all countries have no 
taste for direct involvement with violent resistance (e.g., Sharp 1973). This helps to explain why, compared 
with violent campaigns, nonviolent campaigns have been much more effective in mobilizing large numbers of 
participants (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). The prominent sociologist Randall Collins (2008) advances an 
argument from evolutionary sociobiology which contends that humans are genetically hard-wired for 
emotional sensitivity and cooperation with others, and this makes face to face killing very difficult (for a 
review of similar studies see Cortright 2008, pp.244-246). However, forms of social and cultural conditioning, 
and distancing from the act of killing, can produce aggressiveness and callousness towards killing as well as 
torture (Collins 1974). The theory of the democratic peace contends that citizens of democracies will tend to 
be more peaceful, but this is much debated (Cortright 2008, Pinker 2011, Ripsman 2007). 
The “power of 
nightmares” model 
This model suggests that the “politics of fear”/ “power of nightmares” (Curtis 2004) and the “paranoid style” 
of American politics (Hofstadter cited in Tonry 2008) should not be underestimated. A vivid scare-campaign 
of various nightmare scenarios from communism, to nuclear war, to terrorism can move the public decisively 
towards pro-war attitudes. Thus, the fear of another September 11th attack can motivate support for drone 
strikes on suspected terrorists abroad. 
 
The Nation as the Unit of Analysis 
 The methodological and theoretical logic of the present study follows the rich 
tradition of studies which have taken the nation as the unit of analysis. Among these are 
recent studies which theorize and analyze the “emotional climate” of nations (Basabe and 
Valencia 2007; Bar-Tal, Halperin, and de Rivera 2007; de Rivera and Páez 2007; de 
Rivera, Kurrien, and Olsen 2007; Fernández-Dols, Carrera, de Mendoza, and Oceja 
2007). Similarly, key strategies of survey research have aimed to assess public opinion 
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linkages to enduring traditional values that vary cross-culturally (e.g., Inglehart and 
Baker 2000, Inglehart and Carablio 1997, Inglehart 1997, Inglehart 1990, Inglehart 
1977). Among other findings, the theoretical fruitfulness of cross-national studies of 
values and attitudes is suggested by Halman’s (1995) analysis of longitudinal data (the 
European Values Survey) on civic and personal moral attitudes (including two measures 
of violent/ nonviolent attitudes: the justifiability of political assassinations as well as 
killing in self-defense), which concluded that cross-national differences were more 
significant than within-country differences across education and age groups. 
 In explaining cross-national variations, attempts to categorize nations, whether by 
world-systems position (e.g., core, semi-periphery, and periphery nations), levels of 
development (with the aid of the U.N. Development Index), predominant religious 
tradition, or other cultural markers can provide useful theoretical leverage. Huntington’s 
(1996), by now, infamous “civilizations” hypothesis has been challenged by numerous 
scholars, including Fox (2004) who finds evidence that religion has a greater impact on 
civil wars than does civilization. But admittedly, there are significant areas of overlap 
between religion and civilization. Although some scholars argue that the idea that the 
U.S. has been deeply shaped by Protestant Christianity is a “fantasy” (Fernandez-
Armesto 2003, p.194), others continue the Weberian or neo-Durkheimian/ communitarian 
strain in asserting that the predominant religious traditions in many cultures have shaped 
a variety of social and political values and structural outcomes (e.g., Bellah 2000, 
Inglehart and Baker 2000, Ingelhart and Carbalio 1997).   
 Following a neo-Durkheimian approach, a significant literature has emerged 
(from a seminal article by Bellah (1967)) which argues that cultures can be said to have 
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“civil religions,” or distinctive values, reproduced through collective rituals, holiday 
cycles, national saints, and historical narratives. In the same vein, “collective memory” 
scholarship has explored and theorized the cultural role of historical narratives and 
commemorative symbolism which mythologize national memories (Olick 2007, 
Schwartz and Schuman 2005, Olick 1999, Olick and Robbins 1998, Schwartz 1996, 
Zerubavel 1996). Here, building on strains of Durkheim, Weber, and Geertz, collective 
memory is understood as a “cultural system” (Schwartz 1996). Likewise, analyses have 
exhibited a Weberian approach in which cultures are said to exhibit an ethos or ethic 
(Weber 1922, Weber 1930), a “social cosmology” (Galtung 1997, Galtung 1981), 
“cultural codes” (Bellah 2000), an “emotional climate” (de Rivera 1992), or ideologies 
and religions that function as “cultural systems” akin to genetic programs (Geertz 1973).   
 The prominent scholar of nonviolence Johan Galtung (1997) argued that the 
world could be divided into seven spheres or regions, each headed by a hegemonic 
power: the U.S., the European Union, Japan, Moscow, Beijing, India, and Islam. Galtung 
proposed that the culture of a civilization involves “motivational syndromes” or 
“cosmologies” that “program nations in general and national leaders in particular for 
patterns of international behavior” (pp.188-189).  Civilizations are shaped by their sense 
of “chosenness, their myths, and their traumas” (p.188).  Here, we see Galtung theorizing 
on relatively stable attitudes and values, but he also points to the ongoing interaction of 
cultural myths and historical events (e.g., “traumas”).  Galtung explicitly claims this 
cultural interpretation over against competing interpretations of international behavior: 
“the Marxist assumption of economic primacy, the ‘realist’ assumption of military 
primacy, or the liberal assumption of the primacy of political institutions (e.g., as 
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conceptualized in the democracy-dictatorship dichotomy)” (p.188). However, the present 
project seeks to interrogate both structural and cultural factors. 
Interpersonal Violence: Do State Structures and Policies of Militarism or Nonviolence  
Spillover to the Interpersonal Level? 
 Research from psychology and sociology suggests that people often 
compartmentalize their lives and so inconsistencies and contradictions in attitudes/ values 
and behavior are commonplace (Hitlin and Piliavin 2004, p.381; Wicker 1969). And, 
contradictions and hypocrisies are readily rationalized as people let themselves off the 
hook and deny culpability through forms of “moral disengagement” (Bandura 1990, 
1996).  
 On the other hand, “spillover” between discrete sectors of life is also 
commonplace. For instance, workplace roles have been found to spillover and impact 
parenting practices in the home (Kohn 1969). And, slaughterhouse employment has been 
found to increase arrests for violent crimes and rape (a form of spillover into the 
surrounding community), suggesting a “Sinclair effect” unique to the violent workplace 
of the slaughterhouse (Fitzgerald, Kalof, and Dietz 2009). Several scholars have argued 
that violent and aggressive sports spillover into aggressive tendencies off the playing 
field. Others argue the opposite, casting violent sports in the role of a release valve. The 
sociologist George Ritzer (2003) has contended, “Perhaps if we allowed more violence in 
sport, if sport were less civilized, then we might have somewhat less violence elsewhere 
in the world” (p.131).In possible support of spillover, consider that U.S. Army soldiers 
engage in domestic violence in the home at “twice the rate found in similar groups of 
civilians” (Hedges 2003, p.20). Of course, it is certainly likely that those with 
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propensities for violence are more likely to join the military, but it is undeniable that the 
military also socializes its members into violence.  
 Research that engages broader cultural levels of analysis also suggests that 
spillover is an apt metaphor. Indeed, where cross-national differences – or similarities – 
in individual values, attitudes, and behaviors can be documented, theorists often turn to 
cultural and social-structural explanations (Schooler 1996). Thus, in a study of 6 
industrializing nations, Inkeles (1969) found that a set of similar psychological/ 
attitudinal characteristics called “individual modernity” was associated with exposure to 
industrial factory work, urbanization, education, and mass media. But Inkles (1983) also 
concluded that across the data results, national differences were associated with real and 
powerful contextual effects. As another example, Wright (1989) compared workers in 
Sweden and the U.S. and found that Swedish workers are much more anticapitalist 
ideologically, a pattern he links to institutionalized practices and culture, which we might 
term elite cues, policy cues, and organizational cues. Wright contends in his conclusion 
that “consciousness is shaped by politics, in so far as the strategies of parties, unions, and 
other political actors determine the ways in which people interpret those experiences and 
act on their interests” (p.13). There are three distinct ideological coalitions in Sweden 
(working class, middle class, and bourgeois), while the U.S. lacks a clear working-class 
coalition. Historical and structural differences account for these differences in class 
formation: Sweden’s large state employment sector helped a middle class coalition 
emerge, and Sweden’s strong labor movement and division between blue collar and white 
collar unionism helped solidify the working-class coalition (p.14).         
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 Given these diverse research findings, the question arises whether Costa Rica’s 
policies of demilitarization might spillover all the way down to the interpersonal level? 
Or, framing the issue in terms of the chicken or egg problem – which came first: were 
Costa Ricans already more peaceful on the interpersonal level and demilitarization 
trickled up, or did demilitarization policies trickle down and shape attitudes among the 
populace, or yet again, was there an “elective affinity,” in Weber’s phrase, between 
demilitarization policies and Costa Rican culture?  
Cross-Cultural Research: The Salience of Context 
 How might opinion polls which test peaceful and belligerent attitudes reflect 
cultural learning or praxis?  One possibility is that in the process of answering survey 
questions, respondents interject the contexts they are most familiar with, contexts they are 
emotionally or empathetically engaged with through personal familiarity with victims or 
episodes in their national life. For example, in the 2008 World Gallup poll, Japan ranks 
near the top in one indicator of peaceful attitudes, a question on whether military attacks 
on civilians are justifiable. Ninety percent of Japanese responded such attacks are “Never 
justified,” ranking them third in the world, and tied with Iraq. It seems plausible that most 
Japanese recalled the U.S. atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 
answering that question, instinctively taking the side of the victim.  Similarly, Iraqis may 
hear the question as a referendum on the U.S. military bombing of their country, though 
perhaps some Iraqis also hear in the question their memories of life under a dictator.   
METHODS 
 Unfortunately, individual-level data analysis of the Gallup World Poll is not 
possible at this time because the data is proprietary. However, nation-level analysis is 
64 
possible since the Gallup organization decided to release to the public nation-level means 
and topline data with two demographic breaks – gender and age cohorts.  
 Anderson (2004) has called for the measurement of “peace” through both 
objective and subjective indicators including survey data measuring nonviolent attitudes 
as they interface various micro and macro levels – self, interpersonal, local community, 
national, and international. At the level of power politics, some scholars write of a 
militarism-pacifism ideological continuum (Cohrs and Moschner 2002), but the key 
points along the spectrum of violent/ nonviolent beliefs might be better summarized as 
militarism, realism, just war, or nonviolence (Megoran 2008). Following Anderson’s 
(2004) call, the survey designed for this study tests respondent attitudes at multiple levels 
from interpersonal to international. The survey also tests whether attitudes correspond to 
Megoran’s (2008) ideological categories.   
Costa Rica and the U.S.: Maximally Different Cases? 
 Comparative-historical methodologists have identified the utility of analyzing 
“maximally different cases within given bounds” (Skocpol and Somers 1994, p.76). This 
names the analytical task of the “contrast-oriented comparative historian,” through the 
contrast of clearly distinct contexts the scholar seeks to identify how particular nations, 
for example, “constitute relatively irreducible wholes, each a complex and unique 
sociohistorical configuration in its own right” (p.75). Yet, the sharp contrasts between 
contexts, in the words of Clifford Geertz, “form a kind of commentary on one another’s 
character” (p.76).  
 The survey data (as well as key textbook analyses) in this project draws samples 
from two nations, Costa Rica and the U.S. Are these cases “maximally different” and 
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what boundaries do they share? Both nations are established democracies, shaped by 
histories of indigenous settlement, European settlement, and predominantly Christian 
religious culture. But even here there are notable differences. Costa Rica’s democracy is 
a multi-party democracy, structured by a party-list proportional representation system, a 
system that some analysis have argued is more democratic than the winner-take-all two-
party U.S. system. Costa Rica is strongly Catholic, while the U.S. has been dominated by 
Protestants. Historically, Costa Rica had periods of strong anti-clerical movements, but 
today, Catholic teachings are still taught in public schools.       
 Costa Rica has been deeply influenced by U.S. culture and it is commonly 
referred to as the most “pro-Yankee” Latin American nation. It is also frequently 
observed that school children in each nation believe they live in the greatest country on 
earth. Both nations have legacies of FDR or FDR-like New Deal policies, but in recent 
decades have embraced waves of neoliberal policymaking. Both nations have soldiers as 
national heroes and histories in which foreign armies were repelled through military force 
– but as we shall see these similarities are quite superficial, and the details of how each 
particular case are interpreted within the culture are quite complex.  
 On several factors involving militaristic dynamics these nations would seem to be 
maximally different: structurally (Costa Rica has no military, the U.S. spends more on its 
military than the next 29 nations combined; Costa Rica is a small, middle-income nation, 
the U.S. is a large, wealthy nation) and historically (Costa Rica has had no military for 
over 60 years, the U.S. has been engaged in warfare for much of that time). Costa Rica 
has been identified as among a handful of “good Samaritan” nations who have been 
consistent leaders in human rights initiatives at the U.N. (Brysk 2005). Even tourists to 
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Costa Rica are likely to observe that the people are proud of having no military, while 
U.S. culture routinely and ritualistically celebrates its soldiers as heroes. 
 But even U.S. militarism is the subject to starkly divergent interpretations. Joseph 
(2007) argues that Americans have become increasingly antiwar, forcing U.S. political 
and military leaders to invest enormous resources in stirring up support for imperial wars 
while limiting casualties. Likewise, Page and Bouton (2006) see several stark leader-
citizen disagreements, with the public being much more likely to support the U.N. (p.41), 
joining the International Criminal Court, signing the Landmines Convention (p.215), 
multilateralism in general, stopping arms sales abroad, and renouncing the first use of 
nuclear weapons (p.214, p.242, p.113). One issue where U.S. political leaders were more 
dovish than the public was on the assassination of suspected terrorist leaders (p.214). But 
in general, like Joseph, Page and Bouton see the public as much more casualty-phobic 
than elites (p.242). However, the “casualty-phobic” frame itself smacks of an elite 
orientation. We can assert the same thing by saying that the public seems to value the 
sanctity of life more than elites.  
 Conversely, the military analyst Andrew Bacevich (2005) has noted signs of a 
“new American militarism” pervading U.S. pop culture, policy makers, intellectuals and 
evangelical Christians. Similarly, Lucas and McCarthy (2005) see evidence that U.S. 
society increasingly embraces a “warrior ethics” and hegemonic “support the troops” 
discourse. The result has been the undermining of traditional just war doctrine. Because 
war becomes an occasion to unite the country, war justifies itself. The support of citizens 
for soldiers, regardless of the justice of the war, is understood to create social solidarity. 
It is a “new apolitical blank check” given to soldiers (p.182), and to the power elites who 
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engage in imperial and diversionary wars of choice. Of course, other political rationales, 
often feeble or manufactured (i.e., the “weapons of mass destruction” hysteria in the lead-
up to the Iraq War) are given by politicians, but they are almost irrelevant. Support the 
troops discourse has become a “trump card that can put an end to criticisms. Because 
troops are in Iraq, we betray them by arguing that the war plan is going terribly wrong” 
(p.185). Thus, “Our relationships to the warrior require our allegiance to war” (p.186). 
Further, as I have argued elsewhere, the deaths of soldiers requires us to “win” every war. 
To abandon a war before every objective is achieved (no matter how ill-conceived or 
costly) is to dishonor the lives already sacrificed. Hence, once a war begins, inertia sets in 
and justifies further war. In addition, Hedges (2010) makes clear the wider implications 
of such a state of affairs – it is the ideology, politics and economy of “permanent war” 
which has played a key role in the collapse of liberalism in the U.S. as well as in various 
nations in Europe and the Middle East (p.20).  
 And, one wonders what Joseph (2007) would say about a 2002 survey of the U.S. 
public which found strong majorities of the U.S. public affirmed that the U.S. should 
have long-term military bases abroad in the following nations: Cuba – Guantanamo Bay 
(70% affirmed the U.S. “should have bases”), Germany (69%), South Korea (67%), 
Philippines (66%), Saudi Arabia (65%), Japan (63%), Turkey (58%), Afghanistan (57%), 
and Pakistan (52%) (Page and Bouton 2006, p.117). A solid majority (68%) said that 
“maintaining superior military power worldwide” should be a primary goal of U.S. 
foreign policy (pp.40-41).    
 For all these differences, Costa Ricans and U.S. citizens may also share 
commonalities in their perceptions of war. Most of the U.S. population, like Costa Rican 
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youth today, is shielded from first-hand knowledge of war. Wars have not taken place on 
U.S. soil in the 20th or 21st century, and only “about one half of one percent of the U.S. 
population has been on active military duty at any given time during the past decade of 
sustained warfare” (Pew 2011, p.2). Meanwhile, some European and Asian nations still 
have mandatory military service. The degree to which Costa Ricans today feel 
geographically/ geopolitically vulnerable (given the small size of the country, the lack of 
a military, the ongoing low-intensity “drug war” and Nicaragua’s recent and historical 
belligerence) has not been quantified, but studies of U.S. citizens reveal they have often 
reported more “fear of war” and more “willingness to fight” than citizens of European 
nations (Listhaug 1986). But, U.S. opinions on war are very likely shaped by recent 
historical experiences. Thus, when U.S. citizens think of war they are likely to think of 
“limited war at a geographical distance” (p.76). And since “fear of war primarily relates 
to involvement abroad, with geographical distance to the potential battlefield, [this] 
weakens the psychological reality of potential participation among the citizens” (p.73). 
Likewise, Joseph (2007) contends that the U.S. context has been marked by a shift from 
“mobilized” war with a draft (e.g., WWII) to “conditional” war with a volunteer, 
professional army. The set of social relationships involved in each type are extremely 
divergent. This shift helps to account for widely varying perceptions in the pervasiveness 
of an ethos of militarism in the U.S., but it also relates to U.S. propensities to slip into 
moral disengagement regarding contemporary wars. The complexities involved in various 
accounts of U.S. militarism are illustrated by the following:   
...for many American [Christian] fundamentalists the question of the morality of 
wartime killing does not arise. Their enculturation toward militarism is as 
unquestioned as is that of...New Guinea headhunters. In both cases war is fought 
because of belief in some higher good, and not because of personal 
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aggressiveness or anger – in fact local conflict is studiously avoided...there is no 
moral opposition between peace and war because both are supported by a 
transcending belief in the need for order, discipline, and faith. (Foster and 
Rubinstein 1986, p.xiv) 
 
 Costa Rica is a middle-income nation and a small nation with a population just 
under 5 million people. Of the roughly 242 nations and dependent territories (many of 
which are partially independent in governance) in the world in 2012, 124 (or 51.2%) have 
a population of less than 5 million. This offers one measure of the significance of the 
Costa Rica case, over half of the world’s states are relatively small. 
 Costa Rica is one of only seven nations in the world to have undergone a process 
of demilitarization. It is the largest of twenty-seven nations with no military forces, and 
most of these cases are micro-nations (Cummings 2006). While several scholars have 
analyzed Costa Rica’s demilitarization process (Høivik and Aas 1981, Bird 1984, Aas 
1986, Cummings 2006), what remains unexplored is to what degree Costa Rica has 
cultivated coherent nonviolent ideologies among its citizens, and to what degree it has 
developed mechanisms of celebrating and memorializing the demilitarization process, 
and how that might serve to reproduce nonviolent attitudes in the mass public. I will 
explore the reproduction of violent/ nonviolent ideologies through survey data and 
collective memory processes through the analysis of national narratives embodied in 
state-approved secondary school history textbooks. 
Survey Methods 
 
Building on three questions from the World Gallup Poll, my surveys seek to probe 
the breadth and depth of nonviolent attitudes existing in Costa Rica and the U.S. While 
drawing from several already existing surveys of nonviolent attitudes, the present survey 
offers an improvement by explicitly building on the theoretical literature. Previous 
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nonviolent attitude tests have not clearly distinguished between pragmatic vs. principled 
nonviolent attitudes, nor have they clearly probed for the full spectrum of violent-
nonviolent attitudes at the political level: militarism, political realism, just war, and 
nonviolence. Finally, the present survey also improves on most previous surveys by 
probing for the presence of nonviolent attitudes at multiple levels: interpersonal, family, 
community, national, and international. This will test the degree to which the “myth of 
redemptive violence” (Walter Wink) is embraced at multiple levels. My survey 
instrument has drawn numerous questions from previous cross-national polls (and will 
allow comparisons to those findings) as well as several earlier surveys probing nonviolent 
attitudes including some questions from the following:  
 1) Scale of Militarism – Pacifism (Droba 1931): 44 questions 
 2) Gundlach’s Attitudes Toward War survey, 1938 (Stagner 1942): 27 questions 
 3) Elliott’s (1980) “pacifism scale” (replicated by Heaven, Rejab, and Bester  
  1984): 38 questions 
It is not surprising that some of these survey tools derive from the period between the 
World Wars, since this was a time in which pacifist movements were germinating 
throughout Europe and North America (Cortright 2008).  
To help establish survey validity and allow fruitful comparisons and theoretical 
explanations (e.g., values or personality orientations will be tested as explanatory 
variables), I will also include in this survey two of the most well-validated and cross-
culturally validated survey measures of values and attitude orientations (fortunately, they 
are short): Schwartz’s 21 question value scale (from the European Values Survey), and 
the 8 question scale for the Social Dominance Orientation.  
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Cross-National Survey Research 
 While affirming the value of cross-national research, Allerbeck (1977) details 
many of the hazards of conducting cross-national surveys including possible sampling 
errors. Response rates across countries are likely to differ and refusals to participate are 
probably not random events: “If non-response is related to the variable being compared, 
significance tests would be grossly misleading” (p.376). Interviewer bias, or the context 
of survey administration, may operate differently in different countries, and could 
invalidate comparisons of means or marginals across countries (p.376). In all cases, 
researchers must be attuned to possible sources of bias. Unpacking these and other issues, 
Table 3 below highlights key methodological challenges in cross-national research.  
 Teune (1977) emphasizes the complicated and competing assumptions involved 
in using the nation as a variable/ unit of analysis. First, it may be assumed that the nation 
is a “limit to the generality of a relationship or a distribution of properties” (p.102). Of 
course, this conventional interpretation is challenged by scientists who assume certain 
types of nations (e.g., categorized by world-systems position, level of development/ 
industrialization, regime type, geographical/ cultural region, historically predominant 
religion, etc.) are similar and thus, at least some findings in any given nation might hold 
“external validity,” and findings through “pooled analysis” may be generalizable to 
nations of a similar class (see the third point below). Secondly, the nation can be assumed 
to be an unexplained residual “of all other factors,” treating the nation as if it is an error 
term (pp.102-103). The problem here is that “this error term would often explain more 
than most or many of the variables proper” (p.103). Moreover, any given national context 
is so complicated, it is impossible to account for the “total variance within or among 
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systems,” and every social research design partitions for study only a small part of the 
national context (p.103). Third, the nation can be understood as “manifesting some 
underlying general dimensions which can be translated into variables reflecting some part 
of the variance of the entire system, the country” (p.103). Here, some social scientists 
argue that when translating nations into variables, the strongest metric one should use is 
probably simple ranking, but a simple nominal scale may be preferable (e.g., high 
developed/ low developed, core/ periphery). Still others argue that stronger metrics like 
GNP per capita are appropriate.      
Table 3. Methodological Issues in Cross-National Survey Research 
Methodological issues Explanation 
 
Methods of the present study 
Translation issues Translation issues are numerous and vexing 
(e.g., Harkness 2003). As translators aim for 
“equivalence of meaning,” dilemmas arise 
in formulating questions as well as Likert-
response word choices. Back translation 
offers the best assessment procedure (p.41). 
 
The present study utilized a professional translator to 
translate the survey into Spanish. Although pre-tests were 
conducted in both nations and “back-translation” tests were 
conducted in sections, a more formal back-translation 
process would be beneficial. 
Response style bias (a 
form of measurement 
error): acquiescent or 
extreme response 
biases 
According to several studies, Latin 
American cultures tend to exhibit 
acquiescent or extreme response category 
biases. This can make cross-cultural 
comparisons difficult. 
Tests were conducted in order to detect acquiescent and 
extreme response biases. 
Response style bias: 
“don’t know” and mid-
point answers 
Cultural variation in the readiness to admit 
lack of knowledge (willingness to admit 
ignorance of facts) or opinion can make 
cross-cultural comparisons difficult 
(Sicinski 1970). There is also considerable 
debate over whether “don’t know” or mid-
point answers should be offered as response 
choices in cross-national research or survey 
research in general (e.g., Gilljam and 
Granberg 1993, Raaijmakers 2000). 
Sicinski (1970) suggests that researchers can compensate 
for cultural “don’t know” proclivities by comparing 
responses of comparable groups (e.g., university students, 
as in the present study) rather than marginals for entire 
nations. Following the practice of most survey researchers 
(Bradburn, Sudman, and Wansink 2004, p.141; Schutt 
2001), forced-choice questions (without middle categories 
and without an explicit “don’t know” option) were utilized. 
But the instructions stated respondents could always choose 
not to answer questions and leave them blank. Offering an 
explicit “don’t know” option increases “don’t know” 
responses by about 20% (Schutt 2001, p.218). Similarly, 
research suggests that on many issues10 to 20% of people 
tend to be fence-sitters who choose middle, neutral answers 
(p.218), but some of these actually do lean towards an 
opinion (Gilljam and Granberg 1993). 
Response rates (a form 
of sample bias) 
Differences between countries in response 
rates can affect the validity of cross-national 
comparisons (Heath, Martin, and 
Spreckelsen 2009). 
 
Response rates are comparable: the UO response rate was 
85.2%, and the Costa Rica response rate was estimated to 
be 90%. 
Probe generalized 
attitudes or opinions on 
specific issues? 
Are cross-cultural comparisons better 
facilitated through generalized questions or 
probing opinions on specific issues? Some 
research suggests that generalized attitudes 
toward war are significantly associated with 
attitudes towards specific wars (e.g., Cohrs 
and Moschner 2002). 
 
Questions probed for generalized attitudes since it was 
assumed that general questions better facilitate cross-
national comparison. However, one section probed 
responses to quotations by specific world leaders and the 
quotes included both specific and general issues. The UO 
survey also probed for attitudes on specific wars. 
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Methodological issues Explanation 
 
Methods of the present study 
Data collection 
methods/ mode bias 
(web-based vs. pen and 
paper), and incentives 
Differences in data collection methods (e.g., 
the use of mail back surveys versus face to 
face interviews) have been found to affect 
the validity of cross-national comparisons 
(Heath, Martin and Spreckelsen 2009).  
Other variations in survey instrument 
delivery such as paper and pen surveys 
versus internet surveys may also affect 
validity.  
UO students were given online computer surveys 
completed at a time of their own choosing, while Costa 
Rican students completed paper and pen surveys during or 
after class. All respondents were promised confidentiality, 
but given differing perceptions of computer privacy, it is 
not known whether the computer format gave UO students 
a greater or lesser sense of anonymity/ privacy of disclosure 
(which could result in social desirability bias, but this is 
likely a bigger factor in face to face interviews and with 
private issues (Braun 2003, p.142), but the present survey 
did probe attitudes towards domestic violence which could 
be subject to social desirability bias). It was observed that a 
much higher number of UO students (though the numbers 
were still quite small) offered response patterns that 
strongly suggested they did not read the survey but quickly 
answered it. Thus, the online computer survey seems to 
have attracted more meaningless responses, but the 
Qualtriks computer program aided in identifying these 
since survey taking times are reported. As explained below, 
some of these were thrown out. Incentives were considered 
comparable. Most Costa Rican surveys were completed in 
class with the cooperation of professors, but about 120 
students (over one-third of the sample) were given a 
moderate incentive of $6. UO students were rewarded with 
a moderate incentive of 1 point extra credit in the course. 
Most of the Costa Ricans in class likely felt coerced into 
completing the survey (with no incentive offered). On the 
other hand, professors suggested that students were likely 
to perceive taking the survey as an interesting and pleasant 
break from lectures.   
 
Instrument bias The order of questions, the tone and content 
of questions preceding any given question – 
all of these factors are likely to influence 
responses and to introduce forms of bias 
through priming, cueing, etc. 
First, because order of questions can influence responses, 
the elite quotes section of the survey utilized two forms, 
each with a different order, randomly assigned. Second, 
open-ended questions at the end of the survey asked 
respondents to list national heroes they admired. Heroes 
relevant to nonviolence and war were considered to be 
primed in the imaginations of respondents, especially those 
who were quoted in the elite cues section. To compensate 
for this, an additional mini-survey on heroes was conducted 
among UO students. Third, the present study placed the 
Social Dominance Orientation battery of questions after 
several dozen questions about violence and nonviolence. 
This may have impacted the lower (more pro-equality) 
SDO scores than has been found in other tests of university 
students. That is, it may be that anti-equality/ pro-
dominance responses seemed more “violent” (than would 
otherwise be the case) given the questions that preceded 
this section. However, it may also be that the high 
percentage of social science majors played a significant role 
here.  
 
 
Time-dependent 
context effects and the 
need for replication 
Test-retest studies have demonstrated that 
attitude/ opinion survey data should be 
regarded as approximate. “Cross-cultural 
surveys are especially demanding for the 
reliability and validity of 
observations...Only a configuration (a 
‘Gestalt’) of results can be trusted” 
(Scheuch 1993, p.178). Of course, opinion 
survey samples are likely to be affected by 
highly particular contemporary political 
developments in each country.   
 
 
 
 
The present study includes some replications of previous 
cross-national surveys, facilitating somewhat stronger 
conclusions about the presence of real differences in 
opinions between people in the U.S. and Costa Rica. 
Emergent time-dependent context effects in the present 
study include the rapidly changing perceptions of the 
border conflict with Nicaragua (in the case of 120 Costa 
Rican respondents), and rapidly changing perceptions of the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (in the case of U.S. 
respondents).  
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Methodological issues Explanation 
 
Methods of the present study 
Galton’s Problem/ the 
nation as unit of 
analysis 
This is mostly a theoretical problem, but it 
is methodological in the sense that it 
suggests collecting within-nation data 
across sub-regions is ideal. Galton’s 
problem is “the issue whether a given 
culture can be thought of as ‘causing’ 
something, or whether that something is 
instead the result of diffusion across 
cultures” (Scheuch 1993, p.180). To restate 
it: “when between-country variances are 
smaller than within-country variations, then 
it is quite improbable that references to 
countries can be understood as 
explanations” (p.182).   
Regression analyses in the present study revealed that the 
nation variable (i.e., Costa Rica versus the U.S.) explained 
more variance (in attitudes toward violence/ nonviolence) 
than any other demographic variable. And, when UO 
students identifying with the Democratic Party (historically 
more dovish than Republicans) are compared with Costa 
Rican students, Costa Ricans are more peaceful – in most 
cases by a wide margin – on all 33 questions of item 9. A 
sample from the southern region of the U.S. is likely to 
reveal even larger attitude differences vis a vis Costa Rica’s 
dovish attitudes. The significance of sub-regions in a small 
nation like Costa Rica is questionable. While the diffusion 
of ideologies is undeniable (e.g., nonviolence has 
undergone a very cosmopolitan evolution and cross-
national diffusion process), it remains true that ideologies/ 
values stick and evolve to differing degrees in different 
cultures. It is likely that U.S. hegemony influences Costa 
Rican ideologies of violence/ nonviolence, and this will be 
reflected upon below.   
Cross-national 
comparisons across 
levels of development 
Scheuch (1993) argues: “Comparisons that 
include both modern and developing 
countries produce differences that are very 
hard to interpret – if they make sense at 
all... [This] points to a need for intensive 
consideration of intervening and contextual 
factors before differences between countries 
can be ‘explained’” (p.190). Secondly, 
“Comparisons between countries with 
similar levels of modernity are frustrating 
and stimulating at the same time... One 
needs theory – and usually middle-level 
theory – to make sense of data” (p.191).  
In the present study, the secondary analysis of cross-
national data involves multiple comparisons across levels 
of development. An attempt is made to stay close to theory 
in interpreting differences as well as similarities. 
Factor analysis and 
index construction 
In creating attitude indexes through factor 
analysis, should the indexes be based on 
country-specific data (based on factor 
loadings in the data from each separate 
nation) or the aggregated cross-national 
data? The later option simply treats the 
nation variable as just another demographic 
variable, and this strategy facilitates cross-
national comparisons of the indexes. 
The country-specific form of index construction was 
utilized in the present study, but also a modified cross-
national index was constructed. Because factor loadings 
revealed several cross-national differences, country-specific 
indexes were constructed to allow for greater within-
country analysis and specification of patterns. Because 
factor loadings shared numerous commonalities between 
the datasets, delimited indexes were also constructed for 
cross-national comparison. Rather than conducting a new 
factor analysis from an aggregated cross-national dataset, 
indexes were constructed based on simple commonalities in 
items loading on similar factors in each nation.  
 
Question Types: Probing General Orientations Versus Specific Issues 
 
 Some argue that survey researchers should avoid “hypothetical questions, beyond 
the experience of the respondent, [which] are likely to attract a less accurate response” 
(Baxter, Hughes, and Tight 2001, p.182). Others argue that general questions can be more 
informative. Thus, Cohrs and Moschner (2002) distinguish between the measurement of 
“generalized political attitudes,” as when public opinion polls ask abstract questions or 
seek to uncover relatively stable worldviews, ethical orientations, or ideological 
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orientations, versus attitudes on specific wars or conflicts. More abstractly, social action 
theorists have argued that “generalization is perhaps the most important of the learning 
mechanisms” (Parsons et al. 1951, p.12, cited in Kohn and Slomczynski 1990, p.7). In 
this view, asking generalized questions can better probe the depth of learning, that is, the 
consistency and coherence of attitudes.Moreover, there is some evidence that general 
attitudes on violence do strongly correlate with attitudes on specific wars (Cohrs and 
Moschner 2002).  
 In support of that pattern, in Table 4 below we see that in the UO survey data, 
attitudes about specific wars are robust predictors of scores on the Attitude indexes which 
are drawn from more general/ abstract questions. The strongest relationships include the 
following: views of the Iraq War (Q11_2) is associated with 13.89% of the variance in 
the realpolitiks index, and view of the Afghanistan War (Q11_3) is associated with 
12.85% of the variance in the justwar index. In addition, the militarism and nonviolence 
indexes were most strongly associated with views on the Iraq War, with over 11% of the  
Table 4. Unstandardized OLS Coefficients from the Regression of Specific War Views 
on Abstract Ideological Orientations (UO Data) 
 
Attitude Index 
(general 
questions) 
Q11_1 View on Vietnam War Q11_2 View on Iraq War Q11_3 View on Afghanistan 
War 
B 
(t) 
 
Adj. R² B 
(t) 
 
Adj. R² B 
(t) 
 
Adj. R² 
militarism .17*** 
(5.86) 
.0838 .22*** 
(6.86) 
.1106 .16*** 
(5.57) 
.0749 
nonviolence .15*** 
(4.88) 
.0590 .23*** 
(7.09) 
.1184 .16*** 
(5.24) 
.0671 
Justwar .10** 
(2.94) 
.0205 .20*** 
(5.63) 
.0760 .24*** 
(7.48) 
.1285 
realpolitiks 
 
.18*** 
(5.90) 
.0828 .25*** 
(7.89) 
.1389 .19*** 
(6.25) 
.0909 
Notes: N= 364 to 382, depending on index; Unstandardized regression coefficient; Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics; * = p < .05; 
** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; Responses for each Q11 item were “Yes, a just war” (1), “Somewhat just” (2), and “No, NOT a just war” 
(3); Attitude indexes consist of the means of related survey items, each with a 4-point Likert scale, and scores closer to 4 represent 
more peaceful attitudes  
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variance in each of these indexes associated with views on the Iraq War.Of course, a key 
strength of general and abstract questions is that they can help to facilitate cross-national 
comparisons. Nevertheless, future cross-national opinion research should endeavor to 
increasingly integrate questions which tap violent/ nonviolent attitudes towards specific 
and ongoing live issue campaigns. For instance, a question could ask, “The human rights 
organization Amnesty International supports a global ban on the death penalty, do you 
support or not support such a ban?” 
Comparative Historical Methods: Nonviolent Movements Around the World 
 Comparative historical methods are well-suited for exploring the significance of 
national history and cultural factors while illuminating the limitations of peace indexes 
like the GPI and WPI.  The present project has the potential to contribute to the 
comparative historical literature on revolutions by analyzing nations that have 
experienced salient nonviolent episodes of conflict and identifying trends in state-
approved collective memories of nonviolent revolutions/ campaigns. This may aid future 
projects in identifying some of the mechanisms producing principled and pragmatic 
nonviolent attitudes. The comparative historical literature on revolutions has tended to 
assume that, by definition, revolutions involve political violence. For this reason, 
Fairbanks (2007) contrasts theories of “classical revolution” with “the modern kind of 
nonviolent revolution.”   
 A mix of comparative historical methods are utilized in this investigation. First, 
the “contrast of contexts” model of comparative history can be utilized in selecting 
“maximally different cases within given bounds” (Skocpol and Somers 1994, p.76). 
Second, the “macro-causal analysis” model of comparative history can be employed in 
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attempting to specify “configurations favorable and unfavorable” to the development of 
nonviolent attitudes (p.79), and in developing new causal generalizations. Finally, 
theories and historical comparative methodologies of “path dependence” will be utilized 
in the attempt to isolate the importance of historically contingent events which shaped the 
origins of national institutions and set into motion sequences of “event chains” (e.g., 
Mahoney 2000, p.507). 
Why Analyze Textbooks? 
Two of the main research questions driving this project concern why confidence 
in nonviolent methods varies so greatly around the world, and why nonviolent attitudes 
are not more robust. Given the great number of relatively successful and recent 
nonviolent revolutions and movements around the world, might an investigation of 
collective memory and collective forgetting processes help to explain cross-national 
variation in nonviolent attitudes? To begin to answer this question, I turn to a strategic 
sample of state-sponsored national history textbooks. While school textbooks are clearly 
one source of socialization within the overall curriculum and school context, this project 
does not simplistically view textbooks as the primary source of socialization. Rather, 
government-approved textbooks are approached as social outcomes. They arise from 
complex social and political processes which indicate the boundedness of collective 
memory, public discourse, and hegemonic ideology. Loewen (1995) has demonstrated 
that history textbooks in the U.S. clearly reflect hegemonic ideological norms (which 
shape, structure, and skew historical narratives of the nation), as would be expected since 
they often pass through numerous committees, the editorial teams of corporate 
publishers, and public approval processes before final editing and adoption by school 
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boards. The Ministries of Education in most nations maintain vigorous oversight of 
textbook content, and its ministers and bureaucrats are often party loyalists re-appointed 
after each national election. 
History and geography textbooks have long been recognized as a key site of 
contention involving collective memory and militarism over against education for peace. 
Efforts by the League of Nations and subsequently, UNESCO, have led international 
efforts to eliminate militarism from textbooks (Marsden 2000). Dozens of articles and 
books in recent decades have explored public battles over school history textbook 
content. Some of the primary research streams on textbooks have been devoted to how 
nationalism, wars and militarized conflicts are portrayed in textbooks in places like Japan 
(Ienaga 1994), Germany (Puaca 2011), and Israel-Palestine (Bar-Tal 1998, Moughrabi 
2001, Podeh 2000). In the U.S., several studies have taken a biographical approach and 
assessed how Rosa Parks is portrayed in textbooks and children’s literature (Kohl 1995, 
Schudson 2012, Schwartz 2009). Beyond textbooks, collective memory studies have 
analyzed how collective memories of Dr. King are invoked by politicians in U.S.  
Congressional debates (Polletta 1998), and how King is presented in a national museum 
(Inwood 2009). The present study is the first to explore how nonviolent social 
movements are portrayed in state-approved textbooks around the world.  
As one measure of prevailing hegemonic norms, content coding analyses will be 
conducted of textbook portrayals involving highly salient national episodes of nonviolent 
movements in two primary case studies, the U.S. and Costa Rica, and in several shadow 
cases (Guatemala, El Salvador, Chile, Ghana, Germany, and Norway). This relatively 
large number of case studies was necessary to establish how nonviolent campaigns and 
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nonviolent revolutions are typically reproduced through collective memory processes. 
The results indicate that they are typically portrayed as conventional action rather than 
specifically nonviolent action. This suggests that cultures are at risk for failing to learn 
from successful nonviolent campaigns in their own national histories. In order to remedy 
this trans-national process of forgetting, I contend the lessons that nonviolence works and 
why it works – in short, nonviolent ideology and theory, must become more explicitly 
attached to historical accounts.  
We might assume that a sample of international history textbooks would present 
cases in which local knowledge and local historical memory takes center stage. To the 
degree that is true, it is a relatively recent phenomenon. Textbooks around the world have 
long been shaped by Western values and norms (which include the very idea of textbooks 
and an established curriculum) and the power and reach of multinational publishing firms 
based in the UK, US, France, Germany, and Russia – who often only loosely adapted 
textbooks for foreign contexts (Altbach 1991, p.248, p.242). In many places in the world, 
these dynamics link to cultural and institutionalized legacies of colonial and neocolonial 
domination (p.243). As late as 1991, Altbach argued that a few large core nations 
dominate “the world’s international knowledge system” (p.244). But with the 
proliferation of inexpensive computer-assisted design technology in recent decades, 
publishing has finally become more multinational. Many nations have departed from the 
Western textbook model of loaning textbooks to students, and printing texts on glossy 
paper with many illustrations. In nations of the periphery and semi-periphery, textbooks  
have increasingly been published in-country, and the price of textbooks have been 
reduced by printing on newsprint paper, utilizing fewer graphics (p.248), and requiring 
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(or attempting to require) students to buy their own textbooks. But as I found in Costa 
Rica and Nicaragua, even in urban areas only some families can afford the textbooks, and 
teachers often photocopy dozens of pages for their students each month.  
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CHAPTER II 
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL DATA AND CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS 
SECONDARY DATA ANALYSIS OF THE EVS AND WVS  
 
 Surprisingly, published analyses of most large cross-national datasets have largely 
neglected to undertake any fine-grained analysis of individual-level correlates of 
nonviolent/ violent attitudes. A partial exception here is studies of the “willingness to 
fight” indicator (Inglehart 1990, Listhaug 1986), but even these studies are very limited 
in the variables analyzed. Thus, as depicted in Table 5, a secondary analysis of European 
(EVS) and World Values Survey (WVS) data was conducted on three attitudinal 
indicators, using common demographic variables as predictors/ controls.  
Table 5. Analysis of European and World Values Surveys (Individual-Level Data): 
Regressions of Questions Probing Violent/ Nonviolent Attitudes on Demographic 
Variables  
 
Question Willing to fight for your 
country in a war? 
“Using violence to pursue 
political goals is never justified” 
“Approval: Disarmament 
movement” 
Responses (and 
codes) 
1=yes 
2=no 
1=strongly agree 
2=agree 
3=disagree 
4=strongly disagree 
1=strongly approve 
2=somewhat approve 
3=somewhat disapprove 
4=strongly disapprove 
Data years 
 
1981-2000 1995 1990 
 Coef. 
(S.E.) 
t Coef.  
(S.E.) 
t Coef.  
(S.E.) 
t 
Male dummy  .111*** 
(.004) 
31.31 .054*** 
(.011) 
4.97 .041*** 
(.009) 
4.43 
Town size -.009*** 
(.001) 
-12.96 .018*** 
(.002) 
7.67 -.006** 
(.002) 
-3.09 
Education .005*** 
(.001) 
6.00 -.010*** 
(.003) 
-3.67 NA 
Left-right 
ideology 
.014*** 
(.001) 
19.37 .001 
(.002) 
.25 .045*** 
(.002) 
20.41 
Income .002* 
(.001) 
2.15 -.015*** 
(.002) 
-6.59 .013*** 
(.002) 
6.97 
N 56115 31309 33157 
Number of 
nations sampled 
73 49 38 
Adj R² .0282 .0041 .0153 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001;  NA = very little data available on this 
indicator, so it was omitted from the regression equation; Male dummy (1=male; 0=female); Town size (1=2,000 and less...8=500,000 
and more); Education (1= inadequately completed elementary education... 8=University degree); Left-right ideology 
(1=Left...10=Right); Income (1=Lower income... 10=Wealthiest); The number of nations sampled is approximate as in some cases 
missing data lowered the number of nations included.  
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 Above, we see that males, ideological conservatives, the wealthy, and rural people 
are significantly more willing to fight for their country in a war (i.e., females, lower 
income groups, and urban people are significantly less willing to fight). In addition, it is 
striking that additional education increases the willingness to fight, exactly as Loewen 
(2007) would expect. Hence, the idea that education is a cosmopolitan, humanistic 
enterprise is challenged, as the reproduction of nationalism through education comes into 
focus – a theme we will return to below.   
 The item “Using violence to pursue political goals is never justified” presents the 
absolute pacifist position. Surprisingly, ideology is not a significant predictor – this may 
be an indication that even the left has few sympathetic to a strict pacifist position. The 
regression equation shows that males and urban residents are significantly more likely to 
disagree with this pacifist statement. The urban finding here is somewhat surprising – 
another theme we will return to below. The two significant negative relationships show 
that the better educated and the wealthy are more associated with pacifism, controlling 
for other factors. 
 On the question of approving or disapproving of the disarmament movement, we 
see that males, ideological conservatives, and the wealthy were significantly associated 
with disapproval of the disarmament movement. Urban residents were significantly more 
likely to approve of the disarmament movement. 
 Across all three indicators, as expected, males are more hawkish. Both the 
wealthy and ideological conservatives are significantly associated with hawkish attitudes 
on two indicators, but ideology was not significant for the pacifist ideal (“Using violence 
to pursue political goals is never justified”), and the wealthy were surprisingly associated 
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with the dovish attitude on this item. More urban respondents also performed 
inconsistently, as they were associated with disagreement with the pacifist ideal, but they 
are less willing to fight for their country and more likely to approve of the disarmament 
movement. The education variable also performs inconsistently. Controlling for the other 
factors, more education is associated with respondents’ willingness to fight for their 
country, but also agreement with the pacifist ideal (“Using violence to pursue political 
goals is never justified”). Hence, numerous contradictions are evident in these three 
questions, and it is certainly possible they reflect differences not just tied to sample bias, 
since the three questions tap somewhat discrete areas. It seems reasonable to assume, for 
example, that a respondent could both hope for/ approve of disarmament and also be 
willing to fight for his or her country.   
 Nevertheless, obvious explanations for how the variables perform differently 
across the three questions include the fact that the samples are small and different, and 
peculiarities in the nations sampled (e.g., what education and urbanization means across 
the world can be quite diverse) might help account for these inconsistencies. All of this 
suggests the strength of the Gallup World Poll with its large sample size and its three 
questions on violence/ nonviolence.   
 Many of the results above corroborate an extensive study of the U.S. public by 
Page and Bouton (2006). They found that the following personal and group 
characteristics were most strongly associated with hawkish attitudes: whites, men, 
evangelical Protestants, older people, the wealthy, conservatives, Republicans, and those 
with high levels of education (p.101).   
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 These three indicators offer a glimpse into the multidimensionality of 
nonviolence, as we observe inconsistencies at the individual-level across nonviolent 
attitudinal domains. Because of this multidimensionality, compiling multiple questions 
designed to assess adherence to general ideological orientations towards violence and 
nonviolence may help us make more sense of attitudinal variation at the individual level. 
This is one of the key aims of the survey designed for the present study and conducted in 
the U.S. and Costa Rica, to which we now turn.   
ANALYSIS OF COSTA RICA AND UO SURVEYS 
 The surveyportion of this dissertation project was designed with eight objectives 
in mind. First, samples were drawn from two nations, the U.S. and Costa Rica, selected 
because they have been subjected to a long history of starkly divergent national security 
traditions, elite cues and policy cues relevant to ideologies of violence and nonviolence. 
In short, Costa Rica abolished its army over 60 years ago, while the U.S. maintains over 
725 military bases abroad (Johnson 2004, p.24) and spends far more on its military than 
all of the other major powers combined. For these reasons the two nations were 
conceptualized as strategic sites and “maximally different” cases suitable for an 
exploratory mode of investigation.    
 Second, the surveys began with a replication of the three Gallup World Poll 
questions on violence and nonviolence (see Appendix A, Appendix B, and Appendix C 
for copies of the surveys). Subsequent questions were designed to testwhether these three 
Gallup World Poll questions hold validity as “keystone” indicators of generalized 
nonviolent attitudes that hold across a range of dimensions and interpersonal, communal, 
and international levels. This effort was deemed important since the Gallup World Poll is 
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the largest cross-national poll ever collected, but it only has three questions probing 
violent/ nonviolent attitudes. 
 Third, the survey aims to assess whether university students actually hold 
coherent opinions regarding the morality of violence/ nonviolence and strategies of 
conflict resolution. To this end, the survey represents the first attempt to create indexes of 
four common ideologies of violence and nonviolence and to categorize respondents on a 
spectrum of militarism, political realism, just war, and nonviolence. In this process, the 
author created new questions, but also modified or replicated many of the best questions, 
previously tested and validated, from pre-existing surveys on violent/ nonviolent attitudes 
(see Appendix D). Factor analyses (see Appendix E for the methodology, and Appendix 
Ffor the interitem correlations and reliabilities) were conducted since this is widely 
regarded as the best method for constructing attitude indexes. As we will see below, most 
respondents answered the battery of questions in a fashion consistent enough to classify 
them as subscribing to a particular ideology, and this in itself contributes to the larger 
conversation over the consistency and meaning of public opinions.  
 Fourth, the pragmatic nonviolence item of the Gallup World Poll (i.e., do you 
think peaceful means alone will work?) was viewed as almost a question of historical 
knowledge. Thus, the survey was conceived as an attempt to assess whether people learn 
from historical nonviolent episodes, whether their opinions are shaped by historical 
knowledge. We will also have occasions to consider whether cultures “learn” from 
historical experiences. It was theorized that if respondents possessed nonviolent 
intellectual/ historical capital (i.e., they were aware of successful nonviolent movements 
in history), especially in their own national or regional contexts, they would be more 
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likely to affirm that nonviolent means will work. In addition, since many theorists of 
public opinion have contended that public opinions are often unstable or meaningless, 
“delusional” or a form of “false consciousness” (e.g., Converse 1964, Bourdieu 1972, 
Fromm 1965, Adorno 1998a), the surveys probed whether respondents possess enough 
knowledge to hold opinions about violence/ nonviolence.  
 For both of these reasons, the surveys probed for intellectual capital and historical 
knowledge regarding nonviolence and war. The surveys asked respondents to report their 
historical knowledge on several items including their knowledge of Gandhi’s biography 
(the most iconic exemplar of nonviolence in our time) and their knowledge of nonviolent 
revolutions. Revolutions were selected because they are the most dramatic form of 
nonviolent action and perhaps, they are most likely to compete favorably for 
remembrance in collective memory processes.  
 Fifth, if historical knowledge and memory of nonviolent campaigns is weak at the 
individual level, it may be that a more generalized sense of ideals mediated through 
memories of heroic figures might shape opinions on violence/ nonviolence. Research 
suggests that collective memories of important historical episodes often become reduced 
to and distilled in the biographies of charismatic leaders (Eddy 2012, Schwartz 2009). 
Hence, the key organizations of the U.S. civil rights movement are scarcely remembered 
by college students today, but activists continue to appeal to perceived precedents in 
King’s biography in order to legitimize strategic choices (Eddy 2012). Schwartz (2009) 
theorizes this collective memory process as “oneness” - society’s need for personified 
ideals. For this reason, respondents were asked to identify public figures they considered 
to be the heroes of Costa Rican/ U.S. history that they “admire and respect the most” 
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(Q42). That is, self-perceived heroes were solicited because, it was theorized, they may 
influence and reflect deeply internalized ideological leanings. 
 Sixth, the survey sought to collect data about the experiences of respondents as 
activists and as victims of interpersonal violence. However, participation in nonviolent 
political actions (as well as war) was expected to be weak, given that research suggests 
few university students actually engage in political activism – and that was the case even 
during the much heralded 1960s cycle of student activism when only about 19% of 
students actually engaged in a demonstration (Braungart and Braungart 1974, p.227). 
Nevertheless, it may be that some opinions on violence/ nonviolence are shaped by 
personal experiences as a nonviolent activist. Similarly, it may be that personal 
experiences of interpersonal violence may shape opinions on violence/ nonviolence. 
 Seventh, the surveys sought to test whether respondent views of violence and 
nonviolence would be influenced by “elite cues.” By repeating substantive themes 
presented earlier in the survey, it was possible to test whether respondents were swayed 
by the influence of moral or political elites. And, by varying the presentation of quotes in 
two experimental groups, it was possible to test whether respondents were so highly 
susceptible to elite cues that the order of presenting elite quotes could influence 
respondent answers (i.e., in one experimental group, pro-violent quotes appeared first; in 
the second, pro-nonviolent quotes appeared first). Again, these data collection strategies 
were deemed important given that many theorists have held that much of the mass public 
holds inconsistent and contradictory attitudes that are highly unstable over time, but this 
mass public is susceptible to “policy cues” or “elite cues” (Paul and Brown 2001, Lupia 
1994, Mondak 1993, Carmines and Kiklinski 1990, Brady and Sniderman 1985).  
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 Eighth, the surveys include tests of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and the 
Schwartz Values Survey. As we will see below, numerous studies, including many cross-
national studies, have confirmed the validity of the SDO and Schwartz Values and their 
relevance for violent/ nonviolent attitudes. These tools will also help us identify 
differences between Costa Rican and U.S. society at the level of enculturated values. 
 Although the presentation of data will not always follow this order, the thinking 
guiding the survey methodology was as follows. In order to establish respondent 
coherence, or lack of coherence, on views of violence and nonviolence, several steps of 
inquiry can be undertaken. First, do people seem to remember and learn from prominent 
historical experiences of nonviolent revolution or resistance? Failing that, do people 
remember and revere nonviolent heroes who distill the historical lessons of nonviolence? 
Failing that, are people simply led by “elite cues” – which shape opinions over the short-
term – and which might even shift opinions in the context of a 30-minute survey? Failing 
that, is it the case that ideological positions trump all other factors, and that, as Althusser 
(1971) contended, “ideology has no history”? Of course, all of these factors heavily 
interact and interpenetrate, but they are conceptually distinct and survey methodology can 
help us probe and unpack elements of each one. 
Sampling Rationale and Characteristics of the Cross-National Samples 
 Various demographic frequencies of each sample are reported in the tables below 
(see Appendix G for one methodological note on the sample). There are two sampling 
issues which must be adjudicated. First, are the samples in the two nations matched? 
Second, are the samples representative of their respective nations? All things considered, 
I will argue that the samples from the two nations are relatively matched demographically 
89 
(and valid for cross-national comparison), as well as reflective of cross-cultural 
differences between the nations (e.g., the high percentage of Catholic respondents in 
Costa Rica). Of course, the samples are convenience samples, and caution should be used 
in generalizing beyond these samples to the general populations.  
Sampling University Students 
 Some scholars collecting political opinion data have sampled from university 
students using the rationale that students comprise a relatively educated, politically active 
group (e.g., Eldar 2006). The present project targeted university students, in part, because 
they have recently completed their high school education, which in many countries is a 
major institution of socialization and citizenship training with standardized, state-
sanctioned curriculum including state-approved history textbooks.Indeed, Loewen (2007) 
and Burris (2008) review public opinion data during the Vietnam era and beyond and 
conclude that U.S. citizens with high school degrees and university degrees have tended 
to be more hawkish on military issues than U.S. citizens with less schooling. That is, in 
the U.S. it seems that more schooling tends, on average, to socialize students into more 
patriotic pro-militaristic groupthink.      
Are the Cross-National Samples Matched? 
 Tackling the first issue, note that the UO survey oversampled from females, with 
a 16% gender gap, as opposed to the 4% gender gap in the Costa Rica sample. World-
wide, gender is usually a strong predictor of attitudes with women typically more dovish 
(Burris 2008; Gat 2006, p.606). In the U.S., studies show that women tend to be more 
liberal (ANES 2004), and this includes college-aged women (Dey 1997). Hence, the  
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Table 6. Description of Samples (Percentages) 
Demographic 
category 
Costa 
Rica 
(N=312) 
UO 
(N=403) 
Costa 
Rica 
population 
U.S. 
population 
Age range  
18-29 
 
97 
 
98 
(15-29) 
28.1 
(15-29) 
20.9 
30-39 2 1   
40-49 1 1   
50-59 0 1   
Gender 
men 
 
48 
 
42 
 
50.76 
 
49.26 
women 52 58 49.24 50.74 
Gender gap in 
sample 
4 16   
Class 
Upper 
 
 0 
 
6 
  
Upper middle 40 54   
Lower middle 40 28   
Working 18 8   
Lower  1 3   
Notes: Source for population statistics: Time (2012). 
 
gender gap, depicted in Table 6, is worth tracking: The total results of the UO survey are 
likely to be skewed towards dovish attitudes because females were oversampled from. 
 But the gender gap is likely compensated for and counter-balanced by the much 
higher (compared with the Costa Rica sample) percentage of respondents at the UO 
claiming to be very liberal and liberal –  groups which lean towards more dovish 
attitudes. Table 7 below shows that about 20% more UO respondents identified as liberal 
and about 3% more UO respondents identified as very liberal. Meanwhile, 18% more 
Costa Rican respondents identified themselves as Moderates than in the UO sample. 
These sample issues are not surprising given the contexts: the University of Oregon and 
perhaps especially sociology courses on the UO campus are likely to have more liberals 
than the general population, and female enrollment increasingly outnumbers males at 
university campuses throughout the U.S. In addition, the Costa Rican population as a 
whole tends to self-identify as moderate or conservative (Solis 2012).  
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Table 7. Self-Identified Ideological Orientations of Respondents By Sample Nation 
Self-identified 
ideologicalorientation 
(Q29 in UO/ Q25 in 
CR) 
Costa Rica 
(N=312) 
% 
UO 
(N=403) 
% 
Difference 
between sample 
means 
Very liberal (1) 3.92 7.12  
Liberal (2) 20.92 39.19 
Moderate (3) 48.69 30.79 
Conservative (4) 8.82 12.72 
Very conservative (5) 1.31 1.53 
Don’t know (6) 16.34 8.65 
Sample Means 2.79 2.59 .21** 
Note: two-tailed t-test; *= p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p<.001; For descriptive and statistical analyses, including 
the sample means and t-tests (on sample means) reported above, “Don’t know” responses were recoded as 
missing data. The robvar test in STATA revealed that the variances between the samples were significantly 
different, so the t-test command specified unequal variances. 
 
 The survey data was primarily collected from students in lower-division 
sociology courses on three campuses in Costa Rica (though several dozen surveys were 
also conducted in courses on physics, engineering, journalism, computer science, 
psychology, and pre-med) and exclusively from a large Introduction to Sociology course 
at the University of Oregon. In Costa Rica, the surveys were collected from one 
prestigious public university, UCR, and two private universities. Tests showed that there 
were some significant attitudinal differences between the three campuses in Costa Rica 
when analyzing group means on the militarism and nonviolence indexes, with UCR 
tending to be more dovish on the militarism index and U. Hispanoamericana tending to 
be more dovish on the nonviolence index (see below). 
 The Costa Rica survey sampled slightly more heavily from college majors who, 
according to previous studies, tend to be more hawkish (see below). That is, the Costa 
Rican sample has more engineering majors, a factor which is likely to result in more 
hawkish responses among the Costa Ricans. Indeed, results (reported in Table 8) showed 
that the physics, engineering, and computer science majors were significantly more 
hawkish in the militarism index. Again, likely counter-balancing this is the higher  
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Table 8. Comparing Sample Biases in the UO and Costa Rica Data 
Difference between the 
two samples 
Hypothesized effect Results 
1) The UO data 
oversampled from 
females (the UO data has 
6% more females and 
6% less males than the 
Costa Rica data) 
This sample bias is 
highly likely to result 
in more dovish 
responses in the UO 
data. 
As expected, in both the UO data and the Costa Rica 
data, females are significantly more dovish. T-tests 
revealed that in the Costa Rica data females were 
significantly more dovish on all 3 attitude indexes. In 
the UO data females were more dovish on all 5 
indexes, but the differences only obtained 
significance at the .05 level on the militarism, just 
war, and interpersonal violence indexes.    
2) The UO data 
oversampled from 
liberals (the UO data has 
20% more self-
identified“liberals” and 
3% more“very liberal”). 
This sample bias is 
highly likely to result 
in more dovish 
responses in the UO 
data. 
As expected, in the UO data, regression analyses 
revealed that self-identified liberals held significantly 
more dovish attitudes on the nonviolence index and 
the militarism index. In the Costa Rica data, t-tests 
revealed that self-identified liberals were 
significantly more dovish on the militarism index, 
but there was no significant difference on the 
nonviolence index.   
3) The Costa Rica data 
oversampled from 
physics, computer 
science, and engineering 
majors. 
This sample bias is 
highly likely to result 
in more hawkish 
responses in the Costa 
Rica data. 
As expected, in the Costa Rica data, t-tests revealed 
that these three majors were significantly more 
hawkish on the militarism index, but there was no 
significant difference on the nonviolence index.  
 
percentage of respondents at the UO claiming to be very liberal, liberal, and Democratic 
party voters – three groups tending towards dovish attitudes in the U.S. Meanwhile, a 
larger percentage of respondents in Costa Rica identified themselves as moderates and 
half as many respondents identified themselves as “very liberal” and “liberal” as 
compared with the UO sample. 
 Above we see that all three of the main sources of sample bias are likely to skew 
the data in such a way that the UO data will appear to be more dovish than a better 
matched sample would reveal. Hence, the actual gap in peaceful attitudes between Costa 
Ricans and U.S. respondents is likely to be even more pronounced than what this study 
reveals, and our findings of statistical significance in this study are not likely to be 
artifacts of demographic variables. While the UO data oversampled from liberals (relative 
to the U.S. population as well as the Costa Rica sample), we have to recognize that Costa 
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Ricans in general tend to identify as conservative (Solis 2012). But, given Costa Rica’s 
history and 60+ year long tradition of demilitarization, “moderates” and “conservatives” 
in Costa Rica are likely to express far more dovish attitudes than moderates and 
conservatives in the U.S. Nonetheless, as we see above and will revisit again below, 
Costa Rican liberals were significantly more dovish on the militarism index (compared 
with conservatives and moderates in Costa Rica), but there were no significant 
differences on the nonviolence index. 
Are the Samples Representative of the Respective Nations? 
 About 30% of the U.S. population held a college degree in 2010 as opposed to 
about 11% in 1970 (Time 2012, p.623). As a research site, the University of Oregon is 
likely to be more dovish than the population at large. Joseph (2007) notes that dovish 
Americans tend to be clustered on the East and West coasts (especially compared to the 
South and Midwest) as well as in universities, churches, and labor unions (rather than in 
business; but see below, 16% of the UO sample were business majors, and other typically 
conservative majors were represented as well). In addition, in recent years, a gender gap 
has emerged on  U.S. university campuses, with females comprising the clear majority 
student population. A 2008 study of 24 to 29 year olds found that females are 17% more 
likely to have attended college and 29% more likely to have graduated than similarly 
aged males (Lindo, Swensen, and Waddell 2012, p.255). 
 The University of Oregon is representative of public universities in the U.S. with 
the exception that it has a larger percentage of white students (75%) than the average for 
U.S. higher education (Lindo, Swensen, and Waddell 2012). The UO is also twice the 
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size of the average public university, but it ranks very close to the average in enrollment 
rates, SAT scores, cost of attendance, and financial aid opportunities (p.258).  
 The reach of higher education has greatly increased in Costa Rica, but still lags 
behind the U.S. In 1967, about half a percent of the total Costa Rican population were 
enrolled university students. By 2005, the 166,000 university students comprised 4% of 
the total Costa Rican population (Molina and Palmer 2009, pp.167-168), and by 2012, 
12.7% of Costa Ricans held a post-secondary degree (Time 2012, p.249). Enrollments in 
private universities have grown rapidly in recent years in Costa Rica. By 2005, students 
enrolled in private universities comprised nearly half of the total number of university 
students (Molina and Palmer 2009, p.167) and so it was important to include them in the 
sample. Above we see that young adults (18-29 years old) comprise 28% of the Costa 
Rican population versus 21% in the U.S.   
 Ironically, while Costa Rica has abolished its military and the U.S. maintains the 
world’s second largest force of active military personnel (Time 2012, p.516), each 
sample had only one respondent who had been in the military. This reminds us that 
military service is relatively rare among the general U.S. population: “At any given time 
in the past decade, only about one-half of 1 percent of the public has been on active duty 
in the military” (NPR 2011). Since the Vietnam War, the U.S. military’s shift to an all-
volunteer force has meant that many in the middle class are shielded from knowledge of 
war and military life as well as disinterested in U.S. military actions abroad. But 67 of the 
UO respondents (or 17.22%) answered “yes” to Q28: “Have either of your parents ever 
been in the military?” In the Costa Rican sample, it is likely that the single respondent 
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with military experience may have been in the Nicaraguan or U.S. military, a U.S. 
military academy, or the Costa Rican Civil Guard.   
 In terms of religion, Costa Rica is clearly a Catholic nation, and the results in 
Table 9 support this. And, it is not at all surprising that university students are more likely 
to claim “none” as a religious identity compared with the general populations of each 
nation. The tricky part is trying to separate possible cohort/ generational effects from “life 
cycle” variation in religiosity. That is, there has long been a tendency for U.S. college-
aged young adults (not just those who actually attend college) to claim be less religious 
than older and younger cohorts, but also a pattern in which each generation becomes 
slightly more secular throughout their life cycle (Putnam 2000, pp.72-73; Roberts and 
Yamane 2012, p.99). There are also signs that Costa Rica is becoming somewhat more 
secular (Molina and Palmer 2009, p.171). But Oregon has long been identified as one of 
the most secular states in the U.S., and similarly, the Pacific Northwest region is often 
Table 9. Religious Affiliation of Samples and National Populations (Percentages) 
Demographic 
category 
Costa 
Rica 
sample 
(N=312) 
Costa 
Rica – 
total 
population 
UO 
sample 
(N=403) 
U.S. – total 
population 
Religion 
Catholic 
 
55% 
 
76.3% 
 
17% 
 
23.9% 
Evangelical 
Protestant 
11% 13.7% 15% 51.3% 
Protestant 
Other Protestant 0 0.7% 6% 
Other 6% 4.8% 8% 2.5% 
None 28% 3.2% 24% 16.1% 
Atheist/ 
Agnostic 
-  13% - 
Spiritual, not 
religious 
-  10% - 
Jewish 0  7% 1.7% 
Other groups  1.3% 
Jehovah’s 
Witnesses 
 1.7% Mormon 
1.6% Other 
Christian 
0.7% Buddhist 
0.6% Muslim 
Note: percentages; (“-” = was not an option in sample) 
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called “the none zone” because of the high percentage of respondents identifying their 
religious preference as “none” (Killen and Silk 2004). 
 In Table 10 below, we see that some of the racial and ethnic categories in the 
sampled population are roughly representative of the general populations. The percentage 
of Costa Rican minorities sampled parallels the minority proportions in the larger 
population except the 1% Amerindian category is missing from the sample. The UO data 
had proportionally less African-Americans and Hispanic/ Latino respondents than in the 
total U.S. population. However, many survey studies find that the White/ Non-White 
breakdown is the most significant when it comes to racial/ethnic demographic group 
differences in opinions on national security issues (Burris 2008). Here, we see that the 
proportion of UO respondents identifying as White (79%) was very close to the total U.S. 
population (79.96%).    
 Below in Table 11, we see that 54% of Costa Rican respondents identify with no 
political party. This was expected, as Biesanz, Biesanz, and Biesanz (1999) have  
Table 10. Race/ Ethnicity of Samples and National Populations 
Costa Rica sample of 
college students 
Costa Rica – 
total population 
(data: CIA 
2012) 
UO sample of U.S. college 
students (respondents 
could check one or more) 
U.S. – total population 
(data: CIA 2012) 
63% Mestizo 94% White 
(including 
Mestizo) 
79 % White 79.96% White 
31% White 4% Black 12.85% Black 
3% Black/ Afro-
Caribbean 
3% Black 3% American Indian/ 
Native (Alaskan/ 
Hawaiian) 
0.97% Amerindian and 
Alaska Native 
0.18% Native Hawaiian 
and other Pacific Islander 
0% Amerindian 1% Amerindian 3% Japanese 4.43 Asian% 
1% Chinese 1% Chinese 2% Chinese 
1% Other 1% Other 9% Hispanic/ Latino/ 
Spanish 
15.1% Hispanic 
10% Other 1.61% two or more races 
(July 2007 estimate) 
Note: each nation’s population statistics from CIA World Factbook (www.cia.gov), retrieved Feb 7, 2012 
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observed, political parties lack salience for many in Costa Rica, and “Most voters...say 
that they vote for the candidate rather than the party” (p.71). Observers of Costa Rican 
politics have noted that the most salient dividing line since 1949 has often been those 
who are pro-PLN and those who are anti-PLN, with the latter group taking form in a 
variety of different party configurations over recent decades (Rolbein 1989, p.104). 
Moreover, the ideological distinctions between the parties have often been fluid (Hoivik 
and Aas 1981, p.346).  In addition, the nation has virtually adopted an uncanny tradition 
in which the PLN is voted into power for one presidential term, and voted out the next, 
then the cycle repeats as if informally institutionalizing a check on power (Rolbein 1989, 
p.111, p.177-178). 
 Table 12 depicts political affiliations from the UO survey. Itshows that the survey 
oversampled heavily from respondents identifying with the Democratic party. As will be 
Table 11. Political Party Leanings of Costa Rican Sample and National Trends 
Party Freq. % Presidential Election 
Results (%) 
Legislative Assembly Election 
Results (%) 
2010 2006 2002 2010 2006 2002 
National Liberation 
Party (PLN) 
65 20.83 46.9 40.9 31.1 37.3 36.5 27.1 
Citizen’s Action 
Party (PAC) 
55 17.63 25.1 39.8 26.2 17.6 25.3 22 
Libertarian 
Movement Party 
(PML) 
3 0.96 20.9 8.5 1.7 14.5 9.2 9.3 
Social Christian 
Unity Party (PUS) 
3 0.96 3.9 3.6 38.6 8.2 7.8 29.8 
Other 16 5.13 3.3 7.1 2.7 22.5 21.1 11.9 
No answer 170 54.49  
Notes: N=312;  The Costa Rican survey question was Q: Which political party do you tend to vote for?; 
The high percentage of “Other” parties receiving votes in the Legislative Assembly election is not unusual 
for a proportional representation system like Costa Rica. Election results from Alvarez-Rivera (2010). The 
2010 elections occurred on February 7, about 6 months before the Costa Rican surveys were conducted. 
The 2002 Presidential results led to a runoff election. In the runoff election the PUS candidate received 
58% and the PLN candidate received 42% of votes. The four parties listed by name above have been the 
dominant parties over this period. 
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Table 12. Political Party Leanings of UO Sample (2010) and U.S. Population (2011) 
Party Sample 
Freq. 
% 
Sample 
% U.S. 
population  
Republican 83 20.49 45 
Democrat 196 48.40 45 
Green 4 0.99  
Libertarian 12 2.96  
Other 7 1.73  
I do not vote 49 12.10  
None 43 10.62  
No answer 11 2.72  
Notes: N=405; Source on party leanings in U.S. population: Jones (2012); The UO survey question was Q: 
Which political party do you tend to vote for? 
 
discussed below, this almost certainly skewed the data towards more peaceful attitudes 
than exists in the U.S. population at large.  
Why Attitudes Exhibited in the Two Samples Are Likely to Be Different  
in the General Populations of the U.S. and Costa Rica 
 There are several reasons why the attitudes exhibited in the two samples may be 
different in the general populations of the two nations. Overall, most of the sample biases 
suggest that the attitudinal peace gap between the U.S. and Costa Rican populations may 
be even larger than the gap exhibited in the present samples. First, females around the 
world typically express more peaceful attitudes than males (Gat 2006, Burris 2008). The 
UO survey oversampled from females, with a 16% gender gap, as opposed to the 4% 
gender gap in the Costa Rica sample. For this reason, the UO sample is likely to be 
significantly more dovish than the general U.S. population.  
 Second,U.S. respondents with college degrees tend to be more hawkish than the 
general population (Loewen 2007, Burris 2008), but there are signs of a recent shift as 
college degrees were associated with slightly more dovish attitudes during the Iraq War 
(Burris 2008). The effect of higher levels of education in Costa Rica is unknown, but the 
present study can shed some light here. Third, the Costa Rican sample drew 
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disproportionately from majors in physics and engineering - groups that tend to be more 
hawkish in their attitudes than the general population according to previous cross-
national studies (see below). Fourth, the UO survey clearly oversampled from Democrats 
(relative to the proportion of Democrats in the U.S. population). Again, this is highly 
likely to be a factor making the current sample more dovish than the general population. 
As Burris (2008) has shown, in recent years, political party affiliation often explains 
more variation in attitudes towards military action than almost any other variable – with 
Democrats less hawkish than Republicans. 
 Besides tracking the demographic variables, an analysis of the replicated Gallup 
World Poll questions offers another route for considering how university students in each 
nation, and the present cohort of university students in particular, might differ from the 
general populations. Loewen (2007) argues that university graduates are more likely to be 
hawkish for two reasons, socialization (i.e., more schooling produces more uncritical 
patriotism) and “allegiance” (i.e., more success in society, often made possible through 
education, leads to less critical attitudes towards society including national security 
policies). But what about university undergraduates who have not yet reaped the rewards 
of their education through securing lucrative careers? Will they also be more hawkish, or 
because they have not yet obtained careers and become successful in society, will their 
“allegiance” be weaker? One thinks here of the widely cited notion that after collecting 
their first paycheck post-college, young adults become card-carrying Republicans. 
 Below in Table 13, we see that on the principled objections to terrorism and state 
terrorism, both UO and Costa Rican university students are at least 10% more peaceful 
than the general populations of each nation. Costa Rican university students are 14%  
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Table 13. Comparing Data with Nationally Representative Samples 
Question 
from 
Gallup 
World Poll 
Attitude Probed Costa Rica  Costa Rica: 
University 
students - Gallup 
sample (x̄ - x̄²)  
USA 
 
USA: University 
students – 
Gallup sample  
(x̄ - x̄²) 
Q4 principled stance 
against state 
terrorism (is state 
terrorism 
justifiable?) 
89% responded 
“never justified” (U. 
students 2010) 
 
+14%  
(In Costa Rica: U. 
students are more 
nonviolent than 
general pop.) 
81% responded 
“never justified” (U. 
students 2010) 
+33% 
(In USA: U. 
students are more 
nonviolent than 
general pop.) 
75% responded 
“never justified” 
(Gallup World Poll 
2008) 
48% responded 
“never justified” 
(Gallup World Poll 
2008) 
Q5 principled stance 
against “terrorism” 
(is “terrorism” 
justifiable?) 
90% responded 
“never justified” (U. 
students 2010) 
 
+14% 
(In Costa Rica: U. 
students are more 
nonviolent than 
general pop.) 
86% responded 
“never justified” (U. 
students 2010) 
+10% 
(In USA: U. 
students are more 
nonviolent than 
general pop.) 
76% responded 
“never justified” 
(Gallup World Poll 
2008) 
76% responded 
“never justified” 
(Gallup World Poll 
2008) 
Q6 efficacy of 
nonviolence 
(pragmatic 
nonviolence) 
61% responded 
“peaceful means” 
“will work” (U. 
students 2010) 
 
-12%  
(In Costa Rica: U. 
students have less 
faith in nonviolent 
methods than 
general pop.) 
61% responded 
“peaceful means” 
“will work” (U. 
students 2010) 
+7% 
(In USA: U. 
students have 
more confidence 
in nonviolent 
methods than 
general pop.) 
73% responded 
“peaceful means” 
“will work” (Gallup 
World Poll 2008) 
54% responded 
“peaceful means” 
“will work” (Gallup 
World Poll 2008) 
  
more peaceful on both items. But the largest observed gap is found in the state terrorism 
item, where the UO students are 33% morepeaceful than the general U.S. population on 
this item. This gap might be an artifact of oversampling from females and Democratic 
leaning voters. In any case, this finding at least partially refutes Loewen’s (2008) 
theorizing on how higher degrees of education reproduces more hawkish attitudes. 
Patterns on the nonviolent efficacy item are divergent. UO students are again more 
peaceful (by 7%) on this item than the general U.S. population, but Costa Rican 
university students are 12% less peaceful than the general population. Thus, there may be 
something about the Costa Rican educational system or the historical experiences of the 
young adult cohort, as compared with previous Costa Rican generations, that is not 
reproducing faith in pragmatic nonviolence. One plausible explanation is the failure of 
the mass anti-CAFTA mobilizations beginning in 2005 through the national referendum 
in 2007 which deeply frustrated many progressive civil society sectors. Ultimately, the 
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organizing efforts and mass street protests did not work, as about 51% of the country 
voted to approve CAFTA.         
Attitudinal Variation Across University Majors 
 
 Table 14 depicts the majors of respondents. Numerous studies have found 
significant attitudinal differences among diverse college majors. During the 1960s, 
college majors in the humanities, social sciences, and liberal arts were significantly more 
likely to engage in political activism and protest (Fenton and Gleason 1969, Gamson et 
al. 1967, Braungart and Braungart 1974). Several studies have found that economics 
majors tend to be less cooperative and more selfish in experimental settings (Stout 2011, 
p.249). Frank, Gilovich, and Regan (1987) concluded these outcomes can be explained 
through socialization forces associated with studying economics. A body of research has 
also linked the Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) to “hierarchy-enhancing” academic 
majors including Accounting, Business, Economics, and Marketing. Some majors were 
theorized as “neutrals,” but majors scoring lower on the SDO and theorized as 
“hierarchy-attenuating” majors included Sociology, Social Work, Women’s Studies, 
Special Education, and Public Health (Sidanius et al. 2003; van Laar et al. 1999; 
Sidanius, Sinclair, and Pratto 2006).   
 Diego Gambetta has found evidence that certain personality traits are “slightly 
more” likely to be prevalent among engineers than other university graduates: “Piecemeal 
evidence suggests that traits such as a greater lack of tolerance of ambiguity, a belief that 
society can be made to work like a clock, and a dislike of democratic politics, are more 
frequent among engineers” (Contexts 2008, p.4). One puzzle Gambetta was exploring 
here is that engineers are overrepresented among Islamic jihadists, yet he found no 
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evidence they are recruited for their technological knowledge or intelligence. Wajcman 
(1991) argues that “Of all the major professions, engineering contains the smallest 
proportion of females...[and] projects a heavily masculine image” (p.145).  
 But Messerschmidt (1995) contends that engineers construct and “perform” a 
particular form of masculinity which centers around taking pride in technological 
expertise, and while managerial masculinity typically glorifies risk-taking, engineers 
place higher priorities on quality and safety. Given such nuances, we might expect that in 
a demilitarized nation like Costa Rica, engineers would perform masculinity in context-
specific ways, and not necessarily embrace the norms of militarism which are, given 
Costa Rica’s culture and political structures, likely to be relatively less hegemonic than in 
the U.S. As we will see below, the opposite was true. The Costa Rican engineering, 
physics, and computer science majors were significantly more hawkish on the militarism 
index.   
Table 14. Majors of the Two Samples (Percentages) 
Major Costa 
Rica 
UO 
sociology 31* 13 
psychology 7 12 
pre-law 3 2 
pre-med 14 7 
business 14 16 
physics 7 0 
engineering 13 0 
computer science 8 0 
education 0 7 
journalism 0 7 
other humanities/ 
social sciences 
0 14 
natural sciences 0 6 
other/ undecided 2 16 
Notes: percentages; * An imprecision in the Costa Rica sample should be noted. Unfortunately, the majors of students 
sitting in Introduction to Sociology as well as other first and second year sociology courses and recruited to take this 
survey were not tracked. We can assume some of them intend to be sociology majors but otherwise they represent a 
diverse array of intended majors. Here, they are categorized under “sociology.”  
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Methodological Issues 
 Recruitment of respondents and response rate. The surveys took students about 
25 to 30 minutes to complete.The response rate at the UO was 403 out of 473 (85.2%). 
Students at the UO were solicited through an Introduction to Sociology course. 
Participation in the survey was rewarded with a moderate incentive of 1 point extra credit 
in the course. 
 The researcher and two research assistants agreed that the response rate in Costa 
Rica was about 90%. In Costa Rica, respondents were recruited while seated in various 
courses at three institutions, two private and one public university. Most Costa Rican 
surveys were completed during class-time with the cooperation of numerous professors 
and administrators on three separate university campuses in and around San Jose. As 
professors allowed class time to complete the surveys, the vast majority of students chose 
to complete the surveys, but a few declined including a few who were too young (under 
18 years old). About 120 students at UCR were invited to take the survey in sociology 
classes. These students completed the survey after class, and were compensated with a 
moderate incentive of about $6 (USD).    
 Online survey at the UO. The UO survey was conducted on-line in order to save 
data entry time. The on-line survey was designed to replicate as close as possible the 
paper survey-taking experience in Costa Rica. However, there were differences. In Costa 
Rica, students were either paid for their time, or filled out the survey in a classroom 
during class time with the cooperation of professors. In both cases, it was almost 
impossible for Costa Rican students to carelessly complete the survey in 10 minutes, 
since they were being observed. Under these conditions, most people took about 30 
104 
minutes to complete it. One unforeseen problem with the U.S. survey was that by 
guaranteeing students anonymity in their survey responses and offering them extra credit 
in their course as an incentive, some chose to attempt to earn the survey extra credit by 
completing it carelessly in 5 to 15 minutes. In such cases, response patterns were 
analyzed and it was confirmed that these respondents were answering the questions in 
highly suspect ways such as always choosing the first response. Qualtrics does allow 
some quality control checks such as a duration figure for how long it took respondents to 
complete the survey. Surveys taking between 5 minutes and 16 minutes were treated as 
suspect and omitted from the sample. 
 Sampling issues: Surveying university students – a politically engaged 
subpopulation? Table 15 below depicts respondents’ self-reported levels of political 
interest. It seems likely that university students are less interested and less informed about 
political issues than is commonly assumed. Putnam (2000) concludes from numerous 
empirical studies that in recent decades, cohorts of U.S. adults under thirty have been less 
politically engaged, less likely to read newspapers, to volunteer, and to belong to 
organizations. Thus, there is a “news and information gap,” a generation gap in political 
knowledge and political interest (p.36). There is some evidence of this phenomenon 
cross-nationally. For instance, a 2004 study of Israeli university students found that only 
37% of Hebrew University students and 26.5% at Bar-Ilan University could draw the 
West Bank on a map, and when asked about the Green Line, some students even asked, 
“What is the Green Line?” (Eldar 2006). The results are ironic because the researchers 
decided to survey university students believing that students comprise a relatively 
educated, politically active group. This assumption was clearly not supported. 
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Knowledge of the history and international recognition of the Green Line is essential to 
understanding the territorial disputes at the center of the long-standing Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. 
 But other patterns in intellectual and political capital are also worthy of note. A 
study of 50 U.S. colleges and universities concluded that freshmen often know more 
about U.S. history and politics than seniors, including at elite schools like Yale and UC 
Berkeley (Saunders 2006). As the present study sampled largely from freshmen, their 
proximity to high school education (a major standardized, nation-wide effort in 
socialization), ironically, can be considered a strength as I probe their historical and 
political knowledge.  
Table 15. Self-Reported Level of Political Interest 
Political interest Costa Rica 
(N=312) 
% 
UO 
(N=394) 
% 
Very interested (1) 21.79 11.93 
Somewhat interested (2) 31.73 43.91 
Not very interested (3) 31.41 30.96 
Not at all interested (4) 15.06 13.20 
Sample Means 2.40 2.45 
Note: A two-tailed t-test revealed no significant difference between the two sample means at the .05 level, 
or even the modest .1 level. 
 
 One proxy for political knowledge is found in self-reported levels of political 
interest. Above, we see that the amount of political alienation in the two samples seems 
to be roughly equal. Though about 10% more Costa Ricans claim to be “very interested,” 
this is counter-balanced by the roughly 12% more UO respondents claiming to be 
“somewhat interested.” T-tests revealed no significant differences between the means. 
 Emergent shifts in the political context of surveys in Costa Rica. The first round 
of 229 surveys was conducted in late July of 2010. A few weeks prior to this, the Costa 
Rican legislature, under pressure from the U.S. government, had authorized U.S. troops 
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to land at a port on the east coast of Costa Rica. The alleged reason was to help Costa 
Rica fight narco-trafficking. However, some peace activists in Costa Rica argued that the 
real reason was to intimidate President Ortega in Nicaragua and President Chavez in 
Venezuela (fieldnotes 2010). At the time, Ortega was in the midst of a re-election 
campaign and there were clear and ominous signs that the election would not be 
transparent, nor supervised by third-parties. Meanwhile, Chavez was embroiled in a tense 
war of words with Colombia (a key U.S. ally in the region). Still, only a minority of 
Costa Ricans – mostly leftist peace and justice activists paid much attention to the U.S. 
militarypresence. For example, a July protest march occupied the street in front of the 
Legislative Assembly building in San José, shutting down traffic on a vital arterial street 
for over an hour. The next day, none of the four daily San José newspapers carried a 
word of the protest, though this is not terribly surprising since the Costa Rican media has 
long been controlled by wealthy conservative elites who often align with the interests of 
the U.S. government. 
 A second round of 83 surveys occurred in the late November of 2010. This time, 
more significant historical factors intervened to alter the political context of the survey: a 
heated border conflict developed between Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Indeed, several 
students asked if the survey was being given at this time because of the border conflict 
and a corresponding spike in interest regarding Costa Rican attitudes towards the military 
and conflict resolution issues.  
 In late October and early November of 2010 a crisis developed on the border 
between Nicaragua and Costa Rica. The crisis stemmed from the movement of 
Nicaragua’s military onto an island south of the San Juan River, Isla Calero. The island is 
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officially a part of Costa Rica, but a Nicaraguan military leader claimed to consult 
Google maps which had mislabeled the island (Times 2010, November 16).Other than 
that explanation, the Nicaraguan move is somewhat baffling, though some suspect that 
Nicaragua was maneuvering to secure offshore oil rights. 
 The 83 surveys were completed between November 22 and 26. Thus, surveys 
were completed after Costa Rican police forces were sent to the border with Nicaragua to 
investigate reports of Nicaraguan troops entering Costa Rica (October 22), and after the 
Costa Rican government reported that Nicaraguan troops were spotted on Costa Rican 
soil (November 1), but before December 1st, when the President gave a speech urging 
Costa Ricans to join the Armed Forces Reserves. Ironically, the occasion for the speech 
was the 62nd anniversary of Abolishing the Armed Forces.  
 The border incident led the Costa Rican government to send police forces to the 
border, but also to redouble diplomatic conflict resolution efforts. Early in November, the 
Permanent Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) met in Washington 
D.C. to address the border conflict, and “22 of the 27 OAS representatives voted to 
request that Nicaragua remove troops from the area.” Nicaragua did not attend the 
meeting and Ortega stonewalled the OAS, calling it a “failure” (Williams Nov.19, 2010). 
But Ortega did express openness to diplomatic resolution through the United Nations and 
the international court, rather than the OAS. On Nicaraguan national television he said:  
Let the court say who is right, not guns or threats. The court has the power and the 
instruments to determine that. The OAS doesn't have anything like that…I want to 
make clear that Nicaragua does not want to fall into a provocation. (AP Nov.2, 
2010) 
 
Moreover, Ortega appealed rationally to recent international rulings which affirm 
Nicaragua has sovereign rights over the San Juan River. ICJ rulings include the July 2009 
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ruling that re-affirmed Nicaragua owns the river, but Costa Rica has navigational rights. 
But Ortega then threw in emotional fire with a caustic interpretation of past history, 
accusing Costa Rica of being “an expansionist nation that has historically tried to 
negotiate what it doesn't own” (AP Nov.2, 2010). 
 In mid-November, the Costa Rican government filed a complaint before the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague, Netherlands, “alleging that Nicaragua 
has violated its sovereignty and destroyed parts of a protected wetland” (Williams 
Nov.19, 2010). These diplomatic moves to engage the OAS and the ICJ were the main 
responses of the Costa Rican government to the crisis. Shortly after these developments, 
the second round of surveys was conducted(between November 22-26). At that stage of 
the border conflict, anxiety about unfolding events may have served to alter downward 
people’s perceptions of the efficacy of diplomacy, or raised fears of Nicaraguan 
belligerence and military power, creating a desire for a stronger Costa Rican security 
force. Or perhaps, the events could strengthen confidence in diplomacy, especially since 
key government leaders like the Costa Rican Security Minister José Maria Tijerino (who, 
ironically, was raised in Nicaragua, and with his bi-national biography symbolized the 
possibility of cooperation) urged diplomatic solutions, saying, “Costa Rica, which doesn't 
have an army, is looking for a solution to this conflict through diplomatic channels. We 
are looking for a solution that, if possible, will not further aggravate the situation” 
(Williams Nov.1, 2010).   
 Internal validity on the nonviolent/ violent questions. Cronbach’s alpha tests 
were conducted on the 33 core questions (the 33 items of Question 9) on violent/ 
nonviolent attitudes.Positively-worded questions (in which “Strongly Agree” or “Agree” 
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were the peaceful answers) were reverse coded so that the peaceful answers in the whole 
set of 33 questions assumed the values of “3” and “4.” The alpha score for the 33 core 
questions in the Costa Rica data was .8515. Alpha scores between .9 and .8 are 
considered indicators of “good” internal validity (Nunnally 1978). However, 33 items is 
quite a large number, and such large numbers of items tend to raise alpha scores. In the 
Costa Rica sample on the 33 core questions, low scores (ranging between .1155 and 
.2285) in “item-rest correlation” (which shows how the item is correlated with a scale 
computed from the other 32 items) suggest we should consider omitting these questions 
because including each one drags down the overall alpha score: Q9.3, Q9.10, Q9.13, 
Q9.19, Q9.31. Next, along with the 33 core questions I added in Questions 4 – 6 (the 3 
nonviolent/ violent questions from the Gallup World Poll), and reverse coded them so 
that the peaceful answer is “2,” and standardized the alpha test (because these 3 questions 
were dichotomous). The result was that alpha was improved slightly to .8664, and 
analysis showed that the addition of each one of these 3 items improved the overall alpha 
score. Thus, we can say that the core 33 questions have relatively strong internal 
reliability with the 3 Gallup World Poll questions in the Costa Rica sample. 
 Similarly, the alpha score for the 33 core questions in the UO data was .8623. In 
the UO sample on the 33 core questions, an analysis of the “item-rest correlation” for 
each item suggest I should consider omitting only one question (with an item-rest 
correlation of .0456) because it drags down the overall alpha score: Q9.4. Next, along 
with the 33 core questions I added in Questions 4 – 6 (the 3 nonviolent/ violent questions 
from the Gallup World Poll), reverse coded them, so that the peaceful answer is “2” and 
standardized the alpha test. The result was that alpha was improved slightly to .8669, 
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even though the “item-rest correlation” was low (.1824) on Q5 from the Gallup World 
Poll – and dropping Q5 would raise alpha to .8675. In any case, we can say that the core 
33 questions have relatively strong internal reliability with the 3 Gallup World Poll 
questions in the UO sample. 
Testing the “Elite Cues” Theory of Attitude Formation 
 Conventional assumptions about democracy hold that democracies are a vibrant, 
constructive, and healthy mode of governance because citizens are sufficiently interested 
in the political process, knowledgeable, and capable of engaging in discourse in the 
public square. In addition, leading sociologists contend that Americans value 
individualism to a fault (Bellah et al. 1985). Our lionization of individualism pervades 
public discourse and realms beyond politics as well. A 1978 Gallup survey found that 
80% of Americans endorse an ideal of arriving at their religious beliefs independently of 
churches or synagogues (Roof 2003, p.139). Yet, a substantial body of research by public 
opinion scholars contends that far from being individualists, people’s opinions are 
heavily influenced by “elite cues.”  
 After respondents completed the 34 questions on forms of violence and 
nonviolence, they were presented with a section of quotations. The incorporation of 
quotations from domestic and international political and moral leaders, an innovative 
aspect of the survey, aimed to test the “elite cues” theory of attitude formation. In this 
theory, average citizens are viewed as somewhat indifferent to political policies, and 
somewhat or perhaps largely uninformed about policies and their rationales, all of which 
makes them likely to adopt the opinions of elites and authority figures – thus following 
“elite cues” in the formation of their own opinions and legitimation rationales(Paul and 
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Brown 2001, Lupia 1994, Mondak 1993, Carmines and Kiklinski 1990, Brady and 
Sniderman 1985). This strategy of adopting elite opinions may be a rational and 
economic choice, given the context of modernity where time constraints hinder many 
from becoming informed citizens and many feel powerless to effect change anyway (and 
in turn, disinterested in the issues), or it may be an expression of a generalized 
authoritarian personality, political party loyalty, or a genuine trust in particular political 
or moral leaders.   
 The results indicate strong support for the “elite cues”theory of opinion formation, 
in the realm of political violence. For example, the surveys began by presenting 
respondents with a forced choice question – whether it is “never justified” or “sometimes 
justified” for “the military to target and kill civilians.” The question is quite extreme 
since the actions named here are against commonly agreed upon international law (e.g., 
the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949)). But it seems possible that respondents failed to 
distinguish between targeting civilians and “collateral damage” – and that in itself could 
be a telling indicator of public acceptance of, or confusion over, standard modes of 
operation conducted by the U.S. military and their public relations statements. In the UO 
sample, 19.04% of respondents answered “sometimes justified,” while 80.96% of 
respondents answered “never justified.” Among those who answered “sometimes 
justified,” 86.36% of Republicans and 82.14% of Democrats changed their minds on the 
principle of the acceptability of targeting civilians in military attacks, as they agreed with 
the quote from former President George W. Bush, who said in a 2002 speech at West 
Point military academy, “Targeting innocent civilians for murder is always and 
everywhere wrong (Applause)” (Bush 2002). As will be discussed below, there was also 
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a statistically significant difference in rates of change among the first experimental group 
(where pro-violent elite quotes appeared first) and the second experimental group (where 
pro-nonviolent elite quotes appeared first). In the entire sample, only 6.06% of 
respondents “disagreed” with Bush and no one “strongly disagreed.”   
 What about the initial Gallup World Poll question on the efficacy of nonviolence 
(Q6)? Would respondents who initially affirmed the efficacy of nonviolence maintain 
consistency in their view when confronted with a quote from President Obama in his 
2009 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech - a quote which might be especially likely to 
summon agreement by those affiliated with the Democratic party as well as by those who 
might consider the Nobel Peace Prize a form of authoritative moral capital? The latter is 
likely to be a mainstream perception, but given the context in our polarized nation and the 
fact that Obama had done little of great note (in general as well as in the cause of peace) 
by this point early in his presidency, highlighting his Nobel Peace Prize award would 
probably not be enough to over-ride a general dislike of Obama by respondents who 
loyally identify with the Republican party. That is, in the context of our survey, despite 
receiving the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize, it seems reasonable to assume that Obama would 
not generally be perceived as a “moral leader,” but only as a political elite. At the same 
time, it was expected that the prestige of the Nobel Prize may have pushed some 
respondents towards projecting moral clout/ moral capital onto his quote.  
 To further test the “elite cues” theory, only respondents who consistently gave 
peaceful answers (whether agree or disagree, depending on the question) and consistently 
expressed confidence in the moral superiority of nonviolence and the efficacy of 
nonviolence were analyzed. The following questions were utilized to determine the 
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subsample of “hard core” nonviolent adherents. These questions speak to the same issues 
addressed in the two Obama quotes appearing in the survey. Respondents answered “will 
work” to the following question:  
Q6: “Some people believe that groups that are oppressed and are suffering from injustice 
can improve their situation by peaceful means alone (nonviolent methods). Others do 
NOT believe that peaceful means alone will work to improve the situation for 
oppressed groups. Which do you believe, peaceful means alone will work, or peaceful 
means alone will NOT work?” 
And, respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the following three questions: 
Q9_9: When people suffer under a dictator, a violent revolution is necessary and 
justified. 
Q9_16: When the goal is liberation from tyranny or oppression, war can be necessary and 
justified. 
Q9_18: Diplomacy (negotiations between leaders) often fails and war between nations 
becomes necessary. 
And, respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the following five questions: 
Q9_10: Using violence to pursue political goals is NEVER justified. 
Q9_24: In nations on the verge of civil war, nonviolent movements are likely to be more 
successful in increasing long-term peace and justice than using violence. 
Q9_26: Diplomacy (negotiations between leaders) and nonviolent methods can always 
work to solve international disputes. 
Q9_27: If the goal is peace, peaceful methods must be used because we can NOT 
separate the means (methods) from the ends (goals). 
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Q9_28: Nonviolent methods can work to overthrow dictators. 
 Tracking responses to these nine questions gives us a subsample of hard-core, 
consistent adherents of principled and pragmatic nonviolence, at least in the context of 
this single survey. And, the survey is fairly robust in that there are multiple checks on the 
consistency of their views. In fact, based on these selection criteria we are left with only 
18 respondents (4.5%) of the UO sample.  
 Table 16 below helps us analyze how these hard-core nonviolent adherents 
responded to Obama’s arguments. All survey respondents were randomly split into two 
experimental groups. Each group was exposed to the same elite quotes, but in a different 
sequence. Q13 is the set in which pro-violent quotes appeared first (Form A), andin Q14 
elite quotes favoring nonviolence appeared first (Form B). Two Obama quotes were 
selected because they closely re-iterate questions that appeared earlier in the survey. That 
is, these two Obama quotes do not introduce new nuances concerning violent/ nonviolent 
ideology. The respondents have already weighed in on these same issues. All that is 
really new is the “elite cue,” that is, the perceived authority of the elite attached to the 
ideological claim. The Obama quote which appears in Q13_1(Form A/ the first 
experimental group) and Q14_12 (Form B/ the second experimental group)reads: “‘There 
will be times when nations, acting individually or in concert, will find the use of 
[military] force not only necessary but morally justified.’ – President Obama in his 2009 
Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech” [Answers: 1=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 
4=strongly disagree]. Respondents who answered “strongly agree” (1) or “agree” (2) in 
effect changed their previously consistent nonviolent view to agree with Obama. The 
results appear in the table below. We see below that 10 of the 18 (55.6%) changed their 
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view to agree with Obama’s quote which asserts there are times when military force is 
necessary and justified. 
Table 16. Experimental Group Outcomes Among Hard-Core Nonviolent Respondents: 
Response to Obama’s Cue Endorsing Morally Justified Military Force 
 
Form A 
(Q13_1) 
Frequency % Form B 
(Q14_12) 
Frequency % 
Strongly agree 
(1) 
0 0 Strongly agree 
(1) 
1 12.5 
Agree (2) 3 30 Agree (2) 6 75 
Disagree (3) 6 60 Disagree (3) 1 12.5 
Strongly 
disagree (4) 
1 10 Strongly 
disagree (4) 
0 0 
Total 10 100 Total 8 100 
 
 The second Obama quote, appearing in Q13_2 and Q14_11 read: “‘The 
nonviolence practiced by men like Gandhi and King may not have been practical or 
possible in every circumstance.’ – President Barack Obama in his 2009 Nobel Peace 
Prize acceptance speech” [Answers: 1=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly 
disagree]. Again, respondents who answered “strongly agree” (1) or “agree” (2) in effect 
changed their previously consistent nonviolent view to agree with Obama. The results 
appear in Table 17 below. Overall, 7 of the 18 (38.9%) principled nonviolent adherents 
changed their view to agree with Obama’s quote which affirmed that nonviolence is not 
always practical or possible. 
 Again, these changes in response to elite cues are remarkable, keeping in mind 
that the respondents in the table above have affirmed earlier in the survey that 
nonviolence works, even in the difficult context of a despotic regime. They have even 
affirmed that nonviolent methods and diplomacy can “always work.” They have also  
affirmed that political violence is “neverjustified,” and that wars of liberation and violent 
revolutions are neither necessary nor justified. Yet, in both experimental groups, several 
respondents changed their view to agree with these two quotes from Obama. These 
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results suggest that when confronted with elite opinion, attitudes can be quite malleable 
even among respondents who consistently affirmed principled and pragmatic nonviolent 
attitudes. On the other hand, as we will see below, there is also some evidence that for 
many respondents, attitudes on these issues of violence/ nonviolence appear to be 
relatively stable in the context of a single, complex, multi-item survey. 
Table 17. Experimental Group Outcomes Among Hard-Core Nonviolent Respondents: 
Response to Obama’s Cue Rejecting Nonviolent Efficacy 
 
Form A 
(Q13_2) 
Frequency % Form B 
(Q14_11) 
Frequency % 
Strongly agree 
(1) 
0 0 Strongly agree 
(1) 
1 12.5 
Agree (2) 3 30 Agree (2) 3 37.5 
Disagree (3) 5 50 Disagree (3) 4 50 
Strongly 
disagree (4) 
2 20 Strongly 
disagree (4) 
0 0 
Total 10 100 Total 8 100 
 
Two Experimental Groups: Varying the Presentation Sequence of Elite Quotes 
 Again, in both the UO and Costa Rican surveys, respondents were randomly split 
into two survey forms which are here termed “experimental groups.” The quotes include 
moral and political elites as well as the iconic rebel soldier Che Gueverra. The particular 
political and moral profiles of the elites (e.g., President Obama’s affiliation with the 
Democratic party could make Republicans less likely to agree with him, regardless of 
what he says in any given quote) and leaders (e.g., Che Gueverra is likely to only appeal 
to those with leftist, radical or militant opinions) must be taken into account, such that 
careful, qualitative interpretations and tentative conclusions are called for.  
 T-tests were conducted on the two experimental groups to determine if the order 
of presentation of elite quotes affected propensities to agree or disagree. In the UO data, 
the results show that there were statistically significant differences between the two 
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experimental groups on 4 out of the 13 quotes. On all 13 quotes, respondents had four 
answer choices (1=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree), but again, 
the initial survey instructions suggested they could always leave an answer blank if they 
did not know or preferred not to answer.  
 It was expected that the respondents exposed to the violent quotes first would be 
more likely to answer with pro-violent attitudes, and respondents exposed to the 
nonviolent quotes first would be more likely to answer with pro-nonviolent attitudes. As 
seen in the Table below, results show that this was true in two cases, but in two other 
cases opinion shifted in the opposite direction. Possible interpretations are suggested 
below, but in general, it may also be that the quotes and the particularity of the elites 
attached to them stand on their own. Thus, there are limits to the malleability of 
respondents on questions of violence/ nonviolence, and this is partly because people 
respond differently to different elites, and the order of presentation is not so important. 
Hence, a major limitation of the set of quotes is that only one Republican party leader 
was quoted. In hindsight, the “elites” presented should have been deliberately drawn from 
a variety of voices from both the Republican and Democratic party. Also, including Che 
Gueverra as a leader is not very ideal for the mainstream U.S. context, but his inclusion 
makes possible comparisons with our Central American sample. 
 As seen in Table 18 below, the two groups exhibited significant differences in 
their means on four questions. First, the quote appearing in Q13_12 and Q14_1 was: 
“Violence never brings permanent peace. It solves no social problem: it merely creates 
new and more complicatedones.” – Martin Luther King, Jr. in his 1964 Nobel Peace Prize 
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acceptance speech. This was conceptualized as a pro-nonviolence statement, and so to 
agree with this is a peaceful answer. 
Table 18. T-Tests (Difference Between Group Means) on Two Experimental Groups in 
UO Survey: Items Where the Order of Elite Quotes Significantly Influenced Responses 
 
Quotes of Moral and Political Elites (Question # in 
Form A) x̄ 
 
(Question # in 
Form B) x̄² 
 
x̄ - x̄² 
 
“The nonviolence practiced by men like Gandhi and King 
may not have been practical or possible in every 
circumstance.” – President Barack Obama in his 2009 
Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech  
(Q13_2)  2.17 (Q14_11)  2.04 0.13* 
“The USA has helped underwrite [support] global security 
for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens 
and the strength of our arms…So yes, the instruments of 
war do have a role to play in preserving the peace.” – 
President Obama in his 2009 Nobel Peace Prize 
acceptance speech (See Appendix A for the full quote as it 
appeared in the survey.) 
(Q13_3)  2.30 (Q14_13)  2.08 0.22** 
“Targeting innocent civilians for murder is always and 
everywhere wrong.” – President George W. Bush (2002) 
(Q13_6)  1.54 (Q14_4)    1.40   0.14* 
“Violence never brings permanent peace. It solves no 
social problem: it merely creates new and more 
complicated ones.” – Martin Luther King, Jr. in his 1964 
Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech 
(Q13_12) 1.88   (Q14_1)    1.72 0.16* 
Note: * = p < .05; ** = p< .01; There was no significant difference between group means (Form A vs. Form B) on the 
other 9 elite quotes. Source: UO survey (Eddy 2010) 
 
 The two group means exhibit a significant difference at the .05 level. The Q14 
group has a more peaceful mean (1.72 versus the mean of the Q13 group on this item: 
1.88). The Q14 group was exposed to pro-nonviolent quotes first. This result confirms the 
expected direction of influence. It seems that exposing respondents to Dr. King’s 
condemnation of violence first made some respondents more likely to agree with Dr. 
King, as opposed to placing Dr. King’s words near the end of the set, after the quotes of 
pro-violent elites - which it should be noted, included Obama’s dismissal of King’s 
nonviolent ideology.  
 The second quote (Q13_6 and Q14_4) exhibiting a significant difference between 
the two experimental groups was: “Targeting innocent civilians for murder is always and 
everywhere wrong.”– President George W. Bush (2002).This was conceptualized as a 
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pro-nonviolence statement and to agree with this is a peaceful answer. The two group 
means exhibit a significant difference at the .05 level. The Q14 group has a more 
peaceful mean (1.40 versus the means of the Q13 group on this item: 1.54). Of course, 
this is really a principle of international law, and it is telling that U.S. Presidents rarely 
mention international law as a rationale for their arguments (it seems this would concede 
too much authority to the international community).The Q14 group was exposed to pro-
nonviolent quotes first, so again, this is the expected direction of influence. It had been 
expected that those first exposed to pro-nonviolent quotes would be more likely to 
express agreement with nonviolent principles, including the Bush quote affirming the 
principle that targeting civilians is morally illegitimate. The quote by former President 
Bush appeared close to the middle of the set of quotes in both survey forms. Respondents 
in the Q14 form were exposed to three pro-nonviolent quotes before reading the Bush 
quote, while respondents in the Q13 form were exposed to five pro-violent quotes before 
reading the Bush quote. 
 The next two quotes initially seem to pose challenges to the expected direction of 
influence resulting from manipulating the order of the items. But a closer analysis of the 
particularity of the quotes included in the sets suggests nuanced interpretations may be 
able to reconcile the apparent contradictions. Both quotes at issue here involve President 
Obama offering rationales for a just-war orientation. Question (Q13_2 and Q14_11) was: 
“The nonviolence practiced by men like Gandhi and King may not have been practical or 
possible in every circumstance” – President Barack Obama in his 2009 Nobel Peace Prize 
acceptance speech.This was conceptualized as a pro-violent statement (specifically, a 
pro-just war statement),and so to agree with this was considered a pro-violent answer. 
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The two group means exhibit a significant difference at the .05 level. The Q13 group has 
a more peaceful mean (2.17 versus the mean of the Q14 group on this item: 2.04) as they 
are closer to disagreeing with the Obama quote.The Q13 group was exposed to pro-
violent quotes first, so this is not the expected direction of influence. In any case, for 
some reason, it seems respondents were more likely to disagree with Obama’s pro-just 
war arguments when his quotes appear first. This may reflect the sharply limited degree 
of moral authority that respondents projected onto Obama in the late 2010 context, 
despite having been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Additional reasons for this pattern 
are offered below. 
 One obvious explanation rests in the fact that in the Q14 form, Obama’s quotes 
appeared at the end of the entire set of quotes. Thus, for some respondents, the quotes 
appearing before the Obama quote may have provoked a reaction against nonviolent 
attitudes or against Dr. King, pushing respondents to agree with Obama against Dr. 
King’s nonviolence. Here, I propose that a likely candidate for a mediating variable is 
one quote in particular: Q14_8. Item Q14_8 may have provoked a reaction against Dr. 
King and his nonviolence as he is quoted as saying, “[The USA] is the greatest purveyor 
of violence in the world today.” This dissenting critique of U.S. policy may have made 
respondents more likely to agree two quotes later with Obama as he claims that Dr. King 
and Gandhi (and their nonviolence) were not always practical. This is a particularly 
interesting interpretation because the prophetic King, the radical King with his anti-
Vietnam War stance, is the King that many college students today are likely to be 
unfamiliar with. But it is worth recalling that in the last years of his life, Dr. King’s 
radical and progressive agenda had alienated the majority of Americans, such that “72 
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percent of whites and 55 percent of blacks disapproved of King’s opposition to the 
Vietnam War and his efforts to eradicate poverty in America” (West 2011).  
 King’s lofty place in American collective memory is indisputable. He is, after all, 
the only civil society leader to have an official holiday named after him. But there are 
many signs that collective memory of his radical edge has been watered down. Indeed, 
Polletta (1998) finds that collective memory processes in the U.S. have heavily favored 
the “early King” and neglected the “later King.” Thus, I suggest that when Dr. King is 
de-sanitized, when Dr. King’s nonviolence is clearly linked to a harsh critique of U.S. 
policies, a significance percentage of U.S. college students are more likely to react 
against Dr. King’s nonviolent principles. It seems plausible that Dr. King’s quote 
(Q14_8) harshly dissenting from U.S. policies provoked a reaction among patriotic 
respondents, making them more likely to agree with Obama’s critique of King. Because 
Dr. King’s quote would still be visible on the computer screen of survey takers just two 
quotes above, it could have made respondents more likely to agree with Obama in his 
critique of King. Thus, when respondents are first exposed to the radical Dr. King, 
respondents are more likely to agree with Obama’s suggestion that King’s nonviolence 
could be unrealistic. As we will see below, subsequent cross-tabs analyses of the patriotic 
variable and these items offered support for this interpretation. 
 The fourth and final quote in which statistically different means appeared between 
the two groups is Question (Q13_3 and Q14_13), which read: “The USA has helped 
underwrite [support] global security for more than six decades with the blood of our 
citizens and the strength of our arms…So yes, the instruments of war do have a role to 
play in preserving the peace” – President Obama in his 2009 Nobel Peace Prize 
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acceptance speech (see Appendix A for the full quote as it appeared in the survey). This 
was conceptualized as a pro-violent statement (specifically, a pro-just war statement) and 
a defense of U.S. military policies, and so to agree with this is a pro-violent answer. The 
two group means exhibit a significant difference at the .01 level.The Q13 group has a 
more peaceful mean (2.30 versus the mean of the Q14 group on this item: 2.08) as the 
Q13 group is closer to disagreeing with the Obama quote. Yet the Q13 group was 
exposed to pro-violent quotes first, so this is not in the expected direction of influence. 
Again, for some reason, respondents were more likely to disagree with Obama’s pro-just 
war arguments when his quotes appear first. To put it another way, respondents were 
more likely to agree with Obama when quotes by pro-nonviolent leaders and other pro-
violent leaders came before Obama’s quote. Again, I propose that a plausible 
interpretation here is that Dr. King’s dissenting quote in Q14_8 provoked a reaction 
among patriotic respondents (conceptualizing, for the moment, patriotism in the very 
narrow but conventional sense of being reluctant to critique the U.S.). The key issue to 
adjudicate here is – who are the “patriotic” respondents? Does Q44 (“How patriotic are 
you? Would you say you are extremely patriotic, very patriotic, somewhat patriotic, or 
not especially patriotic?”) hold sufficient validity? 
 Obama versus King: Adjudicating patriotism as a mediating variable. Previous 
studies have shown a link between national pride and confidence in the military as well 
as willingness to fight for the nation (Listhaug 1986, p.75). Rose’s (1985) study of 15 
nations found that in all nations except Iceland, self-identified ideological conservatives 
are 19% more likely to express pride in their country, and while left-wing citizens are less 
likely to express pride, the majority on the left still do express national pride. Those 
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lacking patriotism were disproportionately young and well-educated (Rose 1985). In 
1998, employing semi-structured qualitative interviews, Wolfe (1998) found evidence of 
“mature patriotism” among middle-class Americans, such that the jingoistic “blind 
patriotism” of “America, right or wrong” was largely absent as many voiced critiques of 
America’s wars abroad. However, below I suggest that the percentage of respondents 
embracing “blind patriotism” is enough to produce significant findings in the shifts 
against Dr. King and towards Obama, as we analyze responses to elite cues in the two 
experimental groups. 
 Subsequent cross-tabs analyses of the patriotism variable (Q44) and the two 
Obama quotes initially offered only modest support for the interpretation that the 
dissenting quote of Dr. King was a mediating variable (which might provoke a reaction 
against King and foster agreement with Obama over King), since differences between the 
experimental groups cut across almost all levels of self-identified “patriotism.” 
 I will suggest below this only casts doubt on the validity of conceptualizing the 
“patriotism” variable in terms of “blind patriotism” operating at the individual level. 
Rather, it can be conceived as operating at the cultural level. In Table 19 below, we see 
how respondents sorted into self-identified degree of patriotism (Q44) varied between the 
two experimental groups in their response to the two Obama quotes at issue (which 
exhibited statistically significant differences between their means).   
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Table 19. Cross-Tabs on Patriotism Summarized (Differences Between the Two 
Experimental Groups) 
 
Q44: How patriotic are you? (% 
of overall sample) 
% differences in overall agreement (strongly agree + agree) with Obama as a 
result of placing Obama quote at end of Form (Q14 – Q13, or the agreements 
of respondents exposed to Form Q14 minus agreements of respondents 
exposed to Form Q13) 
(Q13_2 and Q14_11): “The 
nonviolence practiced by men like 
Gandhi and King may not have been 
practical or possible in every 
circumstance.” 
(Q13_3 and Q14_13): “The USA has 
helped underwrite [support] global 
security for more than six decades 
with the blood of our citizens and the 
strength of our arms…So yes, the 
instruments of war do have a role to 
play in preserving the peace.” 
extremely patriotic (4%) +18% +7% 
very patriotic (18%) -4% +10% 
somewhat patriotic (44%) +10% +15% 
not especially patriotic (32%) +23% +16% 
Notes: + = presenting Obama’s quotes at the end of the set of quotes (in Form B/ Q14) led to higher agreement with Obama as 
compared to respondents exposed to Obama’s quotes first (in Form A/ Q13) 
 
 It may be logical to conclude that placing Obama’s quotes at the beginning of the 
sequence are more likely to produce a knee-jerk reaction against Obama regardless of 
what he says, especially among Republicans. Additional analysis (not illustrated here) 
revealed this pattern to be present, but it also showed that Democrats followed the same 
pattern: both Republicans and Democrats were slightly more likely to disagree with all 
three of Obama’s pro-violent quotes when they were the first quotes presented in the set. 
Again, it seems that by placing Obama’s quotes after the other quotes in the set, including 
the critical Dr. King quote, Obama’s views are more likely to appear reasonable to 
respondents.   
 Because those who claimed to be “not especially patriotic” (and who might be 
expected to agree with dissenting quotes like that of Dr. King here) exhibited slightly 
greater differences between the two experimental forms than the “somewhat patriotic,” 
we are left with ex-post facto hypothesizing that even those who see themselves as “not 
especially patriotic” are actually offended or incredulous by Dr. King’s accusation that 
the U.S. is the “great purveyor of violence,” and so they reacted negatively against it. 
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Thus,they are more likely to agree with Obama against King a few questions later in the 
set, than they are likely to agree with Obama when his quotes begin the set of quotes. 
This interpretation actually fits with the broad stream of cross-national theorizing that 
asserts that nationalist influences are not so much at the individual level, but at the 
cultural level. In this case, nationalism is so pervasive in the U.S., even those who do not 
think of themselves as “patriotic,” tend to react negatively to harsh or radical critiques of 
the U.S., and thus are more likely to agree with Obama against King, after they are 
exposed to King’s radical critique of the U.S. 
 This interpretation of the “patriotism” variable is supported by analysis of how 
respondents answered Q44 in cross-tabulations (see Table below) with the dissenting Dr. 
King quote: “[The USA] is the greatest purveyor of violence in the world today.” Among 
those self-identified as “not especially patriotic,” 78% agreed, while 22% disagreed with 
King’s quote of radical dissent. But the other respondents (with different levels of self-
identified patriotism) also tended to follow this pattern of majority agreement with the 
King quote. At every level of self-identified patriotism except (and it is an important 
exception, though the cells were small) for the “extremely patriotic,” clear majorities 
agreed with Dr. King’s dissent. But the percentage who disagree would be enough to 
cause the targeted disparity between the Obama quotes in the two experimental groups.  
 If we conceptionalize Q44 as operationalizing a form of “blind patriotism” that 
reacts against harsh criticism of the U.S. – there is some evidence for this kind of 
patriotism in the data. But self-reported patriotism (whether one thinks of oneself as 
“patriotic”) may also reflect “mature patriotism” as well as tangential issues like the 
salience of family traditions on the 4th of July holiday, family connections and pride in 
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military service, one’s likelihood of displaying the U.S. flag, or the emotion one might 
feel during the playing of the National Anthem.  
 If blind patriotism is the mediating variable creating reaction against Dr. King and 
support for Obama, it seems to operate at the cultural level more than the individual level. 
This is why a sizeable minority (see Table 20 below), some 22% to 24%, of those who 
think of themselves as “not especially patriotic” and “somewhat patriotic” disagree with 
Dr. King’s harsh dissent of U.S. foreign policy.  
Table 20. Cross-Tabs: Levels of Patriotism Confronting Dr. King’s Dissent (Frequency 
and Row Percentages) 
 
Q44: How 
patriotic are you? 
“[The USA] is the greatest purveyor of violence in the world today.” – Dr. King 
(data on this quote in the two forms merged: Q13_13 and Q14_8) 
strongly 
agree 
agree disagree strongly 
disagree 
Total 
extremely 
patriotic 
1 
6.25% 
6 
37.5% 
6 
37.5% 
3 
18.75% 
16 
100% 
very patriotic 11 
15.71% 
32 
45.71% 
19 
27.14% 
8 
11.43% 
70 
100% 
somewhat 
patriotic 
40 
23.81% 
87 
51.79% 
38 
22.62% 
3 
1.79% 
168 
100% 
not especially 
patriotic 
41 
32.28% 
58 
45.67% 
28 
22.05% 
0 127 
100% 
 
 I suggest that the almost 25% in each level of self-identified patriotism who at 
least “disagree” (some also “strongly disagree” but the cell sizes are small) with Dr. 
King’s critique of U.S. violence is a likely source of the differences between Forms A 
and B. When confronted with Dr. King’s radical critique of U.S. violence around the 
world, sizeable minorities, especially those who self-identify as “extremely patriotic” 
disagree with Dr. King. This sizeable minority would be enough to register a significant 
difference between the two experimental groups, producing higher agreements with 
Obama among those exposed to the radical King first. Nevertheless, it is somewhat 
surprising how many respondents did agree with Dr. King. The results are further 
illuminated in Table 21 below. 
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Table 21. Cross-Tabulation of Patriotism and Q10: The U.S. Military Acts As.... (UO 
Data) 
 (1) the world’s 
heroic policeman 
who helps keep 
the peace, and 
furthers freedom 
and democracy. 
(2) (3) Something 
in between 
(4) 
(5) (6) (7) the armed forces 
of a self-interested 
empire that 
dominates and 
exploits the world, 
and mostly serves 
wealthy and powerful 
interests in the U.S.  
Totals 
Extremely 
patriotic 
2 
11.76% 
4 
23.53% 
2 
11.76% 
7 
41.18% 
1 
5.88% 
1 
5.88% 
0 
0 
17 
100% 
Very 
patriotic 
6 
8.57% 
8 
11.43% 
13 
18.57% 
27 
38.57% 
9 
12.86% 
5 
7.14% 
2 
2.86% 
70 
100% 
Somewhat 
patriotic 
2 
1.16% 
9 
5.23% 
18 
10.47% 
88 
51.16% 
33 
19.19% 
15 
8.72% 
7 
4.07% 
172 
100% 
Not 
especially 
patriotic 
0 
0 
2 
1.59% 
3 
2.38% 
62 
49.21% 
27 
21.43% 
22 
17.46% 
10 
7.94% 
126 
100% 
Totals 10 
2.60% 
23 
5.97% 
36 
9.35% 
184 
47.79% 
70 
18.18% 
43 
11.17% 
19 
4.94% 
385 
100% 
 
 Above, adding responses 1 – 3, we see that about 19% of respondents are 
reluctant to mount much of a critique of the U.S. military. Also, we see that in the column 
total for the most critical response (7), only 5% of the sample subscribed to this position. 
The next most critical response (6) attracted 11% of respondents, and the next most 
critical response below that attracted (5) 18% of respondents. In each level of self-
identified patriotism, pluralities or majorities preferred the middle position (4). Again, 
this relatively uncritical stance among the majority, may be the source of the reaction 
against King and in favor of Obama’s elite cue. Nevertheless, comparing Q10 with the 
cross-tabs of Dr. King’s dissenting quote above and self-described level of patriotism, it 
seems clear that many respondents agreed with Dr. King even though here in Q10 (earlier 
in the survey), they did not take such a critical view of the U.S. military. This suggests 
the power of Dr. King’s influence as an elite cue, but respondents may lack information 
to fully embrace a critical view of U.S. foreign policy – as is suggested in Q10.    
 As a final test of “blind patriotism,” consider the results depicted in Table 22. 
Here, respondents confronted a set of questions (Q12) probing attitudes towards common 
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U.S. military tactics – aerial bombing and bombing from un-manned drones. This set of 
questions was designed to identify respondents who simply cannot bring themselves to 
criticize the U.S. military, even when relatively obvious contradictions exist between 
military tactics and traditional notions of courage, as well as the somewhat more 
ambiguous contradictions (given elite cues on these issues) between military tactics and 
ethical norms. As will be detailed in a section below, the results on Q12 suggest that 
roughly 15 to 20% of respondents could not bring themselves to criticize the U.S. 
military for any reason – as they chose to affirm that bombing and using drones was 
“brave.” This is despite the fact that Q12 blatantly specified some of the contradictions, 
as respondents were asked to consider “...bombing campaigns conducted by predator 
drones (un-manned aircraft) and dropping bombs from airplanes flying at 40,000 feet  
(beyond the reach of enemies in Iraq and Afghanistan who lack anti-aircraft 
technology).” 
Table 22. Probing Interpretations of Aerial Bombardment and Predator Drones (UO 
Sample) 
Q12. The U.S. military has used a variety of strategies to attack enemies in Afghanistan and Iraq, including bombing 
campaigns conducted by predator drones (un-manned aircraft) and dropping bombs from airplanes flying at 40,000 feet 
(beyond the reach of enemies in Iraq and Afghanistan who lack anti-aircraft technology). Rate your level of agreement 
or disagreement with the following statements: 
Question Strongly Agree 
(1) 
Agree (2) Disagree (3) Strongly 
Disagree (4) 
Mean 
1. Dropping 
bombs from 
airplanes flying 
at 40,000 feet is 
a smart 
strategy. 
17.88% 42.32% 24.69% 15.11% 2.37 
2. …is morally 
justified. 
4.57% 18.02% 50.25% 27.16% 3.00 
3. …is brave. 3.84% 16.88% 47.06% 32.33% 3.08 
4. Using 
predator drones 
to drop bombs 
is a smart 
strategy.  
17.6% 45.92% 22.19% 14.29% 2.33 
5. …is morally 
justified. 
5.63% 19.95% 47.57% 26.85% 2.96 
6. …is brave. 2.28% 13.96% 47.21% 36.55% 3.18 
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Costa Rica Survey: Elite Cues 
 
 In the Costa Rica survey, there were no statistically significant differences 
between Form A and Form B outcomes in ten of the elite quotes. Where statistically 
significant differences were found, which Form had the more peaceful answers? The 
results appear in Table 23. As expected, Form B (where nonviolent quotes appear first) 
produced more robust nonviolent responses for item 2, the Dr. King quote, and item 3, 
the Gandhi quote. Against expectations, Form B produced significantly more pro-violent 
responses on item 1 (i.e., agreement with Obama’s dismissal of Gandhian and Kingian 
nonviolent tactics).  
 It is difficult to explain why respondents exposed to Form B were more likely to 
agree with the pro-violent Obama quote in item 1. To state the same issue differently, 
why were respondents exposed to Form A more likely to disagree with Obama’s pro-
violent quote? One possibility is that because respondents in Form A were exposed to a 
pro-violent/ even a pro-hatred quote by Che beforehand, they were more likely to react 
against the pro-violent quote of Obama. Thus, respondents in Form A were more likely to 
disagree with the Obama quote. 
 A relatively strong case can also be made for auto-correlation among both Form 
A and Form B respondents. To state this differently, it may be possible that some 
respondents exposed to Form B did not read the Obama quote carefully. They had just 
been exposed to 8 quotes that were pro-nonviolent (see Appendix A), and in number 9, 
the Obama quote at issue appears. To maintain peaceful responses, this item 9 is precisely 
where their responses would have to shift from “Agree” to “Disagree.” Thus, this may be 
a case of auto-correlation in which respondents were in the mode of agreeing with all 
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items, and may have mis-read the Obama quote in terms of praise for Gandhi and King. 
Indeed, survey research suggests that when adding “not” to an item (i.e., “not” does 
appear in the Obama quote), respondents often mis-read it.  
Table 23. T-Tests (Difference Between Group Means) on Two Experimental Groups in 
Costa Rica Survey: Items Where the Order of Elite Quotes Significantly Influenced 
Responses 
 
Quotes of Moral and Political Elites (Question # in 
Form A) x̄ 
 
(Question # in 
Form B) x̄² 
 
x̄ - x̄² 
 
1. “The non-violence practiced by men like Gandhi and 
King may not have been practical or possible in every 
circumstance.” - U.S. President Barack Obama in his 2009 
Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech 
(Q12_4)  2.64 (Q11_9)  2.26   0.38*** 
2. "Violence never brings permanent peace. It solves no 
social problem: it merely creates new and more 
complicated ones." – Martin Luther King, Jr. (U.S.) in his 
1964 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech 
(Q12_6)  1.54  (Q11_8)  1.32   0.22* 
3. "It is a cowardly thought, that of killing others. Whom 
do you suppose to free by assassination?...Those who will 
rise to power by murder will certainly not make the nation 
happy." – Gandhi (1922) 
(Q12_7)  1.56  (Q11_7)  1.35       0.21* 
Note: * = p< .05; ** = p< .01; *** = p< .001; There was no significant difference between group means (Form A vs. 
Form B) on the other 10 elite quotes. Possible responses to the quotes were (with codes): Strongly agree (1), Agree (2), 
Disagree (3), and Strongly disagree (4). In Form A, respondents were presented with pro-violent quotes first. In Form 
B, respondents were presented with pro-nonviolent quotes first. In #1, Form A respondents were more peaceful (to 
Disagree was the peaceful response). In #2, Form B respondents were more peaceful (to Agree was the peaceful 
response). In #3, Form B respondents were more peaceful (to Agree was the peaceful response). In Form A (pro-violent 
quotes appear first) and Form B (nonviolent quotes appear first). 
 
 Similarly (applying the same explanation of an auto-correlation mechanism), in 
Form A, respondents were exposed to three pro-violent quotes before the Obama quote 
(item 1 above), and so many Costa Rican respondents were in the mode of disagreeing 
with all items when the Obama quote (item 1) appeared. This auto-correlation 
explanation is quite plausible since Costa Rican respondents in this sample are so 
consistently nonviolent/ peaceful in their attitudes. But a survey researcher never 
welcomes an explanation like this – positing respondent failure to clearly read and 
understand the item, especially since the differences between the Forms on this item are 
statistically significant. 
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Cross-National Analysis: Testing Elite Cues 
 We see in Table 24 below that the Costa Rican mean is clearly more peaceful/ 
more nonviolent on all of the elite quote items except on item #4 (discussed below). 
Hence, compared with U.S. students, Costa Ricans were more likely to agree with the 
pro-nonviolent quotes by Oscar Arias, the Pope, and Dr. King (items 8, 9, and 12 
respectively) and more likely to disagree with the two pro-violent quotes by President 
Obama as well as the quote by Che Guevera endorsing hatred of enemies (items 1, 2, and 
5 respectively). In item #1, 25% of UO students disagreed, while 65% of Costa Ricans 
disagreed with Obama’s case for necessary and morally justified military force. In item 
#2, 22% of UO students disagreed, while 48%, almost half, of Costa Ricans disagreed 
with Obama’s case that the nonviolence of Gandhi and King is not always realistic or 
possible. Notice also that the items locate the source of Obama’s quotes: his then recent 
Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech. For many respondents, the Nobel prize is likely to 
link Obama to authoritative expertise and moral capital, and citing such credentials is a 
classic technique of persuasive communication. Yet, a significant number of Costa 
Ricans disagreed with Obama on both items.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
132 
Table 24.Cross-National T-Tests (UO & Costa Rica Surveys): Agreement with Moral and 
Political Elites - Results from Experimental Group One (Form A) and Two (Form B) 
Combined (Percentages)   
Quote (and # in Form A of UO 
survey) 
Sample (and n 
in Forms A and 
B) 
Strongly 
Agree 
(1) 
Agree 
(2) 
Disagree 
(3) 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(4) 
x̄ 
 
x̄ - x̄² 
1. “There will be times when nations, 
acting individually or in concert, will 
find the use of [military] force not 
only necessary but morally justified.” 
– President Obama in his 2009 Nobel 
Peace Prize acceptance speech 
UO (n= 198(A); 
n=193 
(B))  
12.02 63.17 24.04 0.77 2.14 -0.65*** 
CR (n= 150 
(A); n=157 
(B)) 
11.40 23.13 40.07 25.41 2.79 
2. “The nonviolence practiced by 
men like Gandhi and King may not 
have been practical or possible in 
every circumstance.”  – President 
Barack Obama in his 2009 Nobel 
Peace Prize acceptance speech 
UO (n=196 (A); 
n= 192 (B)) 
12.63 65.72 20.10 1.55 2.11 -0.34*** 
CR (n= 149 
(A); n=153 
(B)) 
18.87 33.44 31.46 16.23 2.45 
4. “Violence is not the monopoly of 
the exploiters and as such the 
exploited can use it too and, 
moreover, ought to use it when the 
moment arrives.” – Che Guevera 
(1963) 
UO (n= 190 
(A); n=190 
(B)) 
7.89  46.58 40.79 4.74 2.42 .04 
CR (n= 151 
(A); n=156 
(B)) 
23.13 29.97 32.57 14.33 2.38 
5. “Our soldiers must have a 
relentless hatred of the enemy; a 
people without hatred cannot 
vanquish a brutal enemy.” – Che 
Guevera (1967) 
UO (n= 195(A); 
n=197 
(B)) 
8.67 33.42 40.82 17.09 2.66 -0.34*** 
CR (n= 150 
(A); n=155 
(B)) 
12.79 15.41 31.15 40.66 3.00 
8. “People who dismiss the concepts 
of dialogue, diplomacy, and 
negotiation as a waste of time are the 
biggest challenge to people who 
work for peace…I do believe that the 
U.S. tends to resort to military force 
too quickly.” – Oscar Arias Sanchez, 
Costa Rican President (2005) and 
Nobel Peace Prize winner 
UO (n= 195(A); 
n=197 
(B)) 
32.14 54.08 13.01 .77 1.82 0.23** 
CR (n= 150 
(A); n=157 
(B)) 
56.21 33.66 4.58 5.56 1.59 
9. “When war, as in these days in 
Iraq, threatens the fate of humanity, 
it is ever more urgent to proclaim 
that only peace is the road to follow 
to construct a more just and united 
society. Violence and arms can never 
resolve the problems of man.” – 
Pope John Paul II (2003) 
UO (n= 
195(A);  n=197 
(B)) 
27.81 52.30 18.37 1.53 1.94 0.52*** 
CR (n= 152 
(A); n=158 
(B)) 
67.64 24.27 6.47 1.62 1.42 
12. “Violence never brings 
permanent peace. It solves no social 
problem: it merely creates new and 
more complicated ones.” – Martin 
Luther King, Jr. in his 1964 Nobel 
Peace Prize acceptance speech 
UO (n= 195 
(A); n= 198 
(B)) 
35.37 50.89 12.47 1.27 1.8 0.37*** 
CR (n= 153 
(A); n=157 
(B)) 
69.68 20.00 7.74 2.58 1.43 
Notes: * = p< .01; ** = p< .001; *** = p< .0001; UO = University of Oregon sample; CR = Costa Rica sample; See Appendix A and 
Appendix B for the official survey format utilized in each nation; unlike other reporting of results in this document, no items in this 
table were reverse-coded; This table reports overall combined statistics, rather than averaging statistics of Form A respondents with 
those from Form B respondents. The number of respondents exposed to Form A and Form B was often not a perfect 50%-50% split. 
In the items above, the difference between the n of Form A and the n of Form B ranged between 0 and 5 in the UO survey, and 
between 4 and 7 in the Costa Rica survey. As a result, averaged statistics (which are not reported here) are sometimes an 
inconsequential .01 to .02 different (on both percentages and means) from the numbers reported in the cells above. On items 1,2, and 
5: a higher mean was conceived as a more peaceful/ pro-nonviolent answer. On items 8, 9, and 12: a lower mean was conceived as a 
more peaceful/ pro-nonviolent answer.  
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 Similarly, in item #12, 70% of Costa Ricans “strongly agree” with Dr. King’s 
denunciation of violence as solving no social problem, while only 35% of UO students 
“strongly agree” with Dr. King. Given the context of competing norms in U.S. culture, 
where the myth of redemptive violence competes with nonviolent norms partly 
represented in the image of King as a national hero, the percentage of extreme responses 
(i.e., “strongly agree”) on item #12 offers perhaps the single clearest indicator of 
nonviolent attitudes in the survey. When tabulating both “agree” responses together on 
item #12, Costa Rica outscores the UO in affirmation of Dr. King’s statement by a count 
of 90% to 86%, only a 4% gap. On the one hand, the fact that less than 2% in each 
sample “strongly disagree” with King’s statement, and less than 13% in each sample 
“disagree” with King’s statement, demonstrates some degree of widespread resonance 
with nonviolent attitudes in the samples. On the other hand, given the rest of the survey’s 
results, we have reason to question the depth of the nonviolent attitudes expressed by UO 
respondents on this item. Thus, it may be that UO respondents are largely responding to 
an “elite cue” here, that is, to the moral capital of Dr. King. Moreover, a case can be 
made that the 35% gap in “strongly agree” responses best indicates the greater robustness 
of nonviolent attitudes in the Costa Rican sample.        
 And on item 8, a double-barreled question (a potential methodological flaw to be 
sure, though a case can be made for including the two thematically-linked sentences 
together, if interpretations are appropriately tentative), only 32% of UO students 
“strongly agreed” with Dr. Arias, while 56% of Costa Ricans “strongly agreed.” Hence, 
Costa Ricans voiced agreement with the notion that the U.S. tends to resort to military 
force too quickly, neglecting the arts of diplomacy. 
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 Responses to item #4, the complex Che Guevera quote are more difficult to 
categorize in terms of a nonviolent/ violent dichotomy. The difference between the two 
nations on this item is not statistically significant, but conceptually, a very strong case 
can be made that the Costa Rican mean here reflects a slightly stronger concern for 
justice for the exploited and thus, reflects a stronger valuation of a meaningful peace 
(peace with justice). Moreover, the item operationalizes an attitude on violence which can 
be termed a “conservative double-standard” on violence – a standpoint which is 
objectionable for those who identify with (or sympathize with) the oppressed, since this is 
a stance in which the violence of the oppressed, but not the violence of the oppressor is 
condemned (Bell 1968, Eddy 2011). Likewise, the U.S. mean may reflect a slightly 
greater identification with the exploiters. In this quote Che actually articulates and 
advocates a “just revolution” orientation. Item #4 is also double-barreled (again, a 
potential methodological flaw to be sure) in the sense that it begins by pointing out the 
hypocritical double-standard of the exploiters who claim a monopoly on the legitimate 
use of force, and concludes by arguing that the exploited “should” use force when a 
revolutionary situation arrives. The “ought to” use violence argument is the part that 
clearly rejects nonviolence, but in the context of the framing provided by Che it is 
difficult to disentangle violence/ nonviolence from a justified revolt against exploitation 
and violent domination.  
 Interestingly, Costa Ricans were willing to disagree with Che when he spoke of 
“hatred,” so it seems not to be the case that Costa Ricans were swayed merely by the 
prestige or cachet or moral capital that Che holds for many Latin Americans. Che is 
better known for a quote in which he said, “The true revolutionary is guided by feelings 
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of love.” In fact, while analyzing this data, on my way to and from campus I bicycled 
each day past a parked car with a bumper sticker featuring that quote. However, the 
hatred quotation not entirely a misrepresentation of Che’s praxis. Che’s willingness to 
carry out ruthless executions of enemies and deserters has been highlighted by many of 
his critics. The quote comes from Che’s “Message to the Tricontinental” in 1967, before 
his final campaign in Bolivia. As Krauze (2011) has written, “Hatred for him was a 
creative emotion” (p.329). In a fuller version of the quote, Che praises “hate as a factor of 
the struggle, which drives a man beyond the natural limitations of the human condition 
and converts him into an effective, selective, cold killing machine. That is how our 
soldiers have to be” (p.329). This certainly occupies the polar opposite of Gandhians with 
their emphasis on fallibalism, love (and the importance of overcoming hatred), 
reconciliation, and human brotherhood and sisterhood. We might also recall Orwell’s 
novel 1984, in which public hate rituals cultivate the hatred of enemies as a means of 
social control.  
 Below, Tables 25 and 26 depict results for elite quotes that were only included in 
one of the surveys respectively. While the inclusion of these quotes were tailored to 
resonate with respondents in each of the respective national contexts, and the design 
sought to balance pro-violent and anti-violent voices in each survey, the presence of these 
unique quotes and voices makes comparing the rest of the elite quotes in the UO and 
Costa Rican surveys somewhat more tenuous. Future studies should consider only testing 
a battery of identical quotes, or test the effects of varying the voices included.  
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Table 25. Results: Elite Quotes Appearing in UO Survey Only (Percentages) 
 
Quote (and # in Form A) n in Forms A 
and B 
Strongly 
Agree (1) 
Agree 
(2) 
Disagree 
(3) 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(4) 
x̄ 
 
3. “The USA has helped underwrite [support] global 
security for more than six decades with the blood of 
our citizens and the strength of our arms. …So yes, the 
instruments of war do have a role to play in preserving 
the peace.” – President Obama in his 2009 Nobel 
Peace Prize acceptance speech  [see Appendix A for 
full quote] 
n=194 (A); 
n=192 B) 
12.46 58.57 26.39 2.59 2.19 
6. “Targeting innocent civilians for murder is always 
and everywhere wrong.” – President George W. Bush 
(2002) 
n=197(A); 
n=198(B) 
60.75 32.17 6.33 0.76 1.47 
7. “I hate war as only a soldier who has lived it can, 
only as one who has seen its brutality, its futility, its 
stupidity… There is not glory in battle worth the blood 
it costs…When people speak to you about a preventive 
war, you tell them to go fight it. After my experience, I 
have come to hate war…War settles nothing.” – 
Dwight Eisenhower, U.S. Army General and 34th 
President of US (from 1953-1961) 
n=195(A); 
n=198(B) 
32.83 46.81 19.6 0.76 1.89 
10. “It is my conviction that killing under the cloak of 
war is nothing but an act of murder.” – Albert Einstein 
n=197(A); 
n=197(B) 
31.98 42.39 22.59 3.05 1.97 
11. “Violence is impractical because it is a descending 
spiral ending in destruction for all. The old law of an 
eye for an eye leaves everybody blind…Violence is 
immoral because it thrives on hatred rather than love. 
It destroys community and makes brotherhood 
impossible. Violence ends by defaulting itself. It 
creates bitterness in the survivors and brutality in the 
destroyers.” – Martin Luther King, Jr. (1958) 
n=193(A); 
n=197(B) 
37.16 53.34 8.74 0.78 1.74 
13. “[The USA] is the greatest purveyor of violence in 
the world today.” – Martin Luther King, Jr. 1967 
[“purveyor” means supplier, distributer] 
n=195(A); 
n=196(B) 
24.29 48.09 24.05 3.58 2.07 
Note: statistics above were calculated as averages of statistics from Form A respondents and Form B respondents.  
 
Table 26. Results: Elite Quotes Appearing in Costa Rica Survey Only (Percentages) 
 
Quote (and # in Form A) n in Forms 
A and B 
Strongly 
Agree (1) 
Agree (2) Disagree (3) Strongly 
Disagree (4) 
x̄ 
 
5. “War [that involves] the violent 
destruction of an oppressive and inhuman 
regime, is more than justified if its aim is 
the creation of a society where men live 
in peace with each other.” - Father 
Ernesto Cardenal (Nicaragua, 1981) 
n=151(A); 
n=155(B) 
23.21 32.69 24.5 19.61 2.41 
7. "It is a cowardly thought, that of killing 
others. Whom do you suppose to free by 
assassination?...Those who will rise to 
power by murder will certainly not make 
the nation happy." – Gandhi (1922) 
n=150(A); 
n=156(B) 
66.27 23.82 7.93 1.99 1.46 
10. “Any human order to kill must be 
subordinate to the law of God which says, 
‘Thou shalt not kill.’ No soldier is obliged 
to obey an order contrary to the law of 
God.” – Archbishop Oscar Romero (El 
Salvador, 1980) 
n=150(A); 
n=157(B) 
49.45 26.7 19.24 4.62 1.79 
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Quote (and # in Form A) n in Forms 
A and B 
Strongly 
Agree (1) 
Agree (2) Disagree (3) Strongly 
Disagree (4) 
x̄ 
 
11. “With popular, non-violent 
mobilization, always committed to non-
violence, that's when lots of good ideas 
and proposals begin to emerge from 
below (the people).” – Subcomandante 
Marcos of the Zapatistas (Chiapas, 
Mexico, 2006) 
n=147(A); 
n=156(B) 
61.06 32.94 4.67 1.34 1.47 
12. “We consider it unethical to approve 
of any measures to secure the victory of a 
revolution. We do NOT believe that the 
end (goal) justifies the means (method).” 
– Subcomandante Marcos (Chiapas 2001) 
n=144(A); 
n=154(B) 
42.03 38.33 15.22 4.43 1.82 
13. “The first task for any new politics is 
to recognize that there are differences 
between us all and that in light of this, we 
[should] aspire to a politics of tolerance 
and inclusion.” - Subcomandante Marcos 
n=146(A); 
n=152(B) 
57.46 36.49 5.05 1.02 1.50 
Note: statistics above were calculated as averages of statistics from Form A respondents and Form B respondents. 
 
Constructing Indexes Through Exploratory Factor Analysis 
 
 Exploratory factor analysis was conducted on the UO survey data and Costa Rica 
data (see Appendix E) as a method of data reduction, a tool for index construction, and a 
means of comparing how the two nations might differ in their violent/ nonviolent attitude 
structures. Factor analysis has been called “the way to develop constructs” (Gorsuch 
1983, p.351) and composite variables (scales or indexes) from survey questionnaires 
(p.356). Moreover, the “usual scale development procedures are implicit factory 
analyses” (p.358).  
 Because anticipated factors (e.g., militarism, realpolitiks, just war, principled and 
pragmatic nonviolence) were conceptually and theoretically expected to be correlated, an 
oblique rotation was performed. An oblique promax rotation allows correlated factors 
(Hamilton 2003, p.270) and in the present study this allows clearer factors to emerge, 
rather than performing an orthogonal rotation which would force factors to be 
uncorrelated. Missing data reduced the number of observations in the Costa Rica data to 
231 and the UO data to 312. Since 33 variables were involved, this means that the 
subjects-to-variables (STV) ratio became 7:1 in the Costa Rica data and 9.45:1 in the UO 
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data. Numerous scholars including those who have conducted meta-analyses of published 
articles contend that these sample sizes and ratios are acceptable thresholds for STV 
ratios and sample sizes in factor analysis, though some would propose these STV ratios 
and sample sizes are too small (for a review, see Zhao 2009).  
 Factor analysis is far from a mechanical process of blind empiricism, as 
investigators must make numerous decisions based on a priori assumptions, theoretical 
justifications, and careful exploration of numerous statistical options, while allowing 
theory and empirical results to inform methodological decisions. Indeed, factor analysis 
could even be called “an almost impressionistic art form” (York 2011). As a result, we 
rely on face validity and the convergence of theoretical and empirical justifications in 
making those decisions, even as we seek to track only robust findings. Specifically, the 
researcher relied on the following in choosing the number of factors to extract. First, 
apriori theoretical reasons informed the construction of the survey and interpretation of 
the results. Here we should flag the fact that most of the items in the core 33 questions on 
nonviolent/ violent attitudes replicate or build upon existing survey research (see 
Appendix D). Second, maximum likelihood tests were conducted in an attempt to 
determine the proper number of factors, if any, to extract. Third, scree tests were 
performed in an attempt to determine the proper number of factors to extract. Fourth, the 
Kaiser criterion was considered in an attempt to determine the proper number of factors 
to extract. Fifth, analysis was conducted of the item loading tables after rotation. Here, 
following Gorsuch (1983, pp.169-170) and Costello and Osborne (2005), the best fit to 
the data was considered to be the one with the “cleanest” factor structure: “item loadings 
above .30, no or few item crossloadings, no factors with fewer than three items” (p.3). 
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Sixth, analysis of the face validity of the variables that loaded together was conducted 
and the factors were named appropriately (e.g., militarism). Here it was found that 
conceptually linked items were in fact loading together. Seventh, indexes were manual 
constructed consisting of variables that load together (with a .3 cut-off as a rule of thumb) 
and a Cronbach’s alpha test (a coefficient of reliability/ a measure of internal 
consistency) was performed on each index.  
 Maximum likelihood tests were performed as one possible means of determining 
the appropriate number of factors to extract (Hamilton 2003, p.274). These tests showed 
that for both the Costa Rica data and the UO data, when factors 1 through 10 were 
extracted in successive iterations, all models significantly improved upon a no-factor 
model because P< .00005 in the first LR test (in the Stata output) on all of these models. 
The second LR tests (in the Stata output) also suggested that extracting 6 (because P< 
.00005), 7 (because P< .001), 8 (because P< .01), or 9 factors (because P< .05) from the 
Costa Rica data were statistically justifiable. Similarly, the second LR tests suggested that 
extracting 7 (because P> .0005) or 9 factors (because P> .05) from the UO data were 
statistically justifiable. However, when these numbers of factors were extracted for 
analysis in both data sets, the item loading tables did not result in clean factor structures 
(see below), and the links between item loadings were far less clear conceptually. For 
example, when 7 factors were extracted in the UO data, one factor had only two items 
loading above .3, and another factor had only one item loading above .3. When 9 factors 
were extracted in the UO data, 3 factors had only two items loading above .3, and another 
factor had only one item loading above .3. Similarly, in the Costa Rica data, when 6 
factors were extracted, four items crossloaded and on one factor only two items loaded 
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above .3. When 7 factors were extracted, 6 items crossloaded and on one factor only two 
items loaded above .3. As explained below, when less factors were extracted in each data 
set, cleaner factor structures were discovered.       
 Also in an attempt to identify the appropriate number of factors to extract, “scree 
tests” were performed following Cattell (1966a, 1966b). This test is “reasonably 
accurate” (Gorsuch 1983, p.171), producing relatively clear visual results, and as Cattell 
(1966a) argues, “the best rule is evidently to cut at the uppermost point actually on the 
scree” and it is better to extract one too many factors “since rotation will reduce it to 
triviality if it is in excess” (p.252). The scree test on the UO data suggested that 5 or 6 
factors should be retained. The scree test on the Costa Rica data suggested that 3 or 4 
factors should be retained. Following Costello and Osborne (2005), numbers of factors 
above, equal to, and below the number of factors suggested by the scree tests were 
extracted, rotated, and analyzed. After rotation, analysis of the item loading tables clearly 
pointed to the cleanest factor structure: 5 factors should be retained in the UO data and 3 
factors should be retained in the Costa Rica data. This is because when 6 factors were 
extracted from the UO data, three items crossloaded, whereas when 5 factors were 
extracted only one item crossloaded. Costello and Osborne (2005) maintain that the 
“cleanest” factor structure and “best fit to the data” is found where there are “no or few 
item crossloadings” (p.3). When 4 factors were extracted in the Costa Rica data, only two 
items loaded on the fourth factor, whereas when 3 factors were extracted all factors had 
five or more items loading above .3 and there were no crossloadings. Costello and 
Osborne (2005) maintain that at least three items should load on each factor.  
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 The selection of three factors in the Costa Rica data is also supported by the 
Kaiser criterion which suggests retaining factors with eigenvalues equal or higher than 1 
(Torres-Reyna 2011). Only three factors had eigenvalues higher than 1. For the UO data, 
the Kaiser criterion suggested that four factors should be retained. However, the scree test 
and analyses reported below suggest that retaining 5 factors can be justified.  
 Again, in an exploratory mode and following Costello and Osborne (2005), 
various numbers of factors were commanded in Stata and the output analyzed after 
performing an oblique rotation. With the UO data, the results suggested that 5 factors 
were most clearly emerging in the data. During survey construction, theory informed 
expectations that the data would reveal four or five factors: nonviolence, militarism, 
realpolitiks, just war (which was operationalized to include “just revolution” items as 
well), and the researcher entertained the possibility that an additional fifth factor might 
appear reflecting the distinction between principled and pragmatic nonviolence. 
Moreover, it was expected that some of the questions on interpersonal violence 
(including five items on self-defense, domestic violence, and corporal punishment of 
children) to overlap with the other ideologies (nonviolence, militarism, realpolitiks, and 
just war). Instead, the empirical results showed that the expected four factors emerged 
(nonviolence, militarism, realpolitiks, and just war), and a fifth factor was loading on the 
interpersonal violence items. This may be partly due to the fact that this section of the 
survey began with the five items on interpersonal violence, and respondents were thus 
aided in answering these items consistently, a case of “auto-correlation” in the survey 
design. However, auto-correlation is an issue that is unavoidable and not necessarily a 
weakness in the design, especially since respondents were asked to confront a series of 
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difficult questions and it was reasonable to aid their completion of the survey by grouping 
some conceptually linked items together.  
 Similarly, through the process of commanding various number of factors in Stata, 
rotating and analyzing the item loading tables, 3 factors clearly emerged in the Costa 
Rica data. This fit with the researcher’s theoretical hunch, one also based on past opinion 
surveys, that Costa Ricans would express nonviolent attitudes and thus, I theorized they 
would also hold less differentiated ideologies of violence. That is, it was expected that 
Costa Ricans would have less nuanced violent ideologies than U.S. citizens because 
Costa Rican leaders and political structures are less geared towards violent conflict. 
Indeed, this was found to be true in the data as, unlike the UO data, no “realpolitiks” 
factor emerged in the Costa Rica data.  
 Both traditional factor analysis (principal axis factoring) and principal 
components factor analysis were conducted. Results were robust in that analyses of the 
item loading tables in both types of factoring showed that virtually all of the same items 
were loading on the same factors. The primary difference between the outcomes of these 
two types of factor analyses was that the items were consistently loading at a lower 
strength in principle axis factoring. Nevertheless, principal axis factoring analysis was 
selected as the more theoretically warranted and traditional method.  
 Again, analysis of the item loading tables revealed that conceptually linked items 
were loading together. Factors were labeled accordingly. In the UO data, the 5 factors 
were: nonviolence, militarism, realpolitiks, just war, and interpersonal violence. These 5 
factors explain 97% of the total variance. The militarism factor explains 54% of the total 
variance, the nonviolence factor explains 15%, the interpersonal violence factor explains 
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12%, the just war factor explains 9%, and the realpolitiks factor explains 7%. In the Costa 
Rica data, the 3 factors were nonviolence, militarism, and just war. These three factors 
explain 76% of the total variance. The nonviolence factor explains 49% of the total 
variance, militarism explains 17%, and just war explains 9%.  
 Manual indexes were constructed out of each cluster of variables, that is, using 
the high loading items (above .3) on each factor (see Table 1 and Table 2). Each index 
score consists of an average score (equal weights) for the items, rather than a weighted 
score. Wainer (1976) has argued persuasively that there is little to no discernable 
advantage to employing weighted scores over equal weights.  
 Cronbach’s alpha tests were conducted on the indexes. The higher Cronbach’s 
alpha the better the “internal consistency reliability of a measure – the extent to which the 
items of a measure assess a common characteristic” (Aron, Aron, and Coups 2005, 
p.383). A rule of thumb for Cronbach’s Alpha is that “a good measure should have a 
Cronbach’s alpha of at least .6 or .7 and preferably closer to .9” (p.383). Cronbach’s 
alphas for the indexes in the UO data were as follows: militarism (.6488), nonviolence 
(.6851), interpersonal violence (.6230), justwar (.7342), and realpolitiks (.6172). 
Cronbach’s alphas for the Costa Rica data were as follows: nonviolence (.8140), 
militarism (.7193), and just war (.7083).     
 Second-order factor analyses. In each data set, second-order/ higher-order factor 
analyses were conducted on the original correlation matrix (see Appendix H). In the UO 
data, scree plots of second-order factors showed that the data reduced to one factor (after 
9 iterations), and only one factor had an eigenvalue above the 1.0 cut-off, with an 
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eigenvalue of 2.471. This factor explained 49.42% of the variance. Analysis suggested 
this factor can be named violent conflict resolution.  
 In the Costa Rica data, scree plots of second-order factors showed that the data is 
converging on one factor after 25 iterations, but more iterations would be required to 
extract one factor (convergence = .002), which is not surprising given that there were 
only three factors in the matrix. Only one factor had an eigenvalue above the 1.0 cut-off, 
with an eigenvalue of 1.834. This first factor explained 61.14% of the variance, but a 
second factor explained 24.72% of the variance. Analysis suggested the first factor can be 
named militarized conflict resolution.  
 Data limitations: Auto-correlation dynamics, etc. Appendix E reports the items 
loading on factors in the exploratory factor analysis for both data sets. Admittedly, the 
items loading on the “realpolitiks” factor in the UO data do not capture the distinctive 
hard-edge of national interest in the Realpolitiks position such as was operationalized in 
the item: “o. There is nothing wrong with nations seizing territory or natural resources 
through war because nations should protect their own economic security and interests.” 
As another example of this attitude, consider the words of a U.S. congressional 
representative responsible for Africa who told a leading Rwandan human rights activist: 
“The United States has no friends. The United States has interests” (Barker 2004). 
However, item “o” did load on Factor 3, “Interpersonal Violence” (see Appendix E) – 
suggesting that attitudes justifying self-defense, domestic violence, and corporal 
punishment tend to overlap with attitudes affirming national self-interest in the 
realpolitiks position. Arguably, these attitudes roughly fit with the callousness of the 
realpolitiks position. Had the items been arranged in a different order, these items may 
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have been more likely to correlate. For strong theoretical reasons, item o (Q9_15) was 
added to the criteria for determining realpolitiks adherents. A pro-violent response on this 
item represents the essence of the realpolitiks position. 
 Clearly, the order of items matters, and this makes our empirical task difficult. By 
looking at the question numbers in the far right-hand column of the tables in Appendix E, 
we can observe potential cases of auto-correlation (i.e., items correlating partly because 
of their proximity to one another) among the items loading on each of the 5 factors. 
However, many of the items were grouped by ideological orientation in the survey’s 
format (see Appendix D), and this was deemed justified in order to make the survey-
taking experience less taxing and confusing, especially since the subject matter is 
relatively complex.    
Prevalence of the Violent/ Nonviolent Orientations by Nation 
 
 Utilizing the violent/ nonviolent indexes (constructed through the factor analyses), 
variables were created which coded respondents who, based on their survey responses, 
can be said to subscribe to one of the violent/ nonviolent orientations. In the Costa Rica 
Data, three factors emerged, and based on theoretical and empirical rationales these were 
used to construct the militarism index, the just war index, and the nonviolence index. In 
turn, scores on these indexes were utilized in coding adherents to these orientations: 
militarism, just war, or nonviolence (see Appendix I for an explanation of the coding 
formula). The UO data was analyzed following the same procedures with the exception 
that four orientations were coded: militarism, realpolitiks, just war, and nonviolence. 
Coding involved a slight bias in that the “militarism adherents” and “just war adherents” 
variables were constructed so as to capture more respondents who ranged in the middle 
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ground up to the mid-point of 2.5, whereas the nonviolence adherents variable was more 
stringent – coding only those whose average score was above “3” on the indexes (see 
Appendix I). This was done for descriptive and theoretical purposes – under the 
hypothesis that those in the middle ground who lean even slightly towards a just war or 
militarism orientation – in the context of a national militarized conflict, are likely to be 
attitudinally mobilized for war through the well-established “rally round the flag” effect 
(Burris 2008). In Table 27 we see the prevalence of these orientations in each sample. 
Table 27. Ideological Adherents in Costa Rican and UO Samples 
Violent/ Nonviolent 
Orientation  
Costa Rica UO 
Frequency % Frequency % 
Nonviolence   90    28.75% 18 4.43% 
Militarism   29        9.27% 113 27.83% 
Realpolitiks - - 35   8.62% 
Just War 104    33.23% 127 31.28% 
Unspecified   90 28.75% 113   27.83% 
Total 313 100% 406 100% 
 
 The notable scarcity of nonviolence adherents (4.43%) in the UO sample contrasts 
starkly with the 28.75% of nonviolence adherents in the Costa Rican sample. Hence, the 
Costa Rican sample has over 6 times more nonviolent adherents. These results cast doubt 
on Joseph’s (2007) contention that 15 to 20% of the U.S. population are “solid doves,” 
and comes closer to the low-end of Feaver and Gelpi’s (2004) estimate that 10 to 30% of 
the public are “solid doves” (p.186).    
 Above, we also see how the UO sample has three times more adherents of 
militarism. The most prominent orientation in the Costa Rica sample is the just war 
position (a middle position in the spectrum of violent-nonviolent attitudes). While the 
most prominent orientation in the UO sample is also the just war position, militarism 
adherents were almost as numerous, and 8.62% subscribed to realpolitiks, a more 
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extreme pro-violent ideological position than just war, and one which is lacking in the 
Costa Rican sample altogether.  
 Testing the indexes on gender by nation. In the Costa Rica data, it was found that 
mean scores for females were significantly more peaceful than males on all of the 
indexes. Keeping in mind that on a 1 to 4 point scale a mean of 2.5 represents the mid-
point, we see in Table 28 that both male and female means lean towards peaceful 
attitudes on the nonviolence index and militarism index. On the just war index, males 
lean towards pro-violent attitudes, while females lean towards peaceful attitudes. 
Table 28. T-Tests on Gender Differences (Costa Rica Data) 
Index Male 
Mean 
Female 
Mean 
Difference 
Between Group 
Means 
Nonviolence 3.24 3.46 .22** 
Militarism 3.02 3.26 .24** 
Just War 2.43 2.83 .40*** 
Notes: * = p < .01; ** = p< .001; *** = p< .0001; On means: 4 is more peaceful; 1 is more violent. 
 
 Likewise, in the UO data depicted in Table 29, tests on the difference between 
group means were conducted for the variable gender as it interacts with the indexes. It 
should be remembered that while the indexes in the UO data consists of items have 
significant overlap with the items in the same named indexes in the Costa Rica data, they 
are not the same indexes and reflect the discrete outcomes of factor analyses of each data 
set.  
Table 29. T-Tests on Gender Differences (UO Data) 
Index Male 
Mean 
Female 
Mean 
Difference Between 
Group Means 
Militarism 2.75 2.85 .10* 
Nonviolence 2.65 2.71 .06 
Interpersonal 
violence 
2.50 2.79 .29*** 
Just war 2.19 2.40 .21** 
Realpolitiks 2.35 2.42 .07 
Notes: * = p < .05; ** = p< .001; *** = p< .0001; On means: 4 is more peaceful; 1 is more violent; 2.5 is the midpoint. 
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 As in the Costa Rica data, we see that females are more peaceful than males in all 
the indexes, but unlike the Costa Rica data, not all of the differences between male and 
females means attain statistical significance. Keeping in mind that on a 1 to 4 point scale 
a mean of 2.5 represents the mid-point, we can see in Table 29 that male and female 
means lean towards peaceful attitudes on the militarism scale and nonviolence index, and 
there is no significant difference between males and females on the nonviolence index, 
but the difference does achieve significance on the militarism index. On the interpersonal 
violence index, the male mean is at the mid-point (2.5), while the female mean leans 
significantly towards peaceful attitudes. On the just war index and realpolitiks index 
however, both males and females lean toward pro-violent attitudes, though on the just 
war index, females are significantly less pro-violent. 
National Pride 
 
 Koenigsberg (2009) theorizes, with a high degree of abstraction, that the more 
soldiers die for a nation, the more patriotism is likely to be instilled and reproduced 
among citizens. That notion is not supported in our data, since Costa Rica has not had any 
sizeable number of its security forces killed since the 1948 Civil War, yet in our sample, 
Costa Rican university students report significantly higher levels of national pride than 
U.S. university students. In a 1981 sample of thirteen European nations, the U.S., and 
Japan (N=15), two factors accounted for the most variance in national pride: First, 
nations defeated in WWII or that suffered military occupation rank low in national pride 
(Rose 1985). Thus, there is a connection between pride and war history, but the data 
suggests a revision toKoenigsberg’s (2009) simplistic theory of a link between patriotism 
and the sacrifice of soldiers – the motives and outcomes of war also deeply shape 
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collective memory. Second, national pride tends to be highest among former colonies, 
“reflecting a legacy of conscious nation-building in post-independence society” (Rose 
1985, p.88). Consistent with path dependency models, the “positive effect of having to 
struggle for national independence appears to have a long-lasting effect, enduring 200 
years in the case of America” (p.88). In the case of Costa Rica, national independence 
came quite easily. The Spanish colonizers had very little interest in Costa Rica, since 
lacking gold and other prizes, in Spanish eyes it was not the “rich coast” its name 
implied. But a later struggle provided opportunities for conscious nation-building and the 
patriotic collective memory project – the struggle to repel William Walker, the American 
mercenary who sought to conquer Central American and institute Dixeland slavery.    
 Below, Table 30 depicts the results of a patriotism question asked only in the U.S. 
In Table 31, a similar question on national pride shows that the difference between 
sample means is highly significant, with a t-ratio of -10.51 and p=.0000. No doubt, for 
some observers and theorists this finding of significantly more national pride among 
Costa Rican respondents is somewhat surprising (e.g., Koenigsberg 2009), while for 
others not at all. For instance, Biesanz, Biesanz, and Biesanz (1999) argue that “Costa 
Rican schools succeed in producing patriots through constant celebration of the country’s 
virtues. Schools convince children that Costa Rica is the best country in the world” 
(p.214). That seems to be supported by the survey finding on national pride. Given that 
the UO survey oversampled from students affiliated with the Democratic party, we might 
expect that more critical attitudes of the U.S. prevail. Indeed, t-tests revealed that 
Republicans were significantly more proud than non-Republicans at the .0001 level. This 
corroborates Rose’s (1985) study of 15 nations in which self-identified conservatives 
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expressed significantly more national pride in all nations except Iceland. The mean score 
for Republicans on Q33 was1.55 versus non-Republicans who had a mean of 2.11. The 
difference between group means was .56, with a t-ratio of 5.73, p= .0000. A similar 
comparison can be made between Democrats and non-Democrats but the differences are 
less extreme: the group mean for Democrats was 2.12, and for non-Democrats was 1.87 
(i.e., Democrats are less proud); The difference between these group means is -.25, with a 
t-ratio of -3.06, p=.0024, which is significant at the .01 level. 
Table 30. Patriotism, UO Sample (N=385) 
Q44 How patriotic are you?  Would you say 
extremely patriotic, very patriotic, somewhat 
patriotic, or not especially patriotic? 
Extremely patriotic 4.42 
Very patriotic 18.18 
Somewhat patriotic 44.68 
Not especially patriotic 32.73 
Note: This question was not asked in Costa Rica. 
 
Table 31. Pride by National Sample 
Q33 (UO)/ Q30 (CR) How proud are you to be an American/ 
Costa Rican? 
Difference 
between 
means Answer (code) UO  
(N=394) 
Costa Rica 
(N= 308) 
Very proud (1) 30.46 72.73  
Quite proud (2) 42.89 19.81 
Not very proud (3) 23.60 4.55 
Not at all proud (4) 3.05 2.92 
Sample mean 1.99 1.38 -.62**** 
Note: two-tailed t-test; **** = p<.0001 
  
Costa Rica – a “Pacifist” Nation? 
 Questions 9.33 and 9.34 offer evidence which partly questionssimplistic notions 
of Costa Rica as a “pacifist” nation. As we see below, on Q9.33 (an item adapted from 
the Pew Global Attitudes Survey) respondents were asked to rate their level of agreement 
or disagreement the following statement: “It is sometimes necessary to use military force 
to maintain order in the world.” The ideology expressed here embraces political realism 
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but also just war. Arguably, the word choice of “order” offers a slight nuance that shades 
more closely to political realism, as realpolitiks assumes that without instrumental 
violence the international arena is ruled by Hobbesian chaos.  
 Below in Table 32, we see that about 20% of Costa Ricans strongly agree and 
about 40% agree that military force is sometimes necessary, for a total of 60% expressing 
some level of agreement.This is not surprising, but it shows that the “pacifist” descriptors 
that both political elites and average Costa Ricans often use for their nation is not fully 
accurate. Rather, there is some consensus around the idea that military force is 
“sometimes necessary” and thus it would seem, morally justified. Second, in Q9.34, 
respondents were instructed: “Now, please answer the last question (Q9.33) the way you 
think most people in your nation would answer it.” This question was designed as one 
test of social desirability bias, but it can be put to use in other ways as well. For example, 
we should note that a relatively high percentage of students (17%; or 53 out of 312) left 
Q9.34 blank. Surely, respondents in a robust culture of peace would express confidence 
in answering this question and affirming that their fellow citizens believe war is not 
necessary.The other finding here is that about 40% of respondents guessed that their 
fellow citizens would express some level of agreement (strongly agree of agree) with 
Q9.33 on the occasional necessity of military force, while 60% guessed that their fellow 
citizens would express some level of disagreement. This suggests that roughly 20% of 
university students perceive most Costa Ricans to be more pacifist than they (the 
respondent) are themselves.   
 This finding may reflect reality (i.e., it may be that Costa Rican university 
students are, on average, less pacifist than the general population), but it is somewhat of a 
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Table 32. Attitudes Towards Military Force and Perception of Majority Attitudes in 
Nation, Costa Rica Data (n=312) 
 Q9.33 “It is sometimes necessary to 
use military force to maintain order 
in the world.” 
Q9.34 “Now, please answer the last 
question (Q9.33) the way you think most 
people in your nation would answer it.” 
Freq. % Freq. % 
Strongly Agree (1) 51 19.69 23 7.42 
Agree (2) 102 39.38 98 31.61 
Disagree (3) 60 23.17 110 35.48 
Strongly Disagree 
(4) 
46 17.76 79 25.48 
Total 259 100 310 100 
 
puzzle. In the U.S. context, Loewen (2007) has argued that more schooling produces 
more hawkish attitudes such that university graduates are on average, more hawkish. But 
in the Costa Rican context, where demilitarization is celebrated and relatively revered, 
one would expect that more schooling would produce more pacifist attitudes. The finding 
may help to again clarify how complex, multidimensional, and heterogeneous nonviolent 
attitudes are (Kakkad 2005, p.121, pp.125-126). We observed above that our sample of 
Costa Rican university students score as more peaceful than the general population on 
terrorism and state terrorism, but less peaceful on the pragmatic nonviolence item. Here, 
we have indirect and suggestive evidence that Costa Rican university students tend to 
think that most of their nation holds pacifist attitudes, but about 20% of these students 
themselves think military force is something necessary.      
Beyond Attitudes: Tracking Self-Reported Behaviors and Experiences 
 In only a few items did the survey attempt to track violent/ nonviolent 
behaviorsand experiences with violence (as opposed to mere attitudes). One section that 
probed for behaviors was the political action section (Q21 in the UO survey). In addition, 
three questions (Q34, Q35, Q36 in UO survey; Q21, Q21A, Q21B in Costa Rica survey) 
probed for personal experiences with physical attacks or abuse. Admittedly, the data 
provided by these questions are only suggestive as the items, though replications of 
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General Social Survey (2008) questions, are very imprecise. They do not specify the 
context or the severity of the attack, for example, whether their experience of being hit or 
punched involved parental spanking or more serious domestic abuse, a playground fight 
or a more serious attack, whether the respondent was only a victim of the violence or may 
have thrown the first punch.  
 It is worth recalling here (as reported above), that Costa Ricans were significantly 
more opposed to spanking/ parental corporal punishment (Q9.5 in UO survey; Q6e in 
Costa Rica survey). On that question: “Corporal punishment (spanking) is necessary to 
bring up children properly,” about 86% of Costa Rican students disagreed (adding 
together the disagree + strongly disagree responses) versus about 72% of UO students. 
Costa Ricans were also more likely to strongly disagree on that item, as 49% strongly 
disagreed versus 27% of UO students.This corroborates previous survey research by 
McAlister, Orpinas, and Velez (1999) in which 16% of Costa Ricans versus 36% of U.S. 
respondents supported corporal punishment for children (see Table 2 in Appendix J).  
 Turning to the sequence of questions on experiences with violence, Q34 asked: 
“Have you ever been punched or beaten by another person?” Unfortunately, in the Costa 
Rica survey, the translator accidentally rendered the question as (Q21): “¿Ha sido 
golpeado o ha golpeado a otra persona alguna vez en su vida?” [Have you been beaten or 
hit, or have you hit someone at some time in your life?] This not only differs from the 
question in the English survey, but it is a double-barreled question – a format which is 
usually problematic (since we can not be sure the respondent is answering both questions 
or just one of them). Hence, the question should be thrown out, or at least, any 
comparison between the two samples can only be suggestive. Q35 (Q21a in the Costa 
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Rica survey) attempted to specify whether they were hit in childhood or adulthood or 
both, and Q36 (Q21b in the Costa Rica survey) the frequency.  
 The result most deserving of comment is Q34 (Q21 in the Costa Rica survey), as 
about 32% of UO students answered yes, they have been punched/ beaten, but 55% of 
Costa Rican studentsanswered yes, they have been punched/ beatenor have punched or 
beaten another person. Two decades ago, research on students at the University of Costa 
Rica found that 80% reported childhood experiences with spanking, 46% had been hit on 
other parts of the body (not the head) by the hand, and 30% reported being whipped 
(Krugman, Mata, and Krugman 1992). We might surmise that less educated members of 
Costa Rican society would report higher levels of corporal punishment, though the 
enormous growth in Costa Rican college students means that, in recent decades, many 
college students are the first person in their family to attend college (Molina and Palmer 
2007, pp.167-168), and many UCR students are from the lower-middle class (Biesanz, 
Biesanz, and Biesanz 1999, p.221; confirmed also in the present survey, in which 43% of 
UCR students claimed to be from the lower-middle class, 20% from the working class, 
and 1.45% from the lower class). Moreover, about 80% of the college students 
considered spanking and 38% considered hitting other parts of the body to be legitimate 
disciplinary methods (Krugman, Mata, and Krugman 1992). The authors of that study, 
the first of its kind in Costa Rica, conceded the difficulty of generalizing from college 
student retrospective memories to the child-rearing practices of the entire population, but 
tentatively concluded that “the use of physical punishment is at least as widespread as it 
is in the United States” (p.160).  
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 A decade earlier, Strauss (1983) found that 97% of U.S. children experience 
physical punishment. But there is strong evidence that the rate of physical abuse of 
children in the U.S. fell by half between 1990 and 2007, and this has been accompanied 
by, or perhaps been driven by, sharp declines in attitudinal approval for corporal 
punishment (Pinker 2011, p.439). These attitudinal shifts likely stem from moral 
entrepreneurs who publicly advocated for nonviolent parenting beginning in the 1980s 
(Pinker 2011). Studies find that a majority of U.S. respondents still approve of corporal 
punishment by parents, but norms have evolved to distinguish between abuse and “mild 
violence” (p.439). Between 1975 and 1992, mothers admitting to the use of abusive 
violence halved from 20% to 10% (p.439).     
 In the UO data, tests showed that Q34 responses were associated with only some 
of the violent/ nonviolent attitude indexes (constructed from factor analyses of Q9 items). 
When those who had been punched or beaten were compared with those who had not 
been punched or beaten in t-tests of the attitude indexes, there was no significant 
difference between the group means for the militarism, realpolitiks, or nonviolence 
indexes. But, the group that had not been punched or beaten were significantly more 
peaceful in their attitudes on the just war index at the .05 level, and on the interpersonal 
violence index at the .05 level.  
  In the Costa Rican data, t-tests showed that respondents who had not hit 
othersnor been hit scored significantly more peaceful at the .05 level on the nonviolence 
index and on the just war index at the .01 level, but there was no significant difference 
between the groups on the militarism index. Thus, in both samples there is some indirect 
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evidence that those who experience interpersonal violence are socialized into accepting 
some forms of violence as necessary.  
 The results in Q34 (UO)/ Q21 (Costa Rica), i.e., the higher number of respondents 
in Costa Rica who claimed to have hit or been hit, throws some doubt on any pervasive 
“spillover effect” down to the interpersonal level within Costa Rican society stemming 
from Costa Rica’s demilitarization policies. However, as mentioned above, we have to 
take into account the mistranslation of the question as well as socio-economic factors. 
Most Costa Rican students are the first generation of their families to attend university, 
and it is likely that attitudes approving corporal punishment correlates negatively with 
income. On the other hand, Costa Rican respondents did score significantly more 
peaceful in their attitudes on most of the interpersonal violence questions: Q9.1, Q9.2, 
Q9.3, Q9.4, Q9.5, Q7.2, and Q7.3. This leaves two questions where the differences 
between the samples were not significant at the .05 level (Q7.4 and Q8.1), and one 
question where the UO respondents were more peaceful (Q7.1).   
 Do nonviolent adherents practice nonviolent action? Lakey (1973) has argued 
that it has long been the case that “most pacifists do not practice nonviolent resistance, 
and most people who do practice nonviolent resistance are not pacifists” (p.57). This was 
likely to be the case decades and centuries ago, when apolitical religious groups like the 
Mennonites, Brethren, the Hutterites, and the Amish comprised the bulk of self-identified 
pacifists. But as Moskos and Chambers (1993) have noted, the conscientious objector 
movement, especially in Europe, has become secularized. And in the last 50 years, 
nonviolence in general has also become increasingly secularized, as revolutionary 
nonviolent movements have experienced success and nonviolent theorists like Gene 
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Sharp have articulated pragmatic nonviolence – that is, nonviolence as a strategy not 
grounded in moral principles/ the principled nonviolence that has long been linked to 
religiously inspired nonviolence.  
 If nonviolence has become secularized and perceived as a strategy rather than 
exclusively as a set of moral principles, the question is – are nonviolent adherents today, 
unlike many of the apolitical religious pacifists of the past, likely to act on their beliefs? 
The table above supports the broad stream of research which has found that beliefs and 
attitudes affirmed in a survey context, or in any form of verbal or written communication 
for that matter, often do not relate to behavior (Hitlin and Piliavin 2004, Wicker 1969). 
 Given that only three significant associations were found in Table 33 below, it 
seems that nonviolent adherence does not necessarily translate into nonviolent action – 
whether we are concerned with actions conducted in the past, or the willingness to 
engage in nonviolent action in the future. The only significant associations in the table 
above involved, first, 3.4% more nonviolent adherents had attended an anti-war 
demonstration, and about 17% more nonviolent adherents said they “might” attend an 
anti-war demonstration in the future. Second, slightly more nonviolent adherents said 
they “might” attend a school-related demonstration, but ironically 3.4% less nonviolent 
adherents had actually already attended such a demonstration in the past.  
 Third, the relative unwillingness of nonviolent adherents to engage in property 
destruction was statistically significant. This is somewhat ironic given that many 
nonviolent adherents have embraced forms of direct action including property 
destruction, such as Nelson Mandela and the anti-war Plowshares Activists. Some have 
made much of Mandela’s endorsement of violence, but he primarily endorsed sabotage 
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Table 33. Nonviolent Adherents and Political Actions, UO data (Percentages) 
 
Survey Questions on Political Actions: This is a form of 
political action that I (have done, might do, would never do): 
Nonviolent 
adherents 
(n=199) 
Other 
respondents 
(n=196) 
Chi Square 
(df) 
 
 
p 
Signing a petition   1.78 
(2) 
.410 
      Have done 77.9 72.4 
      Might do 20.0 24.1 
      Would never do 2.1 3.5 
Joining in boycotts (refusing to buy products from unjust 
corporations or nations) 
  4.49 
(2) 
.106 
      Have done 26.5 20.3 
      Might do 63.5 63.4 
      Would never do 10.1 16.3 
Attending legal and lawful demonstrations   .17 
(2) 
.918 
      Have done 21.1 21.3 
      Might do 67.4 65.8 
      Would never do 11.6 12.9 
Joining strikes at a workplace   3.85 
(2) 
.146 
      Have done 4.7 3.9 
      Might do 81.6 74.9 
      Would never do 13.7 21.2 
Occupying buildings or factories, or barricading streets   .42 
(2) 
.811 
      Have done 4.2 4.5 
      Might do 50.8 47.5 
      Would never do 45.0 48.0 
Damaging things like breaking windows, removing road signs, 
etc. 
  9.76 
(2) 
.008** 
      Have done 7.9 10.8 
      Might do 12.0 22.7 
      Would never do 80.1 66.5 
Use personal violence like fighting with other demonstrators 
or the police 
  3.67 
(2) 
.186 
      Have done 2.1 1.0 
      Might do 13.1 19.2 
      Would never do 84.8 79.8 
Attending an anti-war demonstration   20.31 
(2) 
.000*** 
      Have done 7.3 3.9 
      Might do 74.5 57.6 
      Would never do 18.2 38.4 
Attending a school related demonstration   6.3 
(2) 
.043* 
      Have done 23.6 31.0 
      Might do 69.1 57.1 
      Would never do 7.3 11.8 
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001; “Nonviolent adherents” dummy variable includes all respondents who scored above the mean 
score on the nonviolence index which was 2.69009 (the mid-point was 2.5 on a 4-point Likert scale) 
 
that strictly avoided harm to people (Presbey 2006, Mandela 1999). While Gandhi tended 
to view property destruction as violent, Dr. King attached great significance to the 
distinction between harming people and property in his definition of “violence” 
(Churchill 1998, pp.144-145). Overall, the results indicate few nonviolent adherents are 
drawing their attitudes from a praxis (insight gained through a cycle of personal action 
and reflection leading to revised strategic action) of nonviolent action or activism. That 
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is, they are not building on a past history of activism. Moreover, their professed 
willingness to engage in nonviolent action in the future rarely differs from those who do 
not claim nonviolent beliefs.    
 Similarly, a chi-square test was run on the nonviolent adherents dummy variable 
and the political interest question (Q30). There was no significant association between 
nonviolent adherence and degree of political interest, with a chi-square of 2.06 (3 df), 
p=.56. Overall, political alienation was fairly high with 31% of UO respondents claiming 
to be “Not very interested” and 13% claiming to be “Not at all interested.” Hence, 
nonviolent adherents in the UO sample bear little resemblance to a group ripe for political 
mobilization. In this sense, few of them exemplify the model of early 20th century 
pacifists who understood the label and movement to involve a “high degree of 
engagement in activity” to work for peace and justice and to reduce violence (Chickering 
cited in Cortright 2008, p.9). Similarly, Gandhi understood nonviolence to be “a means 
by which the active many can overcome the ruthless few” (Schell 2003, p.144). 
 Comparing UO and Costa Rican respondents. While about half of UO 
respondents (199 out of 395) scored above the mean of the nonviolence index, in the 
Costa Rican data, over two-thirds of respondents (200 out of 271) scored above the mean 
of the nonviolence index (M=3.350554). Again, this high proportion scoring above the 
mean in the Costa Rican sample is another subjective indicator of Costa Rica’s culture of 
peace. Although these indexes shared several items in common, it should be remembered 
that these nonviolence indexes were nation-specific, as they were formulated through 
factor analyses of the separate national samples. 
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  Like in the UO data, there was no significant association between nonviolent 
adherents and political interest. In addition, the overall rate of political alienation was 
almost identical to the UO sample with 31% of Costa Rican respondents claiming to be 
“Not very interested” and 15% claiming to be “Not at all interested.” 
 Like in the UO data, only 3 of the 9 political action items were significantly 
associated with nonviolent adherents (for the sake of brevity, only the significant 
associations are depicted in Table 34 below). First, as in the UO data, nonviolent 
adherents were significantly less likely to say they had engaged in property destruction, 
or might do it. And, in much larger numbers they affirmed that they “would never” 
engage in property destruction (90% of nonviolent adherents affirmed they “would 
never” do this versus 65% of the rest of the sample). The association between nonviolent 
adherents and an aversion to politically-motivated property destruction was significant at 
the .001 level. Second, nonviolent adherents were significantly less likely to say they had 
engaged in fighting at demonstrations, or might do it. And, in much larger numbers they 
affirmed that they “would never” engage in personal violence at a demonstration (83% of 
nonviolent adherents affirmed they “would never” do this versus 58% of the rest of the 
sample). The association between nonviolent adherents and an aversion to personal 
violence at demonstrations was significant at the .001 level. Both of these findings are 
unsurprising, though, as noted above in the UO data analysis of these items, the aversion 
to property destruction is not shared by all nonviolent activists, many of whom theorize 
direct action in ways that can include property destruction.  
 Third, as expected given post-survey feedback from several survey respondents, it 
seems there may have been widespread misunderstanding of the term “boycott” in the 
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Costa Rican sample, and a lack of familiarity with the tactic. Note that the boycott item 
below lacked the parenthetical definition which was included in the later UO survey 
version. In the Costa Rican sample, nonviolent adherents were significantly less likely to 
say they had engaged in a boycott or “might do” it. And, they were much more likely to 
say they “would never” engage in a boycott. The chi-square was 6.44 with 2(df), and 
p=.04 (significant at the .05 level). Unfortunately, it can not be known how many 
respondents misunderstood the boycott term. It may be that a lack of familiarity with the 
tactic, could mean that respondents could not imagine even a hypothetical situation in 
which the tactic would be used. Note also that fewer nonviolent adherents claimed to 
have actually engaged in the tactic, and presumably the respondents in this “Have done” 
row do in fact know what a boycott means.   
 If this significant finding is an accurate representation of the attitudes of Costa 
Rican nonviolent adherents towards boycotts, it could be an expression of the cultural 
value of simpatía (Triandis et al. 1984). That is, the tactic may seem disrespectful or 
unnecessarily critical, lacking in sympathy, especially in the abstract context of a survey 
where no scenario of injustice/ oppression/ conflict was conjured up. While the boycott 
tactic continues to be utilized, with a few exceptions it has not been prominent in recent 
decades in the U.S. By contrast, a 2005 survey found that 28% of all Swedes between the 
ages of 16 and 29 claim to have boycotted products while motivated by political or social 
concerns (Ferris and Stein 2010, p.5). Perhaps the nationwide three-year long Taco Bell 
boycott, in support of Florida farm workers, which ended in 2005 is the most prominent 
successful boycott of recent years in the U.S. (Lee 2005). Without organized boycotts, 
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the consumer responsibility movement’s mantra of “voting with your dollars” certainly 
lacks political force. 
 Though many seasoned nonviolent activists would likely consider utilizing the 
boycott tactic under certain circumstances, it may not be a fluke that Costa Ricans might 
consider it too militant. Gandhi himself undertook boycotts including a boycott of British 
cloth. But out of compassion for the British textile factory employees, Gandhi raised 
funds to support these factory workers since the Indian boycott could threaten the 
livelihood of innocent workers. In this sense, Gandhi’s version of the boycott had a 
strong element of compassion, or what could be called, in the Latin American context, 
simpatía. 
Table 34. Cross-tabulations of Nonviolent Adherents and Political Actions, Costa Rica 
Data (Percentages) 
 
This is a form of political action that I (have done, might do, 
would never do): 
Nonviolent 
adherents 
(n=181) 
Other 
respondents 
(n=102) 
Chi 
Square 
(df) 
 
 
P 
Damaging things like breaking windows, removing road signs, 
etc. 
  28.85 
(2) 
.000*** 
      Have done 4.1   12.7 
      Might do 5.6 21.8 
      Would never do 90.3 65.5 
Use personal violence like fighting with other demonstrators 
or the police 
  27.04 
(2) 
.000*** 
      Have done 2.0 12.5 
      Might do 14.8 29.5 
      Would never do 83.2 58.0 
Joining in boycotts   6.44 
(2) 
. 04* 
      Have done 8.3 10.8 
      Might do 39.8 52.9 
      Would never do 51.9 36.3 
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001; “Nonviolent adherents” dummy variable includes all respondents who scored above the mean 
score on the nonviolence index which was 3.350554 (the mid-point was 2.5 on a 4-point Likert scale) 
 
 T-tests confirmed that the two samples revealed numerous significant differences 
in attitudes towards protest tactics. As can be seen in Table 35, Costa Rican students were 
significantly more approving of the following tactics: attending an anti-war 
demonstration, using personal violence like fighting with other demonstrators/ the police, 
joining strikes, and attending legal and lawful demonstrations. Meanwhile, UO students 
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were significantly more approving of the following tactics: property destruction, signing 
a petition, and joining in boycotts. 
 A large number of Costa Rican students, 46.29%, said they would never 
participate in a boycott, and it is likely that a large percentage of this is due to 
misunderstanding the word “boycott.” Post-survey debriefing with respondents indicated 
this was definitely the case with several students – a telling indicator of how little known 
this tactic is in the contemporary Costa Rican context. For this reason, the UO survey was 
adjusted, as noted above, in the hope of improving comprehension, but this also 
undermined the goal of cross-national comparison. 
Table 35. Cross-National Comparisons: Prevalence of Political Action (Percentages) 
 
(Q21) This is a form of political 
action that I (have done, might 
do, would never do): 
 Have done 
(1) 
Might do (2) Would 
never do 
(3) 
x̄ 
 
x̄ - x̄² 
 
1. Signing a petition 
 
 
UO 75.06 22.14 2.8 1.28 -.21*** 
CR 54.49 45.52 2.99 1.49 
2. Joining in boycotts (refusing to 
buy products from unjust 
corporations or nations) 
[clarification in parentheses 
added for UO version] 
UO 23.27 63.43 13.3 1.9 -.47*** 
CR 9.19 44.52 46.29 2.37 
3. Attending legal and lawful 
demonstrations 
UO 21.17 66.58 12.24 1.91 .22*** 
CR 40.13 50.99 8.88 1.69 
4. Joining strikes at a workplace 
[UO version]/ Joining unofficial 
strikes [CR version] 
UO 4.33 78.12 17.56 2.13 .14** 
CR 25 51.03 23.97 1.99 
5. Occupying buildings or 
factories, or barricading streets 
UO 4.35 49.1 46.55 2.42 .02 
CR 12.83 34.54 52.63 2.4 
6. Damaging things like breaking 
windows, removing road signs, 
etc. 
UO 9.39 17.51 73.10 2.64 -.10* 
CR 7.19 11.44 81.37 2.74 
7. Use personal violence like 
fighting with other demonstrators 
or the police 
 
UO 1.52 16.24 82.23 2.81 .13** 
 CR 5.84 20.13 74.03 2.68 
8. Attending an anti-war 
demonstration 
 
UO 5.57 65.82 28.61 2.23 .32*** 
CR 16.23 76.95 6.82 1.91 
9. Attending a school related 
demonstration 
 
UO 27.41 62.94 9.64 1.82 -.07 
CR 24.51 62.09 13.4 1.89 
Notes: two-tailed t-tests; *= p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p<.001; UO = University of Oregon; CR = Costa Rica university students; 
UO (N=395); CR (N=308); After the Costa Rica survey was conducted, questions 2 and 4 in the UO survey were modified as noted 
above in brackets; answer codes were: 1=have done, 2=might do, 3=would never do; hence, a score close to 1 indicates a propensity to 
approve of the tactic, while a score closer to 3 indicates unfavorable attitudes toward the tactic; in the difference between means 
column, a negative difference indicates that UO students approved of the tactic more than Costa Rican students; a positive difference 
indicates that Costa Rican students approved of the tactic more than UO students; robvar tests were first conducted in STATA to 
determine if variances between group means were significantly different 
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 Interestingly, 52.63% of Costa Rican students and 46.55% of UO studentssaid 
they would never “occupy” a public place. Yet, given the worldwide diffusion of the 
“occupy” tactic in 2011, from Tahrir Square in Cairo to Occupy Wall Street and beyond, 
it would be interesting to re-test this item. A prominent linguist named “occupy” the 
word of the year in 2011 (Nunberg 2011).   
Attitudes of U.S. Versus Costa Rican University Students 
 
 Two tailed t-tests were performed on the core 34 questions pertaining to violent/ 
nonviolent attitudes across the two samples. The results show that on all 34 items, Costa 
Rican University students demonstrate significantly more peaceful attitudes, and on 
virtually all of these 34 items, the differences were very robust (p < .001). Ironically, in 
the replication of the three Gallup World Poll items which partly sparked this study, 
Costa Rican students fail to register a more peaceful average than UO students on one of 
the three questions – on that item, Costa Ricans tied with UO students (running count: 
Costa Ricans significantly more peaceful on 36 out of 37 questions). Here, the reason 
Costa Ricans failed to register a more peaceful response is likely related to the fact that 
the Gallup World Poll items offer two answers, rather than a Likert-type set of answers 
ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. When four items probing attitudes on 
interpersonal violence are added, Costa Ricans were more peaceful in three out of four 
items, but significantly more peaceful in two out of the four questions (running count: 
Costa Ricans significantly more peaceful on 38 out of 41 questions). When five more 
questions are added replicating survey items probing attitudes on various types of 
violence, Costa Ricans were more peaceful on all 5 items, but significantly more peaceful 
on four out of five questions (running count: Costa Ricans significantly more peaceful on 
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42 out of 46 questions). When 6 elite cues questions were added, Costa Ricans were 
significantly more peaceful in 6 out of 6 items (running count: Costa Ricans were more 
peaceful on 50 out of 52 items and significantly more peaceful on 48 out of 52 questions; 
one additional item in this section was thrown out due to conceptual problems (see 
below)). UO respondents are more peaceful than Costa Ricans on only 1 out of 52 items, 
and on that item the difference between means was significant at the .01 level.  
Replicating the Gallup World Poll Items 
 At the very beginning of the surveys, university student respondents in both 
nations were asked the Gallup World Poll’s forced choice question (see Table 36 below): 
“Some people think that for the military to target and kill civilians is sometimes justified, 
while others think that kind of violence is never justified. Which is your opinion?” 
Because pre-testing revealed that some university student respondents were not entirely 
clear on the meaning of “civilians,” respondents in both nations were told parenthetically 
that “civilians” means “unarmed men, women, and children who are NOT participating in 
a violent conflict.” Since this definition adds slightly to the Gallup World Poll question 
and flags the ethical issue by highlighting “unarmed men, women, and children” we can 
surmise that the present results are not entirely comparable with Gallup World Poll data 
on this question. Arguably, adding this explanatory note to the question is likely to skew 
results towards a nonviolent answer. Of course, an additional test could be conducted by 
asking the question while presenting visuals of unarmed men, women, and children, and 
varying their ages, race, ethnicity, and religious and culture-bound clothing (e.g., Arab 
Islamic clothing versus Western business attire).  
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 Q6 asked respondents about the efficacy of “peaceful means alone” when utilized 
by oppressed groups. There are numerous complexities with interpreting responses to this 
question, especially cross-nationally. For instance, in one context, “peaceful means 
alone” may conjure up voting or democratic processes, perhaps various forms of dialogue 
and diplomacy will come to mind. In this vein, Article 1.1 of the UN Charter mentions 
the UN’s goal of creating “peace by peaceful means.” In another context the phrase 
“peaceful means alone” may be interpreted as referring to nonviolent protest such as 
mass street actions. Hence, Martin’s (2008) distinction between conventional action and 
nonviolent action, discussed above, must be kept in mind since depending on their 
context, some respondents might think of “conventional action” while others might think 
of “nonviolent action” when reading this question.    
Table 36. T-Tests of Mean Scores: University Students in USA and Costa Rica  
Question Attitude Probed Costa Rica 
(n = 312) 
USA 
(n = 403) 
 
df 
 
t 
 
x̄² - x̄ 
 x̄ SD x̄² SD 
Q4 principled nonviolent 
stance against state 
terrorism (i.e., is it 
justifiable for the military 
to target and kill 
civilians?) 
 
1.11 
 
.32 
 
1.19 
 
.39 
 
709.50 
 
-2.9363 
 
.08** 
Q5 principled nonviolent 
stance against “terrorism” 
(is “terrorism” 
justifiable?) 
 
1.10 
 
.30 
 
1.15 
 
.35 
 
705.97 
 
-2.0367 
 
.05* 
Q6 efficacy of nonviolence 
(i.e., does nonviolence 
“work” for oppressed 
groups?; consistent with 
pragmatic and principled 
nonviolent orientations) 
 
1.39 
 
.49 
 
1.39 
 
.49 
 
702 
 
-0.0150 
 
.00 
 
Notes: Two-tailed t-tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; Because the variances in Q4 and Q5 are significantly different in 
the two samples (robvar tests were run in Stata), the t-test commands run in Stata on these items specified unequal variances (and  
Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom are reported). The underlined words in the following questions highlight the only differences 
between the 2010 surveys of university students and the Gallup World Poll questions. Q4: Some people think that for the military to 
target and kill civilians is sometimes justified, while others think that kind of violence is never justified.  Which is your opinion? 
(Civilians = unarmed men, women, and children who are NOT participating in a violent conflict) [Answers: 1=Never justified; 
2=Sometimes justified]; Q5: Some people think for an individual person or a small group of persons to target and kill civilians is 
sometimes justified while others think that kind of violence is never justified. Which is your opinion? [Answers: 1=Never justified; 
2=Sometimes justified]; Q6: Some people believe that groups that are oppressed and are suffering from injustice can improve their 
situation by peaceful means alone (nonviolent methods). Others do NOT believe that peaceful means alone will work to improve the 
situation for oppressed groups. Which do you believe, peaceful means alone will work, or peaceful means alone will NOT work? 
[Answers: 1=Will work; 2=Will NOT work] 
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 In Table 36 above, we see that the Costa Rican means are significantly more 
peaceful than UO means on the state terrorism and the terrorism items. There is no 
difference between the mean responses on the pragmatic nonviolence item.  
 Comparing Costa Rican and UO means. In Figure 5 below (which graphically 
depicts the data in Table 37), keeping in mind the 2.5 midpoint (all means less than 2.5 
representthe violent end of the attitude spectrum) we observe that the Costa Rican mean 
only falls below the 2.5 midpoint on two items. Thus, the Costa Rican mean reflects pro-
violent attitudes on only 2 of the 18 items. Meanwhile, the UO mean reflects pro-violent 
attitudes on 9 of the 18 items (not including the mean for item “ee” which is just barely 
above the dividing line at 2.51). Hence, even though the means from the two samples  
Figure 5. Means of Cross-National Samples, Depicting Table 37 (18 Questions Positively 
Worded for Agreement by Adherents of Violent Orientations) 
 
Notes: The items a – hh listed above on the horizontal axis are all positively worded for agreement by adherents of 
violent orientations; On means: 4 is more peaceful; 1 is more violent; 2.5 is the midpoint (all means less than 2.5 lean 
towards violent end of spectrum); Values of answers: Strongly Agree (1); Agree (2); Disagree (3); Strongly Disagree 
(4) 
 
 
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
a b c d e f g h i o p q r s ee ff gg hh
Costa Rica UO
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largely seem to parallel one another, the UO means fall on the violent side of the violent/ 
nonviolent divide much more frequently. Moreover, on all means, Costa Rica is more 
peaceful. 
Table 37. T-Tests on Q9 items in the Cross-National Samples: Questions in which 
“Disagree” or “Strongly Disagree” Are the Peaceful Answers (Percentages).  
Item (question letter label/ 
Q9 label) and primary 
category 
Costa Rica (n = 312) USA (n = 403)  
x̄ - x̄² 
 
 
Dis-
agree 
Strong-
ly Dis-
agree 
Total 
(Dis-
agree) 
x̄ 
 
Dis-
agree 
Strong-
ly Dis-
agree 
Total 
(Dis-
agree) 
x̄² 
 
SD SD 
(a/1) Self-defense: “A 
person has the right to kill 
to defend his/ her family.” 
19.22 7.82 27.04 2.09 10.8 1.76 12.56 1.83 .26**** 
.87 .68 
(b/2) Self-defense: “A 
person has the right to kill 
to defend his/ her property.” 
44.30 28.01 72.31^ 2.94 54.52 15.08 69.60 2.80 .14* 
.86 .74 
(c/3) Domestic violence: 
“There are situations in 
which a woman is justified 
in slapping her husband in 
the face.” 
34.22 25.25 59.47 2.72 32.42 11.72 44.14 2.43 .29**** 
.98 .86 
(d/4) Domestic violence: 
“There are situations in 
which a man is justified in 
slapping his wife in the 
face.” 
 
28.90 
 
61.04 89.94^ 3.47 39.45 48.39 87.84 3.34 .13* 
.77 .74 
(e/5) Corporal punishment: 
“Corporal punishment 
(spanking) is necessary to 
bring up children properly.” 
 
37.86 48.54 86.40 3.33 44.64 27.18 71.82 2.95 .38**** 
.76 .83 
(f/6) Militarism: “Military 
discipline develops good 
character in youth.” 
 
32.57 45.93 78.50 3.21 49.75 15.66 65.41 2.78 .43**** 
.87 .74 
(g/7) Militarism: “War 
brings out the best qualities 
in men.” 
 
17.10 77.42 94.52^ 3.71 42.36 50.63 92.99 3.43 .28**** 
.61 .65 
(h/8) Militarism: “Many of 
our nation’s greatest heroes 
are soldiers.” 
26.06 66.45 92.51 3.56 36.82 6.72 43.54 2.38 1.18**** 
.72 .78 
(i/9) Just war: “When 
people suffer under a 
dictator, a violent 
revolution is necessary and 
justified.”  
27.60 24.68 52.28^ 2.65 41.46 3.52 44.98 2.42 .23*** 
.98 .67 
(o/15) Realpolitiks: “There 
is nothing wrong with 
nations seizing territory or 
natural resources through 
war because nations should 
protect their own economic 
security and interests.” 
 
20.00 74.84 94.84 3.67 55.95 23.54 79.49 3.02 .65**** 
.67 .69 
(p/16) Just war: “When the 
goal is liberation from 
tyranny and oppression, 
war can be necessary and 
justified.” 
 
 
25.57 23.62 49.19 2.62 20.76 2.28 23.04 2.16 .46**** 
.96 .61 
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Item (question letter label/ 
Q9 label) and primary 
category 
Costa Rica USA  
x̄ - x̄² 
 
Dis-
agree 
Strong-
ly Dis-
agree 
Total 
(Dis-
agree) 
x̄ 
 
Dis-
agree 
Strong-
ly Dis-
agree 
Total 
(Dis-
agree) 
x̄² 
 
SD SD 
(q/17) Just war: “Because 
freedom and justice may be 
more important than peace, 
war may be necessary and 
although regrettable, it is 
the lesser of two evils.” 
32.66 29.63 62.29 2.85 27.92 3.55 31.47 2.27 .58**** 
.93 .66 
(r/18 ) Realpolitiks: 
“Diplomacy often fails and 
war between nations 
becomes necessary.” 
45.31 37.54 82.85 3.17 61.32 4.33 65.65 2.68 .49**** 
.79 .59 
(s/19) Judeo-Christian 
sanction: “The Biblical 
command against killing 
does NOT apply to 
warfare.” 
19.26 48.99 68.25^ 2.98 47.24 14.17 61.41 2.70 .28*** 
1.17 .79 
(ee/31) Death penalty (myth 
of redemptive violence): 
“The death penalty should 
be used for a person 
convicted of murder.” 
35.28 35.60 70.88 2.93 41.88 10.91 52.79 2.51 .42**** 
1.02 .85 
(ff/32) Realpolitiks: “It is 
necessary to fight terrorism 
by military means 
(methods).” 
35.53 24.67 60.20 2.71 34.61 2.29 36.90 2.28 .43**** 
.99 .69 
(gg/33) Realpolitiks: “It is 
sometimes necessary to use 
military force to maintain 
order in the world.”  
35.48 25.48 60.96 2.79 20.55 1.50 22.05 2.14 .65**** 
.91 .59 
(hh/34) View of culture’s 
embrace of realpolitiks (and 
test of social desirability 
bias): “Now, please answer 
the last question (gg) the 
way you think most people 
in your nation would 
answer it.” 
23.17 17.76 40.93 2.39 11.51 2.56 14.07 1.83 .56**** 
1.00 .73 
Notes: These questions are positively worded for agreement by adherents of violent orientations. Two-tailed t-tests of significance: * = 
p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001;  ^ = items where % “Total (Disagree)” for Costa Rica is less than 10% greater 
than UO “Total (Disagree),” but % of Costa Rica “Strongly Disagree” notably exceeds % of UO “Strongly Disagree”; “Total 
(Disagree)” = “Strongly Disagree” + “Disagree”; On means: 4 is more peaceful; 1 is more violent; 2.5 is the midpoint; Values of 
answers: Strongly Agree (1); Agree (2); Disagree (3); Strongly Disagree (4); Using the robvar command in Stata, the samples were 
found to have significantly different variances on all items except #’s 2, 4, 5, 15, and 31. Hence, on all other items, the “unequal” t-test 
command was specified in Stata.    
 
 While an item by item commentary is prohibited for reasons of space, consider Q9.19 
which probes respondent attitudes towards a key Judeo-Christian sanction: “The Biblical 
command against killing does NOT apply to warfare.” This issue was re-iterated again in the 
elite quotes section (though only in the Costa Rican survey) in item #10: “Any human order 
to kill must be subordinate to the law of God which says, ‘Thou shalt not kill.’ No soldier is 
obliged to obey an order contrary to the law of God” – Archbishop Oscar Romero (El 
Salvador, 1980). One U.S. respondent left a survey comment which argued that the Bible 
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says, “Thou shalt not  ‘murder,’” not “Thou shalt not ‘kill.’” But this was precisely what the 
questions probed – how respondents interpret the passage, whether they circumscribe the 
ethical injunction or adopt strategies of “moral disengagement” (Bandura  
1990; McAlister, Bandura, and Owen 2006). The salience of these basic ethical questions for 
military veterans was recently articulated forcefullyby the U.S. military veteran and novelist 
Karl Marlantes (2012): 
...we are raised in a Judeo-Christian culture. I mean, ‘Thou shalt not kill,’ even for 
the atheists in our culture is a tenet you just do not violate unless you're, you 
know, crazy or a sociopath or something. And so all your young life, that's drilled 
into your head. And then suddenly, you know, you're 18 or 19 and they're saying, 
‘Go get 'em and kill for your country.’And then you do that. And then you come 
back. And then it's like, ‘Well, thou shalt not kill’ again. Well, believe me, that is 
a difficult thing to deal with. And I think what's even more difficult is that the 
only being that should actually take life is the one that gives life. And that's God. 
Or the gods. And you take a young man and you put him in the role of a God 
where he is asked to take a life, that’s something that no 19-year-old is able to 
handle. 
 
 In Table 37 above, we see that the differences between the UO and Costa Rican 
means are significant on all items, and in 16 out of 18 items, the difference is quite robust 
(p < .001). Similarly, in Table 38 below, we see that the differences between the UO and 
Costa Rican means are significant on all items, and in 14 out of 16 items, the difference is 
quite robust (p < .001). In Figure 6 below (which graphically depicts the data in Table 
38), keeping in mind the 2.5 midpoint (all means greater than 2.5 representthe violent end 
of the attitude spectrum) we observe that the Costa Rican mean never falls above the 2.5 
midpoint. Thus, the Costa Rican mean reflects peaceful attitudes on all 16 items. 
Meanwhile, the UO mean equals 2.5 or above on only 5 items.  
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Figure 6. Means of Cross-National Samples, Depicting Table 38 (16 Questions Positively 
Worded for Agreement by Adherents of Nonviolent Orientations) 
 
Notes: The items j – ddlisted above on the horizontal axis are all positively worded for agreement by 
adherents of nonviolent orientations; On means: 1 is more peaceful; 4 is more violent; 2.5 is the midpoint 
(all means greater than 2.5 represent violent end of spectrum); Values of answers: Strongly Agree (1) - 
Strongly Disagree (4) 
 
 Possible sources of bias: Extreme response and acquiescent biases. The striking 
visual differences between Figure 5 (of items all positively worded for agreement by 
adherents of violent orientations)and Figure 6 (of items all positively worded for 
agreement by adherents of nonviolent orientations)deserves interpretation. In Figure 5, 
the intensity and direction of responses in the two samples parallel one another almost 
precisely (the main exception being item H), but with Costa Ricans consistently and 
slightly more peaceful on all items. In Figure 6, the attitude differences between the two 
samples mirror one another in a much more varied and extreme pattern. As will be 
explained below, I believe the most plausible explanation here is that Costa Ricans 
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revealed a “yea-saying bias” in the Figure 5 items, but in Figure 6, where the items were 
worded for agreement by nonviolent adherents, the Costa Rican “yea-saying bias” 
combined with the significantly higher percentage of Costa Rican nonviolent adherents 
(about 29% as compared with 4.4% of UO respondents) and lower percentage of 
militarism adherents (about 9.3% as compared with about 28% of UO respondents) 
produced extreme differences between the two nations on the items in Figure 6.    
 The visual differences alone between Figure 5 and Figure 6 suggest possible 
forms of negativity bias, positivity bias/ “yea-saying bias” (Smith 2003, p.81)/ 
“acquiescent response bias”/ “agreement bias,” and/ or “extreme response bias” in one of 
the nation samples. Such response patterns are likely to distort group means and limit the 
validity of cross-cultural comparisons (Marin, Gamba, and Marin 1992). Moreover, 
research suggests that ethnic differences in these biases do not seem to interact with 
gender (Bachman and O’Malley 1984; Marin, Gamba, and Marin 1992), and still have 
significant effects when education is controlled for (Marin, Gamba, and Marin 1992). 
 Landsberger and Saavedra (1967) found yea-saying to be strong among Spanish 
speakers in the U.S. and Chile. Similarly, analyzing a national health survey, Aday et al. 
(1980) found that Hispanics in the U.S. selected acquiescent responses at higher rates 
(24%) than non-Hispanic Whites (14%). In addition, Marin, Gamba, and Marin (1992) 
found Hispanics in the U.S. to exhibit both acquiescent response stylesand extreme 
response styles significantly more than non-Hispanic Whites. While gender effects were 
inconsistent, the less educated respondents (less than 12 years of formal education) were 
more likely to prefer extreme response styles, and the less acculturated (i.e., assimilated 
to U.S. culture) were more likely to prefer both extreme and acquiescent response styles. 
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It has been theorized that yea-saying is a self-preservation strategy of the powerless (Ross 
and Mirowsky 1984), and therefore is common among less acculturated U.S. Hispanics 
who tend to hold lower socioeconomic statuses than acculturated Hispanics and non-
Hispanic Whites. However, this theory offers less leverage for explaining cross-national 
differences.   
 Many survey experts have concluded that the dominance of poor Latin American 
countries in the very top spots in worldwide surveys, like the Gallup World poll, which 
attempt to identify the happiest nations in the world can be explained by “a Latin 
American cultural proclivity to avoid negative statements regardless of how one actually 
feels” (Weissenstein 2012, p.A3). As Eduardo Lora, a former chief economist of the 
Inter-American Development Bank, concludes, “What the empirical literature says is that 
some cultures tend to respond to any type of question in a more positive way” (p.A3).    
 “Yea-saying bias” is typically assumed to be associated with face-to-face surveys 
administered by an interviewer (Smith 2003), rather than pencil and paper surveys. 
However, Marin, Gamba, and Marin (1992) found that in a self-administered written 
questionnaire (using 5-point Likert-type response scales) in the U.S., Hispanics made 
significantly more (at the .001 level) acquiescent responses than non-Hispanic Whites. 
The less educated made significantly more acquiescent responses (at the .001 level), and 
among Hispanics, the less acculturated Hispanics made significantly more acquiescent 
responses (at the .001 level). In any case, these forms of bias often differ among cultures, 
and can be a source of error, or alternatively, a source of insight about cultural 
communication styles (Smith 2004). The former interpretation pushes us to analyze 
differences in the “error structure” of cross-national samples (Smith 2003, p.80). But the 
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latter interpretation may be particularly apropos in the present study, as these patterns 
may indicate cultural attitudes towards conflict, though in a very limited sense given the 
artificial context of a survey. If these biases seem to be present and introduce a source of 
error, we are prompted to ask: which of the two graphs (i.e., the two sets of items) more 
accurately reflects “real” attitudes? However, we should not yet rule out the possibility 
that these patterns are meaningful indicators of substantive attitudes. 
 To reduce acquiescence, survey design norms prescribe that scales be balanced 
with reversals such that half the items require affirmation and half require negation in 
order to obtain high scores on a construct (McCrae and Costa 1997, Smith 2003). In this 
way, if respondents agree with all of the items, their overall score on the construct will be 
at the mid-point, indicating a lack of robust attitudes. By contrast, some cross-cultural 
survey researchers have avoided the balanced reversals method, arguing that translating 
negations can result in confusing questions and that respondents in some cultures tend to 
avoid registering disagreements (Segall 1986). As for translation issues, they extend 
beyond negative question formulations, since cross-linguistic analyses suggest it is 
difficult to arrive at equivalent translations of adjectives with parallel intensities or 
magnitudes in survey response terms (Voss et al. 1996).     
 Several studies have also identified a tendency for respondents from Hispanic 
cultures to select extreme responses. Tables 37 and 38 point to this tendency among 
Costa Rican respondents, as is identified by the “^” symbol in each table (see “Notes” 
section below each table). A Likert survey in the U.S. found that Hispanics exhibited 
significantly more extreme response stylesthan non-Hispanic Whites (Hui and Triandis 
1989). This pattern has also been linked to other minority groups, as Bachman and 
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O’Malley (1984) found that African-American students in the U.S. have a higher 
propensity for extreme responses than White students. In the Hui and Triandis (1989) 
study, Hispanics selected extreme responses more than non-Hispanics, but the ethnic 
differences only held on a 5-point scale, not on a 10-point scale. However, the Costa Rica 
data in Graph 1, for the most part hovers around the mid-point of 2.5, the opposite of 
extreme responses. Moreover, identifying an extreme bias requires that we can track it 
across a variety of different constructs.  
 The best section of the survey for tracking these forms of response bias is the 21 
Schwartz Values items, since it operationalizes 10 separate value constructs. But there is 
one caveat: the Schwartz Values section offered a 6-point Likert scale, as opposed to the 
4-point Likert scale in the core violent/ nonviolent section (Q9). As discussed above, Hui 
and Traindis found that extreme response bias diminishes as larger point scales (i.e., a 
finer gradation/ more response choices) are offered. However, in one of their data sets 
(dataset 4), Marin, Gamba, and Marin (1992) found the opposite: they found no ethnic 
group differences in extreme bias in a 4-point Likert-type format, but in a 5-point Likert-
type format U.S. Hispanics were significantly (at the .001 level) more likely to choose 
extreme responses than non-Hispanic Whites. In any case, questions in both the Schwartz 
Values section and the Q9 section of the present survey meet Bachman and O’Malley’s 
(1984) three criteria for analyzing extreme response sets: these questions (1) have an 
ordinal response scale with four or more categories, and (2) do not ask for demographic 
information, nor (3) factual reporting. 
 A comparative analysis of the UO and Costa Rican data on the Schwartz Values 
items was conducted. Following Marin, Gamba, and Marin’s (1992) procedures for 
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calculating extreme response bias, the number of times respondents chose a 1 or 6 
response (i.e. the extreme responses, also called “anchors” (p.502)) in the 21 items of the 
Schwartz Values section was counted, averaged to provide response proportions, and 
used as an index. Note that Marin, Gamba, and Marin’s (1992) utilized an additive index 
instead, but it was decided that an average is intuitively easier to interpret. Indeed, Marin 
et al. (1992) also report the proportions. The Costa Rican mean for the extreme response 
index is .39, with a standard deviation of .22 (n=312). The U.S. mean is .26, with a 
standard deviation of .18 (n=403). Hence, Costa Ricans chose an extreme response (a 1 
or a 6) 39% of the time, while UO respondents chose an extreme response 26% of the 
time. Robvar tests in STATA revealed that the variances between the samples were 
significantly different, and so the t-test specified unequal variances. The t-test revealed 
that the two sample means were significantly different at the .0001 level, with a t-ratio of  
8.96, and Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom = 606.8. Thus, compared to UO 
respondents, Costa Ricans were significantly (at the .0001 level) more likely to choose 
extreme responses in the Schwartz Values section.  
 Secondly, two additional indexes were constructed: an extreme yea-saying index 
and an extreme nay-saying index. The percentage of respondents in the UO sample who 
answered with the extreme yea-saying response of “Very much like me” (1) was 
subtracted from the same column of data in the Costa Rican sample on all 21 items. 
Similarly, the percentage of respondents in the UO sample who answered with the 
extreme nay-saying response of “Not like me at all” (6) was subtracted from the same 
column of data in the Costa Rican sample on all 21 items. The results show that mean 
“Very much like me” response was 10.87% higher in the Costa Rican sample (with a 
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standard deviation of 10.94), and the mean “Not like me at all” response was 2.48% 
higher in the Costa Rican sample (with a standard deviation of 4.27).  
 Hence, there is a slight “extreme bias” in the Costa Rican sample, with the bulk of 
it linked to an extreme yea-saying bias. However, this does not settle the question of 
whether the bias is linked to translation issues, Hispanic cultures, national character, 
personality traits, or interactions among those factors. On this count, Hui and Triandis 
(1989) theorized that Hispanic cultural values lead respondents to associate extreme 
responses with the socially desirable virtue of sincerity, and the middle categories of a 
response scale with hiding one’s real feelings. Alternative interpretations include the 
notion that Hispanic cultural values of “collectivism” (Marin and Triandis 1985, cited in 
Marin et al. 1992, p.508) help to explain the extreme response pattern. But, this is 
problematic since Japanese collectivism operates in the opposite way – fostering the 
avoidance of extreme responses (Smith 2003, p.82).  
 Perhaps a more plausible and nuanced argument is that Hispanic cultural scripts 
of “simpatía” lead its members to value conformity, sympathy, dignity, respectful 
politeness, and avoidance of interpersonal conflict, criticism, and disagreement (Triandis, 
Marin, Lisansky, and Betancourt 1984). This would help account for why, in the 
Schwartz Values section, Costa Rican respondents favored the extreme yeah-saying 
response, much more than the extreme nay-saying response. Applying this interpretation 
to the Costa Rican yea-saying pattern in the Schwartz Values section could also explain 
why Costa Ricans seem to be more chameleon-like: due to the cultural script of simpatía, 
they will more strongly identify with diverse values, which helps them avoid conflict. 
Thus, it is possible that the Hispanic and Costa Rican cultural value of conflict avoidance, 
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one not at all uncommon in some “cultures of peace” (Boulding 2000, p.97; Fry 2006, 
p.79), has manifested itself in our survey instruments themselves.  
 In naming these differences in response styles or “judgment styles” (Hui and 
Triandis 1989) across cultural groups we should also consider the interpretation that U.S. 
respondents, or White U.S. respondents in particular, exhibit a tepid, what I will term –a 
“middling bias.” This interpretation is curiouslyunder-theorized in the literature, as 
researchers have sought to explain why U.S. minorities prefer extreme responses, rather 
than why Whites moderate or “qualify” their responses (Bachman and O’Malley 1984, 
p.506). Whether we see a “middling” bias or an “extreme” bias might reflect our own 
ethnocentric biases and propensities to consider sincerity/ passion (stereotypically Latin/ 
Latin American/ Mediterranean) or deference/ modesty/ caution/ moderate affect 
(stereotypically Northern European and Japanese) as more socially desirable (Hui and 
Triandis 1989). Similarly, the methodological problem for cross-national researchers has 
been conceived by researchers in the global north as one of how to limit or “compensate” 
for extreme response styles (e.g., Smith 2003, p.82), rather than compensating for 
middling response styles, even though middling responses could be equally 
disadvantageous for interpretation and theory building.   
 Assuming that Costa Ricans actually do embrace more peaceful attitudes than 
U.S. respondents (as the present data and Gallup World Poll data clearly indicate), and 
building on the finding of a Costa Rican response bias in the Schwartz Values section, I 
would contend that Figure 5 may reflect a yea-saying/ acquiescent bias in the Costa Rican 
sample, but that is not all. The main reason for this claim, as pointed out above, is that the 
Costa Rican data in Figure 5 hovers around the mid-point of 2.5, the opposite of extreme 
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responses. Thus, in adjudicating between Figures 5 and 6, I believe the data can still 
ground significant substantive interpretations, rather than only indicating a source of 
error. For instance, the way in which Costa Rican attitudes largely parallel U.S. attitudes 
in the pro-violence items in Figure 5, and with only slightly (though often statistically 
significant) more peaceful means, could indicate the pervasiveness of the “myth of  
 
 
Table 38. T-tests on the Cross-National Samples: Questions in which “Strongly Agree” 
(1) or “Agree” (2) Are the Peaceful Answers (Percentages) 
Item (question letter label/ 
Q9 label) and primary 
category and/ or variable 
indicator 
Costa Rica (n = 312) USA (n = 403)  
x̄ - x̄² 
 
Strong-
ly Agree 
Agree Total 
(Agree) 
x̄ 
 
Strong-
ly Agree 
Agree Total 
(Agree) 
x̄² 
 
SD SD 
(j/10) Principled 
nonviolence: “Using 
violence to pursue political 
goals is NEVER justified.” 
51.97 18.42 70.39^ 1.89 27.05 40.25 67.30 2.07 .18* 
1.08 .81 
(k/11)Principled 
nonviolence: “War breeds 
disrespect for human life.” 
71.84 16.83 88.67 1.45 16.88 49.36 66.24 2.21 .76**** 
.83 .76 
(l/12) Principled 
nonviolence: “It is better to 
forgive your enemies and 
work for peace with justice 
than to be a good soldier.” 
62.90 30.65 93.55 1.46 14.94 58.73 73.67 2.15 .69**** 
.69 .70 
(m/13) Against militarism: 
“It is better to disobey 
orders and think for yourself 
than to be a good soldier.” 
35.20 30.59 65.79 2.10 10.83 33.75 44.58 2.53 .43**** 
1.01 .79 
(n/14) Against militarism: 
“Military discipline injures 
self-respect and 
individuality.” 
40.40 37.09 77.49 1.87 6.06 43.18 49.24 2.50 .63**** 
.88 .70 
(t/20) Principled 
nonviolence/ against just 
war: “There is NO 
conceivable justification for 
war.” 
48.06 23.55 71.61 1.87 6.46 24.03 30.49 2.75 .88**** 
.97 .75 
(u/21) Principled 
nonviolence/ against just 
war: “The evils of war are 
greater than any possible 
benefits.” 
65.48 22.90 88.38 1.49 11.96 38.42 50.38 2.44 .95**** 
.77 .78 
(v/22) Principled 
nonviolence/ against just 
war: “It is the moral 
duty…to refuse to 
participate in any way in 
any war, no matter what the 
cause.” 
46.77 30.00 76.77 1.82 7.61 32.74 40.35 2.63 .81**** 
.91 .78 
(w/23) Principled 
nonviolence/ against 
militarism: “We should 
honor the heroes of 
nonviolence more than 
those who used violence.”  
 
64.52 23.87 88.39 1.50 16.96 39.49 56.45 2.32 .82**** 
.77 .82 
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Item (question letter label/ 
Q9 label) and primary 
category and/ or variable 
indicator 
Costa Rica USA  
x̄ - x̄² 
 Strong-
ly Agree 
Agree Total 
(Agree) 
x̄ 
 
Strong-
ly Agree 
Agree Total 
(Agree) 
x̄² 
 
SD SD 
(x/24) Nonviolence: “In 
nations on the verge of civil 
war, nonviolent movements 
are likely to be more 
successful in increasing 
long-term peace and 
justice...” 
   1.84    2.21 .37**** 
.77 .69 
(y/25) Principled 
nonviolence and against 
realpolitiks: “…it is 
possible to outlaw armed 
conflict between nations – 
perhaps through the UN and 
the International Court of 
Justice.”  
45.10 39.87 84.97 1.74 8.76 47.68 56.44 2.40 .66**** 
.80 .73 
(z/26) Principled 
nonviolence and against 
realpolitiks: 
“Diplomacy…and 
nonviolent methods can 
always work to solve 
international disputes.”  
52.09 32.80 84.89 1.66 7.56 35.52 43.08 2.55 .89**** 
.80 .72 
(aa/27) Principled 
nonviolence: “…peaceful 
methods must be used 
because we can NOT 
separate the means from the 
ends.” 
50.17 37.46 87.63 1.65 14.54 58.16 72.70 2.15 .5**** 
.76 .68 
(bb/28) Pragmatic 
nonviolence: “Nonviolent 
methods can work to 
overthrow dictators.” 
30.69 38.94 69.63^ 2.08 11.99 55.10 67.09 2.24 .16* 
.92 .70 
(cc/29) Against realpolitiks: 
“We should object to wars 
when nations try to seize 
territory or natural 
resources.” 
59.67 26.89 86.56 1.59 16.41 55.05 71.46 2.14 .55**** 
.84 .69 
(dd/30) Against realpolitiks: 
“We should support 
disarmament efforts…” 
73.40 20.51 93.91 1.34 22.59 59.14 81.73 1.98 .64**** 
.64 .70 
 
Notes: Thesequestions are positively worded for agreement by adherents of nonviolent orientations. This set of questions was reverse 
coded for statistical analysis, but not in the table above; Two-tailed t-tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001;  
**** = p < .0001; ^ = items where % “Total (Agree)” for Costa Rica is less than 10% greater than UO “Total (Agree),” but % of 
Costa Rica “Strongly Agree” notably exceeds % of UO “Strongly Agree”; “Total (Agree)” = “Strongly Agree” + “Agree”; On means: 
1 is more peaceful; 4 is more violent; Values of answers: Strongly Agree (1); Agree (2); Disagree (3); Strongly Disagree (4); 2.5 is the 
midpoint; Where item category is noted as “against just war” it also implies the item is against ideologies placed further towards the 
violent pole of the spectrum (i.e., realpolitiks and militarism). Likewise, “against realpolitiks” implies the item is also against 
militarism. Similarly, on item (bb), pragmatic nonviolence encompasses the more robust principled nonviolence. Using the robvar 
command in Stata, the samples were found to have significantly different variances on all items except #’s 11, 21, 23, 25, and 30. 
Hence, on all other items, the “unequal” t-test command was specified in Stata.    
 
 
redemptive violence” even in Costa Rica’s relatively peaceful culture. Walter Wink 
(1992) has theorized that this myth is world’s dominant religion -- it is “the ethos of our 
times. It is the spirituality of the modern world” (p.13).  
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 Discussing various forms in which the myth surfaces in popular culture, 
especially television and film, Wink argues:  
...the myth of redemptive violence has won children’s voluntary acquiescence to a 
regimen of religious indoctrination more exhaustive and effective than any in the 
history of religions...No other religious system has ever remotely rivaled the myth 
of redemptive violence in its ability to catechize its young so totally. From the 
earliest age children are awash in depictions of violence as the ultimate solution in 
human conflicts. (p.23) 
 
Costa Rican exposure to U.S. television and film is almost as pervasive as U.S. residents 
(Biesanz, Biesanz, and Biesanz 1999), so it is reasonable to assume that their exposure to 
this myth is similarly deep and wide. Supporting this claim is the finding, discussed 
above, that about 60% of Costa Rican university students are not quite “pacifists.” But 
many Costa Rican respondents do embrace diverse forms of nonviolent attitudes, and as 
we will see below, the Costa Rican culture and educational system do expose Costa 
Ricans to the pragmatic and principled virtues of demilitarization.  
 Scanning the UO means in Table 38 above, we observe pro-violent mean attitudes 
on 4 items, and on item “n” the mean fell on the 2.5 midpoint. As in Figure 5, in Figure 6 
we see that Costa Rican means on all of the items are more peaceful than the UO means. 
 As for an “elective affinity” between Costa Rican culture and demilitarization, 
consider the evidence from Q9.13: “It is better to disobey orders and think for yourself 
than to be a good soldier.” This was one operationalization of anti-militarism, and 66% of 
Costa Ricans expressed agreement versus 45% of UO respondents (a 21% gap). This 
finding of an individualistic, anti-militaristic streak is corroborated by years of 
ethnographic work by Biesanz, Biesanz, and Biesanz (1999) who argue that  
Ticos [Costa Ricans] stubbornly – though passively – refuse to obey rules and 
orders that interfere with their own inclinations....[They often embrace] an old 
practice of ‘lowering the floor’ under those who presume to tell others what to do. 
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Distrust of concentrated authority is reflected in the abolition of the army; in 
irreverent jokes about the president, even by his supporters; in the common fear 
that a more professional police force would be, in effect, an army...Other 
longstanding cultural patterns linked to this antiauthoritarian attitude also shed 
light on recent social changes...they fear concentrated power... (p.286)  
 
Like U.S. individualism (Bellah et al. 1985, Bellah 2000), Costa Rican individualism also 
has a dark side – the effects of which have grown as neoliberal policies bring increasing 
inequality and distrust. Thus, many Ticos “seek expensive private solutions to collective 
problems...reluctant to cooperate with neighbors to prevent burglaries, they may instead 
hire private guards and buy guns; rather than work to improve public schools, they may 
send their children to private ones” (Biesanz et al. 1999, pp.286-287).  
Interpersonal Violence 
 Below we turn to several items which probed attitudes towards interpersonal 
violence. In Table 39, we see that Costa Ricans were significantly more peaceful in two 
out of the four questions. On the first item, UO students were significantly more peaceful. 
Because this item sets up a hypothetical situation in which a man’s wife is bumped, it  
Table 39. Replications of Items Probing Attitudes Towards Interpersonal Violence 
Q7. Below are conflicts in which two 
adult male strangers might engage in 
a fist fight. Tell me whether you 
would approve of the use of 
punching in each situation. 
(percentages) 
UO (N=406) Costa Rica (N=312)  
 
Yes (1) No (2) x̄ 
 
Yes (1) No (2) x̄² 
 
x̄ - x̄² 
1. Would you approve of a man 
punching an adult male stranger who 
was drunk and bumped into the man 
and his wife on the street? 
6.93 93.07 1.93 
 
14.1 85.9 1.86 .07* 
2. Would you approve of a man 
punching an adult male stranger who 
had hit the man’s child after the child 
accidentally damaged the stranger’s 
car? 
80.25 19.75 1.20 39.1 60.9 1.61 -0.41*** 
3. Would you approve of a man 
punching an adult male stranger who 
had broken into the man’s house? 
90.89 9.11 1.09 69.58 30.42 1.3 -0.21*** 
4. Would you approve of a 
policeman punching an adult male 
citizen who said vulgar and obscene 
things to the policeman? 
7.14 92.86 1.93 5.81 94.19 1.94 -0.01 
Notes: Two-tailed t-tests of significance:  *= p< .01; **= p< .001; *** = p<.0001; a higher mean (closer to 2) is more peaceful 
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may have elicited Latin American “machismo” attitudes and a concern for protecting the 
woman. Alternatively, it may be that UO students, who do attend a university known as 
something of a “party school” (in 2009, the Department of Education ranked the UO 
No.4 out of over 200 comparably sized schools for student alcohol violations and No.3 
for student drug violations (Fox 2011)) are more likely to imagine themselves as being 
drunk and accidentally and harmlessly bumping into people.  
Replicating Previous Studies: Various Dimensions of Violence  
 The next section of the survey replicated several previous survey items. Table 40 
shows that Costa Rica is significantly more peaceful on four of the items, but there was 
no significant difference on the wife-beating question. While the wife-beating question in 
the table above might seem to be a classic candidate for skewed data through social 
desirability bias, in some cultural contexts, violence against women is routinely and 
publicly approved. For instance, a 2012 survey by UNICEF found that in India, 57% of 
boys and 53% of girls between the ages of 15 and 19 “think wife-beating is justified” 
(Washington Post 2012, p.23A).  
Table 40. Cross-National Comparison: Probing Attitudes Towards Types of Violence  
Q8. Below, several actions are 
described. Tell me whether you 
think the action can always be 
justified, never be justified, or 
something in between. 
(percentages) 
UO (N=406) Costa Rica (N=312)  
 
 
x̄ - x̄² 
Never 
Justifiable 
(1) 
Sometimes 
Justifiable 
(7) 
 
x̄ 
 
Never 
Justifiable 
(1) 
Sometimes 
Justifiable 
(7) 
 
x̄² 
 
 
1. For a man to beat his wife 89.88 1.23 1.23 94.21 0 1.12 .11 
2. Political assassinations 48.51 9.16 2.66 59.29 5.45 2.29 .37* 
3. The use of torture against 
suspected terrorists in order to gain 
important information 
21.18 16.26 3.92 42.63 9.94 3.37 .55** 
4. For the police to beat a crowd of 
nonviolent protesters who refuse to 
leave the streets 
70.94 1.00 1.70 85.9 1.6 1.32 .38*** 
5. Killing in self-defense 1.00 36.05 7.27 4.49 23.72 6.91 .36* 
Notes: Two-tailed t-tests of significance:  *= p< .05; **= p< .01; *** = p<.001; Possible answers appeared as a Likert scale (1-10) 
including “Never Justifiable” (1), “Rarely Justifiable” (4), “Sometimes Justifiable” (7), and “Always Justifiable” (10); A lower mean 
(closer to 1) is more peaceful 
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Testing Intellectual Capital: Knowledge of Nonviolent History 
 The surveys ended with several open-ended questions in which respondents were 
asked open-ended questions in an attempt to test their knowledge of recent historical 
events as well as some key moments in the history of nonviolence around the world. 
Respondents are asked to name successful nonviolent revolutions, the nations in which 
Gandhi led movements, questions about recent and significant world events, and asked to 
name national heroes who they admired the most. Open-ended survey questions such as 
this are thought to increase the mention of recent events, recent presidents and other 
recent leaders (Newport 2011). However, as these surveys were conducted in July (Costa 
Rican Survey)and November of 2010, and before the nonviolent revolutions in early 
2011 in Tunisia and Egypt, no major nonviolent revolutions had filled the news in recent 
years. At the time of the surveys, perhaps the nonviolent revolutions receiving the most 
news coverage in recent years was the fall of the Berlin Wall and the break up of the 
Soviet Union. In this way, the timing of these surveys is well-situated to help us 
understand how likely it is that the Tunisian and Egyptian nonviolent revolutions of 2011 
will be remembered by students around the world in the years to come.     
 In Costa Rica and the U.S., most respondents demonstrated little or no knowledge 
(see Table 41). To put it somewhat crassly, this suggests that many people do not know 
enough to hold an opinion about the efficacy of nonviolent as opposed to violent means. 
Loewen (2007) argues that “nonthinking” and “ill-informed opinions,” which lack 
relevant experience-based insights, are extremely common on important social issues, 
and educated people in particular are more likely to “somehow imagine they know 
enough to hold an opinion” (p.353). 
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Table 41. Knowledge of Nonviolent Revolutions (Percentages) 
Q39: Can you name nations that have had successful, or somewhat 
successful, nonviolent revolutions in the 20th and 21st centuries (from 
1900 through to this year in 2010)? (Please name as many as you can 
remember.)  
Answer Costa Rica 
(N=312) 
UO 
(N=403) 
Gave only wrong answer(s) 2.24 1.74 
“Don’t know” or Left it blank 72.76 83.37 
One correct answer 14.42 7.69 
Two correct answers 6.73 3.97 
Three or more correct answers 3.85 3.23 
Notes: Percentages. If respondents gave one or more correct answers but also some incorrect answers, only the correct 
answers were counted (thus, the only respondents coded as “Gave only wrong answer(s)” were those who only gave 
wrong answers) 
 
 To aid in coding successful/ somewhat successful nonviolent revolutions, the 
exhaustive list compiled by Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) was the primary reference, 
but other sources were also consulted. Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) exclude a number 
of cases of nonviolent movements that have received some prominent coverage in 
pockets of popular culture such as in film documentaries released in years prior to the 
survey’s distribution (in 2010). For example, Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) exclude the 
successful 2000 nonviolent movement against the privatization of Cochabamba, Bolivia’s 
municipal water supply which was featured in the film The Corporation(2003), and the 
largely nonviolent mass protests which successfully resisted a military coup and re-
installed Hugo Chavez as President of Venezuela as featured in the film The Revolution 
Will Not be Televised(2003).In the Costa Rican sample, a handful of students listed 
Bolivia or Venezuela as cases of successful nonviolence, and unfortunately, we cannot be 
sure which movements they were referring to. Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) only list 
one successful nonviolent campaign in Bolivia, the 1977-1982 nonviolent overthrow of 
Military juntas, and only one is listed for Venezuela as well, the 1958 movement against 
186 
the Jimenez dictatorship. It is possible the respondents were referring to more recent 
movements, such as those listed in the films above, or in the case of Bolivia, the election 
of indigenous president Evo Morales and the socialist reforms of his presidency (2006 to 
present) may be perceived as a nonviolent revolution. Indeed, as Morales rose to political 
prominence, becoming the leader of a cocoa grower’s union as well as an indigenous 
coalition, he used a variety of nonviolent civil disobedience tactics including road blocks 
and a 600 km march to the capital city. Morales has called his political reforms including 
nationalizing the oil and natural gas-industry a “process of decolonization” (BBC 2007).  
 Similarly, three UO respondents listed Ecuador as a case of nonviolent success. It 
seems possible that they were thinking of the mass street actions which overthrew the 
government in Ecuador in 2000 and 2005 (Buono and Lara 2006, p.10). Ecuador does not 
appear in Stephan and Chenoweth’s (2008) list, however in addition to the cases in 2000 
and 2005, in 1944 a nonviolent movement in Ecuador overthrew the government (Becker 
2003). The events in Ecuador followed a general strike in El Salvador that removed the 
dictator Maximiliano Hernández Martínez on May 9, only a few weeks earlier, and which 
quickly inspired nonviolent uprisings in Ecuador, Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and 
later in Costa Rica. Student strikes in Nicaragua failed to remove the dictator Anastasio 
Somoza García from power, but a general strike in Guatemala helped to overthrow Jorge 
Ubico on July 1 (Becker 2003).  
 Nonviolent movements and tactics such as general strikes have been widely 
practiced in Latin America, “but are rarely interpreted as examples of nonviolent 
movements,” and the nonviolent component of Latin American resistance has long been 
neglected (Parkman 1988; Becker 2003, p.1). Obviously, overlooking such examples 
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serves to delegitimize nonviolent action in collective memory, and it can also remove 
nonviolent tactics from the “toolbox” of activists and revolutionary strategists who may 
fall back on a reified/ naturalized myth of the necessity of revolutionary violence 
promoted by Marxists among many others. Becker argues,  
Few political activists in Latin America would consider themselves to be pacifists. 
In part, this is due to a lack of the development of a political culture that has 
valued non-violent strategies, and in part it is because icons of non-violence such 
as Martin Luther King have been imported as symbols of struggles for social 
justice rather than as examples of viable strategies. (p.8) 
 
Hence, as I argue in the Jackie Robinson case, even in cases where nonviolent tactics 
played a significant role, events are not remembered in terms of nonviolence. 
 Issues that emerged in the coding and interpretation of these open-ended 
questions included adjudicating which revolutions respondents may be referring to, and 
how to code answers with a mix of correct and incorrect answers.If respondents gave one 
or more correct answers but also some incorrect answers, only the correct answers were 
counted (thus, the only respondents coded as “Gave only wrong answer(s)” were those 
who only gave a wrong answer or answers). For example, one respondent listed three 
valid nonviolent revolutions, but was not penalized for also listing Tibet and Burma. 
Hence, this respondent was coded as listing “3 or more nonviolent revolutions.” 
Nonviolent movements in Tibet and Burma have not achieved nonviolent “success” thus 
far in their long struggles, but they do currently have prominent nonviolent leaders (the 
Dalai Lama for Tibetans and Tibetans in exile and Aung San Suu Kyi in Burma). Other 
answers that were coded as erroneous examples of nonviolent revolutions were: China, 
Colombia, Cuba, France, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Spain (in the Costa Rica sample); 
and, Bhutan, Cuba, Dominican Republic, France, Japan, Italy, Kosovo, Paraguay, Spain, 
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Sweden, Switzerland, UK/ England, (in the U.S. sample). Unfortunately, some of these 
may have been miscoded as erroneous examples, because the respondent may have been 
thinking of particular cases within those nations of nonviolent movements that were 
successful or somewhat successful. Certainly, every nation has many examples of 
nonviolent protest and resistance, but less common are successful/ somewhat successful 
nonviolent movements that could be called “revolutions.” It seems some respondents 
simply named nations that had famous revolutions, and though they were violent 
revolutions, even these often have major nonviolent components or leaders who articulate 
constraints on violence.  
 Several respondents named Costa Rica as an example of a successful/ somewhat 
successful nonviolent revolution. With reservations, this was coded as a correct answer 
even though the 1948 overthrow of the Calderon regime is coded as violent, and 
justifiably so, in the Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) data. The grounds for justifying 
Costa Rica in 1948 as a case of a successful/ somewhat successful nonviolent revolution 
can rest upon Costa Rica’s demilitarization process, which is, after all, a significant 
nonviolent achievement undertaken by only a handful of nations in the world – indeed, it 
is “revolutionary” in that sense. In addition, a case can be made for the nonviolent 
demonstrations in Costa Rica in 1919: “the decisive mobilization of women teachers 
against the Tinoco dictatorship in June 1919…accelerated the fall of the regime…” 
(Molina and Palmer 2009, p.93). A few of the respondents who wrote “Costa Rica” as an 
example of a successful/ somewhat successful nonviolent revolution, offered more 
specific descriptions: “strikes in Costa Rica,” “Costa Rica – movement against ICE 
combo,” and “Costa Rica – ICE combo.” The latter two refer to President Miguel Angel 
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Rodriguez’s (1998-2002) effort to privatize state-owned industries including the Costa 
Rican Electricity Institute (ICE) which was nicknamed the “ICE combo.” In 2000, mass 
nonviolent protest erupted: “Spontaneous protests mushroomed into road blockages, 
work stoppages, and acts of civil disobedience that brought the country to a standstill and 
finally forced the government to withdraw its privatization plans indefinitely” (Molina 
and Palmer 2009, p.157).   
 Other examples of answers that were coded as correct include: Chile, Argentina, 
Venezuela, “Venezuela (Revolución Bolivariana),” “Movement of the workers in Brazil,” 
Brazil, Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Mexico’s Zapatistas, Chiapas (Mexico), 
Guatemala, Poland, Hungary, Philippines, India, South Africa (though some scholars 
debate the cases of India and South Africa in terms of the significance role of 
nonviolence), East Germany, “fall of USSR,” “all of the Communist bloc nations,” “U.S. 
(Martin Luther King),” the “U.S. civil rights movement,” and the “U.S.” (assuming they 
meant the civil rights movement). But, unfortunately, for many of the nations that 
respondents listed we cannot be sure they were thinking of an historical case agreed upon 
by scholars as an example of a successful/ somewhat successful nonviolent revolution 
(e.g., Stephan and Chenoweth 2008), or a more recent, less significant victory of 
nonviolent protest in a particular nation. Probably the coding most worthy of contention 
is the case of “Venezuela (Revolución Bolivariana)” (in English – the Bolivarian 
Revolution), which was coded as an acceptable example of a nonviolent movement. We 
know the respondent was referring to the populist, socialist agenda of Venezuela’s 
President Hugo Chávez. Some may argue that it is difficult to justify categorizing this as 
a nonviolent movement per se, yet all truly democratic political processes are 
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quintessentially nonviolent, and Chávez’s social justice and wealth re-distribution aims, 
at least on paper, are quite “revolutionary.” It is likely that the mentions of Mexico were 
partly cued by an earlier section of the survey in which respondents confronted 
quotations by Subcomandante Marcos, a leader of the Zapatistas in Chiapas, Mexico. The 
Marcos quotes only appeared in the Costa Rican survey. Accordingly, only one UO 
respondent listed Mexico, while ten Costa Rican respondents mentioned Mexico. 
However, we might assume that Costa Ricans would be more familiar with regional/ 
Latin American issues and the Zapatista struggle.  
 Aside from the Zapatista’s initial and brief takeover of the Chiapas capital 
building in San Cristobal in an armed battle on January 1, 1994, and their photogenic 
posing with guns on horseback (reminiscent of Zapata) while deep in the jungle, the 
Zapatista movement has been entirely nonviolent. In fact, the shooting only lasted ten 
days; since then the Zapatistas devoted themselves to a nonviolent war of words, they 
“made a conscious strategic decision to avoid capturing State power,” and they 
prioritized – in Marcos’s words “tolerance and inclusion” (Evans 2009, p.87, p.92). Yet, 
it is difficult to know if the average Latin American perceives the nonviolent character of 
the Zapatista movement. Marcos himself has even advocated and theorized nonviolence, 
as the quotations included in the survey demonstrate. In a 2001 interview Marcos 
explicitly and eloquently endorsed nonviolent means (Marcos 2001), and was widely 
understood as proposing that “armed resistance was no longer viable” (Krauze 2011, 
p.447). The Zapatistas engaged in unarmed protest before and after their 1994 armed 
takeover of the capital and several towns in Chiapas (Muñoz 2006). Muñoz (2006) has 
argued that the ability of the Zapatistas to gain widespread support from transnational 
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activist networks and sectors in the Western media may have to do with their tactics of 
limited violence and nonviolence: “The ‘attractiveness’ of the Zapatistas may also have 
to do with the fact that they did not violate human rights norms, despite their status as an 
armed movement” (p.260). Here, Muñozhighlights how Zapatistas did not target 
civilians, but also the fact that they have never broken the ceasefire negotiated in 1994. 
 I would contend that the Zapatista’s rapid transition to nonviolent tactics was 
absolutely critical to mobilizing the thousands of transnational solidarity and human 
rights activists who came to Chiapas during this period, as well as mobilizing massive 
numbers of domestic supporters who frequently rallied in Mexico City, pressuring the 
government for a peaceful resolution to the conflict. In the summer of 1998, I traveled as 
part of a delegation from Princeton Theological Seminary to the Chiapas highlands to 
engage in nonviolent human rights observation and solidarity activism with Zapatista 
communities. When local Migration officials discovered our presence, they sought to 
deport us and did eventually force us to leave Mexico earlier than planned, initially 
stipulating that we could never return to Mexico, though they finally overturned that 
stipulation thanks to pressure from sympathetic Mexican legislators and lawyers 
advocating for us. At the time, the Mexican government was at a loss for how to deal 
with an enormous influx of transnational human rights activists.  
 Given the relative scarcity of knowledge about successful nonviolent revolutions, 
it is worth revisiting Q6 which replicated the Gallup World Poll question on pragmatic 
nonviolence. In Table 42 below, we see cross-tabs data on how respondents answered 
this Gallup World Poll question in relationship to their knowledge of nonviolent 
revolutions reported in the open-ended question.   
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Table 42. Costa Rica Data: Cross-Tabs of Q39 (Knowledge of Nonviolent History) and 
Q6 (Opinion of Efficacy of Nonviolence) 
 
Q39 “Can you name nations 
that had successful/ somewhat 
successful nonviolent 
revolutions….?”(Please name 
as many as you can 
remember.) 
Q6 “…Which do you believe, peaceful means alone (nonviolent methods) will 
work to improve the situation for oppressed groups, or peaceful means alone 
will NOT work?” (replication of the Gallup World Poll) 
 
Will work 
 
Will NOT work 
 
Total 
Gave only a wrong answer(s) 4 
2.14% 
(66.67%) 
2 
1.68% 
(33.33%) 
6 
1.96% 
(100%) 
“Don’t know” or Left it blank 137 
73.26% 
(61.71%) 
85 
71.43% 
(38.29%) 
222 
72.55% 
(100%) 
1 correct answer 26 
13.90% 
(57.78%) 
19 
15.97% 
(42.22%) 
45 
14.71% 
(100%) 
2 correct answers 
 
14 
7.49% 
(66.67%) 
7 
5.88% 
(33.33%) 
21 
6.86% 
(100%) 
3 or more correct answers 6 
3.21% 
(50%) 
6 
5.04% 
(50%) 
12 
3.92% 
(100%) 
Total 187 
100% 
(61.11%) 
119 
100% 
(38.89%) 
306 
100% 
(100%) 
Notes: frequency counts and column %; row % in ( ); N=306; if respondents gave one or more correct answers but also 
some incorrect answers, only the correct answers were counted (thus, the only respondents coded as “Gave only wrong 
answer(s)” were those who only gave wrong answers) 
 
 Table 42 shows that on this indicator (Q6), those with knowledge of nonviolent 
history (in Q39) differ very little from the rest of the sample. Although the cell sizes are 
small, those with the most knowledge of successful nonviolent revolutions are less likely 
to affirm that nonviolence “will work” (i.e., 50% of those with the most intellectual 
capital regarding nonviolence (in Q39) affirmed nonviolence “will work” (in Q6), 
compared with the overall sample total of 61.11% who affirmed nonviolence “will 
work”). Thus, in the Costa Rican sample, it seems possessing some rudimentary 
knowledge of nonviolent history makes little impact on how respondents answered Q6. 
This finding, together with the striking finding below, lends at least some support to 
Althusser’s (1971) notion that “ideology has no history” (p.160).  
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 The most striking finding is that of the 187 respondents who said nonviolence 
“will work,” 73.26% were unable to name (and an additional 1.60% gave an erroneous 
case or cases) a successful/ somewhat successful nonviolent revolution. Of the 119 
respondents who said nonviolence “will NOT work,” 71.43% were unable to name (and 
an additional 2.14% gave an erroneous case or cases) a successful/ somewhat successful 
nonviolent revolution. The results should be read with a degree of caution because it is 
difficult to read too much into the claim that a revolution was “somewhat successful.” 
Hence, we may well imagine someone affirming that many nonviolent revolutions are 
somewhat successful, while still opting for the negative answer when faced with the 
dichotomous question: “Do peaceful means (nonviolent methods) alone work or NOT 
work?” (Q6) It seems a major issue here is the nature of dichotomous questions, such as 
those which begins the survey (including Q6, a question replicating the Gallup World 
Poll question on nonviolent efficacy). Many respondents may have wished for more 
nuance in the answers presented by the Gallup World Poll. 
 With a larger sample size and larger cell sizes, it could be better determined 
whether additional intellectual capital regarding nonviolent history can increase faith in 
the efficacy of nonviolence. Though it is possible that the direction of causation might be 
the reverse – such that those who “believe in” or are temperamentally open to 
nonviolence tend to seek out more opportunities to learn nonviolent history and thus 
possess more intellectual capital regarding nonviolence. And, it should be remembered 
that this subgroup (who correctly named three or more successful/ somewhat successful 
nonviolent revolutions) is only 3.92% of the sample, and 50%of these respondents 
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accepted and 50% rejected the efficacy of nonviolence when faced with a forced 
dichotomous choice (i.e., nonviolence alone “will work”/ “will NOT work”).  
 In Table 43, we see that UO respondents who possess significant intellectual 
capital regarding nonviolent history (i.e., knowledge of three or more cases of successful/ 
somewhat successful nonviolent revolutions around the world) are much more likely to 
affirm nonviolent methods alone “will work,” as 84.62% of this subgroup did. The 
relationship here appears much stronger than in the Costa Rica data (Table 42 above), but 
if we add up all the respondents who answered with 1, 2, and 3 or more correct answers 
we are left with 66.67% in these categories affirming that nonviolence “will work.” This 
is only about 6% higher than in the Costa Rica data. And again, as in the Costa Rica data, 
the subgroup of respondents who correctly listed 3 or more (successful/ somewhat 
Table 43. UO Data: Cross-Tabs of Q41 (Knowledge of Nonviolent History) and Q6 
(Opinion of Efficacy of Nonviolence) 
 
Q41 “Can you name 
nations that had 
successful/ somewhat 
successful nonviolent 
revolutions….?”(Please 
name as many as you can 
remember.) 
Q6 “…Which do you believe, peaceful means alone (nonviolent methods) 
will work to improve the situation for oppressed groups, or peaceful means 
alone will NOT work?” (replication of the Gallup World Poll) 
 
Will work 
 
Will NOT work 
 
Total 
Gave only a wrong 
answer(s) 
2 
0.82% 
(28.57%) 
5 
3.23% 
(71.43%) 
7 
1.76% 
(100%) 
“Don’t know” or Left it 
blank 
203 
83.54% 
(60.78%) 
131 
84.52% 
(39.22%) 
334 
83.92% 
(100%) 
1 correct answer 21 
8.64% 
(72.41%) 
8 
5.16% 
(27.59%) 
29 
7.29% 
(100%) 
2 correct answers 6 
2.47% 
(40%) 
9 
5.81% 
(60%) 
15 
3.77% 
(100%) 
3 or more correct 
answers 
11 
4.53% 
(84.62%) 
2 
1.29% 
(15.38%) 
13 
3.27% 
(100%) 
Total 243 
100% 
(61.06%) 
155 
100% 
(38.94%) 
398 
100% 
(100%) 
Notes: Frequency counts and column %; row % in ( ); N=398; if respondents gave one or more correct answers but also 
some incorrect answers, only the correct answers were counted (thus, the only respondents coded as “Gave only wrong 
answer(s)” were those who only gave wrong answers) 
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successful nonviolent cases) is quite small (and the cell sizes are small), comprising only 
3.27% of the sample. Again, as in the Costa Rica data, it is striking that a high percentage 
of respondents (83.54%) who agreed that nonviolent methods alone “will work,” could 
not successfully name a successful/ somewhat successful nonviolent case. This raises 
serious questions about what respondents are thinking about, bringing to mind or 
recalling from memory, when they contemplate an abstract and general question such as 
Q6 (a replication of a Gallup World Poll question) which began the survey. If they cannot 
think of a case or example on which to base their opinion, what are they basing their 
opinion on? Do they know enough to hold an opinion?  
 In Figures 7 and 8 we can see how few historical cases are mentioned by at least 
three respondents. Of course, three respondents constitutes about 1% of sampled Costa 
Rican students and a little less than 1% (actually .75%) of sampled UO students. In the 
UO data, the cases receiving the most mentions are India and the USA, while in the Costa 
Rica, the cases receiving the most mentions are India, Costa Rica, and the USA. In the 
Costa Rica sample, 25 (8.17%) of respondents listed Costa Rica as an example of a 
successful/ somewhat successful nonviolent revolution, 32 (10.46%) listed India, 15 
(4.9%) listed the USA (with a few clarifying that they meant the U.S. civil rights 
movement), 10 (3.27%) listed Mexico, and 9 (2.94%) listed Argentina. In the UO sample, 
31 (7.79%) respondents listed the U.S. as an example of a successful/ somewhat 
successful nonviolent revolution, 27 (6.78%) listed India, 12 (3.02%) listed South Africa, 
and 5 (1.26%) listed the USSR.  
 The salience of historical nonviolent memories attached to India and the USA are 
worth pondering. U.S. hegemony and the predominance of the English language likely 
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Figure 7. Costa Rican Student Memories of Successful/ Somewhat Successful Nonviolent 
Revolutions in the 20th and 21st Centuries. Raw numbers (frequency counts). Only cases 
with 3 or more mentions are graphed. (N= 306) 
 
Figure 8. UO Student Memories of Successful/ Somewhat Successful Nonviolent 
Revolutions in the 20th and 21st Centuries. Raw numbers (frequency counts). Only Cases 
with 3 or More Mentions are Graphed. (N=398) 
 
play a role in cross-national cultural diffusion. And, charismatic leaders were attached to 
both movements in India and U.S. – a factor which appears to be crucial to earning a 
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lasting place in collective memory (Eddy 2012, Schwartz 2009). But the fact that Gandhi 
and King were explicitly and consistently committed to principled nonviolence, the type 
of nonviolence which resonates so strongly with major world religious traditions, likely 
plays a significant role in their collective memory successes (Eddy 2012). Through 
several rounds of surveys in the present study, India and the U.S. civil rights movement 
consistently receive the most mentions when respondents are asked to list successful 
nonviolent revolutions or movements. The case of India is somewhat ironic since Stephan 
and Chenoweth (2008) only code India’s nonviolent movement as achieving “limited 
success.” While Gandhi certainly had charisma and the media outlets of the British 
Empire at his disposal, I believe the frequency of mentions this case receives still lends 
some support to my contention that principled nonviolence resonates more profoundly 
with observers and thus, it is most likely to compete well in collective memory (Eddy 
2012).  
 During the course of this dissertation, a major cross-national, nonviolent protest 
movement emerged first in Tunisia and Egypt, spreading throughout much of the Middle 
East and to the U.S. in the form of Occupy Wall Street. The movements in Tunisia and 
Egypt were particularly dramatic, rapidly bringing down the Tunisian dictatorship and 
leading to tense showdowns in Tahrir Square in Cairo (the occupation of the square 
began on January 25, 2011), the dissolution of the Mubarak dictatorship (he resigned on 
February 11) and democratic elections (culminating with the inauguration of the 
democratically elected President Morsi on June 30, 2012). The Egyptian revolution was 
no smooth path to democracy, as the military junta often sent mixed signals about the 
path to civilian leadership, but protesters kept the pressure on for reform. Both the 
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Tunisian and Egyptian movements received very prominent news media coverage in the 
U.S., but I was interested to see if college students would remember and interpret these 
movements as “successful nonviolent revolutions.”  
Additional Surveys Probing Nonviolent/ Violent Capital 
 On September 27, 2012, the author surveyed an upper-division sociology class 
(almost all were seniors) at the UO (N=34), asking them to answer open-ended questions 
listing their historical and contemporary knowledge of nonviolent revolutions (same 
question as above) as well as nonviolent movements (see Appendix K). The course was 
“Systems of War and Peace,” but not all students had a particularly strong interest in the 
topic, and the survey was given in the opening minutes of the first day of class for the 
term. First, students were asked – in a much more direct follow-up to the Gallup World 
Poll question on nonviolent efficacy: “Can you name some oppressed groups who were 
suffering from injustice and who improved their situation by peaceful means alone 
(nonviolent methods)? (Please name as many as you can remember.)” Unlike the 
question below, this question was not included in the main 2010 surveys in the US and 
Costa Rica (see Appendices A and B). Students responses were as follows: don’t know 
(19, or 55.9%), U.S. civil rights movement under Dr. King (7, or 20.6%), India (3, or 
8.8%) [includes: Gandhi (1), “India’s boycott of England” (1), “India’s Rebellion from 
Great Britain” (1)], women’s movements (3, or 8.8%) [includes women’s suffrage (1), 
women’s movements (2)], the gay and lesbian rights movement (2), labor union 
movements (2), Asian-Americans (1), and “Islamic-Muslim cultures” (1). Second, their 
responses to the question asking them to list successful/ somewhat successful nonviolent 
revolutions were as follows [again, students were invited to list as many as they could 
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remember]: Don’t know (27, or 79.4%), India under Gandhi (4, or 11.8%), Egypt – 
including one respondent who wrote “Egypt?” (2, or 5.9%), Syria (1), Libya (1), 
“Sudan?” (1), and “Canada?” (1). Of course, the Syria and Lybia movements of the last 
two years quickly became violent movements and so far, only the Lybian movement has 
overthrown the regime.  
 Comparing the results from the two questions it is clear that case knowledge of 
nonviolent revolutions is lower than case knowledge of nonviolent social justice 
movements/ campaigns of the oppressed. It is also possible that students may be confused 
by the term “revolution,” especially when used in connection with nonviolent 
movements. This could have led to the under-reporting of knowledge of nonviolent 
revolutions in the main 2010 survey. Indeed, in the 2012 survey question which asked 
about oppressed groups using nonviolent methods, rather than “nonviolent revolutions,” 
respondents reported a higher percentage of case knowledge, as the “don’t knows” fell to 
about 56% (as opposed to the 79% who were ignorant of cases of “nonviolent 
revolution”). 
 The relatively low reporting of the U.S. civil rights movement (20.6%) is 
remarkable. And, given the widespread media coverage of the “Arab Spring,” the 
absence of Tunisia in student lists and the extremely low reporting of Egypt (5.9%) is 
very surprising. It suggests students do not follow the news, or for some reason, did not 
perceive these as nonviolent movements/ revolutions. As of early February 2013, the 
Egyptian case looks messy and the future uncertain. It may be that even knowledgeable 
students would hesitate at this point to call the Egypt’s nonviolent revolution a “success.” 
Yet, many new democracies undergo such serious strains and conflicts. Snyder (2000) 
200 
found that new democracies are at greater risk for civil war, especially ethnic wars. 
Several studies find that instability, including moves both toward and away from 
democracy elevate the risk of civil war, but “moves away from democracy are much 
more strongly associated with civil war onset in the next year than moves toward it” 
(Hegre et al. 2001, Fearon and Laitin 2003, p.85 n.32). Compared to the ongoing violent 
civil war in Syria, Egypt since Tahrir Square has been a beacon of hope. Imperfect and 
struggling - yes, but the loss of life has been minimal. All of this supports the line of 
questioning begun above.  
 Why is intellectual capital about nonviolent movements so scarce? Perhaps it is 
the case, as one expert qualitative interviewer has concluded, that people carry around in 
their heads “not the stuff of experience but the conclusions they have drawn” (Rabiger 
2004, p.340). That is, specific historical knowledge and facts are often lacking, but 
general opinions and theories of the way the world works are present in some form. 
Nevertheless, the complete lack of case knowledge which the majority of respondents 
confessed to in the surveys is breathtaking, lending credence to Bourdieu’s (1972) 
contention that “public opinion does not exist.” Might students possess equally scarce 
knowledge of cases of “successful” violence, war, or revolution? Can they name cases 
where they believe violence “worked,” or cases where targeting and killing civilians was 
justified? The latter question asks for more qualitative data to probe more deeply into the 
question from the Gallup World Poll: are attitudes on this Gallup World Poll item based 
on relatively informed opinion? Further, can students name cases where diplomacy 
“worked”? Do they perceive that  international organizations and international treaties 
have helped to build peace – and can they name some of them?      
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 Building on these observations and questions, and seeking to uncover more fully 
the attitudes probed by the three key questions on violence/ nonviolence in the Gallup 
World Poll, a third survey was conducted with a few additional open-ended questions. 
Students were asked to list examples of cases which indicate their degree of historical and 
contemporary knowledge of nonviolent movements, nonviolent revolution, and 
diplomacy, as well as war and revolutionary violence (see Appendix K). An upper-
division sociology course (most were seniors or juniors) at the UO was surveyed on the 
first day of class in the winter term, January 8, 2013. The results, reported in Table 44, 
suggest patterns in the intellectual and historical capital of students, and provides a basis 
for theorizing about how student beliefs are linked to knowledge of historical and 
contemporary cases of nonviolence and violence. 
Table 44. Survey of Knowledge of Violent and Nonviolent Historical Episodes (N=61) 
Survey question Most frequently listed answers (% of respondents listing the 
case) 
 
Don’t know 
(%) 
Can you name oppressed groups who 
improved their situation by peaceful 
means alone? 
24.6% U.S. civil rights movement  
18% India led by Gandhi 
13.1% Women’s rights/ suffrage 
9.8% Gay rights movement 
47.5% 
Can you name nations with successful/ 
somewhat successful nonviolent 
revolutions? 
13.1% India 
8.2% U.S.ᵃ 
4.9% South Africa 
4.9% Egypt 
3.3% fall of USSR  
77% 
Can you name nations with successful/ 
somewhat successful violent revolutions? 
44.3% American Revolutionᵇ 
23% French Revolutionᵇ 
18% Russian Revolutionᵇ 
14.8% Egyptᵓ 
14.8% Germanyᵇ 
4.9% Nazi Germanyᵇ 
9.8% China 
9.8% Iran/ 1979 Iranian Revolutionᵈ 
9.8% Vietnam 
8.2% Cuba 
8.2% Libya 
3.3% Tunisiaᵓ 
26.2% 
Can you name specific wars when violent 
methods have “worked” in resolving 
conflicts in world history? 
52.5% WWII 
6.6% Atomic bombs dropped on Japan to end WWII 
21.3% WWI 
19.7% US civil war 
11.5% American Revolutionary War 
8.2% Vietnam 
26.2% 
Can you name cases where diplomacy 
“worked” in resolving conflicts in world 
history? 
19.7% Cold War/ US and Russia  
3.3% Cuban Missile Crisis 
1.6% Northern Ireland 
 
68.9% 
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Survey question Most frequently listed answers (% of respondents listing the 
case) 
 
Don’t know 
(%) 
Can you name international treaty (or 
several treaties) that you think ensures a 
more peaceful world? 
6.6% Geneva Accords 
6.6% Treaty of Versaillesᵉ 
3.3% Nuclear arms treaty 
 
70.5% 
Can you name international organization 
(or several organizations) that you think 
ensures a relatively more peaceful world? 
31.1% United Nations 
8.2% Peace Corps 
6.6% NATO 
3.3% Amnesty International 
3.3% NAFTA 
 
42.6% 
Can you name a case where targeting and 
killing civilians was justified?  
6.6% Atomic bombs dropped on Japan to end WWII 
6.6% If civilians aid enemy combatants 
1.6% Collateral damage 
1.6% If enemy killed your civilians first 
31.1% No, I 
can’t think of 
a specific case 
37.7% I don’t 
think that can 
be justified 
Notes: UO Survey conducted by author on Jan 8, 2013; See Appendix K for specific question wording; On each question, students 
were asked to list as many as they could think of; On each question, some students listed erroneous cases, but in most cases these were 
mixed with correct answers. ᵃ = It seems here that some students conceived as the US civil rights movement as a “revolution.” ᵇ = In 
actuality, the early and definitive stages (according to John Adams, the second U.S. President, among others (Kurlansky 2006, Schell 
2003)) of the American Revolutionary War were largely nonviolent, but this recognition is extremely rare among the mass public, and 
even scholars, at the present time. Similarly, the Russian Revolution (of 1917) was accomplished with nonviolent action. This was not 
even perceived by many observers at the time because it flew in the face of revolutionary theory which assumed, as an article of faith, 
that violence was essential, and also because the Bolsheviks used violence to consolidate their regime after gaining power (Schell 
2003, pp.175-183). Similarly, during the French Revolution, the stage of overthrow was bloodless, but the stage of foundation was 
bloody: “The revolutionaries would be more violent toward one another than they had been toward the old regime” (p.167). In the 
case of Germany, 4.9% of respondents specifically wrote “Nazi Germany,” and we cannot be sure how many of those who just wrote 
“Germany” were actually thinking of the Nazis’ rise to power. But in fact, the Nazis rose to power through the creation of parallel 
hierarchies/ institutions, strategically it was an almost Gandhian “constructive program,” and through democratic elections. And, 
“Hitler even bragged about the nonviolence of his revolution...Hitler claimed that it had been ‘the least bloody revolution in history’” 
(p.184). ᵓ = The listing of Egypt and Tunisia as violent revolutions indicates a serious misperception of contemporary events, as these 
cases were nonviolent revolutions with only some outbreaks of limited violence by unarmed demonstrators, in most cases after they 
were provoked by pro-government thugs. ᵈ = Similarly, respondents erred by listing Iran here. In actuality, the Iranian Revolution of 
1978-79 was nonviolent – it was a clear case of an “unarmed insurrection” (Schock 2005, p.3), and of “people power” (p.1).  ᵉ = This 
treaty ended WWI, but is widely considered as a leading cause of WWII (hence, to list it here was erroneous). 
 
 The key finding from the table above is that respondent knowledge of violent 
events was much higher. By a wide margin, respondents were more likely to list “don’t 
know” on the items asking for knowledge of nonviolent movements, nonviolent 
revolutions, treaties, diplomacy, and organizations that ensure a more peaceful world. It 
seems our culture reproduces collective memories of war much more effectively than 
memories of peaceful events and institutions. The listing of Egypt and Tunisia as violent 
revolutions by some respondents seems to indicate a failure to perceive these cases as the 
nonviolent revolutions that they were. This may involve a failure to recognize that limited 
violence, or minor street skirmishes, are a far cry from a bloody violent revolution.  
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 Knowledge of Gandhi. In the primary survey (conducted 2010), an additional 
question probed respondent knowledge of some of the broad outlines of Gandhi’s 
biography. Namely, in an open-ended question, would respondents report awareness that 
he personally led nonviolent movements in both South Africa and India? Again, this 
question was deemed significant since there is some evidence that collective memory 
processes tend to reduce and compress memories of historical episodes and social 
movements to the biographies of leaders (Eddy 2012, Schwartz 2009). As the 20th 
century’s most iconic nonviolent leader, knowledge of Gandhi’s biography is an 
important test of nonviolent capital.  
 As above, in Q37, respondents who answered with one correct answer and one 
wrong answer were coded as “1 correct answer.” In the Costa Rica data, many 
respondents in this category did offer one wrong answer as respondent guesses ranged 
from England (by far the most common wrong answer) to the USA, Germany, Tibet, 
Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and China. Only three respondents offered only “wrong 
answer(s).” Surprisingly, a few respondents who fell in the “1 correct answer” category, 
did not name India (the nation Gandhi is most commonly associated with), but did name 
“Africa.” Similarly, some named “Africa and Asia.” This only happened in a few cases, 
but coding was generous here, giving respondents the benefit of the doubt. The question 
asked them to name nations, but as a hint and a clarifying detail, the question told them 
that Gandhi led nonviolent movements on two different continents. It seems some 
respondents may have misread the question and answered with continents, or they may 
have only known the continent or continents and not known the nations in which Gandhi 
led movements.  
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 As depicted in Table 45 below, in the UO data for Q40 (Q37 in the Costa Rica 
data), 13.15% of the sample provided the two correct answers (South Africa and India), 
whereas in the Costa Rica data only 2.24% of respondents were able to provide the two 
correct answers. Meanwhile, in the UO data, 28.29% provided one correct answer (in 
almost all cases “India”), whereas in the Costa Rica data 36.86% provided one correct 
answer (in almost all cases “India”). The higher percentage of UO respondents who could 
provide two correct answers is likely due to the fact that a few weeks prior to the 
administration of this survey, the professor in this sociology course had lectured on 
Gandhi’s theories of power and mentioned some details of Gandhi’s biography. Given 
this coincidence, it is surprising that evidence of knowledge in the UO sample did not rise 
above the Costa Rican sample more significantly. In both the UO and Costa Rica samples 
only about 40% in each sample were able to name either one or two of the nations in 
which Gandhi led nonviolent movements in.Furthermore, the fact that only 27 UO 
students named India in Q41 above suggests that UO student knowledge of Gandhi’s 
movements and understanding of them as “successful/ somewhat successful” nonviolent 
movements is quiet tentative and incomplete, even though 114 UO students could name 
the location of one of Gandhi’s movements (usually India) and 53 could name both India 
and South Africa (as seen in Table 45 below).  
 In the Costa Rica data, cross tabs with Q37 and Q6 (not depicted here) were 
similar to the cross tabs of Q41 and Q6 (see above) in the Costa Rica data: rudimentary 
knowledge of Gandhi’s biography (an imperfect proxy measure of respondent familiarity 
with nonviolent history) had a very weak association with how respondents answered Q6. 
The only cells large enough to interpret in the Costa Rica cross tabs concerns those who 
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Table 45. Student Knowledge of Gandhi’s Nonviolent Movements 
(Q37 in CR/ Q40 in UO data): Gandhi was a leader of nonviolent 
protest movements that achieved some degree of success in two 
different nations (on two different continents). Can you name these two 
nations that he personally lived in and led nonviolent protest 
movements in? 
Answer Costa Rica 
(N=312) 
UO 
(N=403) 
Gave only wrong answer(s) 3 
0.96% 
7 
1.74% 
“Don’t know” or LB 187 
59.94% 
229 
56.82% 
One correct answer 115 
36.86% 
114 
28.29% 
Two correct answers 7 
2.24% 
53 
13.15% 
Notes: Frequency count and column %; Correct answers: South Africa and India 
provided one correct answer (37.58% of the sample) and those who checked “don’t 
know”/ left it blank (59.15% of the sample). The Costa Rican respondents who provided 
one correct answer were only about 3% higher than the “don’t knows” in their 
affirmation that nonviolence “will work” (in Q6). In the same crosstabs (Q40 and Q6) of 
the UO data, the impact of rudimentary nonviolent intellectual capital appears larger (see 
Table 46 below). In the UO data, those who gave one correct answer were 5% higher in  
Table 46. UO Data: Cross-Tabulation of Q40 (Knowledge of Gandhi’s Nonviolent 
History) and Q6 (Opinion of Efficacy of Nonviolence) 
 
Q40 “Gandhi was a leader of nonviolent 
protest movements that achieved some 
degree of success in two different nations 
(on two different continents). Can you 
name these two nations that he 
personally lived in and led nonviolent 
protest movements in? 
Q6 “…Which do you believe, peaceful means alone (nonviolent 
methods) will work to improve the situation for oppressed groups, or 
peaceful means alone will NOT work?” (replication of the Gallup World 
Poll) 
 
 
Will work 
 
 
Will NOT work 
 
 
Total 
Gave only a wrong answer(s) 2 
0.82% 
(28.57%) 
5 
3.23% 
(71.43%) 
7 
1.76% 
(100%) 
“Don’t know” or LB 129 
53.09% 
(56.33%) 
100 
64.52% 
(43.67%) 
229 
57.54% 
(100%) 
1 correct answer 74 
30.45% 
(66.07%) 
38 
24.52% 
(33.93%) 
112 
28.14% 
(100%) 
2 correct answers 38 
15.64% 
(76%) 
12 
7.74% 
(24%) 
50 
12.56% 
(100%) 
Total 243 
100% 
(61.06%) 
155 
100% 
(38.94%) 
398 
100% 
(100%) 
Notes: Frequency counts, column %, (row %); N=398; if respondents gave one or more correct answers but also some incorrect 
answers, only the correct answers were counted (thus, the only respondents coded as “Gave only wrong answer(s)” were those who 
only gave wrong answers); LB = left it blank (No answer) 
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affirming the efficacy of nonviolence (in Q6) than the overall sample average of 61.06%  
 (and 10% higher than the “don’t knows”), while those who gave 2 right answers were 
15% higher than the overall sample average (and 20% higher than the “don’t knows”) in 
affirming the efficacy of nonviolence (as measured in Q6).   
 An additional question (Q38) sought to tap knowledge of Gandhian nonviolence 
as articulated in his concept of satyagraha. Only three respondents in Costa Rica 
responded to Q38 by writing that satyagraha was an “ideology of nonviolence,” but none 
offered more specifics like truth-force or soul-force. Because of this result, the question 
was deemed too difficult and dropped in preparation for the UO survey. 
 It might be assumed that the history of war, especially a putatively “good war” 
like World War II was for the U.S., would be more thoroughly taught in the school 
system than the history of nonviolence. And in the case of Latin America, we might 
assume that the history of an iconic rebel soldier like Che Guevara , would be more 
thoroughly taught and better remembered by respondents than nonviolent history.  
 Additional knowledge of history/ current events. UO respondents were also 
asked a question (Q38) designed to tap student knowledge of some of the context and 
causes of the September 11th terrorist attack on the United States, perhaps the 
paradigmatic event of our time, and an event that occurred while the majority of the 
current cohort of university students were in elementary school. In essence, their 
knowledge, or lack of knowledge about this event can be credited to or blamed on their 
high school education and the socialization provided by our public and private school 
systems in general.  
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 However, current events, partly because of their controversial nature, are 
notoriously left out of high school curriculum and history textbooks (Loewen 2007). Up 
until recently, the scarce coverage of the Vietnam War in high school U.S. history classes 
and textbooks were key evidence of this practice, and to some degree this trend continues 
because the U.S. was not victorious in Vietnam (Leahey 2010, Loewen 2007). But if the 
Vietnam War is often given little coverage, we might expect student retention of World 
War II, the “good war,” to be much better. After all, coverage of this war receives pride 
of place in many U.S. history textbooks, and wars in general are thought to provide the 
drama and story lines that make for engaging history. One question (Q39) sought to 
probe student knowledge of World War II, though admittedly, the question is relatively 
tough since Americans are not accustomed to thinking about their role in the international 
arena in terms of multilateral alliances. Indeed, remembering World War II in terms of 
“powerful” U.S. allies seems almost counter-cultural.     
 Table 47 depicts respondent knowledge about the perpetrators of the September 
11th attacks. Since 15 of the 19 hijackers were citizens of Saudi Arabia, the correct 
answer here is clearly Saudi Arabia. Those who were coded as “don’t know” primarily 
includes respondents who checked the “don’t know” box, but also a few respondents who 
left the question blank, and the following two answers that were counted as incorrect 
because the question specifically asked for a nation: 11 wrote Al Queda, and 4 wrote 
Islam/ Muslims. The “Other nation” category included the following frequency counts: 
USA (8), Pakistan (5), Iran (4), Sudan (2), and Egypt (1). Respondents would have been 
in about 4th grade when the September 11th, 2001 attacks occurred. Guided by the elite 
cues of the Bush Administration, public discourse in the weeks and years following the 
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attacks have ignored the Saudi Arabian connection. For this reason, the question should 
be considered somewhat difficult, and the results corroborate that assessment, with only 
16% providing the correct answer. 
Table 47: Proxy Question Probing Knowledge of the Context/ Causes of September 11th 
Q38. Can you name the nation that most of the 
September 11th airplane hijackers were citizens of? 
(Open-ended question; no answers provided by survey) 
Answer given Freq. % 
Saudi Arabia (the only 
correct answer to the 
question as phrased) 
65 16.13 
Iraq 45 11.17 
Afghanistan 116 28.78 
Other nation 23 5.71 
Don’t know 154 38.21 
Total 403 100 
Note: “Don’t know” includes a few respondents who left the question blank and 15 answers considered incorrect because they did not 
name a nation as the question asked for. 
 
 Since respondents are recent high school graduates and high school history 
textbooks offer extensive coverage of World War II, the “good” war, it was considered 
worth probing their memory of the war through one proxy indicator. The results in Table 
48 show that the majority of respondents remember some of the broad details of World 
War II.   
Table 48. Proxy Question for Knowledge of World War II  
Q39. Can you name from 1 to 4 of the biggest (and 
most powerful) allies of the United States during World 
War II? (Open-ended question; no answers provided by 
survey) 
Answer given Frequency % 
One correct 76 18.86 
Two correct 41 10.17 
Three or more correct 86 21.34 
Don’t know 164 40.69 
Some correct, some 
very wrong 
30 7.44 
Only wrong answer(s) 6 1.49 
Total 403 100 
Note: Of course, Britain was counted as correct, but only one additional British Commonwealth nation was counted as valid in 
addition to the UK/ England/ Britain. Thus, respondents who listed: UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand only received credit for 
2 correct answers. The British Commonwealth was one of the four big Allies, but it was decided in coding that listing all of the 
relatively small commonwealth nations while failing to list Russia and China should not be considered as comprehensive knowledge 
of the Allies in World War II.  
 
 In comparison with the historical questions detailed above, it seems UO students 
do possess knowledge of issues that interest them and perhaps affect their lives, in at least 
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superficial ways by binding them together with peers and others in the community. There 
is little doubt that awareness of the football team’s recent games offers knowledge which 
can be a social lubricant on campus, in the local community, and beyond. In Q51, 
depicted in Table 49, we see that 281 (72%) respondents could correctly identify the last 
names of the UO quarterback, star running back, and field goal kicker (in that order). 
Twenty-three (6%) respondents were tricked by an inability to distinguish between the 
quarterback and running back positions, but did select the correct set of names. Eleven 
(3%) respondents were tricked by the list which included last years UO quarterback and 
two more erroneous names (names of star players from other Pac-10 Conference football 
teams) for the other positions. Only three more respondents were tricked by other 
erroneous name lists.    
Table 49. Knowledge of the UO Football Team (UO survey) 
 
Q51. Can you select the correct last names for the current UO 
quarterback, star running back, and field goal kicker (IN THAT 
ORDER)? 
Answer options Freq. % 
Don’t know 73   18.67 
Polk, Price, Folk 1 0.26 
Price, Polk, Folk 0 0 
James, Thomas, Beard 23 5.88   
Thomas, James, Beard* 281 71.87 
Brehaut, Franklin, Forbath 1 0.26 
Luck, Taylor, Jones 0 0 
Taylor, Luck, Whitaker 1 0.26 
Masoli, Jones, Kahut 11 2.81 
Note: * = the correct answer 
 
 In open-ended questions, Costa Rican respondents were asked to report their 
broad knowledge of the biography of Che Guevara and the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq (in 
2003). These items, the results of which are depicted in Table 50, were designed to test 
knowledge of war, one of the traditional emphases of history as taught in schools around 
the world. Because the Costa Rican government initially signed onto the “Coalition of the 
Willing” in support of the Iraq War and this sparked a public outcry and rapid exit from  
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Table 50. Costa Rican Student Knowledge of Salient Historical Events 
Answers Can you name some nations that 
supported the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq 
(in 2003) by sending soldiers from their 
own military forces? 
Che Guevara was part of armed 
revolutionary groups in several nations. 
Can you name some or all of them? 
Don’t know/ Left blank/ Wrong 
answer 
67% 78% 
1 correct 16% 10% 
2 correct 10% 10% 
3 or more correct 7% 2% 
 
the Coalition, it was expected that Costa Rican respondents would perform well on the 
Iraq War question. As can be seen above, the results indicate weak collective memory/ 
knowledge of the war. Similarly, despite a raft of recent films about Che Guevara, the 
ubiquitous t-shirt iconography of Che in Latin American and throughout the world 
(indeed, one photo of Guevara has been ranked “the most famous photograph in the 
world” (BBC 2001, May 26), few respondent reported knowledge of the broad outlines of 
Che’s biography (as operationalized here). The correct answers here were Cuba, Bolivia, 
and the Congo, but Guevara was also involved nonviolently in Arbenz’s reform 
movement in Guatemala. 
Overall Tally: Costa Rican Versus U.S. University Students 
 Both samples were exposed to 53 “identical” items testing violent/ nonviolent 
attitudes. Of course, the items were not strictly identical because of translation into 
Spanish for the Costa Rican survey, format differences (the UO survey was an internet 
survey, while the Costa Rican survey was pen and paper), and a few item additions to the 
UO survey (Q10, Q11, and Q12) which preceded the elite quotes section in the UO 
survey only. The identical violent/ nonviolent attitude items in the surveys were (using 
UO survey numbering): Q4, Q5, Q6, Q7 (4 items), Q8 (5 items), Q9 (34 items), Q13 and 
Q14 (the elite quotes sections, in which 7 of the same quotes were tested in both 
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samples), and Q34 (1 item). The UO mean was more peaceful on two items (Q7.1 and 
item #4 of the elite quotes section, though in hindsight, that question was considered very 
problematic as a test of nonviolent/ violent attitudes, and so was not counted in the 
overall tally (see above)), and on one item (Q6) the two sample means were the same (a 
tie). Of the 52 items considered valid, the Costa Rican mean was more peaceful on 50 
(96.2%) of the items. The differences were statistically significant in 48 out of the 52 
items(92.3%). 
Individual-Level Data: Do the Gallup World Poll Questions Provide “Keystone” 
Indicators of Violent/ Nonviolent Attitudes? 
 The survey was partly designed to probe whether the three Gallup World Poll 
questions on nonviolent attitudes hold validity as “keystone” indicators of generalized 
nonviolent attitudes that hold across a range of dimensions and interpersonal, communal, 
and international levels. Below, we test that assumption. One reason this inquiry is 
important is because up until now, the Gallup World Poll offers the largest global sample 
of violent/ nonviolent attitudes.  
 It is worth briefly considering the structure and biases of these three questions. 
First, note that all three questions are dichotomous, and force respondents to take a 
position (but see Appendix L for a methodological note). Second, the questions were 
carefully constructed to avoid social desirability bias. By stating that “Some people 
think...while others think...,” respondents are essentially encouraged to view both choices 
as socially legitimate opinions. Third, Q4 and Q6 are already skewed towards a peaceful 
end of the spectrum of attitudes. That is, the choices given are “never justified” and 
“sometimes justified.” A full spectrum of attitudes would be better represented by a 
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continuum of choices between two extremes: “never justified” and “often justified” or 
even “always justified.” Hence, the survey was constructed with the assumption that very 
few people would select the extremes of “always justified” or even “often justified.” 
Clearly, the implicit assumption is that world publics are already heavily tilted towards 
the peaceful end of the spectrum such that at least some forms of violence (i.e., targeting 
civilians) tend to be seen as either “sometimes” or “never justified.”  
 Below in Table 51, we see that when we split the sample into two groups 
according to their answer on Q4, a dichotomous choice (never/ sometimes justified), 
these two groups remain significantly different across all five  indexes of violent/ 
nonviolent attitudes. Moreover, the mean scores for the group affirming “never justified” 
are more peaceful on all five indexes.  
Table 51. T-Tests of Individual Responses to State Terrorism Question with Violent/ 
Nonviolent Indexes (UO Sample) 
Index Q4 military attacks 
on civilians – 
justified? (n) 
x̄ SD df t x̄ - x̄² 
 x̄² 
militarism  Never (n=302) 2.86 .43 373 4.79 .27**** 
Sometimes (n=73) 2.59 .42 
nonviolence Never (n=299) 2.73 .46 368 3.54 .21*** 
Sometimes (n=71) 2.52 .38 
interpersonal 
violence 
Never (n=319) 2.72 .47 390 4.09 .25*** 
Sometimes (n=73) 2.47 .46 
just war Never (n=306) 2.35 .50 375 3.21 .20** 
Sometimes (n=71) 2.15 .44 
realpolitiks Never (n=310) 2.44 .44 381 4.42 .25**** 
Sometimes (n=73) 2.19 .44 
Notes: N= 392; x̄= Mean.Two-tailed t-tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001; 
Using the robvar command in Stata, the two groups were found to have equal variances on all items. On means: 4 is 
more peaceful; 1 is more violent (some items were reverse coded); 2.5 is the midpoint; Values of answers: Strongly 
Agree (1); Agree (2); Disagree (3); Strongly Disagree (4); Data source: Survey of Attitude Towards Conflict (Eddy 
2010), University of Oregon sample  
 
 Below in Table 52, we see that when we split the sample into two groups 
according to their answer on Q5, a dichotomous choice (never/ sometimes justified), 
these two groups remain significantly different across four of the five indexes of violent/ 
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nonviolent attitudes, but on several items the significance is not as robust as we observed 
in Table 51. Moreover, the mean scores for the group affirming “never justified” are 
more peaceful on all five indexes.  
 Below in Table 53, we see that when we split the sample into two groups  
Table52. T-Tests of Individual Responses to Terrorism Question with Violent/ 
Nonviolent Indexes (UO Sample) 
Index Q5 individual attacks 
on civilians – 
justified? (n) 
M SD df t x̄ - x̄² 
 
militarism  Never (n=320) 2.84 .44 373 3.84 .24*** 
Sometimes (n=55) 2.6 .39 
nonviolence Never (n=314) 2.69 .46 368 .31 .02 
Sometimes (n=56) 2.67 .40 
interpersonal 
violence 
Never (n=336) 2.72 .47 390 4.63 .32**** 
Sometimes (n=56) 2.40 .44 
just war Never (n=322) 2.34 .50 375 2.40 .17* 
Sometimes (n=55) 2.17 .48 
realpolitiks Never (n=327) 2.42 .45 381 2.19 .14* 
Sometimes (n=56) 2.28 .44 
Notes: N= 392; x̄= Mean.Two-tailed t-tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001; 
Using the robvar command in Stata, the two groups were found to have equal variances on all items. On means: 4 is 
more peaceful; 1 is more violent (some items were reverse coded); 2.5 is the midpoint; Values of answers: Strongly 
Agree (1); Agree (2); Disagree (3); Strongly Disagree (4); Data source: Survey of Attitude Towards Conflict (Eddy 
2010), University of Oregon sample  
 
Table53. T-Tests of Individual Responses to Gallup World Poll Nonviolence Question 
with Violent/ Nonviolent Indexes (UO Sample) 
Index Q6 peaceful means 
alone – will work? (n) 
M SD df t x̄ - x̄² 
 
militarism  Will work (n=229) 2.86 .44 368 2.90 .14** 
Will not work 
(n=141) 
2.72 .43 
nonviolence Will work (n=224) 2.77 .47 364 4.46 .21**** 
Will not work 
(n=142) 
2.56 .40 
interpersonal 
violence 
Will work (n=235) 2.73 .48 386 2.84 .14** 
Will not work 
(n=153) 
2.59 .47 
just war Will work (n=228) 2.37 .51 372 2.61 .13** 
Will not work 
(n=146) 
2.24 .46 
realpolitiks Will work (n=234) 2.47 .46 334.26 4.31 .20**** 
Will not work 
(n=146) 
2.27 .41 
Notes: N= 388; x̄= Mean. Two-tailed t-tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < 
.0001; Using the robvar command in Stata, the two groups were found to have equal variances on all items, except on 
realpolitiks (Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom is reported). On this item, the “unequal” t-test command was specified 
in Stata. On means: 4 is more peaceful; 1 is more violent (some items were reverse coded); 2.5 is the midpoint; Values 
of answers: Strongly Agree (1); Agree (2); Disagree (3); Strongly Disagree (4); Data source: Survey of Attitude 
Towards Conflict (Eddy 2010), UO sample  
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according to their answer on Q6, a dichotomous choice (will/ will not work), these two  
groups remain significantly different across all five indexes of violent/ nonviolent 
attitudes. Moreover, the mean scores for the group affirming “will work” are more 
peaceful on all five indexes. A further test of the strength of association between the 
indexes and the Gallup “keystone” questions was conducted through regression analyses.    
 Each of the indexes were regressed on the binary variable Q4 (i.e., the indexes 
serve as the dependent variable and the binary as the independent variable), and R-
squared was interpreted as a measure of the strength of association. It was found that on 
average, all of the index scores were significantly associated with Q4 responses at or near 
the .001 level. 
 In the UO data, Q4 predicts the most variance in the Militarism Index, with 5.5% 
(Adjusted R² = .0554) of the variance in militarism scores associated with Q4 responses 
(see Table 54). As expected, Q6 predicts the most variance in the Nonviolence Index.  
Table 54. OLS Regression – Testing the Capacity of “Keystone” Gallup World Poll and 
Pew Global Attitudes Survey Questions to Predict Scores in the Violent/ Nonviolent 
Indexes (UO Survey Data) 
 
Index Q4 (military attacks 
on civilians) 
Q5 (individual 
attacks on civilians) 
Q6 (efficacy of 
peaceful means) 
Q9_33 (military 
force not 
necessary) 
B 
(SE) 
Adj R² B 
(SE) 
Adj R² B 
(SE) 
Adj R² B 
(SE) 
Adj R² 
militarism  -.27 
(.06)**** 
.0554 -.24 
(.06)** 
.0354 -.14 
(.05)** 
.0197 .26 
(.04)**** 
.1148 
nonviolence -.21 
(.06)*** 
.0303 -.02 
(.07) 
-.0025 -.21 
(.05)**** 
.0492 .24 
(.04)**** 
.1045 
interpersonal 
violence 
-.25 
(.06)*** 
.0387 -.31 
(.07)**** 
.0498 -.14 
(.05)** 
.0180 .11 
(.04)** 
.0148 
just war -.21 
(.06)** 
.0241 -.17 
(.07)* 
.0125 -.14 
(.05) 
.0153 .27 
(.04)**** 
.1038 
realpolitiks 
 
-.25 
(.06)**** 
.0463 -.14 
(.06)* 
.0099 -.20 
(.05)**** 
.0443 .47 
(.03)**** 
.3931 
Notes: N= 392; B=unstandardized regression coefficient; SE= Standard Error; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < 
.0001; Q4, Q5, Q6 are reproduced from Gallup World Poll 2008; Q9_33 is reproduced from Pew Global Attitudes 2007 survey  
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The relatively low amount of variance accounted for on each item in Table 54 is 
explained by the dichotomous nature of these questions (Q4, Q5, and Q6) which provides 
less leverage in accounting for the diversity of opinions that exist on violence/ 
nonviolence – especially in the UO sample. In other words, the diversity of opinions was 
better captured by the 4-point Likert scale from which the violent/ nonviolent indexes are 
drawn, and it is not surprising that the binary variables (Q4, Q5, and Q6) had little power 
(though in most cases it was statistically significant) in predicting that variation. This is 
clearly demonstrated by the Q9_33 regressions. Q9_33 reproduced an item from the Pew 
Global Attitudes 2007 survey which asked respondents their level of agreement/ 
disagreement with the statement: “It is sometimes necessary to use military force to 
maintain order in the world.” Respondents confronted a 4-point Likert scale (Completely 
agree, Mostly agree, Mostly disagree, and Completely disagree). With the aim of closely 
replicating this question, respondents in the UO and Costa Rica surveys confronted a 4-
point Likert scale: Strongly Agree (1); Agree (2); Disagree (3); Strongly Disagree (4). 
Our results show that Q9_33 (the Pew question) is associated with much more of the 
variance in the violent/ nonviolent indexes than the Gallup World Poll questions, as 
Q9_33 is associated with 11% of the variance in the Militarism Index, 10% of the 
Nonviolence Index, and a robust 39% of the variance in the Realpolitiks Index. The latter 
makes good theoretical sense as maintaining “order” carries a nuance that resonates with 
the ideology of realpolitiks. Clearly, the Pew item and its 4-point Likert scale helps 
explain much more variance in violent/ nonviolent attitudes than the dichotomous Gallup 
World Poll questions. Hence, the Pew item is much closer to being a “keystone” question 
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on violent/ nonviolent attitudes and this is likely related to the use of a 4-point Likert 
scale. 
 Again, in the UO sample, Q4 predicts the most variance in the Militarism Index, 
with 5.5% (Adjusted R² = .0554) of the variance in militarism scores associated with Q4 
responses. In the Costa Rica sample (not depicted here), Q4 also predicts the most 
variance in the Militarism Index, with 10.2% (Adjusted R² = .1021) of the variance in 
militarism scores associated with Q4 responses. Similarly, in the UO sample, Q6 (the 
efficacy of peaceful means question) predicts the most variance in the Nonviolence 
Index, with 4.9% (Adjusted R² = .0492) of the variance in nonviolence scores associated 
with Q6 responses. In the Costa Rica sample, Q6 predicts the most variance in the 
Nonviolence Index, with 7.9% (Adjusted R² = .0786) of the variance in nonviolence 
scores associated with Q6 responses.  
 Additionally, in a regression analysis of the Costa Rica sample, the Pew item 
achieves significance at the .0001 level on all three violent/ nonviolent indexes. The Pew 
item is associated with 7.3% of the variance in the Nonviolence Index, 12% of the 
variance in the Just War Index, and a robust 45.2% of the variance in the Militarism 
Index. Thus, in the Costa Rica sample, the Pew item is a better “predictor” than the 
Gallup World Poll questions of scores on the Militarism Index, but not of scores on the 
Nonviolent Index, where the Pew item (Q9_33) and Q6 explained roughly the same 
amount of variance in the Nonviolent Index. This is likely because Costa Rican attitudes 
as a whole lean decisively towards nonviolence and a dichotomous question like Q6 can 
capture the diversity (or lack thereof) of opinions as effectively as a 4-point Likert scale 
(e.g., Q9_33).  
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 In the UO sample, when all three independent variables (Q4, Q5, Q6) are added in 
a multiple regression model, these three questions are associated with 7.5% of the 
variance in the Militarism Index, 7.5% in the Nonviolence Index, 7.4% in the 
Interpersonal Violence Index, 3.4% in the Just War Index, and 8.3% in the Realpolitiks 
Index. In the Costa Rica sample, when all three independent variables (Q4, Q5, Q6) are 
added in a multiple regression model, these three questions are associated with 14.4% of 
the variance in the Nonviolence Index, 10.7% of the variance in the Militarism Index, and 
12.7% of the variance in the Just War index. It seems the “keystone” questions explain 
more variance in the Costa Rica sample because, on average, there is less variance in 
Costa Rican attitudes and peaceful attitudes predominate.   
 Overall, it is difficult to assert that the Gallup World Poll presents us with three 
keystone questions on violent/ nonviolent attitudes. While t-tests showed that these three 
questions were significantly associated with variations in most of the more 
comprehensive violent/ nonviolent attitude indexes, the three questions do not robustly 
predict variance in attitudes very robustly, especially in the U.S. sample where attitudes 
were found to vary more than in Costa Rica. Again, this is likely linked to the 
dichotomous nature of the Gallup World Poll questions, and as a result, the Pew Global 
Attitudes question with its 4-point Likert scale explains much more variance in the 
violent/ nonviolent attitude indexes. 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF VALUES, SDO, AND OTHER VARIABLES 
Schwartz Values 
 
 Numerous psychological studies have concluded that “values are more likely to 
create than to be created by perceptions” (Aalberg 2003, p.94). A growing body of 
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research by Schwartz and his colleagues has revitalized the study of values as predictors 
of numerous attitudes. Values are conceptualized as guiding principles in people’s lives. 
Schwartz (2007) theorizes that values are beliefs tied to emotion, a motivational construct 
(i.e., abstract goals people strive for), a source of standards or criteria aiding routine 
evaluations in the social world, and as a system of ordering priorities hierarchically 
(Schwartz 2007). The core ten values and the survey instrument were refined through 210 
samples in 67 nations between 1988 and 2002 (Schwartz 1992, 1994b). The ten Schwartz 
Values have been further validated or partially validated in several additional cross-
national studies (Boehnke and Schwartz 1997; Davidov, Schmidt, and Schwartz 2008; 
Schwartz and Boehnke 2004; Spini 2003). Schwartz and Sagiv (1995) conclude, “there is 
substantial support for the claim that 10 motivationally distinct value types are 
recognized across cultures and used to express value priorities” (p.113). Table 55 below  
Table 55. Core Goals of the Motivational Types in the Schwartz Values Scheme  
 
Motivational Types Core Goals 
POWER Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and 
resources 
ACHIEVEMENT Personal success through demonstrating competence according 
to social standards 
HEDONISM Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself 
STIMULATION Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life 
SELF-DIRECTION Independent thought and action – choosing, creating, exploring 
UNIVERSALISM Understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection for the 
welfare of all people and for nature 
BENEVOLENCE Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with 
whom one is in frequent personal contact 
TRADITION Respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas 
that traditional culture or religion provide the self 
CONFORMITY Restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or 
harm others and violate social expectations or norms 
SECURITY Safety, harmony and stability of society, of relationships, and of 
self 
 
Source: Davidov, Schmidt, and Schwartz (2008) 
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details the core goals of the motivational types, while Appendix M details the questions 
which operationalize each Schwartz value.  
 Because the ten Schwartz Values are susceptible to multicolinearity, it is 
advisable to enter only up to eight centered values as predictors in the regression, and 
thus to exclude at least two values a priori on theoretical grounds (Schwartz 2011). 
Previous research by Mayton, Peters, and Owens (1999) found that five of the Schwartz 
values significantly correlated with militaristic attitudes (including POWER, 
ACHIEVEMENT, HEDONISM, SECURITY, and CONFORMITY), while the five 
remaining values (STIMULATION, SELF-DIRECTION, TRADITION, 
BENEVOLENCE, and UNIVRSALISM) were not significantly associated with 
militarism. However, BENEVOLENCE and UNIVERSALISM were the only values 
negatively associated with militarism, and it was considered theoretically sound to 
include these variables on tests of the nonviolence index. In an exploratory mode, only 
two values were excluded from regression analyses, SELF-DIRECTION and 
STIMULATION. These two values were considered less theoretically salient on issues of 
violence and nonviolence.    
 Research by Kakkad (2005) found that nonviolence related negatively with the 
value types of POWER and HEDONISM as well as SDO (see below). Nonviolence 
correlated positively with the value types of UNIVERSALISM and BENEVOLENCE. 
However, Kakkad operationalized nonviolence by utilizing the Nonviolence Test (NVT) 
(Kool and Sen 1984; Kool 2008).  
 The present author considered the NVT far too limited and susceptible to social 
desirability bias. For instance, respondents are likely to give the more mature answer in 
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the following: Q60: “When I am in a bad mood I...a. feel like smashing things; b. relax 
and tell myself things will get better.” The NVT ignores international relations and social 
movements and instead focuses on self-control and anti-punitiveness. Thus, it does not 
suit the goal of identifying common ideologies of violence/ nonviolence. Many of the 
NVT items probe whether respondents favor restorative justice over punitive justice. But 
the survey instrument can be fairly accused of holding a naive faith in restorative justice, 
while neglecting complexities. For instance, Q57 reads: “A clergyman who is involved in 
immoral behavior should... a. be allowed to return to his/ her position in the church after 
he/ she repents and changes his/ her ways; b. never be allowed to return to his/ her 
position in the church.” The “A” answer was coded nonviolent. A similar question on 
teachers appears in Q53, but a “sex crime” is specified. Once again, the answer coded as 
nonviolent is the less punitive option, but highly unrealistic. Consider also Q51: “All 
citizens should be allowed to carry weapons...a. only when there is a war; b. to defend 
themselves.” The “A” answer was coded as nonviolent. Of course, this is highly 
problematic because pacifists would obviously object to coding this as nonviolent. Only a 
just war adherent, or someone subscribing to militarism or political realism ideology, 
would be comfortable with this answer. The forced-choice dichotomous questions are 
also problematic.       
 The internal reliabilities of the Schwartz values indices were obtained for the 
merged (UO and Costa Rica) data set, and the separate samples (see Table 56). Testing 
the separate samples is important because exploratory factor analyses on the data have 
verified that the structure of attitudes towards violence and nonviolence in the two 
nations are distinct. On the whole, the relatively low alphas are not particularly surprising 
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given that all of the indices are composed of only two items, with the exception of the 
UNIVERSALISM index, which is composed of three items. This 21-item version of the 
45-item Schwartz Values Survey has the advantage of economy and efficiency (for 
survey designers seeking to limit their numbers of questions), but an analysis of data 
from 20 nations in the European Social Survey suggests that the more economical survey 
may have trouble discriminating 3 of the 10 values with confidence (Davidov, Schmidt, 
and Schwartz 2008, p.440).  
Table 56. Cronbach’s Alphas (Scale Reliability Coefficients) for Schwartz Values in 
Merged and Separate Samples 
Value Indices Merged 
data 
UO 
sample 
Costa Rica 
sample 
Conformity .53 .66 .40 
Tradition .28 .32 .28 
Benevolence .58 .67 .49 
Universalism .56 .52 .57 
Self-Direction .46 .36 .54 
Stimulation .64 .70 .60 
Hedonism .68 .71 .65 
Achievement .72 .69 .74 
Power .56 .50 .56 
Security .55 .47 .61 
Notes: alphas above .7 are considered acceptable levels of internal consistency, between .6 and .7 is 
questionable, between .6 and .5 is poor, and below .5 is considered unacceptable 
 
 T-tests were conducted to determine if the group means (UO means versus Costa 
Rican means) were significantly different on the centered Schwartz values. Robvar tests 
in STATA revealed that the two samples had unequal variances on six of the centered 
values (SECURITY, TRADITION, BENEVOLENCE, HEDONISM, ACHIEVEMENT, 
and POWER), so unequal variances were specified for these t-tests. 
 In Table 57, we see that the most significant differences (at the .001 level or 
higher) between the cross-national samples are: UO respondents value POWER and 
HEDONISM to a higher degree, while Costa Rican respondents value UNIVERSALISM, 
SECURITY, and SELF-DIRECTION to a higher degree. At the lower .05 level of 
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significance, UO respondents also value ACHIEVEMENT and BENEVOLENCE to a 
higher degree. Because values are theorized as capturing a deeper belief structure than the 
more specific attitudinal-level opinions, these findings suggest that the U.S. and Costa 
Rica do have some culture-specific differences that may partially drive attitudes on 
violence and nonviolence. Again, Kakkad (2005) found that nonviolent attitudes related 
negatively with the value types of POWER and HEDONISM, and correlated positively 
with the value types of UNIVERSALISM and BENEVOLENCE. This leads us to expect 
that the UO respondents will score lower on our nonviolent indicators, and Costa Ricans 
will score higher, but the fact that UO respondents scored higher on BENEVOLENCE 
makes the picture more complex. 
Table 57. T-tests of Centered Schwartz Values (Costa Rica vs. UO Means) 
 
Schwartz value 
(centered) 
Costa Rica (n=312) UO 
(n=403) 
 
df 
 
t 
 
x̄² - x̄ 
 x̄ SD x̄² SD 
Security .202 .907 -.179 .787 590.9 5.73 .381**** 
Conformity -1.157 1.034 -1.105 1.025 669 -0.65 -.052 
Tradition -.243 .951 -.246 .856 604.0 .048 .003 
Benevolence .677 .712 .783 .629 597.7 -2.03 -.107* 
Universalism .828 .712 .375 .701 669 8.27 .454**** 
Self-Direction .579 .775 .332 .749 669 4.19 .248**** 
Stimulation .071 .922 .176 .873 669 -1.51 -.105 
Hedonism -.045 1.001 .245 .790 555.9 -4.07 -.289*** 
Achievement -.001 .896 .155 .822 610.1 -2.32 -.156* 
Power -1.327 1.002 -.722 .872 592.2 -8.22 -.605**** 
Notes: † = p< .1; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001; for each dummy variable, 
robvar tests were first conducted in STATA to determine if variances were unequal; In cases of unequal 
variances between groups, t-tests specified “unequal” variances; For the centered Schwartz values, scores 
of 3 indicate “very much like me,” and -2 indicates “not at all like me” (positive scores signify that the 
value is more important) 
 
 Schwartz (2007) contends that conflicts between specific values like POWER vs. 
UNIVERSALISM and HEDONISM vs. TRADITION are “near-universal” (p.16). Some 
of the differences between the Costa Rican and UO samples can be readily explained by 
Schwartz’s adoption of Inglehart’s (1997) distinction between materialist (SECURITY, 
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TRADITION, and CONFORMITY) vs. post-materialist values (HEDONISM, 
STIMULATION, and SELF-DIRECTION) (Schwartz 2007, p.6). Because Costa Rican 
students are likely to have grown up with less economic security than UO students (given 
that Costa Rica is a developing country with a lower GDP per capita), it is little wonder 
Costa Ricans value SECURITY more highly and HEDONISM less. These cross-national 
differences are particularly interesting because Schwartz (2007) has argued from data on 
20 countries that “life stage” effects shape value priorities, such that hedonism, power, 
stimulation, and achievement values are, on average, likely to be universally valued 
relatively more by cohorts of young adults (p.7).      
 In a study of 20 nations, Schwartz (2007) found that UNIVERSALISM values 
only begin to rise in the last years of secondary school, but they “are substantially higher 
among those who attend university” (p.10). This may be because a university education 
broadens the capacity for empathy and global awareness, or because people who 
prioritize universalism values are likely to seek higher education (p.10). A study in Italy 
found that UNIVERALISM values best predicted voting center-left rather than center-
right, and a study in France found that UNIVERSALISM values best predicted engaging 
in political activism in the past year (Schwartz 2007). Below we will analyze how these 
values are associated with indices of militarism and nonviolence. The fact that Costa 
Ricans scored significantly higher on UNIVERSALISM will be important to revisit as 
one possible explanatory variable for the more specific attitudes on violence/ 
nonviolence. 
 
 
224 
The Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) Scale 
 The Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) Scale evolved out of research and 
theoretical streams developed by Fromm and Adorno et al. (1950) on the “authoritarian 
personality.” The construct delineated a personality type which embraces racism, sexism, 
homophobia, and conservative politics, while rejecting egalitarianism and empathy for 
lower-status groups (Sidanius and Pratto 1999, p.74). Erich Fromm (1965) argued that for 
the authoritarian personality “…the concept of equality does not exist…it has no real 
meaning or weight for him [sic], since it concerns something outside the reach of his 
emotional experience. For him the world is composed of people with power and those 
without it, of superior ones and inferior ones” (pp.195-196).   
 Authoritarian personality theory has been both criticized and redeemed by 
empirical findings and it informs part of the theoretical stance of the SDO scale. One 
critique of the attempt to measure authoritarianism was that “agreement bias” in survey 
measurements could lead researchers to falsely identify respondents as authoritarians 
(Sidanius and Pratto 1999, p.7). Agreement bias, or “yea-saying bias,” occurs when 
respondents tend to agree with survey questions regardless of the content. Over the 
decades, researchers have moved through various instruments attempting to measure 
varieties of authoritarianism, the Fascism Scale, Dogmatism Scale, Anti-Egalitarianism 
Scale, and Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale. The bottom line is that researchers have 
developed valid measurements of generalized ethnocentrism and attitudes favoring 
dominance/ group dominance. In addition, cross-national research has validated that 
generalized ethnocentrism is positively associated with political conservativism (p.7).  
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 While the SDO overlaps heavily with authoritarianism, Sidanius and Pratto 
(1999) maintain that the SDO is theoretically and conceptually distinct: “authoritarianism 
concerns submission to the authority of the ingroup, whereas SDO concerns attitudes 
toward hierarchical relationships between groups” (p.74). But again, these heavily 
overlap. Wald, Owen, and Hill (1989) conceptualize “authority-mindedness” as an 
attitudinal predisposition which values authoritative structures and patterns of relating in 
families and other groups. Ammerman (1987) explains the privileges and paternalistic 
care involved here: “They come to expect groups to be divided between sheep and 
shepherds. The shepherds are entitled to deference and rewards, while the sheep are 
entitled to love and care” (p.128). For conservative Protestant Christians, this worldview 
has a theological rationale as it mirrors views of the deity, and the violent punishment of 
the Biblical deity is even understood as legitimating parents’ corporal punishment of their 
children (Ellison and Bartkowki 1997). However, the violent punishment of the deity 
portrayed in the Bible is largely limited to the Old Testament, an incident in Acts Chapter 
5, and a literalist reading of the last book of the New Testament, Revelation. Ironically, 
this means that the nonviolent God of Jesus is de-emphasized by conservative 
Protestants.    
 Pinker (2011) argues that dominance is better termed “tribalism” (p.523). As we 
will see, tribalism is a psychological tendency that the “sports fan” variable is also 
theorized to capture by intellectual luminaries like Noam Chomsky. Years of research 
utilizing the SDO scale has shown that the social dominance orientation: 
 ...inclines people to a sweeping array of opinions and values, including patriotism, 
racism, fate, karma, caste, national destiny, militarism, toughness on crime, and 
defensiveness of existing arrangements of authority and inequality. An orientation 
away from social dominance, in contrast, inclines people to humanism, socialism, 
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feminism, universal rights, political progressivism, and the egalitarian and pacifist 
themes in the Christian Bible. (p.523) 
 
 The reliability and validity of the SDO scale has been confirmed in cross-national 
research (e.g., Sidanius and Pratto1999, Sidanius et al. 2000). Nevertheless, a few 
critiques may be warranted, including the potential for social desirability bias in items 1 
through 4 which model approval of dominance, and may strike many respondents as 
reflecting attitudes that are too harsh or mean-spirited to admit or subscribe to.  
 After reverse coding items 5 through 8 on the 8-item SDO scale, the means of the 
SDO scale were calculated at the individual respondent level and averaged for each 
sample. The mean SDO score for the University of Oregon (USA) sample was 2.09, 
while the mean SDO score of the Costa Rica sample 2.11. Robvar tests in STATA 
showed that the variances between the two samples were not significantly different, and 
t-tests showed that there was no significant differences between sample means. A lower 
SDO score represents more favorable attitudes toward equality, and a higher SDO score 
represents more favorable attitudes towards dominance. Thus, the U.S. sample was 
slightly more favorable toward equality. This could be because the UO data includes 6% 
more females and 6% fewer males than the Costa Rica data. Many studies have found 
that females have lower SDOs, and Sidanius, Sinclair, and Pratto (2006 ) found that the 
male-female difference in SDO remained essentially constant across students’ university 
careers.   
 But on the whole, the finding of no significant difference in SDO scores between 
the two nations is not particularly surprising, since both nations are hierarchical societies 
with large inequalities. The salience of the Nicaraguan immigrant “other” within Costa 
Rican society (Sandoval-García 2004) is one explanation for why Costa Rican students’ 
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SDO scores are similar to UO students. And, by some measures, Costa Rica is a more 
unequal society than the U.S. The ratio of the average income of the richest 10% to the 
poorest 10% is 23.4 in Costa Rica (ranking as the 22nd most unequal nation in the world) 
versus 15.9 in the U.S., which ranks as the 41st most unequal nation (UN Human 
Development Report 2009). Similarly, the ratio of the average income of the richest 20% 
to the poorest 20% is 15.6 in Costa Rica (ranking as the 20th most unequal nation), versus 
8.4 in the U.S. The U.S. ranks as the 48th most unequal nation by this measure (UN 
Human Development Report 2007-2008). Nevertheless, by these measures, Costa Rica is 
a more equal society than all of the other Central American nations.  
 The means SDO scores for both the Costa Rica and U.S. samples were markedly 
lower (i.e., more pro-equality) than for several samples from California: 3 samples of San 
Jose State University undergraduate students, 1 sample of UC Berkeley undergraduates, 
and 10 samples of Stanford University undergraduates, all taken in 1990-1992. The 
means of those samples ranged from a low of 2.31 to a high of 3.13 (Pratto et al. 1994). 
One possible explanation for the differences between my samples and the samples from 
California university students in the early 1990s rests in differences in the samples 
between predominant majors and career interests. Pratto et al. (1994) found that the 
intended career paths of students influenced their SDO scores, as some careers were 
theorized to serve elite interests (“hierarchy-enhancing” careers) while other careers, as in 
the helping professions, serve the oppressed (“hierarchy-attenuating” careers), though 
many other careers were labeled “middlers” to reflect a relatively neutral affect on 
hierarchical social structures (pp.747-748). In a study of UCLA undergraduate students 
during a 4 ½ year period, Sidanius, Sinclair, and Pratto (2006) found that hierarchy-
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attenuating majors had a mean SDO score ranging from 1.74 to 1.90 (measured at one 
year increments), while hierarchy-enhancing majors had a mean SDO score ranging from 
2.10 to 2.20 (p.1644).  
 However, regressions of 10 categories of majors (each tested individually, not 
controlling for any other factors) revealed that only business majors in the UO sample 
significantly predicted SDO scores, at the .05 level of significance. With a beta of .12, t-
ratio of 2.43, and p=.015, business majors were associated with significantly higher SDO 
scores (i.e., more favorable towards social dominance). This corroborates previous 
research on business majors and SDO scores, leading to the classification of business 
majors as an hierarchy-enhancing major (Sidanius et al. 2003; van Laar et al. 1999; 
Sidanius, Sinclair, and Pratto 2006). The UO sample targeted students in an introduction 
to sociology course (though only 13% reported an intention to major in sociology), and 
my Costa Rica sample oversampled from students in lower-division sociology courses.  
 Two other plausible explanations for the lower SDO scores in the two samples 
rests in survey context effects. First, the context of a sociology course may prime pro-
equality sentiments in students. Sociology professors tend to implicitly or explicitly 
assume a variety of human rights and social justice norms that are pro-equality, and in 
both nations students were exposed to several weeks of lectures before taking the 
surveys. Studies suggest that the influence of professors (who, on average, are much 
more liberal than the general population) on student political attitudes is weak or non-
existent for about 57% of students, while about 27% move to the left and 16% move to 
the right between their freshman and senior years (Mariani and Hewitt 2008). But we 
know less about the short-term consequences of sociology lectures and course readings. 
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Secondly, the placement of the SDO items in the surveys may have biased answers 
towards pro-equality sentiments because the survey began with numerous questions 
which required students to reflect on violence and nonviolence. Since the SDO items 
were embedded in this context, the pro-dominance SDO items may have appeared more 
dangerous, radical, mean-spirited, or violent than would be the case if survey questions 
on violence did not precede the SDO battery of questions. Likewise, the pro-equality 
items might have appeared more nonviolent, tolerant, or civilized than would be the case 
if survey questions on nonviolence did not precede the SDO battery of questions.  
The Sports Fan Variable 
 The “sports fan” variable is a dummy variable, based on coding respondents who 
answered “1” (“great/ excited/ very happy”) on Q50: “When the UO football team wins, 
how do you feel? (1) great/ excited/ very happy; (2) happy; (3) somewhat happy; (4) 
mostly indifferent; (5) I do NOT care at all if they win or lose.” It should be remember 
that this survey was conducted in November, 2010 when the UO football team was 
ranked #1 in the nation. They were undefeated. By the end of the season they had a 
perfect 12-0 record and went on to play in the BCS National Championship game. As 
will be seen below, almost 72% of respondents could correctly pick out, from a list of 
name sets, the UO quarterback, star running back, and field goal kicker. As Table 58 
depicts, the team clearly generated excitement on campus and the majority of students 
were following the success of the football team. I would propose that this 
operationalization of “sports fan” imperfectly but helpfully captures the degree to which a 
respondent is integrated into mainstream U.S. culture – including a tacit acceptance of 
forms of U.S. militarism.    
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Table 58. UO Data: Sports Fan Indicator (N= 393) 
Q50. When the UO football team wins, how do you feel? 
Answer options Freq. % 
great/ excited/ very happy 249 63.36 
happy 97 24.68 
somewhat happy 25 6.36 
mostly indifferent 15   3.82 
I do NOT care at all if they win 
or lose 
7 1.78 
 
 
The Role of Spectator Sports 
 
 In his provocative essay “Education After Auschwitz,” Theodor Adorno (1998) 
argues that the role of sports, and perhaps especially spectator sports, should be studied 
for its relationship to the cultural and psychological production of violence. In his 
masterful documentary film on the Vietnam War, Hearts and Minds (1974), director 
Peter Davis’s juxtaposition of the Vietnam War and U.S. military discourse about it with 
high school football games and locker-room pep talks suggested a link between the 
socialization into aggression and tribalism in U.S. sports settings, and how Americans 
think about war. This may be worth pondering given that in the present sample of UO 
students, 63 out of 166 (38%) males actually played football in high school.  
 Similarly, the leading leftist intellectual Noam Chomsky (1992) has argued that 
sports and spectator sports in particular may serve the function of inculcating jingoistic 
attitudes. Chomsky argues that America’s obsession with spectator sports, which the 
mass media heavily promotes, is politically significant, since it functions as a “crucial 
example of the indoctrination system,” and (much like Marx’s “opiate of the masses” 
critique of religion) as an enormous diversion from worrying about or critical thinking 
about political and social issues that actually affect the quality of people’s lives. Such 
diversional obsessions reduce citizens’ “capacity to think.” Chomsky guesses this 
231 
dynamic operates not only among the “Joe Six Packs” of the country, but also “the eighty 
percent.”   
You know, I remember in high school, already I was pretty old. I suddenly asked 
myself at one point, why do I care if my high school team wins the football game? 
I mean, I don't know anybody on the team, you know? I mean, they have nothing 
to do with me, I mean, why I am cheering for my team? It doesn't mean any -- it 
doesn't make sense. But the point is, it does make sense: it's a way of building up 
irrational attitudes of submission to authority, and group cohesion behind 
leadership elements -- in fact, it's training in irrational jingoism. That's also a 
feature of competitive sports. I think if you look closely at these things, I think, 
typically, they do have functions, and that's why energy is devoted to supporting 
them and creating a basis for them and advertisers are willing to pay for them and 
so on. (Chomsky 1992b) 
 
Joan Acker (2012), a sociologist at the University of Oregon, has argued, 
 
the greatest issue about football, and the reason that I want it to be abolished, is 
that it glorifies and legitimates a certain form of male violence. Vast crowds 
spend considerable money to watch young men injure each other. Yes, they also 
throw and catch balls and run for the goal, but those activities do not mitigate the 
main message that violence in pursuit of winning is okay. This is also how 
capitalism operates, as well as the U.S. military, which is always ready to send it 
troops wherever. 
 
 By contrast, in her book Dancing in the Streets, Barbara Ehrenreich (2007) argues 
that sports provide an outlet for collective emotion and carnivalesque celebration that 
societies repress or suppress at their own peril. Thus, “...football has restored to our 
culture the experience of collective joy, which elite culture has virtually prohibited for the 
last three centuries, alas and alack” (Earl 2007). Differing somewhat from Durkheim’s 
notion of “collective effervescense” and how emotional rituals cement social solidarity, 
Ehrenreich (2007) suggests that the main consequences of repressing such collective 
rituals is depression.  
 But in the case of college football, these rituals of “collective joy” can also 
involve significant costs, some of them depressing in their own right. Lindo, Swensen, 
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and Waddell’s (2012) study of 29,737 students (non-athlete undergraduate students) over 
9 years at the University of Oregon found that when the UO football team had a winning 
season, the course grades of males during the fall term (the term coinciding with the 
football season) fell significantly relative to female grades. Survey data confirmed that 
when the UO football team wins, males report being more likely to decrease studying, 
increase partying, and increase alcohol consumption. Females also reported these 
behaviors in response to the football team’s success, but at lower levels, suggesting that 
their academic performance also suffers but this is masked by the common practice of 
grade curving.  
 Keep in mind that these findings relate to the success of the football team attached 
to the local tribe. Can we infer that losing leads to better grades and less partying, or is 
there evidence for other behavior patterns in response to losses? Card and Dahl (2011) 
found that in cities with professional football teams, police report data exhibits spikes in 
domestic violence on the day of the game (Sundays), concentrated during a time window 
near the end of the game, when the home team loses in an upset. Tragically, “upsetlosses 
(defeats when the home teamwas predicted towin by four ormore points)lead to a 10% 
increase in the rate of at-home violence bymen against theirwivesand girlfriends” 
(p.103).Upset wins or losses when the game was expected to be close revealed 
insignificant effects. Hence, the association between football spectatorship and violent 
behavior can be very real, and here it appears to be shaped by wins and losses of the local 
social group/ tribe (i.e., dominance), rather than by the mere violence of the game itself.       
 The idea that sport is a “sublimation for war” or a “harmless,” “rational” and 
“civilized” outlet – a good candidate for William James’s “moral equivalent of war” as 
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the philosopher George Santayana proposed, is an old idea (Jessup 1940, pp.23ff.). But 
rather than reifying “sport,” we must acknowledge the great diversity in sport and sports 
traditions. For instance, when missionaries introduced soccer to the Gahuku-Kama people 
of New Guinea, the indigenous insisted on playing the game with modified rules: 
“instead of seeking victory for one of the teams, they multiply the number of games until 
the defeats and victories are equally balanced. The match is ended not when one team is 
victorious...but when there is no loser” (Levi-Strauss 1976 Vol. 2, p.319).    
 Research has found that U.S. sports fans – operationalized as those who regularly 
watch sports on television – are more likely to vote (Franz 2012). This offers some 
indirect evidence for a Durkheimian theory of sports as cultivating social solidarity, of 
social bonds cemented through collective, emotional rituals.  
 But there is also evidence of a darker, tribalistic side. College students who are 
avid fans of their school’s football and men’s basketball teams express more homophobic 
and sexist views than their non-sports fan peers (Smith 2009). Fans of some TV sports 
offered significantly more support for Iraq War than non-fans (Stempel 2006).And, 
Stempel even found that the sports fan variable was a better predictor of support for the 
war than many of the most common correlates of hawkish attitudes: “…televised 
masculinist sports constitute a central institution in producing and reproducing militaristic 
nationalism, surpassing social class, religion, age, gender, family structure, and region in 
explanatory power” (p.102). Stempel’s regression model included the following control 
variables: gender, education, region, race, church attendance, born-again religious 
identity, age, and married-with-children status. Controlling for these factors, Stempel 
found thatsupport for the Iraq War was strongest among TV fans of Baseball, the NFL, 
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college football, NASCAR, and tennis (Stempel 2006). The tennis finding may require 
some theoretical gymnastics to account for, or the explanation may be simpler – it seems 
plausible that fans of tennis might tend to be wealthier, and wealth correlates with 
Republican Party membership.    
 Much as Stempel found, in the present study, the sports fans variable (i.e., fans of 
UO football) attains significance in most of our tests, and it is associated with more 
hawkish/ pro-violent attitudes. Hence, it seems that Chomsky may be onto something in 
positing a link between spectator sports and tribalism. Additional tests to identify 
spectator sports fans (Q52) in the mode of Stempel’s research on TV fans, produced a 
few significant findings after controlling for gender. As will be seen below, tests of a 
socialization thesis in connection with athletics (Q48) or playing specific sports produced 
some significant findings, but playing specifically violent sports like football (Q49), 
produced no significant findings after controlling for gender. 
Results: Regression Analyses 
 In the UO data, analysis of various regression models (see Table 59) revealed that 
gender, political party, and Christian self-identification predicted SDO scores. In short, 
females and Democrats were significantly more pro-equality, while males, Republicans, 
and Christians favored social dominance. However, numerous dummy variables (see 
Appendix N for explanations of the dummy codes) indicating more specific Christian 
subcultures failed to obtain significance at even the modest .1 level when entered into 
regressions as sole independent variables including evangelical, catholic, literalist, born 
again, and attenders. Similarly, other dummy variables also failed to obtain significance 
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at the .1 level including black, Hispanic, white, and class. In Model 4, several Schwartz 
values were associated with SDO variance.    
Table 59. OLS Standardized Coefficients (betas) for SDO on Independent Variables (UO 
Data) 
Independent variables SDO 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
male (Male=1; Female=0)  .206*** 
(.106) 
.198*** 
(.103) 
.187*** 
(.101) 
 .111* 
(.094) 
white (Yes=1; No=0) -.001 
(.137) 
.006 
(.129) 
.025 
(.126) 
  
class (Upper class=1; 
Lower class=5) 
-.104 
(.065) 
-.074 
(.062) 
-.086 
(.060) 
  
left-right ideology (Far 
left=1; Far right=5) 
.200** 
(.063) 
    
Christian (Yes=1; No=0) .050 
(.112) 
.113* 
(.107) 
.102* 
(.101) 
  
Republican (Yes=1; No=0)  .111* 
(.129) 
   
Democrat (Yes=1; No=0)   -.221*** 
(.101) 
 -.132** 
(.094) 
Security    -.074 
(.066) 
-.057 
(.065) 
Conformity    .190** 
(.057) 
.190*** 
(.057) 
Tradition    -.014 
(.065) 
-.012 
(.064) 
Benevolence    -.206*** 
(.083) 
-.174*** 
(.083) 
Universalism    -.268*** 
(.097) 
-.221*** 
(.099) 
Achievement    -.015 
(.069) 
.022 
(.069) 
Power    .173** 
(.067) 
.152** 
(.067) 
Hedonism    .028 
(.076) 
.036 
(.074) 
N 330 362 362 363 363 
Adj R² .10 .07 .11 .28 .30 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors;* = p ≤ .05; ** = p ≤ .01; *** = p ≤ .001; SDO values 1=favor equality, 7=favor 
dominance; Schwartz values were reverse coded and centered; For the centered Schwartz values, scores of 3 indicate “very much like 
me,” and -2 indicates “not at all like me” (positive scores signify that the value is more important) 
 
 
Delimited Indices for Cross-National Comparison 
 
 “Militarism” and “Nonviolence” indices were constructed for the complete cross-
national dataset as delimited versions of the indices previously created through separate 
factor analyses of the two national data sets. Only items loading in both national samples 
were utilized for the purposes of cross-national comparison. Hence, rather than 
conducting a new factor analysis with the aggregated cross-national dataset, these 
delimited indices were created through an artificial but justifiable process. The delimited 
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Nonviolence Index includes 6 items (numbers Q9.23 – 9.28), with a Cronbach’s alpha 
score (scale reliability coefficient) of .77 (acceptable/ good), while the delimited 
Militarism Index includes 4 items (Q9.6, 9.7, 9.13, and 9.14), with a Cronbach’s alpha 
score (scale reliability coefficient) of .63. 
 Below in Table 60, we see that in the UO data, as Universalism scores increase 
(i.e., Universalism is increasingly viewed as a value priority/ as “very much like me”) 
scores on the Nonviolence Index and the Militarism Index become significantly more 
peaceful. 
Table 60. Descriptive Statistics for Schwartz Values (UO Data) 
Variable (Value 
Type) 
M (raw) M (centered 
values) 
SD (centered 
values) 
Correlations with 
militarism index 
Correlations with 
nonviolence index 
Security 4.31 -.18 .79 -.14 -.15 
Conformity 3.41 -1.11 1.02 -.17 -.15 
Tradition 4.26 -.25 .86 -.18* -.08 
Benevolence 5.26 .78 .63 .12 .02 
Universalism 4.87 .37 .70 .31**** .27**** 
Self-Direction 4.81 .33 .75 .12 .11 
Stimulation 4.67 .18 .87 .03 .14 
Hedonism 4.73 .24 .79 .0003 .09 
Achievement 4.65 .15 .82 -.05 -.10 
Power 3.78 -.72 .87 -.04 -.16 
Note: N=373; Sidak t-tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001; In the correlations, all 
Schwartz Values are centered, following Schwartz (2011). The Sidak method was used to avoid Type I errors associated with the 
“multiple comparison fallacy” (Hamilton 2003, p.136). The “militarism” and “nonviolence” indices were delimited versions of the 
indices created through separate factor analyses of the two national data sets. Only items loading in both data sets were utilized for the 
purposes of cross-national comparison; Schwartz values were reverse coded, so that a score of 6= “very much like me” and 1= “not at 
all like me” (higher scores signify that the value is more important); For the centered Schwartz values, scores of 3 indicate “very much 
like me,” and -2 indicates “not at all like me” (hence, positive scores signify that the value is more important); For the nonviolence 
index and militarism index, the score of 4 is most peaceful, and score of 1 is least peaceful  
 
 Some of the above findings are somewhat surprising, and a degree of post-hoc 
theorizing is in order. We see that in the Costa Rica sample, as the CONFORMITY value 
increases, the score on the Militarism Index becomes significantly less peaceful. At first 
glance, this may be surprising given the Costa Rican context of a demilitarized 
society.Would not those highly valuing conformity in such a society tend to embrace 
peaceful attitudes? One possible reading here is that the Costa Rican “culture of peace” is 
not so deeply engrained that conformists instinctively chose peaceful values in the 
survey. Of course, the key issue to adjudicate here is how does the Schwartz values 
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schema operationalize “conformity” (see Appendix M). It seems that the two items 
operationalizing “conformity” might tap an extreme form of conservativism including 
authoritarianism (e.g., see especially item #7 (in Appendix M): “She believes that people 
should do what they’re told. She thinks people should follow rules at all times, even 
when no-one is watching.”), and views of human nature as fundamentally belligerent. A 
long line of research has confirmed that such personality types tend to prefer a strong 
military, and it seems that some Costa Ricans also fall into this pattern. 
 Meanwhile, as SELF-DIRECTIONscores increase, scores on the Militarism Index 
become significantly more peaceful. Again, a conventional liberal-conservative split may 
help explain this finding, as on average, liberals/ Democratic party voters tend to oppose 
militarism (Burris 2008). Psychological research confirms that liberals exhibit more 
“openness to experience”; they “crave novelty, variety, diversity, new ideas, travel” 
(Haidt 2012). It seems the operationalization of SELF-DIRECTION (see item #1 in 
Appendix M: “...new ideas and being creative is important to her...”) taps this trait.  
 Hence, for both the CONFORMITY and SELF-DIRECTION findings, a 
conventional liberal-conservative schema offers explanatory insight. Indeed, the 
Schwartz theory of basic personal values categorizes SELF-DIRECTION and 
STIMULATION under “openness to change values,” while CONFORMITY, 
TRADITION, and SECURITY represent “conservation values” (Caprara et al. 2006, 
p.7).  
 A particularly provocative finding is that as the SECURITY value increases, the 
score on the Nonviolence Index becomes significantly (at the .05 level) more peaceful. 
Hence, this provides indirect evidence that in Costa Rica, those who highly value 
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SECURITY, and the government’s role in providing security (see item #14 in Appendix 
M) are confident that nonviolent means are sufficient for maintaining national security.    
 Below in Table 61, in the far right column, negative values represent cases where 
the Costa Rican sample scores lower on the centrality of this value than the UO sample, 
while positive values represent cases where the Costa Rican sample scores higher on the 
centrality of this value. T-tests on the difference between group means reveal that 
SECURITY, UNIVERSALISM, AND SELF-DIRECTION are significantly more central 
to the values structure of Costa Rican respondents. POWER and HEDONISM, and to a 
lesser degree BENEVOLENCE and ACHIEVEMENT, are significantly more central to 
the values structure of UO respondents.  
Table 61. Descriptive Statistics for Schwartz Values (Costa Rica Data and Cross-National 
Comparison) 
Variable (Value 
Type) 
M (raw) M (centered 
values) 
SD (centered 
values) 
Correlations 
with militarism 
index 
Correlations 
with 
nonviolence 
index 
M(CR) – M(UO) 
[t-tests of mean 
centered values] 
Security 4.69 .20 .91 -.08 .22* .38**** 
Conformity 3.36 -1.16 1.03 -.35**** -.04 -.05 
Tradition 4.26 -.24 .95 -.05 .05 .003 
Benevolence 5.17 .68 .71 .09 .01 -.11* 
Universalism 5.33 .83 .71 .21* .01 .45**** 
Self-Direction 5.08 .58 .78 .30**** .01 .25**** 
Stimulation 4.59 .07 .92 .15 -.09 -.105 
Hedonism 4.47 -.04 1.00 .02 -.12 -.29*** 
Achievement 4.51 -.001 .90 -.03 .06 -.16* 
Power 3.18 -1.33 1.00 -.16 -.08 -.60**** 
Note: N=298; The correlations involved Sidak t-tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001; In 
the correlations, all Schwartz Values are centered, following Schwartz (2011). The Sidak method was used to avoid Type I errors 
associated with the “multiple comparison fallacy” (Hamilton 2003, p.136). The “militarism” and “nonviolence” indices were delimited 
versions of the indices created through separate factor analyses of the two national data sets. Only items loading in both data sets were 
utilized for the purposes of cross-national comparison; Schwartz values were reverse coded, so that a score of 6= “very much like me” 
and 1= “not at all like me” (higher scores signify that the value is more important); For the centered Schwartz values, scores of 3 
indicate “very much like me,” and -2 indicates “not at all like me” (hence, positive scores signify that the value is more important); 
For the nonviolence index and militarism index, the score of 4 is most peaceful, and score of 1 is least peaceful  
 
 Before looking at the UO and Costa Rican samples separately, a cross-national 
analysis of the merged data set, depicted in Table 62, will allow us to test the relative 
influence of nationality upon attitudes towards nonviolence and militarism. The results 
below show that the nation variable is associated with far more variance than any of the  
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Table 62. OLS Standardized Coefficients (betas) for Regression of Nonviolence and 
Militarism Indexes (UO and Costa Rica Data Merged) on Independent Variables 
Independent variables Nonviolence Index Militarism Index 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Male (Male=1; Female=0) -.020 
(-.44) 
-.038 
(-.90) 
-.090* 
(-2.14) 
-.101* 
(-2.50) 
Class (Upper class=1; 
Lower class=5) 
.024 
(.55) 
-.013 
(-.33) 
.006 
(.15) 
-.030 
(-.76) 
Left-right ideology (Far 
left=1; Far right=5) 
-.007 
(-.14) 
-.058 
(-1.27) 
-.097* 
(-2.09) 
-.139** 
(-3.12) 
Political interest (Very 
interested=1; Not at all 
interested=4) 
.130** 
(3.01) 
.133** 
(3.21) 
-.018 
(-.44) 
-.006 
(-.14) 
Religious (Yes=1; No=0) .014 
(.27) 
.031 
(.67) 
-.086 
(-1.79) 
-.065 
(-1.41) 
Religious Attendance (More 
than once a week=1; 
Never=5) 
-.129* 
(-2.60) 
-.058 
(-1.23) 
-.090 
(-1.90) 
-.030 
(-.66) 
SDO (1=favor equality; 
7=favor dominance) 
-.051 
(-1.03) 
-.117* 
(-2.50) 
-.038 
(-.80) 
-.105* 
(-2.28) 
Security .135** 
(2.83) 
.070 
(1.56) 
.008 
(.17) 
-.051 
(-1.15) 
Conformity -.068 
(-1.28) 
-.049 
(-.97) 
-.153** 
(-3.01) 
-.147** 
(-3.03) 
Tradition -.143** 
(-2.76) 
-.068 
(-1.41) 
-.158** 
(-3.20) 
-.086 
(-1.82) 
Benevolence -.129* 
(-2.56) 
-.051 
(-1.08) 
-.109* 
(-2.27) 
-.052 
(-1.14) 
Universalism .194** 
(2.81) 
.086 
(1.31) 
.180** 
(2.71) 
.091 
(1.43) 
Achievement -.063 
(-1.22) 
-.040 
(-.82) 
-.061 
(-1.22) 
-.027 
(-.57) 
Power -.160** 
(-2.81) 
-.034 
(-.62) 
-.126* 
(-2.31) 
-.013 
(-.25) 
Hedonism -.058 
(-1.02) 
-.024 
(-.45) 
-.032 
(-.59) 
-.023 
(-.44) 
USA (Yes=1; No=0)  -.442*** 
(-8.49) 
 -.368*** 
(-7.30) 
Major1 (pre-law)  .035 
(.78) 
 .006 
(.13) 
Major2 (business)  .062 
(.96) 
 .020 
(.32) 
Major3 (psych)  .068 
(1.19) 
 .042 
(.76) 
Major4 (natural sciences & 
tech) 
 .018 
(.30) 
 -.004 
(-.06) 
Major5 (humanities & other 
social sciences) 
 .065 
(.88) 
 -.003 
(-.05) 
Major6 (pre-med)  .079 
(1.43) 
 -.033 
(-.60) 
Major7 (sociology)  .081 
(1.21) 
 .045 
(.67) 
N 506 505 524 523 
Adj R² .15 .27 .19 .29 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; Majors are dummy codes (Yes=1; No=0); 
Major 8 (other/ undecided) is the omitted comparison variable for college majors; Schwartz values were reverse coded and centered; 
For the centered Schwartz values, scores of 3 indicate “very much like me,” and -2 indicates “not at all like me” (positive scores 
signify that the value is more important); For the nonviolence index and militarism index, the score of 4 is most peaceful, and score of 
1 is least peaceful  
 
sociodemographic variables or the attitudinal and values orientation variables. The 
highest t-ratios, by far, are linked to the USA dummy variable. The negative betas show 
that US respondents had a less peaceful score (than CostaRicans) on the nonviolence 
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index (-.442 standard deviations lower) and a less peaceful score on the militarism index 
(-.368 standard deviations lower), and both of these differences were significant at the 
.001 level. Of course, when a Costa Rican dummy variable is substituted for the USA 
dummy variable, the t-ratios and betas remain the same except they all become positive, 
since Costa Rican respondents scored significantly more peacefully on these indexes.   
 Other significant relationships include the association between declining interest 
in politics and increases in peaceful scores on the Nonviolence Index. It seems those who 
value nonviolent methods tend to be somewhat turned off by politics. As for the Schwartz 
values, the most consistent finding across Models 1 and 2 is that CONFORMITY is 
associated with lower (less peaceful) scores on the Militarism Index. Many of the 
Schwartz values which are significant in Model 1 fall to insignificance when controlling 
for nation in Model 2. 
 As expected, those scoring high on the SDO scale (i.e., those who favor 
dominance) score lower (less peaceful) on the nonviolence index and the militarism 
index. Similarly, as expected, and corroborating numerous previous studies (e.g., Burris 
2008; Greeneet al. 1991, p.156; Listhaug 1986, p.75) on indicators of militarism/ hawkish 
attitudes, males and those who identify themselves as adherents of conservative (right) 
ideology are more likely to score low (less peaceful) on the militarism index. Somewhat 
surprisingly, these patterns did not apply to the nonviolence index. 
 To further delineate cross-national comparisons, the above regression models 
were repeated with the separate Costa Rican and U.S. samples while still testing the 
delimited nonviolence and militarism indexes. All of the Schwartz values were tested 
while entering into the models only eight values at a time (per recommendations, see 
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Schwartz 2011). Dummy variables for the three Costa Rican university campuses were 
added to the models, but none of these variables rose to significance. 
 The Costa Rican sample. When testing the delimited militarism index in the 
Costa Rican sample, only the centered Conformity value rose to significance at a .05 
level or greater, with a beta coefficient of -.23, and a t-ratio of -2.88 which is significant 
at the .01 level. The negative coefficient indicates that as Conformity scores increase, the 
nonviolence index scores become less peaceful. As discussed above, this may be because 
of the way Conformity is operationalized. It seems that the two items operationalizing 
“conformity” might tap an extreme form of conservativism including authoritarianism 
(see especially item #7 in Appendix M). In addition, the Self-Direction value is 
significant but only at the .1 level, with a beta of .14 and t-ratio of 1.73. As expected, the 
SDO variable was significant and in the predicted direction, with a beta coefficient of -
.17 and a t-ratio of -2.16, which is significant at the .05 level. The negative coefficient 
indicates that as SDO scores increased (i.e., dominance is favored rather than equality) 
scores on the nonviolence index decreased, becoming less peaceful. 
 When testing the delimited nonviolence index in the Costa Rican sample, only the 
centered Security value rose to significance, with a beta coefficient of .20, with a t-ratio 
of 2.19, significant at the .05 level. The positive coefficient indicates that higher scores 
on the Security value were associated with more peaceful scores on the nonviolence 
index. Again, this suggests those who value Security in Costa Rica are confident in the 
efficacy of nonviolent methods. As expected, the SDO variable was significant and in the 
predicted direction, with a beta coefficient of -.30, t-ratio of -3.63, significant at the .001 
level. The negative coefficient indicates that as SDO scores increased (i.e., dominance is 
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favored rather than equality) scores on the nonviolence index decreased, becoming less 
peaceful.  
 In the Costa Rican sample testing the nonviolence index, the only other 
significant variable in the models is more surprising. The left-right ideology variable had 
a beta coefficient of .20, with a t-ratio of 2.46, significant at the .05 level. The positive 
coefficient indicates that respondents who self-identified with more conservative/ right 
ideologies are associated with more peaceful scores on the nonviolence index. Hence, 
self-identifying conservatives in Costa Rica score higher on the nonviolence index. 
Contrary to our ad-hoc theorizing on the Conformity variable above, this suggests that 
Costa Rica’s peace culture is relatively deeply engrained, such that conservatives in this 
context favor nonviolent methods, which after all, are the traditional means in the Costa 
Rican context. In addition, it may be that leftists in the Costa Rican context are more 
open to forms of revolutionary violence, perhaps following revolutionary Latin American 
master images embodied by figures like Che Guevara.     
 The UO sample. When testing the delimited nonviolence index in the UO sample, 
only two variables rose to significance at the .05 level. First, the self-reported left-right 
ideology variable (Q29) had a beta of -.23, with a t-ratio of -3.56, significant at the .001 
level. The negative coefficient indicates that as conservative ideology increases, the 
nonviolence index scores become less peaceful. This finding is in the expected direction, 
especially in the U.S. context, but it is the opposite pattern of the Costa Rican sample. 
The second variable that rose to significance was the self-reported political interest 
variable (Q30), with a beta of .12, a t-ratio of 2.06, significant at the .05 level. The 
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positive coefficient indicates that as self-reported political interest decreases, scores on 
the nonviolence index become more peaceful.    
 When testing the delimited militarism index in the UO sample, only one variable 
rose to significance at the .05 level, the self-reported left-right ideology (Q29). The 
ideology variable had a beta of -.20, with a t-ratio of -3.09, significant at the .01 level. 
The negative coefficient indicates that as conservative ideology increases, the militarism 
index scores become less peaceful. The UNIVERSAISM value almost obtained 
significance at the .05 level, with a beta of .17, a t-ratio of 1.94, p=.054. The positive 
coefficient indicates that as the UNIVERSALISM value increased among respondents, 
the militarism index scores become more peaceful. In addition, the gender dummy 
variable (Q15) was significant, but only at the .1 level, with a beta of -.10, and a t-ratio of 
-1.72. The negative coefficient indicates that, as expected, males scored less peaceful on 
the militarism index. 
 
Testing the Nation-Specific Nonviolence and Militarism Indexes: UO Data 
 The nation-specific nonviolence and militarism indexes will now be tested, 
because versions of these appear in both Costa Rica and the U.S., and they represent 
attitude extremes, whereas the “Just War” and “Realpolitiks” Indexes probe the middle 
ground of violent/ nonviolent attitudes, and “realpolitiks” did not even emerge as a factor 
in the Costa Rica data. 
 Analysis of demographic indicators show that very few robustly predict scores on 
the nonviolence index. Sex was not a significant predictor at the .05 level, or even the .1 
level, when entered into the regression equation as the sole independent variable (not 
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depicted in the table above). Similarly, race and ethnicity (i.e., Hispanic/ Latino) were not 
significant predictors at the .05 level , or even the .1 level, as the following dummy 
variables were entered into the regression equation as the sole independent variables: 
white, nonwhite, black, and Hispanic. In the same way, class was not a significant 
predictor at the .05 level, or even the .1 level, when entered into the regression equation 
as the sole independent variable.  
 Similarly, most majors (not depicted above) were not significant predictors of 
nonviolence index scores. Majors were sorted into ten dummy codes: 1 (sociology), 2 
(psychology), 3 (pre-med), 4 (business), 5 (education), 6 (journalism), 7 (the arts), 8 
(other humanities, other social sciences, and pre-law), 9 (life sciences, natural/ earth 
sciences, and technology), and 10 (other/ undecided). Only major 4 (business) and major 
8 were significant predictors at the .05 level, in each case, they were associated with 
lower (less peaceful) scores on the nonviolence index. However, it is likely that codes 8 
and 9 should have been split up into more specific majors, but the number of dummy 
variables was already somewhat unwieldy. 
 As can be seen in Table 63 below, ideology and political party identification were 
significant predictors of scores on the nonviolence index. Those identifying with the 
Republican party and conservative ideology tended to have significantly lower (less 
peaceful) nonviolence index scores, and those identifying with the Democratic party 
tended to have significantly higher (more peaceful) nonviolence index scores. The 
political interest variable (Q30), with a t-ratio of 1.71, approached but did not obtain a .05 
level of significance. With a positive coefficient of .09, this tells us that as interest in 
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politics declines, nonviolent scores rise. Hence, it seems that adherents of nonviolence 
tend to be turned off by politics. 
Table 63. OLS Standardized Coefficients (betas) for Regression of Nonviolence Index on 
Independent Variables (UO Data) 
Independent variables Nonviolence Index 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model 
5 
Model 
6 
Model 
7 
Model 
8 
Model 9 
Male (Male=1; 
Female=0) 
-.02 
(-0.30) 
-.06 
(-1.07) 
-.05 
(-.99) 
-.08 
(-1.44) 
-.01 
(-.26) 
-.02 
(-.32) 
 .004 
(.07) 
.048 
(.05) 
White (white=1; 
nonwhite=0) 
.05 
(.96) 
.03 
(.58) 
.01 
(.28) 
.03 
(.51) 
.03 
(.49) 
.06 
(1.03) 
   
Class (Upper class=1; 
Lower class=5) 
.02 
(.46) 
-.02 
(-.28) 
.01 
(.21) 
.003 
(.05) 
-.001 
(-.02) 
.02 
(.30) 
   
Left-right ideology 
(Far left=1; Far 
right=5) 
-.32*** 
(-5.91) 
    -.31*** 
(-5.70) 
 -.19** 
(-3.29) 
-.208*** 
(.03) 
Political interest 
(Very interested=1; 
Not at all 
interested=4) 
.09 
(1.71) 
    .09 
(1.68) 
  .134* 
(.03) 
Republican (Yes=1; 
No=0) 
 -.23*** 
(-4.43) 
       
Democrat (Yes=1; 
No=0) 
  .19*** 
(3.58) 
      
Christian (Yes=1; 
No=0) 
   -.16** 
(-2.74) 
     
Religious Attendance 
(More than once a 
week=1; Never=5) 
   -.02 
(-.28) 
     
Attenders (Yes=1; 
No=0) 
        .078 
(.06) 
SDO (1=favor 
equality; 7=favor 
dominance) 
    -.20*** 
(-3.71) 
    
UO football fan 
(Yes=1; No=0) 
     -.12* 
(-2.15) 
 -.13* 
(-2.45) 
-.114* 
(.05) 
baseball fan (Yes=1; 
No=0) 
        -.118* 
(.07) 
King/ Parks listed as 
hero (Yes=1; No=0) 
        .118* 
(.05) 
Security       -.07 
(-1.16) 
  
Conformity       -.04 
(-.62) 
  
Tradition       -.09 
(-1.38) 
  
Benevolence       -.10 
(-1.58) 
  
Universalism       .18* 
(2.34) 
.18** 
(2.79) 
.17** 
(.04) 
Achievement       -.06 
(-.84) 
  
Power       -.12 
(-1.73) 
-.06 
(-.98) 
-.044 
(.03) 
Hedonism       .04 
(.51) 
  
N 319 349 349 343 343 317 346 313 312 
Adj R² .09 .05 .03 .02 .03 .10 .08 .12 .16 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; Schwartz values were reverse coded and 
centered; For the centered Schwartz values, scores of 3 indicate “very much like me,” and -2 indicates “not at all like me” (positive 
scores signify that the value is more important); For the nonviolence index, the score of 4 is most peaceful, and the score of 1 is least 
peaceful; see Appendix N for descriptions of dummy codes  
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 As a whole the religious variables were not significant predictors. The only 
significant predictor was the dummy variable (Q58) for Christian (see table above). 
However, “evangelical” almost obtains significance (at the .05 level) when substituting 
“evangelical” in place of the “Christian” variable in Model 4. In another version of 
Model 4, the “Christian” variable lost significance at the .05 level once Republican party 
identification was controlled for. Controlling for sex, race, and class, the following 
dummy variables did not obtain significance at the .05 level: religious (Q54), catholic 
(Q55), literalist (Q57), born again (Q60), and attenders (those claiming to attend religious 
services once a month or more, based on Q56).  
 Adding the variable “knowledgeable of nonviolent revolutions” (see Appendix N) 
to Model 8, increased the variance explained (Adj R²) from .1212 to .1249, but in this 
model, with a beta of .08, t-ratio of 1.51, and p= .131, the variable approaches the modest 
.1 level of significance. The positive beta tells us that those who have some knowledge of 
successful historical nonviolent revolutions, are associated with more peaceful scores on 
the nonviolence index. Of course, we should not oversimplify the causal connections 
here. Those who are open to or adhere to nonviolent beliefs and ideology, will probably 
be more likely to remember cases of successful nonviolent revolutions, and to retrieve 
them from memory. However, it is plausible that knowledge of successful nonviolent 
revolutions might push people towards more robust nonviolent beliefs.    
 As expected, higher SDO scores were associated with significantly lower (less 
peaceful) nonviolence index scores. Among the Schwartz values, only the Universalism 
value was a significant predictor, with higher Universalism scores associated with higher 
(more peaceful) nonviolence index scores. 
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 Interestingly, the “sports fan” dummy variable (those who answered “1” on Q50) 
was a significant predictor even after controlling for political ideology and political 
interest, as well as sex, race, and class. The negative beta of -.12 tells us that sports fans 
were associated with lower (less peaceful) scores on the nonviolence index. When SDO 
is substituted for the “sports fan” variable in Model 6, SDO performs almost identically 
as the “sports fan” variable and the overall model performs almost identically.  
 Also of interest, Model 8 explains the most variance in the nonviolence index. 
When pro baseball fan (discussed above) is substituted for UO football fan in Model 8, 
the beta, coefficient, t-score, p-value (level of significance), and Adjusted R-squared are 
all virtually identical. When SDO is substituted for the “sports fan” (UO football fan) 
variable in Model 8, SDO is insignificant, and the model explains 2% less variance (Adj 
R² = .10). And, when SDO is added to the set of variables in Model 8 depicted above, 
sports fan remains significant, while SDO is insignificant, and slightly less variance is 
explained (Adj R² = .11). Hence, when controlling for these particular variables, sports 
fan (UO football fan) is a more robust predictor than SDO.  
 In Table 64 below it is striking that Models 6 and 7 offer a greater amount of 
variance explained (Adj R²), yet among the 8 selected Schwartz values, again only 
UNIVERSALISM is a significant predictor. The parsimony of Model 6 also merits 
comment, as with only two highly significant variables, ideology and UO football fan, a 
relatively large amount of variance is explained. 
 Analysis of demographic indicators show that a few robustly predict scores on the 
Militarism Index. Sex was a significant predictor at the .05 level, when entered into the 
regression equation as the sole independent variable (not depicted in the table above) as 
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well asin Model 4. When entered as the sole independent variable, the “male” dummy 
variable had a beta of -.11, t-ratio of -2.18, p=.03. Hence, males had significantly lower 
(less peaceful) scores on the Militarism Index.  
 Analyzing race and ethnicity, the following dummy variables were entered into 
the regression equation as the sole independent variables in separate tests: white, 
nonwhite, black, and Hispanic. Of these, only the “white” variable achieved significance 
at even the modest .1 level. With a beta of .09, t-ratio of 1.66, and p=.097, “white” 
achieved significance at the .1 level. Of course, it must be kept in mind that the sample 
drew only from college students. Thus, for example, it may be that uneducated non-
whites would exhibit more peaceful attitudes. Burris (2008) found that non-whites have 
tended to hold more antiwar attitudes over recent decades. 
 Class was not a significant predictor at the .05 level, or even the .1 level, when 
entered into the regression equation as the sole independent variable. Similarly, when 
entered as the sole independent variables, most majors (not depicted above) were not 
significant predictors of militarism index scores. Only major 4 (business) and major 9 
(life/ natural/ earth sciences and technology) were significant predictors at the .05 level 
(not depicted above). Business majors were associated with lower (less peaceful) scores 
on the militarism index, significant at the .05 level, with a beta of -.11, t-ratio of -2.15, 
p=.03. Unexpectedly, major 9 was associated with more peaceful scores on the militarism 
index with a beta of .12, t-ratio of 2.32, and p=.02. It may be that the sample of major 9 
respondents were over-represented by students motivated to enter scientific fields out of 
ecological concerns (the UO has a strong environmental studies program), or by students 
planning to enter “helping professions” in various medical fields.   
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Table 64. OLS Standardized Coefficients (betas) for Regression of Militarism Index on 
Independent Variables (UO Data) 
Independent variables Militarism Index 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Male (Male=1; 
Female=0) 
-.07 
(-1.35) 
-.078 
(-1.51) 
-.08 
(-1.51) 
-.10* 
(-2.00) 
-.01 
(-.22) 
-.07 
(-1.37) 
 -.05 
(-.88) 
White (white=1; 
nonwhite=0) 
.10 
(1.96) 
.10 
(1.94) 
.07 
(1.40) 
.09 
(1.71) 
.10 
(1.82) 
.11* 
(2.03)  
 .07 
(1.27) 
Class (Upper class=1; 
Lower class=5) 
.05 
(.86) 
.02 
(.35) 
.04 
(.70) 
.03 
(.65) 
.02 
(.30) 
.04 
(.68) 
 -.03 
(-.56) 
Left-right ideology 
(Far left=1; Far 
right=5) 
-.33*** 
(-6.28) 
    -.32*** 
(-6.00) 
 -.16** 
(-2.72) 
Political interest 
(Very interested=1; 
Not at all 
interested=4) 
-.02 
(-.46) 
    -.029 
(-.56) 
  
Republican (Yes=1; 
No=0) 
 -.27*** 
(-5.16) 
      
Democrat (Yes=1; 
No=0) 
  .25*** 
(4.87) 
 
     
Christian (Yes=1; 
No=0) 
   -.29*** 
(-5.08) 
 
   -.07 
(-1.23) 
Religious Attendance 
(More than once a 
week=1; Never=5) 
   -.01 
(-.17) 
 
    
SDO (1=favor 
equality; 7=favor 
dominance) 
    -.29*** 
(-5.52) 
  -.15* 
(-2.48) 
UO football fan 
(Yes=1; No=0) 
     -.15** 
(-2.81) 
 -.11* 
(-2.14) 
Security       .02 
(.34) 
 
Conformity       -.05 
(-.76) 
 
Tradition       -.12 
(-1.90) 
-.12* 
(-2.24) 
Benevolence       .01 
(.19) 
 
Universalism       .35*** 
(4.58) 
.17* 
(2.60) 
Achievement       .008 
(.12) 
 
Power       .01 
(.19) 
 
Hedonism       .01 
(.17) 
 
N 318 349 349 344 342 316 348 292 
Adj R² .12 .08 .07 .08 .09 .14 .14 .21 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics (t-ratios of 2.0 or greater are generally significant); * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < 
.001; Schwartz values were reverse coded and centered; For the centered Schwartz values, scores of 3 indicate “very much like me,” 
and -2 indicates “not at all like me” (positive scores signify that the value is more important); For the militarism index, the score of 4 
is most peaceful, and the score of 1 is least peaceful; see Appendix N for descriptions of dummy codes  
 
 As can be seen in Table 64 above, ideology and political party identification were 
significant predictors of scores on the militarism index. Those identifying with the 
Republican party and conservative ideology tended to have significantly lower (less 
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peaceful) militarism index scores, and those identifying with the Democratic party tended 
to have significantly higher (more peaceful) militarism index scores.  
 As a whole the religious variables were significant predictors of militarism index 
scores. When substituting various religious dummy variables in place of “Christian” 
(Q58) in Model 4 (see table above), two are significant at the .05 level: evangelical (beta 
of -.15, t-ratio of -2.72, p= .007) and literalist (beta of -.135, t-ratio of -2.41, p= .017). 
Both of these variables indicate forms of conservative Christianity. Like the Christian 
variable, these two variables are associated with lower (less peaceful) scores on the 
militarism index. The Catholic, born again, attenders (the attendance variable was 
omitted in the iteration of Model 4 in which attenders was tested), and “religious” 
variables were not significant when substituted in Model 4. Also in separate regressions 
(not depicted above) controlling only for republican party identification, the following 
dummy variables remained significant predictors of militarism at the .05 level: Christian, 
evangelical, and literalist. In each case, these variables were associated with significantly 
lower (less peaceful) militarism index scores. When controlling for republican party 
identification, the following religious dummy variables were not significant at the .05 
level: religious, catholic, attenders (dummy variable of Q56), attendance (Q56), and born 
again. 
 Interestingly, in Model 6 the “sports fan” (UO football fan) dummy variable 
(those who answered “1” on Q50) was a significant predictor even after controlling for 
political ideology and political interest, as well as sex, race, and class. The negative beta 
of -.15 tells us that sports fans were associated with lower (less peaceful) scores on the 
militarism index. When the “athlete” dummy variable (Q48) was substituted for “sports 
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fan” in Model 6, “athlete” was not a significant predictor. Hence, it seems participation in 
sports is not associated with pro-militaristic attitudes, but being a sports fan is.  
 As expected, higher SDO scores were associated with significantly lower (less 
peaceful) militarism index scores. Among the Schwartz values, only the Universalism 
value was a significant predictor. The positive beta of .35 tells us that higher 
Universalism scores are associated with higher (more peaceful) militarism index scores. 
 Between-group differences in the nation-specific indexes. The most noteworthy 
differences in Table 65 below include political party and ideological orientations, as well 
as Christianity and some indicators of conservative Christianity, which were especially 
significant in militarism index scores. Again, Republicans and conservatives were 
significantly more pro-violent, Democrats and liberals were significantly more nonviolent 
in their attitudes. Christians, conservative Christians, sports fans, and business majors 
were significantly more pro-violent. Males were more pro-violent, but this was 
significant at the .05 level only on the militarism index. Compared with non-whites, 
whites were more nonviolent in militarism index scores, but only at the moderately 
significant .1 level.    
 Additional tests were conducted on the theories (detailed above) of sports as 
agents of socialization into tribalism and/ or violence. First, following Stempel’s (2006) 
theories of masculinity and spectator sports, respondents were asked to identify which 
sports, if any, and how often they watch particular sports on television or the internet 
(Q52). Second, respondents were asked about their participation in particular sports.  
 Stempel (2006) found the most significant effect (at the robust .001 level) of 
support for the Iraq War among fans of watching baseball. This is ironic because baseball 
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was not conceptualized as a “violent mimetic sport”/ hypermasculinist sport (p.88), since 
unlike football, it does not “dramatize direct physical domination” (p.96). Stempel makes 
sense of this finding by coding sports along racial lines, and baseball is coded as a 
relatively White sport. He also hypothesizes that baseball is more closely linked to a 
conservative mindset and what he calls “the strict-father morality” or “masculinist moral  
Table 65. Between-Group Differences: T-Tests of Indexes (UO Data) 
Dummy variable Nonviolence Index Militarism Index 
Difference Between Means (M(non-
dummy) – M(dummy) 
Difference Between Means (M(non-
dummy) – M(dummy) 
Male (vs. female) .06 .10** 
White (vs. non-white) -.01 -.09* 
Black (vs. non-black) .11 .09 
Hispanic -.03 -.03 
Upper classes .06 .08* 
Moderates and Conservatives .20**** .27**** 
Liberal -.22**** -.28**** 
Republican .26**** .28**** 
Democrat -.16**** -.24**** 
Politically interested -.006 -.07 
Knowledgeable of nonviolent revolutions -.13** -.16** 
Rural .02 .06 
Religious .06 .11** 
Christian .13*** .24**** 
Catholic .09 .09 
Evangelical .14* .23**** 
Born again .03 .11 
Literalist .02 .26*** 
Attenders .02 .10* 
Military parents .03 -.03 
Athlete (Q48) .004 .08 
High School football player .06 .14** 
High School baseball/ softball player .10 .16*** 
Sports fan (UO football fan; Q50) .12** .16*** 
Pro baseball fan .26**** .16** 
NFL football fan .10* .13** 
Major 1: Sociology -.08 .03 
Major 2: Psych -.06 -.10 
Major 3: Pre-med .006 .08 
Major 4: Business .15** .13** 
Major 5: Education -.07 .01 
Major 6: Journalism -.03 .01 
Major 7: Arts -.16* -.09 
Major 8: Other humanities .12* .002 
Major 9: Natural sciences .02 -.22** 
Major 10: Undecided/ other -.19 -.03 
 
Notes: * = p< .1; ** = p < .05; *** = p < .01; **** = p < .001; for each dummy variable, robvar tests were first conducted in STATA 
to determine if variances were unequal; In cases of unequal variances between groups, t-tests specified “unequal” variances; In the 
difference between means columns above, a negative difference indicates the dummy variable has a larger mean, and hence, the 
dummy group (e.g., for the nonviolence index these include: white, Hispanic, liberal, Democrat) scores more peaceful on the index; a 
positive difference indicates the non-dummy variable has a larger mean, and hence, the non-dummy group (e.g., for the nonviolence 
index these include: female, non-black, non-Republican, non-Christian) scores more peaceful on the index; see Appendix N for 
descriptions of dummy codes 
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capital” (p.99). Stempel also found significant effects (at the .01 level) for supporting the 
Iraq War among respondents watching NFL, college football, NASCAR (National 
Association for Stock Car Auto Racing), and tennis. The latter finding could be related to 
the fact that Stempel did not control for income (i.e., wealthier folks – in addition to 
being more likely to be hawkish and Republican, are probably bigger fans of tennis). The 
present survey has a much smaller sample size than Stempel’s nationally representative 
sample, so results are only suggestive. Similarly, the cell sizes for NASCAR andtennis 
are too small to analyze in the present study. But larger cell sizes make it possible to track 
the following groups: 48 respondents (12.4% of the sample) claimed to “often” watch 
Major League Baseball, and 109 respondents (28% of the sample) claimed to “often” 
watch NFL football. 
 In the present survey of UO students, NFL fans and pro baseball fans did score 
significantly (each at the .05 level) less peaceful on the Militarism Index. Interestingly, of 
all the spectator and participation sports variables, baseball fans have the largest effect on 
the Nonviolence Index, with baseball fans scoring significantly less peaceful (at the 
robust .001 level) on this index. This finding corroborates what Stempel (2006) found on 
baseball fans and support for the Iraq War. Again, baseball fandom seems to be a proxy 
indicator conservative political leanings. 
 When females are dropped from the sample and only males are compared, 
baseball fans remain significantly less peaceful (at the .05 level) on the Nonviolence 
Index (p=.0366), but there was no significant difference for NFL fans versus non-fans on 
the Nonviolence Index. When the sample is limited to males, baseball fan is not 
significantly associated with Militarism Index scores (at the .05 level), but NFL fans are 
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less peaceful on the Militarism Index and the difference (.13) with non-fans approaches 
significance at the .05 level (p=.0552). Also just comparing males, there was no 
significant difference between fans of baseball or the NFL on the Interpersonal Violence 
Index, respectively.  
 Hence, some of Stempel’s results were supported in the present study. The 
significant associations between violent ideological leanings and baseball fandom as well 
as the UO football fan variable offers some support for Stempel’s (2006) findings as well 
as Chomsky’s theories of a spectator sport-tribalism link. The differences between the 
Stempel study and the present one merit comment. Stempel tracked a nationwide sample 
and probed for degree of involvement in watching sports on TV. The present sample 
replicated Stempel’s sports fan indicators but also tested the relatively unique experience 
of being a football fan for the number one college team in the nation, while attending the 
school. If any spectator sport experience could generate “tribalism,” this may be one of 
the best candidates. The sporting rituals (“collective effervescence” in Durkheim’s 
phrase) occur each week throughout the fall term. If students are unable to obtain free 
tickets to the games, many of them are still likely to watch the games on TV, in bars, 
dorms, or apartments. In fact, Lindo, Swensen, and Waddell (2012) found that during the 
2010 UO football season, only 10 percent of female UO students and an even lower 
percentage of males reported watching zero UO football games. Moreover, “Some 40 
percent of females watched 10 or more games out of 12, while over 50 percent of males 
watched 10 or more games” (p.257). 
 Of course, it is difficult to disentangle causes and effects, and to discern to what 
degree particular personality types are drawn to the football fan experience, to what 
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degree the experience of being/ becoming a football fan cultivates tribal or aggressive 
impulses, and to what degree this might “spillover” into other attitudes at least 
tangentially related to aggression and in-group/ out-group issues such as nonviolence/ 
militarism, and the hawk-dove continuum on foreign policy.       
 If spectatorship of sports, or certain kinds of sports, can cultivate forms of 
tribalism, it seems that participation in certain sports might socialize people in similar 
ways. Q48 asked respondents if they were an athlete in high school. Q49 asked them to 
specify which sports they played. Above, we see that athletes did not score significantly 
different on the Nonviolence Index or the Militarism Index. Sixty-five respondents (19% 
of the sample) said they played football in high school. This group scored less peaceful 
on the Militarism Index, and it was significant at the .05 level. An additional test (not 
depicted above) showed that football players were much less peaceful on the 
Interpersonal Violence Index, and the .23 difference between means was significant at the 
robust .0001 level.   
 However, when females are dropped from the sample and males who played 
football are compared with other males, there are no significant differences on the 
Militarism, Nonviolence, or Interpersonal Violence indexes at the .05 level. Thus, 
controlling for gender, the experience of playing football in high school was certainly not 
significant in the sample. But the sample size is relatively small and the effect of playing 
football among non-college attendees, or even other majors on campus, could be 
different. 
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Testing the Nation-Specific Nonviolence and Militarism Indexes: Costa Rica Data 
 Below in Table 66, the results for ULatina are not surprising since the primary 
majors sampled from there were physics, engineering, and computer science. Similarly, 
the primary major sampled from at UCR was sociology. The primary majors sampled 
from at U Hispanoamericana were pre-med and psychology. 
Table 66. Between-Group Differences: T-Tests of Indexes (Costa Rica Data) 
Dummy variable Nonviolence Index Militarism Index 
Difference Between Means (M(non-
dummy) – M(dummy) 
Difference Between Means (M(non-
dummy) – M(dummy) 
Male (vs. female)  .22****  .24**** 
White (vs. non-white) -.01  .08 
Mestizo (vs. white)  .0007 -.10 
Upper classes  .07  .14** 
Liberal  .11 -.31**** 
Politically interested  .10* -.13** 
Knowledgeable of nonviolent 
revolutions 
.05 -.07 
PLN party -.02  .12 
PAC party -.07 -.17** 
Religious -.15**  .20*** 
Catholic -.13**  .06 
Evangelical  .14*  .36**** 
Attenders -.16***  .09 
UCR  .08 -.31**** 
U Latina  .008  .30**** 
U Hispanoamericana -.18***  .03 
Major 1: law -.19 -.008 
Major 2: business -.11 -.02 
Major 3: psych -.06 -.02 
Major 4: physics  .23  .34** 
Major 5: engineer  .03  .24** 
Major 6: comp sci  .04  .32*** 
Major 7: pre-med -.15**  .05 
Major 8: sociology  .07 -.38**** 
Major 9: other/ undecided  .20  .29 
 
Notes: * = p< .1; ** = p < .05; *** = p < .01; **** = p < .001; for each dummy variable, robvar tests were first conducted in STATA 
to determine if variances were unequal; In cases of unequal variances between groups, t-tests specified “unequal” variances; In the 
difference between means columns above, a negative difference indicates the dummy variable has a larger mean, and hence, the 
dummy group (e.g., for the nonviolence index these include: the religious, Catholic, attenders, pre-med majors, etc.) scores more 
peaceful on the index; a positive difference indicates the non-dummy variable has a larger mean, and hence, the non-dummy group 
(e.g., for the nonviolence index these include: females, non-liberals, the politically uninterested, and non-evangelicals) scores more 
peaceful on the index; for the Mestizo variable the non-dummy category was whites (racial minorities were coded as “missing” on this 
variable only); see Appendix N for descriptions of dummy codes 
 
 It is interesting that there is no significant left-right/ liberal-conservative gap in 
the Nonviolence Index, but in the Militarism Index a significant gap emerges with 
liberals scoring more peacefully on the Militarism Index. Another surprising flip-flop is 
that the non-religious are significantly more peaceful on the Militarism Index, but the 
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Religious are significantly more peaceful in the Nonviolence Index. Similarly, the 
“politically interested” score significantly more peaceful on the Militarism Index, but on 
the Nonviolence Index they score marginally lesspeaceful (with a difference that is 
significant at only the .1 level). Hence, it seems those inclined to adhere to nonviolence 
tend to be politically uninterested and religious. But the politically interested and non-
religious in Costa Rica are more suspicious of militarism. 
 Below in Table 67, the most significant negative predictors of Nonviolence Index 
scores are gender (with males scoring less peacefully) and SDO scores (with high SDO 
scores associated with less peaceful Nonviolence Index scores). The most significant 
positive predictors of Nonviolence Index scores were the SECURITY value type. The 
“religious” variable was not significant at even the modest .1 level when substituted for 
Catholic in Model 2. The political party dummy variables, PLN and PAC, were not 
significant predictors at the .05 level, or even the .1 level, when entered into the 
regression equation as the sole independent variable (not depicted in the table above). 
 Below in Table 68, we see that the most significant negative predictors of 
Militarism Index scores are gender (with males scoring less peacefully) , SDO scores 
(with high SDO scores associated with less peaceful Nonviolence Index scores), left-right 
ideology (with conservatives/ right-wingers scoring less peacefully), and the 
CONFORMITY value type (with conformists scoring less peacefully). The most 
significant positive predictors of Militarism Index scores are the value types of 
UNIVERSALISM and SELF-DIRECTION.  
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Table 67. OLS Standardized Coefficients (betas) for Regression of Nonviolence Index on 
Independent Variables (Costa Rica Data) 
Independent variables Nonviolence Index 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Male (Male=1; 
Female=0) 
-.25*** 
(-3.62) 
-.23** 
(-3.16) 
-.22** 
(-3.14) 
-.16* 
(-2.33) 
  -.14* 
(-2.37) 
-.12 
(-1.82) 
White (white=1; non-
white=0) 
.01 
(.15) 
.03 
(.37) 
.04 
(.50) 
.04 
(.54) 
    
Class (Upper class=1; 
Lower class=5) 
-.01 
(-.16) 
-.03 
(-.47) 
-.03 
(-.40) 
-.03 
(-.41) 
    
Left-right ideology (Far 
left=1; Far right=5) 
.10 
(1.36) 
.003 
(.04) 
.01 
(.15) 
.18* 
(2.58) 
   .19** 
(2.63) 
Political interest (Very 
interested=1; Not at all 
interested=4) 
.08 
(1.11) 
.05 
(.64) 
.06 
(.78) 
.05 
(.74) 
    
Catholic (Yes=1; No=0)  .07 
(.94) 
      
Religious Attendance 
(More than once a 
week=1; Never=5) 
 -.08 
(-.99) 
-.13 
(-1.64) 
     
Evangelical (Yes=1; 
No=0) 
  -.12 
(-1.56) 
     
SDO (1=favor equality; 
7=favor dominance) 
   -.33*** 
(-4.68) 
  -.31*** 
(-4.61) 
-.33*** 
(-4.38) 
Security     .20** 
(2.93) 
.24*** 
(3.53) 
.19** 
(3.24) 
.18** 
(2.79) 
Conformity     -.07 
(-.91) 
   
Tradition     .12 
(1.72) 
.17* 
(2.44) 
.13* 
(2.19) 
.11 
(1.56) 
Benevolence     -.003 
(-.04) 
   
Universalism     .13 
(1.45) 
.19** 
(2.89) 
.03 
(.36) 
.05 
(.61) 
Achievement     .12 
(1.56) 
.15* 
(2.27) 
.09 
(1.49) 
.09 
(1.32) 
Power     -.08 
(-1.00) 
   
Hedonism     -.02 
(-.30) 
   
Self-Direction      .10 
(1.54) 
 .11 
(1.63) 
Stimulation      .007 
(.10) 
  
N 207 194 194 206 261 261 259 213 
Adj R² .06 .04 .05 .15 .08 .08 .19 .20 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; Schwartz values 
were reverse coded and centered; For the centered Schwartz values, scores of 3 indicate “very much like 
me,” and -2 indicates “not at all like me” (positive scores signify that the value is more important); For the 
nonviolence index, the score of 4 is most peaceful, and the score of 1 is least peaceful; see Appendix N for 
descriptions of dummy codes  
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Table 68. OLS Standardized Coefficients (betas) for Regression of Militarism Index on 
Independent Variables (Costa Rica Data) 
Independent variables Militarism Index 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Male (Male=1; 
Female=0) 
-.25*** 
(-4.02) 
-.28*** 
(-4.25) 
-.27*** 
(-4.05) 
-.16* 
(-2.55) 
  -.12* 
(-2.14) 
-.13* 
(-2.23) 
White (white=1; non-
white=0) 
-.08 
(-1.21) 
-.08 
(-1.28) 
-.07 
(-1.13) 
-.06 
(-.95) 
    
Class (Upper class=1; 
Lower class=5) 
-.02 
(-.27) 
-.05 
(-.68) 
-.03 
(-.53) 
-.06 
(-.94) 
    
Left-right ideology (Far 
left=1; Far right=5) 
-.27*** 
(-4.07) 
-.21** 
(-2.91) 
-.20** 
(-2.90) 
-.18** 
(-2.91) 
   -.06 
(-.88) 
Political interest (Very 
interested=1; Not at all 
interested=4) 
-.07 
(-1.11) 
-.07 
(-1.07) 
-.07 
(-1.07) 
-.09 
(-1.51) 
    
Catholic (Yes=1; No=0)  .01 
(.14) 
      
Religious Attendance 
(More than once a 
week=1; Never=5) 
 .11 
(1.49) 
.06 
(.88) 
     
Evangelical (Yes=1; 
No=0) 
  -.15* 
(-2.19) 
    -.16** 
(-2.77) 
SDO (1=favor equality; 
7=favor dominance) 
   -.36*** 
(-5.57) 
  -.33*** 
(-5.31) 
-.37*** 
(-5.34) 
Security     -.10 
(-1.49) 
-.03 
(-.44) 
-.07 
(-1.31) 
-.09 
(-1.42) 
Conformity     -.33*** 
(-4.91) 
-.23** 
(-3.41) 
-.20** 
(-3.24) 
-.19** 
(-2.94) 
Tradition     -.067 
(-1.02) 
   
Benevolence     .057 
(-.82) 
   
Universalism     .11 
(1.23) 
.17* 
(2.37) 
.04 
(.57) 
-.05 
(-.58) 
Achievement     -.05 
(-.76) 
   
Power     -.12 
(-1.51) 
-.04 
(-.64) 
.03 
(.54) 
.02 
(.34) 
Hedonism     -.10 
(-1.27) 
   
Self-Direction      .14* 
(2.20) 
.15* 
(2.48) 
.17* 
(2.42) 
Stimulation      -.006 
(-.09) 
  
N 219 205 205 218 275 275 272 209 
Adj R² .14 .13 .16 .24 .15 .17 .29 .34 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; Schwartz values 
were reverse coded and centered; For the centered Schwartz values, scores of 3 indicate “very much like 
me,” and -2 indicates “not at all like me” (positive scores signify that the value is more important); For the 
militarism index, the score of 4 is most peaceful, and the score of 1 is least peaceful; see Appendix N for 
descriptions of dummy codes  
 
RESPONDENT HEROES AND VIOLENT/ NONVIOLENT IDEOLOGY 
 Psycho-social theorists Otto Rank and Ernest Becker conceived of societies as 
“codified hero-systems or as symbolic action systems that produce, distribute and 
circulate statuses and customs in order to cope with human fears of death or extreme 
otherness” (West 1999, p.264). Rank, who builds on and transcends Freudian 
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psychology, understood myth as “wish fulfillment,” and in and through myths entire 
cultures sought to “create a second womb” or “womblike ideal,” i.e., a future paradise or 
the recreation of a primal paradise (Segal 2004, p.xxiii). For Rank, the true cultural hero 
is the artist, “the one who in religion, art, or philosophy creates ‘sublime wish 
compensations’ for the lingering frustrations of life...” (p.xxiv). Here, it is worth noting 
that artists were scarcely mentioned as admired heroes from U.S. history in the open-
ended survey question, though this likely reflects conventional associations of “history” 
with political figures, a notion strongly fostered by history textbooks. Building on Rank, 
it seems that cultural myths, whether religious or quasi-religious, and historical narratives 
can at least approach functional equivalence, as in Bellah’s (1967) concept of the “civil 
religions” of nation-states. In order to explore U.S. and Costa Rican cultures as “codified 
hero-systems,” we will analyze the lists of national heroes provided by respondents.  
 While the Gallup Poll has long conducted regular surveys of who the most 
admired Americans are, the present survey allows us to analyze how the personal heroes 
listed by respondents relates to other values and attitudes. I will argue that the listing of 
some heroes clearly reflects hegemonic U.S. public school socialization with its 
laudatory, superficial and one-dimensional portraits of presidents and non-controversial 
figures. Of course, given that the elite quotes section preceded this hero question, we 
must consider that the U.S. moral and political elites quoted (President Obama, Dr. King, 
Dwight Eisenhower, George W. Bush, and Einstein) were certainly “cued” for mention in 
this later section.  
 In the U.S. school system, racial issues are discussed, but labor and class struggles 
are systematically omitted or glossed over (Loewen 1995, Shanker Institute 2010). 
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Hence, heroes of the struggle for racial justice readily appear in the lists of respondents – 
Dr. King, Rosa Parks, Harriet Tubman, and Malcolm X. But respondents did not list 
figures from the U.S. labor movement struggles or class conflict struggles, though a 
handful of respondents listed wealthy tycoons like Andrew Carnegie, Phil Knight, and 
Warren Buffet who each received one vote.  
 As we will see below, the frequency with which Rosa Parks is mentioned prompts 
reflection. Martin Luther King, Jr., who was well grounded in Hegel’s philosophy of 
history, seems to have viewed Rosa Parks, as well as himself as filling the roles of 
“world-Historical Individuals” who have been “caught up by the Zeitgeist” and move 
history through a new dialectical development (Baker-Fletcher 1993, p.92). It is worth 
considering the relatively small, in some ways symbolic, role Parks played in the Civil 
Rights movement.  Parks was in many ways a wise and gracious figure, deeply religious, 
but she is almost never given voice in textbooks (i.e., she is almost never quoted). Her 
rise to vaulted status as a major heroine almost calls for a Jungian analysis (e.g., Ulanov 
1971), as if the collective conscience was yearning for an archetypal feminine figure. Her 
more frequent listing by female respondents might push us towards similar 
interpretations.  
 Like Gandhi’s movements in South Africa and India (e.g., Chabot and Vinthagen 
2007), many lessons from the U.S. civil rights movement can cautiously inform 
theoretical generalizations about nonviolent action (e.g., Andrews 2002, McAdam and 
Tarrow 2000, McAdam 1999, McAdam 1983, Morris 1993). But as Eddy (2012) has 
argued, the universe of possible lessons becomes sharply reduced through the playing out 
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of collective memory processes. With the single exception of Dr. King, few U.S. civil 
rights leaders are referenced in public discourse (Polletta 1998).  
 Thus, it seems that social movement templates often obtain “stickiness” in the 
collective memory by virtue of their attachment to charismatic leaders (Eddy 2012). This 
is not surprising given that memory templates need “sponsors” to live on in collective 
memory (Fine and McDonnell 2007, p.176), and charismatic and influential leaders often 
attract such sponsors long after they have passed from the scene. Schwartz (2009) argues 
that this process illustrates “oneness,” society’s need for personified ideals. A case in 
point is the following quote by a scholar who has written, “Three principles of civil 
disobedience: Thoreau, Gandhi, and King” (Gier 2013).  
 Whether discussed in terms of a persistent “great man/ woman” view of history or 
the cultural resonance achieved by cults of personality, it is unclear if social movements 
lacking a clear moral and ideological leader with almost messianic expectations attached 
to them can be long preserved in collective memory (Eddy 2012). It seems we may be 
“stuck” with memory templates attached to charismatic leaders.   
 Indeed, a recent sample of U.S. college students today can come up with 
organizational names, even if we spot them some of the key acronyms of the civil rights 
movement: CORE, SCLC, and SNCC. Of course, these are the Congress of Racial 
Equality (CORE), the Southern Christian Leadership Council (SCLC), and the Student 
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). In October of 2011, the author conducted a 
survey utilizing a convenience sample of UO students enrolled in a lower division 
sociology course (all of whom attended high school in the U.S., mostly in Oregon and 
California). At the end of a class period, students (n=118) were given the 3 acronyms 
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above and asked to identify the full names of these organizations and their significance in 
U.S. history. Eleven students (9.3% of the sample) could place the organizations in the 
civil rights era, but only 5 (4.2% of the sample) could identify one or more of the 
organizational names (Eddy 2012).  
 Below we will see that 32.5% of the same sample (the same class, surveyed a few 
weeks earlier) had claimed Dr. King as a hero. Yet the vast majority were unable to 
provide the name of Dr. King’s SCLC organization, suggesting that most students 
actually know very little about Dr. King’s biography. In addition, the survey suggests that 
history is not taught or remembered in terms of organizations. We should recall that 
SNCC also had notable leaders like Stokely Carmichael and Diane Nash, though SNCC’s 
slogan was “We are all leaders.”  
 Perhaps, to some degree, we are hardwired to organize and remember narratives 
attached to personalities – suggesting a provocative link to the Boston Personalism that 
deeply influenced Dr. King (Baker-Fletcher 1993). In the late 1950s King (1958) wrote, 
Boston Personalism’s theory that “the clue to the meaning of ultimate reality is found in 
personality…remains today my basic philosophical position” (p.100). In Boston 
Personalism, a theological position developed  by several scholars at the University of 
Boston while Dr. King was a doctoral student there, God was conceptualized as “Infinite 
or ‘Absolute’ Personality,” or “the complete and perfect personality” (Baker-Fletcher 
1993, p.63). For Dr. King, this grounded a robust notion of human dignity.       
 But the disappearance of organizations from collective memory leaves us with 
memory templates that distort how it is social movements, organizations and traditions, 
not individuals alone, who create social change. Consider for example that even where 
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Dr. King seems to act alone – as in giving speeches, a network of activists collaborated 
with him and supported him. Dr. King’s important speech “Beyond Vietnam” (also called 
“A Time to Break Silence”) was written by a team of writers including Vincent Harding, 
an African-American and member of the Mennonite Church, a traditional peace church 
(Smiley 2011).        
 Preoccupations with celebrity are routinely scorned by many intellectuals. 
Consider this quote by Admiral Hyman Rickover (“father” of America’s nuclear navy): 
“Great minds discuss ideas, average minds discuss events, small minds discuss people.” 
Chris Hedges (2009) is particularly trenchant in his critique of the modern cult of 
celebrity as he writes, “Celebrity worship banishes reality” (p.22); “Human beings 
become a commodity in celebrity culture” (p.29); “This cult of distraction...masks the 
real disintegration of culture” (p.38); “Celebrity culture has bequethed to us... ‘junk 
politics.’ Junk politics does not demand justice...It personalizes and moralizes issues 
rather than clarifying them” (p.47).  
 Yet, Hedges’ analysis of the dark side of this obsession with personality helps to 
illuminate the sharp distinctions which can be drawn between celebrities and moral 
exemplars. The early 20th century sociologist Jane Addams argued that exposure to moral 
exemplars, like Tolstoy and Gandhi, should be a basic element of education, a way to 
cultivate what Alexis de Tocqueville termed the pro-social “habits of the heart” (Elshtain 
2002b, p.377).     
 It is inevitable that heroes become used and even co-opted as they are interpreted 
through the lenses of group-based agenda in the present (Inwood 2009).For example, 
nonviolent adherents like Tolstoy, Gandhi, and King interpreted Jesus’s message in the 
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terms of nonviolence and liberation, while the Protestant Reformation leader Martin 
Luther saw in Jesus grounds for “just war” doctrine, but no grounds for a “just 
revolution” (Pelikan, 1985, p.171; see also chapters 14 and 17). Polletta (1998) found that 
U.S. politicians invoke King on both sides of contested issues, but all tend to invoke only 
the “early King.” 
 Contradictions abound in our highly selective use of heroes. Consider that a 
portrait of Dr. King hangs in a dining hall of the infamous U.S. military prison in 
Guantanamo, Cuba (Sims 2012, p.61). In January of 2013, the U.S. Marine Corps posted 
a tweet on their official site: “A man who won’t die for something is not fit to live. - 
Martin Luther King Jr.” (Greenwald 2013). Similarly, a top Pentagon lawyer, at a 2011 
ceremony commemorating the King holiday, argued that King would support the U.S. 
wars on terror (Greenwald 2013). A 2013 web posting from the US Air Force’s Global 
Strike Team claimed Dr. King would be “proud” of the team’s possession of the“most 
powerful weapons in the US arsenal” and the multiracial, multicultural composition of 
the team (Greenwald 2013). By contrast, during his life King said, “When scientific 
power outruns moral power, we end up with guided missiles and misguided men. ... the 
destructive power of modern weapons eliminates even the possibility that war may serve 
any good at all” (cited in Maynard and Carrigan 2013, p.A7).  
 In all of these example, we see once again that “ideology has no history,” and 
ideology leads social claims makers to drop famous names without wrestling with their 
biographies. In the same way, Eddy (2012) found that transnational human rights activists 
in Israel-Palestine drew upon distinct memory templates of Gandhi and King depending 
on whether they adhered to principled or pragmatic nonviolent ideological orientations. 
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In keeping with their ideological convictions, the latter were likely to gloss over Gandhi 
and King’s emphasis on strict nonviolent discipline, overcoming hatred, seeking trust and 
reconciliation (Eddy 2012, Eddy forthcoming).  
 Parks is not history reduced to biography (i.e., the great man/ woman view of 
history), or a speech (as King is so often reduced to his “I Have a Dream” speech), she is 
history reduced to a gesture – her refusal to move to the back of the bus. She is almost 
never given voice in high school history textbooks, almost never quoted. As a narrative 
device, shining a light on her initial single act of refusal, enables historians to neglect the 
381 days of the bus boycott in which all of Montgomery’s black citizens made enormous 
sacrifices. And, it is just too much that, among American students today, the most 
frequently cited female hero is silent, reduced to a gesture, not given voice. It is shocking 
how few females were listed as admired heroes of U.S. history. Predictably, U.S. 
presidents dominated student lists.  
 When Cornel West, a leading African-American intellectual and populist of our 
time, limits his list of heroes to two, he typically says Dr. King and Fannie Lou Hamer. It 
is telling that other black female civil rights leaders who were trailblazing activists, and 
who arguably took more risks than Parks, and who, as spokespeople for the cause 
articulated the salient issues of the day more completely like Ella Baker, Fannie Lou 
Hamer, or Diane Nash are not remembered by students. In this sense, and with incredible 
irony, it seems listing Parks as a hero, since it likely stems from superficial textbook 
portraits of her (in which she is reduced to a gesture), is a very unParks-like thing to do, 
because Parks was about civil disobedience, about saying “No!” to the system in the 
name of a higher morality and higher ideals. Hence, as a hero she becomes the opposite 
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of what she stood for in life. She is co-opted, praised in the process of not questioning, 
not asking, who are the heroes who are too controversial to be included?Or, asking, what 
about the real Parks might be too controversial to be included in mainstream textbooks 
today – why is she almost never given voice (never quoted) in the texts? In some ways, 
she is the ideal symbol because she can be reduced to an uncomplicated gesture.   
 Lifting her up as a hero hides the organizations that she worked in and through. 
The textbooks do not tell us she was one of the first women in Montgomery to join the 
NAACP and served as its secretary for many years (Kohl 1995). Listing Parks as a hero 
(or Dr. King or any other number of other figures as well), at least, if it is done without 
richer knowledge of her biography than that provided in textbooks, risks becoming an act 
of deep conformity rather than any challenge to injustice.  
 Which brings us to an important issue regarding nonviolent action and collective 
memory. A bronze statue of Rosa Parks placed outside the downtown Eugene, Oregon 
city bus station well illustrates some of the challenges nonviolent action faces in 
competing for space in collective memory. For centuries, Western cultures have 
commemorated their heroes, very often soldiers holding sabers or guns, in statues placed 
up on high pedestals. As viewers had to look up, the symbolism was clear – these figures 
represented “lofty” virtues and “high” ideals. The Parks statue in Eugene is flat on the 
sidewalk. She is seated, as she was on the bus in Montgomery, Alabama. Children can 
look her in the eye or sit in her lap. Adult passersby look down upon her statue. Kohl 
(1995) sounds a relevant note here as he questions the tendency for textbooks and school 
children to refer to her, unlike other heroes and historical figures, by first name: Rosa 
(p.34, p.40). In the context of white supremacy’s legacy (in which black adults were often 
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called by their first names as a mark of their inferior status (pp.40-41), Kohl is right to 
express ambivalence about this. Yet, we must recognize too that heroes are the target of 
psychological projections even as they meet human needs – and Parks as a female 
heroine, may take on motherly projections in the patriarchal context of stern, hegemonic 
masculinist fathers.  
 From another but related angle, Parks’ statue may embody the utterly ordinary 
nature of nonviolence – and in this sense is nonviolence well represented, though 
problematic. Because at the very historical juncture when it first becomes possible to 
celebrate and commemorate a black woman in a public statue in the United States, why 
this sudden transition to eye-level heroes? If our official national heroes are finally now 
allowed to come from the ranks of the cultural underdogs (and moral giants) from the 
margins, perhaps we should put our heroes up on high pedestals for a few more centuries. 
The danger in viewing nonviolence as so mundane is that it fosters ignorance of its power 
and fosters the forgetting of its role. Rather than framing nonviolence as an alternative, 
more fully human, more ethical, more cosmopolitan means of conflict resolution which 
addresses our deep needs for security without harming others, nonviolence becomes 
unremarkable, unexplained conventional action (i.e., she simply refused to move to the 
back of the bus), and since it is under-theorized its power and potential is neglected or 
misunderstood.  
 Critical analysts of school textbooks have detected structural biases which seem 
to shape the selection and presentation of historical narratives. The selection and framing 
of the Montgomery Bus Boycott may be partly linked to the “happy ending” and the 
ready-made assertion that progress was made (this seems to be a requirement before 
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delving into the history of racism (Loewen (1995) also notes this pattern that U.S. history 
is a march of progress in the presentation of, and omissions in, textbook narratives of 
Jackie Robinson) and the narrative is also assumed to be more compelling because credit 
can be given to two individuals, Rosa Parks and Dr. King, rather than social movement 
organizations (Kohl 1995).    
 Since female respondents comprise over half (58%) of the sample (which was 
58% female, 42% male), an analysis of the proportions of listed heroes by respondent 
gender is helpful. When broken down by gender, the listing of Rosa Parks as a hero takes 
on additional significance. Parks was primarily listed by female respondents as seen in 
Table 69 below. But Dr. King also was more likely to be listed by females. Overall, 
52.76% (210 out of 398) of thesample listed Dr. King as a hero, while 12.56% (50 out of 
398) listed Rosa Parks as a hero. We can see in Table 69 above that only 6 (or 12%) of 
the 50 people who listed Rosa Parks as a hero were male respondents. Thus, the vast 
Table 69. Crosstabs: Heroes of U.S. History by Respondent Gender  
 
Q42 Heroes Males Females Total 
Other heroes listed 40 
67.80 
(24.10) 
19 
32.20 
(8.19) 
59 
100.00 
(14.82) 
“Don’t Know” 55 
44.72 
(33.13) 
68 
55.28 
(29.31) 
123 
100.00 
(30.90) 
Martin Luther King, Jr. listed 65 
39.16 
(39.16) 
101 
60.84 
(43.53) 
166 
100.00 
(41.71) 
Rosa Parks listed 0 
0 
(0) 
6 
100.00 
(2.59) 
6 
100.00 
(1.51) 
King & Parks listed 6 
13.64 
(3.61) 
38 
86.36 
(16.38) 
44 
100.00 
(11.06) 
Total 166 
41.71 
(100.00) 
232 
58.29 
(100.00) 
398 
100.00 
(100.00) 
Notes: Frequency count, Row %, (Column %); Q42 was open-ended. “Other heroes listed” represents respondents who 
listed heroes that did not include King or Parks. “King & Parks listed” represents respondents who included both King 
and Parks in their list of heroes. 
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majority, 44 (or 88%) of the 50people listing Rosa Parks as a hero were female 
respondents. Meanwhile, of the 210 people listing King as a hero, 139 (or 66.19%) were 
females, and 71 (or 33.81%) were males. Among female respondents, 139 (or 59.91%) of 
232 females listed King as a hero, and 44(or 18.97%) of 232 females listed Rosa Parks as 
a hero. Among male respondents, 71 (42.77%) of 166 males listed King as a hero, and 6 
(or 3.61%) of 166 males listed Rosa Parks as a hero. In addition, of the people who listed 
“other heroes” (not including King or Parks), 67.8% were males, and 32.20% were 
females. Hence, Dr. King and especially Rosa Parks were listed as heroes much more 
frequently by female respondents, while males tended to list other heroes.  
 Another surprising insight is that only about 15% of respondents listed heroes 
without including King or Rosa Parks in their list, though about 31% answered “don’t 
know.” Overall, about 53% of respondents included King in their list. However, it must 
be kept in mind that the survey heavily “cued” respondents to think of nonviolent heroes, 
since this question came near the very end of the survey and respondents had not only 
been forced to answer many questions on nonviolence/ violence, but also read three 
quotations by Dr. King. On the other hand, they were also exposed to one quote by 
President Obama questioning the feasibility of King’s nonviolence in his 2009 Nobel 
Peace Prize speech.  
 Although some respondents listed several heroes, the most common response to 
the question was listing two heroes – and the most frequent response was “Lincoln and 
MLK” and “MLK and Rosa Parks” was second. 
 Above we discussed the lack of consistent and coherent ideologies in the U.S. 
populace. It is also evident that many respondents listed a set of heroes that reflect 
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contradictions, depending on how the hero is interpreted. For example, among 
respondents who listed only two heroes we find the following combinations: “Rosa Parks 
and all the U.S. soldiers,” “Martin Luther King and Mr. Bush,” “Firefighters of 
September 11th and Rosa Parks,” “Ronald Reagan and Dr. MLK,” “George Washington 
and Rosa Parks” – the latter is perhaps the quintessential distillation of U.S. hegemonic 
public education. As another example, one respondent listed two heroes: “Rosa Parks and 
Crazy Horse.” Following well-known principles of art, we can say that the unlikely 
juxtaposition of these two icons is itself poetic, and almost media-savvy as one might 
expect of a generation accustomed to marketing themselves in social media like 
Facebook. Yet, we cannot help wondering if the respondent could even quote one 
sentence that either one of these figures ever said. It might be contended that exercises in 
name-dropping like this may mean very little as indicators of individual personality, yet 
on the face of it, the very superficiality and contradictions in a given set of listed heroes 
may speak volumes about our cultural moment. Heroes may simply be chosen because 
they sound exotic, or evoke a spirit of nonconformity. In the case of Rosa Parks and 
Crazy Horse, there is a logical tie of outsider/ underdog resistance to oppression and 
domination. The two biggest heroes of my own childhood were Dr. King and Geronimo, 
and a mix of contingencies (i.e., a family vacation stop at a fort where Geronimo was 
held) and family influences (i.e., my Father marched with Dr. King and was very proud 
of that fact) played a role. But the contradictions in a given list of heroes may reflect the 
fragmentation of the self in modernity which some theorists have emphasized (Habermas 
1987).  
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 Nonviolent heroes like Dr. King and Rosa Parks are not necessarily remembered 
for their nonviolent tactics and values. Analyses of crosstabs between Q42 and the three 
King quotes in the elite cues section found little difference between the respondents 
listing Dr. King as a hero and their responses to Dr. King quotes. As another example, 
crosstabs were run on Q42 and Q6. 
 We see in Table 70 below that over 1/3rd of those who listed Dr. King and Rosa 
Parks as heroes, responded to Q6 by answering that peaceful means alone “will NOT 
work.” This disconnect between admiring King and Parks as heroes, while disavowing or 
failing to recognize the strategic efficacy of nonviolence is difficult to reconcile without 
positing a degree of ignorance about their biographies. Arguably, nonviolence is the very 
core of the examples of Dr. King and Rosa Parks.  
Table 70. Crosstabs: Heroes of U.S. History by Belief in Efficacy of Nonviolence 
Q42 Heroes Q6. …Which do you believe, peaceful means alone will 
work, or peaceful means alone will NOT work? 
Total 
“will work” “will NOT work” 
Other heroes listed 38 
65.52 
(15.64) 
20 
34.48 
(12.90) 
58 
100.00 
(14.57) 
“Don’t Know” 68 
53.13 
(27.98) 
60 
46.88 
(38.71) 
128 
100.00 
(32.16) 
Martin Luther King, Jr. 
listed 
108 
66.26 
(44.44) 
55 
33.74 
(35.48) 
163 
100.00 
(40.95) 
Rosa Parks listed 3 
50.00 
(1.23) 
3 
50.00 
(1.94) 
6 
100.00 
(1.51) 
King & Parks listed 26 
60.47 
(10.70) 
17 
39.53 
(10.97) 
43 
100.00 
(10.80) 
Total 243 
61.06 
(100.00) 
155 
38.94 
(100.00) 
398 
100.00 
(100.00) 
Notes: Frequency count, Row %, (Column %); 
 However, given the relative lack of association found above between knowledge 
of nonviolent revolutions and being more likely to affirm pragmatic nonviolence, the 
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more surprising finding is that almost 2/3rds of those listing King and Parks as heroes did 
affirm nonviolence “will work.”   
 It has been noted that in Latin America, even though nonviolent tactics have long 
been central to many social movements in the region, these tactics are not named and 
theorized as nonviolence, and lacking a political culture that theorizes nonviolence, 
“icons of non-violence such as Martin Luther King have been imported as symbols of 
struggles for social justice rather than as examples of viable strategies” (Becker 2003, 
p.8). But such malleability is not unique to heroes of nonviolence. In the same way, Che 
Guevera is often reduced to an icon of youth rebellion, and his strategies of armed 
revolution discarded by those who invoke his image. And there are empirical reasons to 
seriously doubt the depth of biographical knowledge held by respondents who claim a 
given hero. As discussed below, a second survey of UO students found that very few 
students could either recognize or provide the name of Dr. King’s organization, the 
SCLC, even when spotted the acronym (Eddy 2012).  
 In Figure 9 below we see several names that were well-known for both their 
military service and political careers as U.S. president (Washington, Ulysses S. Grant, 
Theodore Roosevelt, Eisenhower, and JKF). And, Lincoln, of course, was a notable 
advocate for the justwar tradition, conceived broadly. But, given the long tradition of 
U.S. militarism, it is strikinghow few soldiers were named by respondents. Other soldiers 
listed (and their frequency counts) were: Pat Tillman (2), George S. Patton (2), Douglas 
MacArthur (1), Andrew Jackson (1), Colin Powell (1), and three vague references as 
follows: “any soldier who died to protect us,” “all the U.S. soldiers,” and 
“the U.S. military.” These generalized forms of admiration are illuminating, as it suggests 
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Figure 9. Frequency Counts of Heroes Listed (Open-Ended Question) 
 
Notes: 31.51% of respondents checked “don’t know” (a high level of attrition readily explained by the fact that this 
question came near the end of a 30 minute survey and was preceded by difficult historical questions that many 
respondents did not know the answer to), while 68.49% of respondents listed one or more hero 
 
that knowledge of any one soldier’s accomplishments is lacking (and that education has 
not equipped them with such knowledge) and/ or that our cultural “hero system” confers 
on all soldiers in the abstract an heroic status. The Native American warriors Crazy Horse 
and Sitting Bull each received one vote. Two Confederate generals also received votes: 
Stonewall Jackson (1) and Robert E. Lee (1). The listing of Pat Tillman as a hero by two 
respondents is likely linked, in part, to the release of the film documentary, The Tillman 
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Story (2010) which played in local movie theaters a few months before this survey was 
given. This data corroborates the ngram searches reported on below. Just as Dr. King 
exceeds mentions of soldier heroes and Generals in books in American English, he 
exceeds heroes of war even more dramatically in the self-reported lists of heroes by our 
respondents. 
 The relatively high ranking of Amelia Earhart is likely explained by two factors. 
First, Amelia, a big-budget Hollywood biopic was released in 2009, and secondly, Earhart 
died young and tragically. The latter is a clear pattern emergent in the data – historical 
figures who died or were killed relatively young and tragically are given a clear boost in 
heroic status. The liminal terrain of death, and the role of sacrifice or martyrdom, of 
giving one’s life for a cause, so central to Judeo-Christian tradition, seems to set people’s 
minds towards mythic domains. The two largest vote getters, Dr. King and Lincoln fit 
this model, but so do other top vote getters including JFK, Malcolm X, and Amelia 
Earhart. This pattern may also explain why Robert Kennedy received two votes and John 
Lennon received one.  
 In the Costa Rica sample, the high percentage of students listing Juan Santamaria 
also illustrates this pattern (as well as the power of socialization via Costa Rica’s school 
system). Santamaria, the official national hero of Costa Rica, was a “drummer boy” who 
died in a battle defending Costa Rica sovereignty against the American William Walker 
and his mercenaries in 1856 (Creedman 1977). Incidentally, early on, Walker’s 
adventurism was funded by the U.S. industrialist Cornelius Vanderbilt. Santamaria had 
volunteered for the heroic task of setting fire to Walker’s fort in Rivas, Nicaragua, on the 
condition that his fellow soldiers promised to take care of his mother if he was killed 
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(JSHCM 2012). His mother was granted a pension by the government in 1857, and in 
1864, just as Santamaria’s memory was being promoted to hero status by government 
officials, her pension was tripled (Palmer 2004, p.92). As a mulatto from the lower 
classes and a bastard child of a poor woman, Santamaria’s race was awkward for white 
elites who preferred to view Costa Ricans as homogenously white (Palmer 2004, p.95, 
p.92), but his class position as a common man and his lack of “voice” as a complete 
unknown was “convenient” for the elites who promoted him as a national hero during a 
mass conscription campaign (p.93, p.95). Hence, Santamaria was the shrewd public 
relations campaign of elites who sought to encourage nationalist sentiments as well as 
more foot soldiers for the army. In fact, when President Barrios of Guatemala declared 
the Union of Central America in late February of 1885, the Costa Rican government soon 
issued an emergency call to arms, and in this context, Santamaria was again resurrected 
as a “popular military hero who the lower classes could identify with” (p.93). It seems 
Santamaria’s promotion to hero status was also partly linked to the fact that President 
Juan Rafael Mora, the “great hero” of the Costa Rican campaign against Walker had 
become delegitimized in collective memory, as Mora had been overthrown in the 1859 
coup and killed in 1860 while trying to regain power through a military invasion (p.92). 
 Von Hahn, a 19th century scholar of hero myths found 14 cases of “Aryan” hero 
tales which all included, among other common features, a hero who is abandoned by his 
father, fights wars, frees his mother, becomes king, founds a city, and dies young (Segal 
2004, p.vii). Santamaria clearly matches four of these patterns – he was abandoned by his 
father, he fights a war, provides for his mother (freeing her from poverty), and dies 
young. He does not become king or found a city, but he helps to defend Costa Rica’s 
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independence and in a sense, becomes king of the collective memory as his heroism is 
viewed as trumping that of all other Costa Rican leaders. We will see below how peace 
advocates in Costa Rica have re-envisioned Santamaria’s myth to exemplify more 
peaceful values. 
Second U.S. Survey on Heroes 
 In October of 2011, the author conducted another survey using a convenience 
sample of 126 University of Oregon students enrolled in a lower division sociology 
course. Additional data is desirable because in the 2010 survey (the primary survey in the 
present study), the survey context likely primed responses influenced by the questions on 
violence and nonviolence that preceded it, as well as the elite quotes.  In the second 
sample of college student, the context was shaped by a professor and course materials 
which undoubtedly led some students to list John Brown and Hugh Thompson as heroes. 
Prior to the survey, students sat through a short lecture in which the professor, building 
on course readings in Loewen (1995), argued that the abolitionist John Brown was an 
important American hero. Students were then shown a film on John Brown, by Kenner 
(2000), which both questioned and reaffirmed the traditional portrait of Brown as 
mentally unbalanced – a highly doubtful notion which is nonetheless in keeping with 
most U.S. textbook accounts of Brown (Loewen 1995). In a single open-ended question 
at the end of the class period, students were asked to list their hero or heroes from U.S. 
history and explain why they had made that selection. The students (n=126), at least 116 
of them, cast 136 votes for heroes, while 10 students claimed “None” (i.e., they had no 
heroes).  
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 The most frequently cited hero, by far, was Martin Luther King, Jr. with 41 votes 
(32.5% of students listed Dr. King). The next most frequently cited was John Brown, who 
received 14 votes (11.1%). Of course, the listing of Brown reflects the course context, but 
perhaps also the malleability of student attitudes and their lack of meaningful pre-existing 
attachment to other heroes (as well as the ever-present data collection problem of 
surveys: nothing is at stake, so respondents may invest little mental energy in their 
responses). The next most cited figure was President Lincoln who received 12 votes 
(9.5%). Ten people who cited King as a hero specifically mentioned King’s nonviolent 
methods as a reason for listing him as a hero. Despite all of the militaristic history of the 
U.S., only eight students (6.3%) listed soldiers or generals as heroes – one listed George 
Washington, two listed Confederate Generals in the Civil War, and five respondents 
listed soldiers who were famous for acting nonviolently – as one listed Bradley Manning 
(the U.S. soldier allegedly linked to the release of classified documents to the website 
WikiLeaks), and four listed Hugh Thompson. Buttwo students voting for Thompson 
could not remember his name, a clear indicator of superficial attachment to their “hero” 
(these students simply named the context in which Thompson acted - describing“the 
helicopter pilot” in Vietnam who intervened to stop the Mai Li massacre). Their answers 
were no heavily doubt influenced by class discussion and assigned course reading (Zinn, 
Konopacki, and Buhle 2008) which praised Thompson. Malcolm X received 8 votes 
(6.3%) and Huey P. Newton of the Black Panthers one vote. This is perhaps indirect 
evidence that the counter-arguments against nonviolence during the U.S. civil rights era 
still attractive in some niches. Other nonviolent or peace activists receiving votes 
included Rosa Parks (5 votes or 4%), Cesar Chavez (1 vote), Daniel Ellsberg (1 vote), 
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Jackie Robinson (1 vote), Ida B. Wells (1 vote), and the “Iron Jawed Angels” (1 vote) 
who sacrificed for women’s suffrage through nonviolent resistance including fasting in 
prison. The single reference to the “Iron Jawed Angels” may be linked to a 2004 
Hollywood film about them of the same name, starring the celebrity actress Hillary 
Swank. Thus, “memory entrepreneurs” in Hollywood may have some effect on the 
collective memory, though in this case the effect was extremely limited.  
 Importantly, the 32.5% listing Dr. King and the 4% listing Rosa Parks are far 
lower percentages than were found in the main 2010 survey in which 52.76% listed Dr. 
King and 12.56% listed Rosa Parks. It seems clear that the format of the 2010 survey 
cued/ primed nonviolent heroes in the open-ended responses, leading to three times more 
respondents listing Rosa Parks and 20% more respondents listing Dr. King. Clearly, 
because Dr. King was quoted in the survey, respondents, especially females, were primed 
to think of Rosa Parks in this open-ended response.    
Heroes of Costa Rican Respondents 
 In Table 71 below we see when Costa Rican respondents were asked to list 
national heroes, the top 3 vote getters were soldiers. The only indigenous person in these 
top 15 heroes is a rebel leader who employed revolutionary violence. Four of the top 6 
vote getters were soldiers, and the top female vote getter was a soldier. The top 2 
Presidential vote getters were war leaders as well, which fits with popularity trends 
among U.S. Presidents as well (Henderson and Gochenour 2012). 
 What is the significance of listing a soldier as a hero? Does it predict attitudinal 
orientations towards violence or nonviolence? To probe this question, the following t-
tests were run. In the Costa Rican data, a dummy variable was created in which every 
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respondent who listed a soldier or warrior was coded as “1.” These included respondents 
who listed the following as national heroes: Juan Santamaria (87 votes), Pancha Carrasco 
(17 votes), Juan Rafael Mora Poras (45 votes), General Jose Maria Canas Escamilla (1 
vote), General Tomas Guardia (1 vote), and Joaquin Mora Poras (1 vote). Note that all 6 
of these military leader heroes were involved in the War with William Walker – clearly a 
watershed event for the pantheon of Costa Rican heroes. Joaquin Mora Poraswas in  
 
Table 71. Costa Rican Heroes Listed by Respondents in Open-Ended Question (N=313) 
Name Description Freq. % 
Listing 
Juan Santamaria Soldier, martyr, national hero of the war against the filibustering 
William Walker (1856-1857). Killed while setting fire to Walker’s 
fort. 
 
 
87 27.80 
Juan Rafael Mora 
Porras (referred to 
as President Mora, 
or President Mora 
Porras) 
President (1849-1859), mobilized the nation for the war against 
William Walker (1856-1857), with his brother, General Jose 
Joaquin Mora Porras (General Mora) leading the troops in the 
field. After the war, the politically powerful Mora family “tried to 
manipulate the ensuing election to assure their stay in power” but 
Mora was overthrown in 1859 (Rolbein 1989, p.35). A year later, 
after invading unsuccessfully with an armed force, he was 
executed by firing squad. After this ignoble end, Rolbein (1989) 
notes, “It would be almost a century before the Mora name was 
resurrected to hero status, celebrating the opposition to armed 
imperialism” (p.35), i.e., embodied in the symbol of William 
Walker, the private U.S. imperialist. 
 
  
45 14.38 
Jose Figueres 
Ferrer 
The “grandfather of modern Costa Rica” (Foley and Cooke 1996, 
p.33). Leader of the “Army of National Liberation” in the 1948 
Civil War and head of the ruling Junta (1948-1949). Elected 
President twice (1952-1958, 1970-1974). Social democrat, a 
founder of the PLN party. The Junta abolished the army, outlawed 
the Communist party, nationalized the banks, granted women the 
right to vote, gave citizenship rights to all native-born residents 
(Blacks, Chinese, and the indigenous were no longer 2nd class 
citizens), instituted an independent election tribunal, a tax on the 
wealthy, bolstered social services and a Social Security system 
(e.g., a minimum wage, low-cost health care, child support, and 
education funding increased) -- reforms which became embedded 
in the 1949 Constitution (Helmuth 2000, p.24). 
 
 
 
 
38 12.14 
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Name Description Freq. % 
Listing 
Rafael Angel 
Calderon Guardia 
President (1940-1944), through a broad alliance including 
Catholic leaders, labor unions, and the Communist Party, he 
instituted very progressive reforms which established social 
security and national healthcare systems as well as a minimum 
wage and other labor protections. Many elites soon opposed him. 
He ran for President again in 1948, but though electoral 
irregularities clouded the outcome, the widespread perception at 
the time and for many decades following, was that Calderon had 
lost by 10,000 votes (recent studies suggest Calderon actually won 
the election (Molina and Palmer 2007, p.113)). Calderon seized 
power with the help of Congress, which his party controlled. This 
sparked the Revolution of 1948 in which at least 2,000 Costa 
Ricans died (some sources over 4,000 died (p.114)), and Calderon 
was ousted by Figueres. From Nicaragua, Calderon led failed 
invasions of Costa Rica in 1948 and 1955 (Hoivik and Solveig 
1981, p.346). Unlike Figueres who relinquished power to a 
revitalized democracy in 1949, Calderon’s three attempts to seize 
power deeply undercut his progressive legacy. He eventually 
returned to Costa Rican and ran unsuccessfully for the presidency 
in 1962, but his son was elected President in 1990.   
26 8.31 
Oscar Arias President (1986-1990, 2006-2010), winner of Nobel Peace Prize in 
1987 
24 7.67 
Pancha Carrasco Female soldier heroine of the war against William Walker (1856-
1857) 
17 5.43 
Franklin Chang 
Diaz 
NASA astronaut, born and grew up in Costa Rica. Attended 
college and earned a doctorate in physics at MIT in the U.S. He is 
a naturalized U.S. citizen, veteran of 7 Space Shuttle missions. 
14 4.47 
Manuel Mora 
Valverde 
Lawyer and politician, candidate for President in 1940 and 1974, 
one of the founders of the Costa Rican Communist Party (1929) 
11 3.51 
Braulio Carrillo Lawyer and politician, President (1835-1842), worked to separate 
church and state, in 1838 he declared Costa Rica a “free state” and 
abandoned the Central American Federation. In 1841, he turned 
dictatorial, dissolved Congress and suspended personal freedoms, 
was soon overthrown and murdered in exile.  
10 3.19 
Clodomiro Picado Scientist, born in Nicaragua, received doctorate in Paris, research 
was a precursor to discovery of penicillin 
8 2.56 
Carmen Lyra Novelist, children’s author, women’s political leader, teacher, 
opened Costa Rica’s first kindergarten, joined Communist Party, 
died in exile in Mexico after the 1948 civil war  
8 2.56 
Alfredo Gonzalez 
Flores 
President (1914-1917), instituted reforms including a progressive 
income tax. He was overthrown by General Tinoco in 1917. Later 
served as the first president of the National Bank of Costa Rica 
(1936-1940). 
8 2.56 
Juan Mora 
Fernandez 
Chief of state (1824-1833), modernized the nation through 
establishing a printing press, newspaper, mint, and new gold 
mining technology. He declared the Virgin of the Angels patron 
saint of Costa Rica.  
6 1.92 
Emma Gamboa 
Alvarado 
A leading educator in the 20th century, dean of the Education 
department at UCR and president of the National Association of 
Educators. In 1947, she helped lead a nonviolent march of over 
6,000 women for electoral reform, during a protest cycle in which 
many protesters had been killed (Hillerbrand 2012). 
 
5 1.60 
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Name Description Freq. % 
Listing 
Pablo Presbere An Indian chief who violently rebelled against missionary priests 
and Spanish colonial soldiers in the Talamanca uprisings of 1710. 
The Governor’s forces executed the “freedom fighter” by bow and 
arrow.  
5 1.60 
Note: Many descriptions drew from Creedman’s (1977) Historical Dictionary of Costa Rica. 
 
charge of the Costa Rican army and rose to the rank of general during the war. General 
Canas was general of the Costa Rican forces during the war and later commander in chief 
of all the Central American allied forces. General Tomas Guardia “distinguished himself 
in the war against William Walker” (Creedman 1977, p.93). Later, he served as a 
dictatorial President, though “at the behest of his wife the death penalty was abolished” 
(p.93). Juan Rafael Mora Poras was the war President who mobilized the country against 
William Walker’s forces. He was overthrown in 1859. A year later he invaded Costa Rica 
leading an armed force, intent on regaining power, but he failed and was executed 
(Creedman 1977). Additional listed fighters coded as “1” for this dummy variable 
included: Pablo Presbere (5 votes) and General Frederico Tinoco (2 votes) who led a 
coup and briefly became President in 1917. It was decided to not include Figueres (38 
votes) in this code. Although he was the key military leader of the 1948 civil war, his role 
in disbanding the army and his very prominent political leadership make him much more 
than just a soldier hero. The dummy variable “soldier hero” (i.e., respondents listing a 
soldier or fighter/ warrior as a hero) included 125 respondents out of the sample of 312.  
 T-tests on the dummy variable “soldier hero” revealed that there was no 
significant difference in attitudes between this group and the rest of the sample, on the 
Nonviolence Index or the Militarism Index, not even at the modest .1  level. Thus, at least 
in the case of Costa Rica, embracing soldiers as national historical heroes is not 
associated with pro-military attitudes. This underscores the enormous capacity for people, 
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as they confront cultural symbol systems and myths, to compartmentalize ideals and 
embrace contradictions. It is likely that contradictions and inconsistencies are not even 
perceived by respondents. Rather, the commonsense thinking here may be that different 
times call for different heroes. In any case, it seems that upholding soldiers of the past as 
heroes in collective memory carries few implications for attitudes on violence/ 
nonviolence. This may be one sign of Costa Rica’s solidified peace culture.   
 Some in Costa Rica do perceive the contradictions in celebrating Juan Santamaria 
as the nation’s only state-sanctioned hero. The interpretations of Francisco Cordero Gené, 
a former government bureaucrat and prominent activist affiliated with the Friends 
(Quaker) Peace Center in San José, offers fascinating insights. In his explanation of the 
Santamaria narrative, Cordero emphasizes that Santamaria was a drummer boy, “he 
didn’t even carry a gun.” Many of the statues around the nation get this detail wrong – as 
he is often shown carrying a rifle. And, Francisco points out that Santamaria’s battlefield 
heroics were relatively nonviolent as well. Santamaria set William Walker’s fort on fire, 
an attempt to flush out and force Walker and his soldiers to surrender. Cordero’s 
conclusion is that Santamaria’s heroism is found in how “he went to war, not because he 
was willing to kill, but because he was willing to die.” And, the cause was just. After all, 
Walker’s agenda included establishing slavery in Central America, extending Dixie 
plantations all the way to Panama. Santamaria symbolizes the objection to slavery, the 
fight for freedom and human rights.           
U.S.–SPECIFIC SURVEY QUESTIONS 
 A few questions were asked only in the UO survey. These probed generalized 
views of the U.S. military’s role in international affairs, views of specific U.S. wars, and 
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building on previous research on militaristic attitudes the UO survey also collected 
indicators of respondent affiliations with sports. In Table 72 below, we see that about 5% 
of respondents assented to the most critical view of the U.S. military’s international role, 
but the highest percentage of respondents selected the middle answer, between critical 
and laudatory. Because so many selected the middle position, further analysis is 
somewhat hampered by small cell sizes outside the middle position. It is worth noting 
that Joseph (2007) estimates that the “doves,” those with a principled objection to U.S. 
militarism and who embrace an “alternative approach to the problems of global violence 
and security,” comprise about 15-20% of the population (p.3). That is roughly what we 
see here if we accept both 6 as well as 7 indicating this set of attitudes. But based on 
previous studies, we would expect that a university campus would have a higher 
percentage of doves than the rest of the U.S. population. 
 
Table 72. On the Role of the U.S. Military in World Affairs (N=426) 
Q10 People vary in their opinion of how the U.S. military impacts the rest of the world. In your opinion, 
does the U.S. military act as the world’s heroic policeman, or as the armed forces of a self-interested 
empire, or something in between? The U.S. military acts as… 
(1) the world’s 
heroic 
policeman who 
helps keep the 
peace, and 
furthers 
freedom and 
democracy. 
(2) (3) (4) 
Something in 
between 
(5) (6) (7) the armed 
forces of a self-
interested empire 
that dominates and 
exploits the world, 
and mostly serves 
wealthy and 
powerful interests 
in the U.S. 
17 
3.99% 
28 
6.57% 
38 
8.92% 
198 
46.48% 
75 
17.61% 
49 
11.50% 
21 
4.93% 
 
 
On Support for Recent and Ongoing U.S. Wars 
 
 Just a few weeks after the UO survey was conducted (in November of 2010), a 
CNN/Opinion Research Corporation survey of a nationally representative sample 
(conducted December 17 – 19), found that 63% of the public was opposed to the war in 
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Afghanistan – an all-time high up to that point. As we can see below, this is about 20% 
higher than the numbers of UO students who claimed that the Afghanistan war is “not a 
just war.” Only 35% of respondents said they still support U.S. involvement (Terkel 
2010). Notable group variation in opposition to the war included Republicans (44% 
oppose) versus Democrats (74% oppose), and income level with those making over 
$50,000 per year (54% oppose) more favorable towards the war versus those making 
under $50,000 per year (70% oppose). Of course, support/ opposition to a war is a 
slightly different question than asking whether a war was/ is a “just war.” Yet, it is 
difficult to imagine too many people affirming a war as “just” while opposing it, and still 
fewer numbers – if any at all - would be likely to say a particular war is “not a just war” 
while supporting it. 
 Before addressing Table 73 below, consider that a nationally representative 
Gallup poll in mid-2010 found that 55% of Americans said that the Iraq War was a 
“mistake” when presented with a dichotomous answer choice: “Yes, a mistake”/ “No, not 
a mistake” (Dugan 2013). This is down from April of 2008, when 63% claimed the Iraq 
War was a mistake. And, in a March 2013 survey, 57% of Americans said the Vietnam 
War was a mistake, but this is down from 69% in a 2000 survey. In the 2013 survey, the 
youngest age cohort (18 to 29 years old) was by far the least likely of all the age cohorts 
Table 73. Respondent Views of U.S. Wars 
Q11 People vary in their opinions about U.S. involvement in recent wars. In your opinion, were the 
following wars just and worthy causes deserving of U.S. military involvement? 
 Yes, a just 
war (1)  
Somewhat just 
(2) 
No, NOT a just 
war (3) 
x̄ 
 
1. Vietnam War 
(1955 – 1975) 
17.69% 36.67% 45.64% 2.28 
 
2. Iraq War (2003 to 
present) 
10.83% 34.26% 54.91% 2.44 
3. Afghanistan War 
(2001 to present) 
17.38% 39.04% 43.58% 2.26 
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to say that the Vietnam War was a mistake with 43% answering “Yes, a mistake” 
(compared with 52% (30 to 49 years old), 69% (50 to 64 years old), and 70% (65 and 
older). Hence, the youngest age cohort, who hold no personal memory of the Vietnam 
War (i.e, the young who have only been exposed to collective memory of the Vietnam 
War filtered through educational institutions, the media, etc.), are the least likely to say 
the Vietnam War was a mistake. Moreover, it seems collective memory processes have 
failed to communicate the antiwar knowledge which those who lived through the 
Vietnam War possess. This suggests that generational replacement and socialization 
processes fails to reproduce the antiwar lessons of the Vietnam War.  
 In the same 2013 Gallup survey, among 18 to 29 years olds, 50% said the Iraq 
War was a mistake and 43% said the Afghanistan War was a mistake. For each war, these 
percentages come very close to the figures claiming “No, NOT a just war” in Table 73 
above. Thus, we have some basis for asserting that the “mistake” question and the ethical 
orientation (i.e., just war/ somewhat just/ not just) of the questions above elicit similar 
responses – more on this below.       
 In the table above, if we combine the respondents who said the Vietnam War was 
a “just war” or “somewhat just” we are left with 54.36% of respondents affirming some 
degree of legitimation for the Vietnam War. Ironically, this makes the war more popular 
among U.S. youth today than it ever was with the American public that lived through it. 
It is higher than the percentage of Americans who approved of President Johnson’s 
handling of the war in Vietnam (a proxy measure of support for the war) between April 
1966 through April 1968 (Leahey 2010). The only time approval of Johnson’s handling 
of the war topped 50% occurred in three polls between July 1965 and January 1966 and 
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after the Gulf of Tonkin crisis when a “rally round the flag” effect produced 85% support 
for Johnson’s handling of the war, though this diminished to 38% four months later 
(pp.76-78). After the Tet Offensive in early 1968, and onward through May 1971, the 
percentage of Americans claiming the Vietnam War was a “mistake” hovered between 50 
and 60% (p.77). It seems history has effectively “whitewashed” the war for subsequent 
generations. Leahey’s (2010) analysis of U.S. high school history textbook coverage of 
the Vietnam war strongly supports that inference.   
 On the other hand, while it is striking that only about 46% of students claimed the 
Vietnam War was not a just war, the “mistake”question is different from the “just war” 
question in this survey. During the Vietnam War era, most surveys asked respondents 
whether they support the war or favor the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam. The 
above question is a different question, as it probes ethical views of the war. Research has 
shown that a major source of antiwar sentiment in the U.S. is pragmatic rather than moral 
(Feaver and Gelpi 2004, Joseph 2007). For instance, many respondents during the 
Vietnam War era favored withdrawal for pragmatic reasons (e.g., the war can not be won, 
or the casualties and costs are too high) rather than moral reasons (Schuman 1972). But, 
analyzing this data, questions about collective memory issues still rise to the fore, 
especially since scholars like Loewen (2007) argue that consensus has emerged in the 
culture at large that the Vietnam War was “a mistake, politically and morally” (p.348). 
Political elites who led and directed the war effort including Robert McNamara and Clark 
Clifford, have admitted as much.  
 We might well surmise with the benefit of hindsight, that students today would be 
more likely to condemn the war on moral grounds, even if they generally tend to evaluate 
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wars on pragmatic rather than moral grounds. Since the U.S. lost the war, and today the 
war is largely viewed as having been unwinnable, respondents are more likely to perceive 
the war as immoral. This explanation follows Kaplowitz (1973), who theorizes that 
evaluations of strategic effectiveness and moral legitimacy reciprocally influence one 
another. Since a majority of our respondents did not condemn the war as unjust, we are 
led to different conclusions. College students today may lack antiwar knowledge, an 
important source of antiwar attitudes (Cohrs and Moschner 2002). Related to this, those 
who are inclined towards pragmatic (rather than moral) judgments about war, may lack 
accurate information about the Vietnam War’s costs in blood and treasure. It makes sense 
that the visceral sense of costs would decline over time through collective memory 
processes of the “ideological state apparatuses” (Althusser 1971). In addition, Leahey 
(2010) argues that high school history textbooks (which I take to be one indicator of 
hegemonic attitudes, rather than merely propaganda passively absorbed by all students or 
teachers) today do not mount a moral critique of the Vietnam War, but instead focus on 
noncontroversial issues. Thus, concerning the Vietnam War, both moral and especially 
pragmatic sources of antiwar sentiment seem to have weakened through collective 
memory processes. In the documentary filmTwo Days in October, the Vietnam War 
veteranJim Shelton expressed critical perspectives including disgust with the U.S. 
military’s deception of the media which he personally witnessed, but he nevertheless 
maintained: “I'm not ready to give up on Vietnam [the Vietnam War] as a force for good, 
okay? I'm not ready to admit that was an evil thing that happened to the United States of 
America, that never should have happened, or even that it wasn't worth it. Now, part of 
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that is because I can't accept the deaths of my buddies as not being worth something” 
(Kenner 2005; emphasis added).  
 Shelton’s reflexive insight is often articulated by soldiers, though often with less 
awareness of the dynamics in play. A U.S. Marine Jake Romo has recently said in 
response to a Pew survey which found that 52% of Americans think the Afghanistan War 
was not worth it: “I don't think it's anybody's right who didn't fight to say that it wasn't 
worth going over there [Afghanistan] and fighting. If nothing else, that spits in the face of 
everyone who willingly, and continues to willingly, sacrifice” (Conan 2011). Thus, the 
sacrifices and losses of soldiers justify a continuance of the status quo (Koenigsberg 
2009). Hence, we observe ideological “strategies of containment” (Jameson 1981) which 
include the idea that U.S. soldier deaths somehow make a war sacred and the purposes of 
the war unquestionable, and the idea that only soldiers have a “right” to criticize a war.   
 Burris (2008) analyzed between-group differences in over 200 U.S. surveys 
conducted between 1964 to 2006 (i.e., the Vietnam and post-Vietnam eras), which probed 
support for military action. During the Vietnam era, support for military action was 
stronger among men, whites, and the more affluent, as well as among the more educated 
and younger persons (note – the latter two groups are sampled from in the present study). 
In the post-Vietnam era, only a few changes have emerged in these between-group 
differences. Males, whites, and the more affluent remain more pro-war. However, 
political party loyalties have tended to serve as key drivers of these between-group gaps, 
especially when military events have provoked a “rally-‘round-the-flag” response. The 
Vietnam War was very much a bi-partisan war (Loewen 2007). Burris (2008) found some 
signs that the more educated and younger persons had become relatively more antiwar 
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with the outbreak of the Iraq War in 2003, but as for age cohorts, the latest Gallup Poll 
data suggests a return to the dominant historical pattern – the young are more hawkish 
and the old more dovish (Burris 2008, Dugan 2013  
 Let us briefly consider whether these between-group differences hold in our 
sample, concerning views of the justifiability of past and current wars. Concerning 
respondent views of the Vietnam War, we are given a glimpse into how socialization into 
collective memories (i.e., through the school system) and the filter or lens provided by 
current military actions, might alter average opinions of a past war. However it must be 
kept in mind that unlike the representative national surveys Burris (2008) analyzed, the 
present survey only sampled from college students (i.e., educated young people). 
 The data in Table 74 is displayed with gender breakdowns in Table 75. 
Interestingly, we see in Table 75 that males are significantly more likely than females to 
view the Vietnam War as an unjust war. Hence, the Vietnam era gender gap disappears  
Table 74. T-Tests of Between-Group Differences in Views of Vietnam War (UO Data) 
 
Dummy Variable (n of 
dummy/ n of non-
dummy) 
 
x̄ 
 
x̄² 
 
 
df 
 
t 
 
x̄² - x̄ 
 
male (n=165/221) 2.36 
(males) 
2.23 
(females) 
384 -1.72 -.13* 
white (n=299/ 91) 2.24 
(whites) 
2.42 (non-whites) 376 1.83 .17* 
Republicans (n=81/ 
301) 
1.94 
(Republicans) 
2.37 
(non-Repub.) 
380 4.77 .43**** 
Democrats 
(n=188/194) 
2.43 
(Dem.) 
2.14 
(non-Dem.) 
380 -3.81 -.29**** 
moderates and 
conservatives 
(n=175/207) 
2.15 
(mod-conserv) 
2.39 
(liberals) 
380 3.06 .23*** 
Christians (n=198/180) 2.15 
(Christians) 
2.44 
(non-Chr.) 
376 3.95 .30**** 
Catholic (n=64/ 307) 1.98 
(Catholic) 
2.34 
(non-Cath.) 
369 3.49 .35**** 
UO football fan 
(n=244/ 137) 
2.19 
(fan) 
2.45 
(non-fan) 
379 3.25 .26*** 
Notes: Two-tailed t-tests of significance: * = p < .1; **= p < .05; *** = p < .01; **** = p<.001; Q11 codes are 1 (“just war”), 2 
(“somewhat just”), 3 (“not a just war”); hence, higher means (x̄) are more peaceful/ antiwar; T-tests showed no significant differences 
(at even the .1 level) on other dummy variables including: Hispanic, black, upper classes, religious, evangelical, born again, attenders, 
Biblical literalist, rural, military parents, and athletes; see Appendix N for descriptions of dummy codes; Survey conducted November, 
2010  
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and even reverses to a significant degree through socialization into collective memory of 
the war. Yet, consider that in a 1964 nationally representative survey, the gender gap was  
quite significant: 61% of women opposed escalationin Vietnam, as opposed to 42% of 
men (Burris 2008, p.444). 
Table 75. View of Vietnam War, UO Survey (Fall 2010) 
 
Response Female Male Total 
Yes, a just war 18.55% 16.36% 17.62% 
Somewhat just 40.27% 31.52% 36.53% 
Not a just war 41.18% 52.12% 45.85% 
Total 221 
100% 
165 
100% 
386 
100% 
 
 At the time of the 2010 survey, the last U.S. combat troops had withdrawn from 
Vietnam about 38 years before. University students taking the survey would of course, 
not have been shaped by living through the Vietnam War era, i.e., they would not be 
directly shaped by the media coverage or political speeches of that day. Rather, their 
memories of the war are mediated and filtered through history textbooks, Hollywood 
films, family discussions, and other retrospective accounts.   
 Following Burris (2008), it could be that the reason young males are more dovish 
in their attitudes in the survey is because young men may be more likely to have seen or 
taken an interest in Hollywood films about the Vietnam War, and thereby learned some 
of the problems with the war – which school textbooks usually “whitewash” (Leahey 
2010). However, many Hollywood Vietnam War films also serve to obscure the moral 
issues of the war. The war is framed as apolitical as the narrative focuses on the trials of a 
single platoon, a “band of brothers”/ “band of warriors” who are just doing their duty. In 
fact, Lucas and McCarthy (2005) show how four of Hollywood’s Vietnam War films 
(Green Berets (1968), Apocalypse Now (1979), Platoon (1986), We Were Soldiers 
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(2002)) justify the war because democracy is superior to the primitive, brutal enemy. In 
addition, in the middle two films a cynical soldier “redeems the war for the warrior and 
the American people,” as the soldier escapes cynicism, the chaos and  violence of the war 
through embracing violence (p.181). Through this violence the soldier not only survives 
but arrives at “self-discovery” (p.181). Hence, although Apocalypse Now and Platoon 
could be called “anti-war,” there is a sense in which the War is redeemed as the 
battlefield becomes apolitical. This frame of the Vietnam War also resonates strongly 
with the “support the troops” discourse and ethic which serve to depoliticize the recent 
and ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
 However, since we oversampled from females, the sample characteristics might 
partly explain the surprising direction of the gender gap as well. Perhaps if our sample 
included more males and more male majors from business or the natural sciences, the 
gender gap would disappear or reverse.    
 Racial gaps in views of the war also disappear or are muted. Blacks and Hispanics 
are not significantly different in their views of the war, even at the .1 level. Hence, 
although nonwhites were more likely to oppose the war during the decades of the 
Vietnam War, collective memory processes have somehow prevented the reproduction of 
many of these racial gaps in views of the war. Consider that 1964, nationally 
representative survey 75% of Nonwhites opposed escalationin Vietnam as opposed to 
51% of Whites (Burris 2008, p.444). 
 However, just comparing Whites and Nonwhites, we see in the Table above that 
White respondents were slightly more favorable towards the war’s justifiability. Hence, it 
seems that the other racial minority groups (numerically, Native Americans, Hawaiians, 
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and Asian Americans are the best represented groups in the sample) drive the White/ 
Nonwhite racial gap in views of the Vietnam War. 
 For the Vietnam War, of all the group means reported in the table above, the most 
robust antiwar mean scores belong to non-sports fans (2.45), non-Christians (2.44), 
Democrats (2.43), and non-whites (2.42). The most robust prowar mean scores belong to 
Republicans (1.94) and Catholics (1.98). Other relatively prowar mean scores include 
Christians (2.15), moderates and conservatives (2.15), and sports fans (2.19). 
Nevertheless, even these relatively prowar group mean scores hover decisively around 
only a “somewhat justified” code of 2 – far from a ringing endorsement of the war. For  
Table 76. T-Tests of Between-Group Differences in Views of Iraq War (UO Data) 
 
Dummy Variable (n of 
dummy/ n of non-
dummy) 
 
x̄ 
 
x̄² 
 
 
df 
 
t 
 
x̄² - x̄ 
 
male (n=164/ 228) 2.44 
(male) 
2.45 
(female) 
390 .12 .008 
white (n=304/ 80) 2.41 
(whites) 
2.52  
(non-whites) 
382 1.29 .11 
Hispanic (n=46/ 351) 2.63 
(Hispanic) 
2.42 
(non-Hisp.) 
63.6 -2.33 -.21** 
black (n=15/ 382) 2.73 
(black) 
2.43 
(non-black) 
16.6 -2.47 -.30** 
upper classes (n=227/ 
150) 
2.37 
(upper class) 
2.54 
(lower classes) 
340.1 2.35 .17** 
Republicans (n=82/ 
307) 
2 
(Republicans) 
2.56 
(non-Repub.) 
106.4 5.87 .56**** 
Democrats (n= 
193/196) 
2.63 
(Democrats) 
2.26 
(non-Dem.) 
363.9 -5.57 -.37**** 
moderates and 
conservatives 
(n=176/213) 
2.24 
(mod-conserv) 
2.60 
(liberals) 
334.9 5.19 .36**** 
religious (n=221/168) 2.38 
(religious) 
2.52 
(non-rel.) 
387 2.13 .15** 
Christians (n=200/185) 2.3 
(Christians) 
2.6 
(non-Chr.) 
377.5 4.47 .3**** 
Catholic (n=64/ 313) 2.22 
(Catholic) 
2.48 
(non-Cath.) 
375 2.81 .26*** 
Biblical literalist 
(n=25/ 359) 
2.16 
(literalist) 
2.46 
(non-lit.) 
382 2.16 .30** 
attenders (n= 79/ 318) 2.32 
(attenders) 
2.47 
(non-attend.) 
108.8 1.67 .16* 
athletes (n= 330/ 56)  2.42 
(athletes) 
2.61 
(non-athletes) 
79.6 2.10 .19** 
UO football fan (n= 
248/140) 
2.40 
(fan) 
2.52 
(non-fan) 
386 1.75 .13* 
 
Notes: Two-tailed t-tests of significance: * = p < .1; **= p < .05; *** = p < .01; **** = p<.001; Q11 codes are 1 (“just war”), 2 
(“somewhat just”), 3 (“not a just war”); hence, higher means (x̄) are more peaceful/ antiwar; T-tests showed no significant differences 
(at even the .1 level) on dummy variables including: male, white, nonwhite, rural, military parents, evangelical, and born again; see 
Appendix N for descriptions of dummy codes 
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the Iraq War, of all the group means reported in Table 76, the most robust antiwar mean 
scores belong to blacks (2.73), Hispanics (2.63), Democrats (2.63), non-athletes (2.61), 
liberals (2.6), and non-Christians (2.6). The most robust prowar mean scores belong to 
Republicans (2), but note that this mean only represents an affirmation that the war is 
“somewhat just.” Other relatively prowar groups include literalists (2.16), Catholics 
(2.22), and attenders (2.23). 
 In Table 77, we see that a “rally-‘round-the-flag” effect for the Afghanistan War 
diminished between-group gaps among Hispanics and the classes. But consistent with 
Burris’s (2008) identification of long-term attitude trends, blacks were slightly  
Table 77. T-Tests of Between-Group Differences in Views of Afghanistan War (UO 
Data) 
 
Dummy Variable (n of 
dummy/ n of non-
dummy) 
 
x̄ 
 
x̄² 
 
 
df 
 
t 
 
x̄² - x̄ 
 
male (n=165/ 227) 2.15 
(males) 
2.34 
(females) 
390 2.57 .19* 
white (n= 303/ 80) 2.26 
(whites) 
2.23  
(non-whites) 
381 -.29 -.03 
black (n= 15/ 382) 2.6 
(blacks) 
2.25 
(non-blacks) 
395 -1.82 -.35* 
upper classes (n= 227/ 
149) 
2.21 
(upper class) 
2.32 
(lower classes) 
374 1.48 .12 
Republicans (n=81/ 
307) 
1.90 
(Republicans) 
2.36 
(non-Repub.) 
386 5.14 .46**** 
Democrats 
(n=193/195) 
2.39 
(Dem.) 
2.14 
(non-Dem.) 
386 -3.40 -.25**** 
moderates and 
conservatives 
(n=175/213) 
2.09 
(mod-conserv) 
2.40 
(liberals) 
386 4.25 .31**** 
Christians (n=199/185) 2.14 
(Christians) 
2.38 
(non-Chr.) 
382 3.33 .25**** 
catholic (n= 64/ 312) 2.14 
(Catholic) 
2.28 
(non-Cath.) 
374 1.37 .14 
Biblical literalist (n= 
25/ 358) 
1.96 
(literalist) 
2.28 
(non-lit.) 
381 2.10 .32** 
evangelical (n= 54/322) 2.06 
(evangelical) 
2.29 
(non-evan.) 
374 2.16 .23** 
attenders (n= 78/ 319) 2.13 
(attenders) 
2.29 
(non-attend.) 
395 1.79 .17* 
UO football fan (n= 
248/ 139) 
2.19 
(fan) 
2.37 
(non-fan) 
385 2.23 .17** 
 
Notes: Two-tailed t-tests of significance: * = p < .1; **= p < .05; *** = p < .01; **** = p<.001; Q11 codes are 1 (“just war”), 2 
(“somewhat just”), 3 (“not a just war”); hence, higher means (x̄) are more peaceful/ antiwar; T-tests showed no significant differences 
(at even the .1 level) on dummy variables including: white, nonwhite, Hispanic, upper classes, rural, military parents, religious, 
catholic, born again, and athletes; see Appendix N for descriptions of dummy codes  
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(significant at only the .1 level) less supportive of the Afghanistan War’s justifiability.  
For the Afghanistan War, of all the group means reported in Table 77, the most robust 
antiwar mean scores belong to liberals (2.40), Democrats (2.39), non-Christians (2.38), 
and non-sports fans (2.37) followed by females (2.34). The most robust prowar mean 
scores belong to Republicans (1.90), literalists (1.96), and evangelicals (2.06). Other 
groups ranking as relatively prowar are moderates and conservatives (2.09), attenders 
(2.13), Christians (2.14), Catholics (2.14), males (2.15), and sports fans (2.19). 
Questioning Means and Ends: Aerial Bombing and Predator Drones 
 By 2010, fifty-six nations were developing robotic weapons (Markoff 2010). A 
few years ago, the US Department of Defense even predicted that a third of US fighting 
strength would consist of robots by 2015, though such a rapid shift has been doubted by 
experts (Hudson 2011). For the U.S. government, the obvious advantage of utilizing 
robots and remote-controlled drones is that it limits soldier casualties. Since the Vietnam 
War, U.S. military leaders have actively sought to “manage casualties” to maintain 
support of the U.S. public (Joseph 2007). Similarly, some scholars use polling data to 
divide the U.S. public into four categories including “solid doves,” “solid hawks,” a 
“casualty-phobic” group which reacts to war-inflicted American military deaths, and a 
“defeat-phobic” group which reacts to perceived war success and failure (Feaver and 
Gelpi 2004). Joseph (2007) believes the latter two categories comprise some 50 to 60% 
of the U.S. population that function as an actual and potential opposition to war, 
combined with the 15 to 20% of the population who are “solid doves.” Clearly, the 
implication here is that the effective use of robots and drones (i.e., serving to avoid U.S. 
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military casualties and help the military “succeed”) can potentially manage to hold off the 
majority of the U.S. public’s potential opposition to war.       
 Collins (1974) theorized that “callous cruelty is especially characteristic of large-
scale, bureaucratic organization, the violence of the modern army and state” (p.432). In 
their forms of organization, impersonal routinized interactions, democratic bureaucracies 
and modern armies are highly susceptible to callous cruelty. Of U.S. bombing campaigns 
in Vietnam, Collins writes,  
it is not surprising that the use of long-distance, bureaucratically administered 
weapons should produce appalling atrocities. The long chain of information 
reporting and the very impersonality of communications categories served to keep 
much of the human consequences from the awareness of not only the American 
public, but of the soldiers themselves; but enough leaked through to create the 
most extreme sense of schizophrenia between the low-key personal relationships 
within the modern military and their vicious consequences for its victims. (p.434) 
 
Little has changed in the bureaucratic organization and attitudes in the decades since. A 
poll conducted in October of 2001 found that almost 80% of American college students 
supported the U.S. bombing strategy in Afghanistan (Over 2004, p.121). A Gallup survey 
conducted in March of 2013 found that 65% of Americans (79% of Republicans versus 
55% of Democrats and 61% of Independents) support drone attacks on terrorists abroad 
(Brown and Newport 2013).  
 Gallup also found that Americans are split between those who are following news 
about the government’s use of drones and those who are not:  
49% are following news about the drones very or somewhat closely, while the 
same percentage is following the news not too closely or not at all. The 49% 
‘closely following’ number is below the 61% average across more than 200 news 
events that Gallup has measured in this way... Republicans (59%) are more likely 
than Democrats (45%) or independents (48%) to say they are following the news 
about drones very or somewhat closely. (Brown and Newport 2013) 
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Hence, those who are engaged with media coverage of drones are more likely to support 
their use. In support of the obvious notion that knowledge is needed to hold opinions, 
Gallup found that “those not following the news closely are less likely to have an opinion 
in either direction” on several potential uses of drones (Brown and Newport 2013). 
 The U.S. survey includes a section (see Appendix A, Q12) testing attitudes 
towards aerial bombing campaigns and attacks by predator drones. This section probes 
whether respondents consider such military strategies to be 1) “smart strategy,” 2) 
“morally justified,” 3) “brave.” This section was designed to test hypotheses articulated 
by Kaplowitz (1973), which assert that we all (social scientists and the average person) 
tend to “allow our moral judgments to influence our strategic judgments and vice versa” 
(Gamson 1975, p.72). More precisely, if there is a lack of clarity on the strategically 
rational course of action, then “people will tend to believe that the normatively desirable 
course of action is also strategically rational” (p.73). Likewise, if there is a lack of clarity 
on the moral or normative criteria for a given course of action, then “people will tend to 
believe that the strategically rational choice is the normative one” (p.73), i.e., the choice 
of action that should be taken on account of moral and ethical considerations. 
 This would seem to explain many areas of interaction between strategic and 
ethical orientations, including some of the differences between principled and pragmatic 
nonviolence. Pragmatic nonviolent adherents are those who believe nonviolence is not 
always sufficient strategically, thus violence is permissible morally, and to insist on 
nonviolent strategy when it is ineffective is immoral and irresponsible. Conversely, 
principled/ Gandhian nonviolent adherents, at least ideal typically, believe nonviolence is 
always sufficient, always moral, always responsible (see Eddy 2012). 
298 
 Given that the U.S. has the technological capacity for these two strategies (aerial 
bombardment and drone attacks), and the U.S. policy goal of limiting U.S. casualties has 
become a normative criterion, following Kaplowitz, I hypothesized that respondents who 
say each action is smart strategy will also affirm they are morally justified in the next 
question. Likewise, those who said they were not smart strategies would also claim they 
were not morally justified. That is, I expected the first two questions to be highly 
correlated. 
 In the introduction to this set of three questions, I explain that the U.S. military 
leadership has employed these two strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan, so there is an 
element of testing susceptibility to “elite cues” in these questions as well. There may be a 
tendency to conclude if U.S. military leaders are already employing these strategies they 
must be smart strategy, they must be morally justified. Similarly, the question on bravery 
was meant to probe whether respondents were capable of any critique at all of the U.S. 
military. Clearly, aerial bombing strategies where enemies do not possess anti-aircraft 
technologies (as detailed in the question) and the use of drones are not brave or 
courageous by any definition.  
 The category of bravery encompasses cultural “honor codes” (Appiah 2010), or 
the norms of “honor cultures” (Felson and Pare 2010), and approaches the realm of moral 
ideals. Gandhi was one who consistently emphasized a connection between courage and 
morality, as he believed that “courage is a major index of moral stature” (Horsburgh 
1968, p.64n). This view led him to often praise soldiers, but these statements have often 
been taken out of context, misunderstood, and co-opted by those who wish to make 
Gandhi over into an advocate of political violence and just wars in some situations (Eddy 
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2012). Nevertheless, it seems clear that Gandhi often romanticized the courage of 
soldiers, and neglected how the “courage” of soldiers is created through methods of 
social control (Collins 2008). For instance, the “firing ratios” of soldiers have often been 
quite low historically, but depending on the social organization of the military, firing 
ratios can and have been raised (Collins 2008). Hence, in a sense, Gandhi was right to 
admire the average soldier of his time – it seems many of them were bravely willing to 
die, but not to kill. 
 At a July 4th celebration parade in the small town of Harrisburg, Oregon in 2008, I 
saw a Veterans of Foreign Wars float featuring numerous military posters on the side 
including a picture of a predator drone and the incredible tag line below: “Unmanned and 
Unafraid.” To be sure, the glorification of military technology is nothing new, but 
attributing bravery to robots, or robots operated by humans working thousands of miles 
from the battlefield is a peculiar development.    
 Appiah (2010) argues that honor and morality can be distinctive spheres, and 
demonstrates the strong links between honor and respect, dignity, and shame. Appiah 
suggests that shifts in conceptions of honor can bring about moral revolutions. For this 
reason, there is a great deal at stake in the military’s attempt to co-opt notions of courage. 
 The use of aerial bombardment and drones flags one of the contradictions at the 
heart of warfare (another key contradiction is the central role of almost child-like 
obedience to superiors in soldiering as opposed to traditional notions of bravery aswillful, 
“masculine” independence (Koenigsberg 2009)) since the relative disappearance of hand-
to-hand combat and the invention of forms of long-range missile firing including 
slingshots, catapults, guns, canons, and technologically-directed bombs. Conceivably, 
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such technologies could have been understood as un-masculine or cowardly, and with 
drones operated by soldiers thousands of miles from the battlefield we observe the 
technician/ the computer nerd’s full eclipse of the traditionally masculine and courageous 
soldier. Indeed, one wonders if these tensions with traditional martial virtues may 
contribute to the “stress” said to be felt by military personnel charged with flying the 
drones from the safety of 7,000 miles away. Yet, two of the main media investigations of 
drone operators to date made no mention of any possible sense of shame about the work. 
Rather, soldiers spoke of feeling proud about being able to protect and save the lives of 
U.S. soldiers on the ground (Logan 2009, Lindlaw 2008).  
 Seemingly aware of these deep contradictions between technology and traditional 
notions of courage, but also seeking to accommodate their bureaucracy to the changing 
nature of warfare, the Pentagon sought to create a new definition of the situation, giving 
in it seems to hubris and over-confidence in their abilities to unleash successful 
propaganda campaigns that deny tradition if not basic realities. In early 2013, the U.S. 
Defense Department announced a new military medal, the “Distinguished Warfare 
Medal,” for cyber warriors and remotely-piloted aircraft operators. The incredible mis-
step was that the Defense Department ranked this medal above combat medals for 
bravery such as the Bronze Star and the Purple Heart. A backlash followed, including a 
letter signed by 22 Senators which argued that assigning the new medal this high ranking 
in the hierarchy of medals “...diminishes the significance of awards earned by risking 
one's life in direct combat or through acts of heroism” (Terkel 2013).  
 Another side to this debate is that masculinity is not homogeneous, and so we 
must speak of masculinities which are segmented along occupational lines. Men in blue-
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collar jobs often “perform” masculinity through brute strength, men in white collar 
managerial positions often perform masculinity through aggressive risk-taking in pursuit 
of corporate profits, and men in engineering professions perform masculinity by 
mastering cutting-edge technology (Messerschmidt 1995). Of course, these insights 
suggest there is no inherent contradiction between masculinity, courage, and technology. 
Indeed, to suggest this would be to reify all three concepts. But there remains a potential 
and at least dimly perceived contradiction between all three concepts, and this may be 
linked to the male division of labor in society and the different class-based performances 
of masculinity identified by Messerschmidt (1995). Nevertheless, it seems that 
technology has evolved within Western culture and militaries in such a way that the use 
of military technologies is very often perceived as masculine and brave.   
 Table 78 below shows that the overall sample means had the highest level of 
agreement for interpreting these tactics as “smart strategy,” while the means on the issue 
of “morally justified” approached disagreement and the issue of “brave” leaned slightly 
towards disagreement. We can see that respondents tended to cluster around the mid-
points and avoid the extremes of “Strongly” Agree/ Disagree on all questions. Overall, 
60.2% of respondents agreed (whether checking “Strongly Agree” or “Agree”) that 
dropping bombs from 40,000 feet was “smart strategy,” but only 22.59% called it 
“morally justified,” and 20.72% called it “brave.” Overall, 63.52% of respondents agreed 
(whether checking “Strongly Agree” or “Agree”) that using predator drones to drop 
bombs was “smart strategy,” but only 25.58% called it “morally justified,” and 16.24% 
called it “brave.” One conclusion here is that in the controlled and structured setting of an 
anonymous survey, strong majorities of respondents were able to marshal a negative 
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critique of military policy in the form of disagreeing with the statements that predator 
drones and dropping bombs from airplanes flying at 40,000 feet (where enemies have no 
anti-aircraft technologies) are “morally justified” or “brave” tactics. Yet, majorities 
affirmed both tactics were “smart strategy.” Thus, it would seem in the minds of most 
respondents there is a disconnect between smart strategy, ethics, and the traditional 
military virtue of courage. Moreover, this disconnect is partly created by technological 
capabilities and in particular, technological advantages over enemies.  
Table 78. UO Data: Probing Interpretations of Aerial Bombardment and Drones (N=397) 
Q12. The U.S. military has used a variety of strategies to attack enemies in Afghanistan and Iraq, including bombing 
campaigns conducted by predator drones (un-manned aircraft) and dropping bombs from airplanes flying at 40,000 feet 
(beyond the reach of enemies in Iraq and Afghanistan who lack anti-aircraft technology). Rate your level of agreement 
or disagreement with the following statements: 
Question Strongly 
Agree (1) 
Agree (2) Disagree (3) Strongly 
Disagree (4) 
Mean 
1. Dropping bombs 
from airplanes 
flying at 40,000 
feet is a smart 
strategy. 
 
17.88% 
 
42.32% 
 
24.69% 
 
15.11% 
 
2.37 
2. …is morally 
justified. 
4.57% 18.02% 50.25% 27.16% 3.00 
3. …is brave. 3.84% 16.88% 47.06% 32.33% 3.08 
4. Using predator 
drones to drop 
bombs is a smart 
strategy.  
 
17.6% 
 
45.92% 
 
22.19% 
 
14.29% 
 
2.33 
5. …is morally 
justified. 
5.63% 19.95% 47.57% 26.85% 2.96 
6. …is brave. 2.28% 13.96% 47.21% 36.55% 3.18 
 
 
 Randall Collins (2008) has argued that most forms of violence and interpersonal 
violence involve lopsided power relations. Collins persuasively refutes crucial 
components of the widespread mythology of violence as he debunks the “formula that the 
fighters are brave, competent, and evenly matched…The reality is almost entirely the 
opposite” (pp.39-40). For example, vendettas are one category of “honor confrontations,” 
but they are “not fair fights…Instead, the aim is to apply overwhelming superiority when 
it is one’s turn to dominate (pp.223-224). Of course, asymmetric warfare has been the 
303 
norm in imperial adventures. Collins also argues that humans are genetically hard-wired 
for cooperation and killing is very difficult, thus very few are “competent” in their use of 
violence. Rather than bravery, soldiers are surrounded by an emotional field of fear 
precisely because they do not want to kill. This biological/ evolutionary argument may 
strike some sociologists as too essentialist, however Collins builds a thoroughly 
sociological argument that killing becomes much easier with changes in the social 
organization of military troops (e.g., group-operated weapons raise firing ratios in war), 
training (e.g., training which makes shooting guns a reflex), and technology which makes 
killing from long-distance the norm.  
 A closer analysis of the data offers partial support for the Kaplowitz (1973) 
hypothesis – those who affirmed aerial bombardment from planes and drones as “smart 
strategy,” were much more likely to affirm these strategies are “morally justified” and 
even “brave” than those respondents who rejected their strategic value. Likewise, those 
who initially disagreed that these were smart strategies, almost unanimously condemned 
them as morally unjustified and also believe these strategies are not brave. The results 
reported below demonstrate these findings. 
 While the data is suggestive, it is somewhat crude in that it may simply test 
respondent willingness/ tolerance or aversion/ intolerance for answering closely related 
questions inconsistently. On the other hand, this is precisely what we aimed to test – how 
respondents deal with contradictions when it comes to drones and aerial bombing. 
Nevertheless, perhaps a slightly more robust test would have spaced out the questions 
within the survey form or utilized computer screen changes after each question, to 
prevent answer alterations or highly conscious efforts to make answers consistent. Table 
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79 below shows that, of those who “Disagree” or “Strongly Disagree” that bombing from 
airplanes is “smart strategy” in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, only 2.52% agree that it is 
“morally justified,” and the vast majority (97.49%) believe it cannot be “morally 
justified.” Table 80 below shows that, of those who “Disagree” or “Strongly Disagree” 
that bombing from airplanes is “smart strategy,” only 7.01% agree that it is “brave,” and 
the vast majority (92.99%) believe it is not “brave” in the cases of the Iraq and 
Afghanistan wars where the enemy does not possess anti-aircraft technology.  
 
Table 79. Sub-Sample of Q12_2: Respondents Who Disagree that Bombing from 
Airplanes is “Smart Strategy” in Q12_1 
Q12_2 Freq. % 
Strongly Agree (1) 2 1.26 
Agree (2) 2 1.26 
Disagree (3) 77 48.43 
Strongly Disagree (4) 78 49.06 
Total 159 100.00 
Notes: Question 12_2 = “Dropping bombs from airplanes flying at 40,000 feet is morally justified.” 
Answer values: 1=Strongly Agree; 2=Agree; 3=Disagree; 4=Strongly Disagree; STATA command: 
tabulate Q12_2 if ( Q12_1>2) 
 
Table 80. Sub-Sample of Q12_3: Respondents Who Disagree that Bombing From 
Airplanes is “Smart Strategy” in Q12_1 
Q12_3 Freq. % 
Strongly Agree (1) 1 0.64 
Agree (2) 10 6.37 
Disagree (3) 68 43.31 
Strongly Disagree (4) 78 49.68 
Total 157 100.00 
Notes: Question 12_3 = “Dropping bombs from airplanes flying at 40,000 feet is brave.” Answer values: 
1=Strongly Agree; 2=Agree; 3=Disagree; 4=Strongly Disagree; STATA command: tabulate Q12_3 if 
(Q12_1>2) 
 
 Of those who “Strongly agree” or “Agree” that dropping bombs from airplanes is 
“smart strategy,” we see their responses in Table 81. Of those who “Strongly agree” or 
“Agree” that dropping bombs from airplanes is “smart strategy,” 36.17% agree that it is 
“morally justified,” but the majority (63.83%) believe it is not morally justified. 
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Nevertheless, we see that respondents who affirm aerial bombardment as “smart 
strategy,” are much more likely to claim it is also “morally justified” than those 
respondents who initially rejected its strategic value (in Table 80). 
 In Table 82 below we see that of those who “Strongly agree” or “Agree” that 
dropping bombs from airplanes is “smart strategy,” 29.91% agree that it is “brave,” but 
the majority (70.08%) believe it is not brave. Nevertheless, we see that respondents who 
affirm aerial bombardment from airplanes as “smart strategy,” are much more likely to 
claim it is also “brave”than those respondents who initially rejected its strategic value (in 
Table 80). 
Table 81. Sub-Sample of Q12_2: Respondents who Agree that Bombing from Airplanes 
is “Smart Strategy” in Q12_1 
Q12_2 Freq. % 
Strongly Agree (1) 16 6.81 
Agree (2) 69 29.36 
Disagree (3) 121 51.49 
Strongly Disagree (4) 29 12.34 
Total 235 100.00 
Notes: Question 12_2 = “Dropping bombs from airplanes flying at 40,000 feet is morally justified.” 
Answer values: 1=Strongly Agree; 2=Agree; 3=Disagree; 4=Strongly Disagree; STATA command: 
tabulate Q12_2 if ( Q12_1<3)  
 
Table 82. Sub-Sample: Respondents Who Agree that Bombing from Airplanes is “Smart 
Strategy” in Q12_1 
Q12_3 Freq. % 
Strongly Agree (1) 14 5.98 
Agree (2) 56 23.93 
Disagree (3) 116 49.57 
Strongly Disagree (4) 48 20.51 
Total 234 100.00 
Notes: Question 12_3 = “Dropping bombs from airplanes flying at 40,000 feet is brave.” Answer values: 
1=Strongly Agree; 2=Agree; 3=Disagree; 4=Strongly Disagree; STATA command: tab  Q12_3 if 
(Q12_1<3)  
 
 Similar results were found on the questions concerning drone use. Table 83 
showsthat, of those who “Disagree” or “Strongly Disagree” that bombing from drones is 
“smart strategy” in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, only 4.11% agree that it is “morally 
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justified,” and the vast majority (95.9%) feel that it cannot be “morally justified.” Table 
84 shows that, of those who “Disagree” or “Strongly Disagree” that dropping bombs 
from drones is “smart strategy,” only 6.12% agree that it is “brave,” and the vast majority 
(93.88%) feel that it is not “brave.”  
 Table 85 shows that, of those who “Agree” or “Strongly Agree” that bombing 
from drones is “smart strategy,” 38.37% agree that it is “morally justified,” but the 
majority (61.63%) believe that it is not “morally justified.” Nevertheless, we see that 
respondents who affirm drones as “smart strategy” are much more likely to claim it is 
also “morally justified,” than those respondents who initially rejected its strategic value. 
 Table 86 below shows that, of those who “Agree” or “Strongly Agree” that 
bombing from drones is “smart strategy,” only 22.27% agree that it is “brave,” and the 
majority (77.73%) believe that it is not “brave.” Nevertheless, we see that respondents 
who affirm drones as “smart strategy” are much more likely to claim it is also “brave,” 
than those respondents who initially rejected its strategic value. 
 Similar to Bandura’s (1990, 1996) theories of moral disengagement, Zygmunt 
Bauman (1995) theorizes that “there is more than a casual connection between the ability 
to commit cruel deeds and moral insensitivity. To make massive participation in cruel 
Table 83. Sub-Sample: Respondents who Disagree that Bombing from Drones is “Smart 
Strategy” in Q12_4 
Q12_5 Freq. % 
Strongly Agree (1) 2 1.37 
Agree (2) 4 2.74 
Disagree (3) 68 46.58 
Strongly Disagree (4) 72 49.32 
Total 146 100.00 
Notes: Question 12_5 = “Using predator drones to drop bombs is morally justified.” Answer values: 
1=Strongly Agree; 2=Agree; 3=Disagree; 4=Strongly Disagree; STATA command: tabulate Q12_5 if 
(Q12_4>2) 
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Table 84. Sub-Sample: Respondents Who Disagree that Bombing from Drones is “Smart 
Strategy” in Q12_4 
Q12_6 Freq. % 
Strongly Agree (1) 1 0.68 
Agree (2) 8 5.44 
Disagree (3) 64 43.54 
Strongly Disagree (4) 74 50.34 
Total 147 100.00 
Notes: Question 12_6 = “Using predator drones to drop bombs is brave.” Answer values: 1=Strongly 
Agree; 2=Agree; 3=Disagree; 4=Strongly Disagree; STATA command: tabulate Q12_6 if (Q12_4 > 2) 
 
Table 85. Sub-Sample: Respondents Who Agree that Bombing from Drones is “Smart 
Strategy” in Q12_4 
Q12_5 Freq. % 
Strongly Agree (1) 20 8.16 
Agree (2) 74 30.20 
Disagree (3) 118 48.16 
Strongly Disagree (4) 33 13.47 
Total 245 100.00 
Notes: Question 12_5 = “Using predator drones to drop bombs is morally justified.” Answer values: 
1=Strongly Agree; 2=Agree; 3=Disagree; 4=Strongly Disagree; STATA command: tab  Q12_5 if ( 
Q12_4<3) 
 
Table 86. Sub-Sample: Respondents Who Agree that Bombing from Drones is “Smart 
Strategy” in Q12_4 
Q12_6 Freq. % 
Strongly Agree (1) 8 3.24 
Agree (2) 47 19.03 
Disagree (3) 122 49.39 
Strongly Disagree (4) 70 28.34 
Total 247 100.00 
Notes: Question 12_6 = “Using predator drones to drop bombs is brave.” Answer values: 1=Strongly 
Agree; 2=Agree; 3=Disagree; 4=Strongly Disagree; STATA command: tab  Q12_6 if ( Q12_4<3) 
 
deeds possible, the link between moral guilt and the act which the participation entails 
must be severed” (p.148).  
 Gamson (1975) deftly condenses Kaplowitz’s two hypotheses as follows. First, 
“[if] strategic rationality does not clearly specify a course of action as desirable but 
normative criteria do, people will tend to believe that the normatively desirable course of 
action is also strategically rational” (pp.72-73).  Second, “[if] normative criteria do not 
clearly specify a course of action while strategic criteria do, people will tend to believe 
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that the strategically rational choice is the more normative one” (p.73).   In other words, 
behavior can be framed by two interacting tendencies: “people behave strategically 
within the limits of certain norms….[and] people think in normative terms within certain 
strategic limits” (Kaplowitz 1973, p.572).   
 In a chapter-length treatment, the community organizer and grassroots political 
strategies Saul Alinsky (1971) has indirectly attempted to answer that question. Alinsky’s 
significance rests in the fact that he has influenced how both liberals and conservatives in 
the U.S. think about community organizing, political strategy and tactics (Williamson 
2012). Alinsky theorizes that the thinking of social actors regarding means and ends can 
be summarized in the following eleven propositions. Alinsky insists that we must place 
issues in their historical context and understand the interrelationality of means and ends. 
To contemplate whether the end justifies the means is too abstract. Alinsky argues that 
the real question has always been “Does this particular end justify this particular 
means?” (p.47). Below I analyze and critique Alinsky’s eleven propositions on “the 
ethics of means and ends.” These propositions are as follows: 
 1. “One’s concern with the ethics of means and ends varies inversely with one’s 
personal interest in the issue....[and] one’s distance from the scene of conflict” (p.26). 
The statement can be taken as a critique of principled nonviolent activists. It verges on 
the punt of a moral relativist which seeks to separate the unity of means and ends (which 
principled/ Gandhian nonviolent activists adhere to) and which neglects the strategic 
efficacy of moral means like nonviolence. It seems to imply that when one is closely 
linked to grievances and injustices (e.g., if one is a victim of terrorism), one has no moral 
reservations about using drones, violence or other questionable means. Perhaps more 
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precisely,it is a critique of inactive pacifists or non-militant nonviolent activists that is 
time and culture/ organization-bound rather than universal. Certainly, King and the SCLC 
had great personal interest in achieving civil rights reforms and they held to the 
importance of ethical means because of their moral and strategic value.  
 On the whole, this principle strikes a false note: U.S. and world citizens 
concerned about terrorism have advocated a strategy that rejects the use of drone attacks, 
and which embraces a police model of finding the terrorists, apprehending them and 
prosecuting them in legal trials. Rather than bomb the neighborhood where suspected 
terrorists live, an act likely to create more terrorists, this view promotes international law 
and rejects the mimetic violence (i.e., imitating the violent terrorism of terrorists) of 
drone attacks.   
 2. “The judgment of the ethics of means is dependent on the political position of 
those sitting in judgment” (p.26). Here we have a basic standpoint theory of the sociology 
of knowledge. Few pieces of evidence could be more startling here than Alinsky’s 
observation that “Eight months after securing independence, the Indian National 
Congress outlawed passive resistance and made it a crime” (p.43). Also after India’s 
independence, when India still lacked nuclear weapons, Prime Minister Nehru called the 
world to abandon the cold war’s “fear complex,” and to abandon nuclear weapons. Citing 
Mohandas Gandhi’s nonviolent victory through the conquest of fear, Nehru argued that 
Gandhi’s teachings could end fear and the cold war. Further, he added that India is 
unafraid, “not only have we not got an atom bomb, we rejoice in not having an atom 
bomb” (AP 1954?). But by 1974 India was testing nuclear weapons, and in 2012 India 
celebrated its 63rd Republic Day with a military parade in which the Agni-IV missile, 
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which delivers a one-ton nuclear warhead, rolled through the streets of New Delhi as a 
symbol of national pride (Bhattacharya 2012). Or consider Chomsky’s contention two 
decades ago, hardly in need of revision today, that “If the Nuremberg laws were applied, 
then every post-war American president would have been hanged” (Chomsky 1990). In 
other words, U.S. hegemonic power prevents ethical judgments against itself, much as 
Alinsky theorizes here. 
 3. “In war, the end justifies almost any means” (p.29). Even if we accept this 
proposition as accurate phenomenologically, we still have to account for how social 
actors define the “almost” – whether by referencing international law or other ethical 
norms.  
 4. “Judgment must be made in the context of the times in which the action 
occurred and not from any other chronological vantage point...Ethical standards must be 
elastic to stretch with the times” (pp.30-31). This is a basic claim of situational ethicists 
over against those who claim to adhere to universal, trans-historical ethical norms.   
 5. “Concern with ethics increases with the number of means available and vice 
versa” (p.32). Alinsky’s “realism” and pragmatic utilitarianism emerges very clearly here 
as he writes, “To the man [sic] of action...Reviewing and selecting available means is 
done on a straight utilitarian basis – will it work? Moral questions may enter when one 
chooses among equally effective alternate means. But if one lacks the luxury of choice 
and is possessed of only one means, then the ethical question will never arise; 
automatically the lone means becomes endowed with a moral spirit. Its defense lies in the 
cry, ‘What else could I do?’” (p.32). Again, Alinsky’s utilitarianism is transparently 
clear: “To me ethics is doing what is best for the most” (p.33).  
311 
 6. “The less important the end to be desired, the more one can afford to engage in 
ethical evaluations of means” (p.34). This principle can supply a “realpolitiks”or a 
“Machiavelian” (Bharadwaj, 1998) critique of nonviolence. It implies that principled 
nonviolent adherents are privileged actors, not really committed to social change.  
 7. “Generally, success or failure is a mighty determinant of ethics” (p.34). This 
restates the Kaplowitz hypothesis above. As one example, I would point to Robert 
McNamara who recounts that his superior, General Curtis E. LeMay argued that if the 
U.S. lost the war, they would be prosecuted as war criminals for their role in the 
firebombing of Japanese cities. In retrospect McNamara concurred – they were “behaving 
as war criminals,” and he confessed the only reason such American actions were not 
categorized as “immoral” was because the U.S. won the war (Wiener 2009). 
 8. “The morality of a means depends upon whether the means is being employed 
at a time of imminent defeat or imminent victory” (p.34). Alinsky here uses the example 
of the U.S.’s decision to drop the atomic bomb which sparked a universal moral debate 
because “Defeat for Japan was an absolute certainty...” (p.35). By contrast, Alinsky 
suggests that if the atomic bomb had been developed and dropped shortly after the attack 
on Pearl Harbor, when Japan’s defeat was not at all certain, then “the use of the bomb at 
that time on Japan would have been universally heralded as a just retribution...The 
question of the ethics of the use of the bomb would never have arisen...” (p.35).      
 9. “Any effective means is automatically judged by the opposition as being 
unethical” (p.35). Here, Alinsky comes very close to asserting that war is only anarchy 
and chaos, an assumption that resonates with realpolitik’s view of the international arena. 
However, a critique is in order here - those who insist on ethical norms are not merely 
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sore losers among the opposition. Rather, there are third-parties who also judge the 
morality of means and ends, and in our globalized world, their views expressed through 
institutional means like the United Nations can matter a great deal. 
 10. “You do what you can with what you have and clothe it with moral 
arguments” (p.36). “All effective actions require the passport of morality” 
(p.44).Similarly, 11. “Goals must be phrased in general terms like ‘Liberty, Equality, 
Fraternity,’ ‘Of the Common Welfare,’ ‘Pursuit of Happiness,’ or ‘Bread and Peace’” 
(p.45). There is little doubt that U.S. Presidents have long adhered to this rule in their 
tactical playbook. 
 In many of these rules, Alinsky’s realism stands starkly opposed to principled/ 
Gandhian nonviolence. For Alinsky, guiding ethical ideals within a political/ resistance 
campaign are conceived as a frill and a luxury, rather than as crucially important in 
mobilizing resistance/ activists, attracting allies, or converting opponents as Gandhian 
nonviolence aims for. From a Gandhian point of view, Alinsky is misguided in his 
consistent separation of means and ends. While Alinsky does recognize that activists/ 
revolutionaries/ campaigners and their opponents all seek to cloak their strategies in 
moral legitimation, he neglects complexities in the social construction of reality. Namely, 
he misses the fact that only a purely tribalistic perspective would utterly neglect strategic 
and ethical norms outside the group/ campaign leadership. I would also contend that 
many of Alinsky rules are ahistorical, since research shows that the resistance campaigns 
which attract the largest numbers of participants have almost always been nonviolent 
campaigns (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011).  
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CHAPTER III 
SEARCHING FOR CORRELATES OF NONVIOLENT ATTITUDES 
ANALYSIS OF THE CROSS-NATIONAL DATA SET 
 Which nations express the most peaceful attitudes? To what degree do democratic 
governance, religious traditions, and historical experiences of war or nonviolent 
revolutions shape attitudes towards nonviolence and violence? Among other questions we 
will considerwhat role the following might play in shaping cross-national opinions about 
violence and nonviolence: 1) Structural peace; 2) Modernization, industrialization, and 
democracy; 3) Education; 4) History/ collective memory.  
 In recent years, there has been a surge in optimistic assertions that over the course 
of several centuries the world has become more peaceful. Many of these claims are based 
on strong empirical data from interdisciplinary work blending archaeology, anthropology, 
history, sociology, psychology, and criminology. The bottom line is that scholars have 
charted significant declines in war deaths, murders, and other forms of violence over the 
centuries, and in many regions of the world these trends have continued even in recent 
decades (Pinker 2011, Goldstein 2011).  
 But, with these clear downward trends in multiple forms of physical violence 
(laying aside, for the moment, the notion that poverty is a deadly form of structural 
violence), have attitudes around the world also become more peaceful? If so, are these 
attitudes grounded in increasing rationality/ cosmopolitanism/ moral sensibilities through 
education, through the spread of democracy or the transnational market links of global 
capitalism, through increasing respect for and transnational networks supporting human 
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rights and international law, or through forms of social control and law enforcement via a 
strong government (i.e., a Leviathan)?  
 In the contemporary period, contradictory perceptions of the historical, cultural 
and biological underpinnings of violence and nonviolence are commonplace, whether 
analysts make philosophical assumptions about “human nature” or aim to interpret 
religious-mythological narratives (e.g., what Jesus meant by “turn the other cheek”) or 
trace evidence of humanity’s evolutionary hard-wiring (e.g., Collins 2008). For instance, 
just 15 years ago, the seminal scholar of religion Walter Wink (1998) called the “myth of 
redemptive violence” the “real myth” and “dominant religion” in the world today (p.42). 
Similarly, Wink (1992) has claimed, “No other religious system has ever remotely rivaled 
the myth of redemptive violence in its ability to catechize its young so totally” (p.23). 
Such claims ring a profoundly discordant note, contradicting the new global peace 
trumpeted by Pinker (2011). 
 Optimistic assessments of modernity as a progressive, peaceful force have a long 
history among social theorists. Kant’s theory of the “democratic peace” is only one 
example of this. Comte, Schumpeter (1919) and Veblen (1919) agreed that industrialized 
societies were “more pacific social formations” than preindustrial societies (Cohen 1986, 
p.256). Schumpeter (1919) described imperialism and militaristic belligerence as 
“essentially noncapitalist. Indeed [such modes of thought] vanish most quickly wherever 
capitalism fully prevails” (p.124). Nevertheless, Schumpeter saw that in many places, the 
ideology and economy of the modern bourgeoisie was still held captive by preindustrial, 
aristocratic/ autocratic “imperialist absolutism” (p.124). More recently, Pinker (2011) 
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extends Norbert Elias’s theory of a “civilizing process” at the heart of various forces 
within modernity. 
 While Marx had a very different vision of industrialization as a force precipitating 
inevitable class conflict and revolutionary violence, Dwight Macdonald (1946) argued 
that Marx missed the significance of the economy and ideology of perpetual war. 
Macdonald suggested that without “an adequate theory of the political significance of 
war...modern socialism will continue to have a somewhat academic flavor” (cited in 
Hedges 2010, p.20). Against the view that the modern masses were essentially peaceful, 
Max Weber contended that “the citizens of the emerging democracies and industrial 
states could be easily swayed by appeals to patriotism and class interest” (Cortright 2008, 
p.305). And, theorists like Randall Collins (1974) have argued that modern bureaucratic 
forms of governance, social organization and rationality – including those embodied in 
democratic bureaucracies, have demonstrated an historically unique capacity to foster and 
reproduce a modern form of cruelty he terms “callous cruelty.” Similarly, numerous 
scholars have argued that “moral disengagement” from violence is easily orchestrated by 
shrewd military and political leaders (Bandura 1990, 1996). And Zygmunt Bauman and 
Leonidas Donskis (2013) argue that “moral blindness” and everyday insensitivity are 
distinctive characteristics of what they call “liquid modernity.”  
 The social relations of capitalist societies have also been theorized as distinctively 
impersonal, as Marx identified the “callousness of the wage system in an impersonal 
market economy” (Collins 1974, p.432). And, modern capitalism has widened inequality 
and, like premodern inequality regimes of caste, legitimated it as utterly natural, denying 
the reality that inequality is “literally a killing field” (Therborn 2013). Toqueville, among 
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others, theorized that social inequality reproduces deep divides that serve to cultivate 
forms of belligerence and make it difficult for us to recognize our common humanity 
(Zeitlin 2001, p.95). Addressing contemporary capitalist societies, Bauman (2008) argues 
that “the consumer is the enemy of the citizen” (p.190), and so the modern trend toward 
consumer identities threatens informed democratic decision-making and humane politics.  
 Still others see modern multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism as carrying 
immense potentials for radical democracy, social justice, human rights, and individual 
emancipation. And, numerous urban theorists tie this liberatory potential explicitly to the 
“complex modern city,” as perhaps “the only kind of environment in which modern 
values can be realized” (Marshall Berman cited in Tajbakhsh 2001, p.162).             
 Pinker (2011) and Goldstein (2011) lead us to expect thatworldwide,peaceful and 
nonviolent attitudes should be growing and more prevalent in modern, developed nations. 
Pinker’s (2011) meta-analysis of the vast inter-disciplinary literature on violence, war, 
and peace suggests that five historical forces have driven declines in multiple forms of 
violence and reinforced peaceful attitudes: 
1) The “Leviathan”: a strong state with a strong judicial system and a monopoly on the 
use of legitimate force can deter various forms of violence from murder to civil 
war. There is also the potential for strengthening forms of an “international 
Leviathan” (p.166), such as the International Criminal Court, International Court 
of Justice, and the U.N.  
2) Commerce: the theory of “gentle commerce” or the market as a pacifying force is very 
old, but only recently has cross-national research by Russett and Oneal (2001) 
demonstrated that it explains even more of the variance in peace than democracy: 
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countries open to the global economy were less likely to engage in militarized 
conflicts.   
3) The increasing “feminization of cultures”: where women are empowered, cultures tend 
to move away from the glorification of violence. 
4) Increasing cognitive and relational cosmopolitanism which can be related to increasing 
literacy, mobility, urbanization, and the mass media – all of which can enlarge 
circles of sympathy. 
5) Growth in rationality/ reason (increasing education can be taken as one proxy for this). 
 Of course, declines in violence need not necessarily be predictive of declines in 
every form or level of violent attitudes, since traditions, norms, and metanarratives like 
the “myth of redemptive violence” (Wink 1998) are likely to have significant staying 
power. And, in tension with the sweeping, bird’s eye view of Pinker, Hegre and 
Sambanis (2006) argue that the literature on the causes of civil war has produced only 
two robust findings – the risk of civil war is more likely:1) the lower a nation’s average 
income (GDP per capita); 2) as a nation’s population increases (i.e., the risk of civil war 
is greater among larger nations). The authors of the GPI argue that one more factor with 
widespread consensus should be added to this list: if a nation has a history of war, and 
especially if there has been a recent war, civil war is more likely (GPI 2012, p.70). It 
seems this identification of a recent conflict furnishes the rationale for measuring a 
limited time span in the GPI’s only historical/ longitudinal variable (i.e., the only variable 
whose data spans across several years): Number of external and internal conflicts fought: 
2002-07 (GPI 2009)/ 2003-08 (GPI 2011)/ 2004-09 (GPI 2012) (see Appendix O). Thus, 
presently, the scientific consensus is that large nations, nations in poverty, and with a 
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history of conflict appear to have the greatest risk factors for civil war. But what about 
nonviolent and belligerent attitudes, do the above factors also predict attitudes? 
 
Possible Nation-Level Correlates of Violent/ Nonviolent Attitudes 
 
 Although we are focused on nonviolent attitudes, our main theoretical and 
empirical resource is the cross-national literature on violence which is more focused on 
various structural and cultural predictors of events (e.g., civil wars, low-intensity 
conflicts, and interstate wars). Our task is to probe the secondary effects and interactions 
these historical events might have on attitudes, as well as the effect structural and cultural 
factors play in shaping attitudes. The possible correlates of violent/ nonviolent attitudes 
to be tested, include the following numbered variables. 
 GDP per capita/ poverty and state as a Leviathan. Numerous studies have found 
that lower income per capita increases the likelihood of civil war (e.g., Fearon and Laitin 
2003, Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Consider that half of contemporary wars take place in 
nations with the poorest sixth of the people (Pinker 2011, p.305). Fearon and Laitin 
(2003) contend that income per capita is a proxy measure of state power (i.e., state as a 
Leviathan) and functioning including capabilities in governance, financial, police, and 
military sectors (Of course, rising GDP per capita is heavily associated with 
industrialization and capitalism). In terms of Pinker’s (2011) analysis of historical 
development and a long-term trajectory towards greater peace, this is a proxy indicator of 
whether the state is a “Leviathan” capable of preventing and resolving conflicts through 
the force of its power and reach. In fact, Holtermann (2012) found that the negative 
association between GDP per capita and the civil war risk disappeared when controlling 
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for “state reach” (measured by road density, telephone density, and % urban of the 
population), but remained robust controlling for poverty (measured by the mean income 
of the poorest decile). Thus, Holtermann argues that it is not poverty, but rather “low 
state reach and capacity give political and military opportunity for organizing 
insurgency” (p.56). The mountainous variable below is another proxy indicator for this.     
 Extending the Leviathan theory to international conflict, it would predict that the 
existence of hegemonic military powers should help maintain global peace as in the 
periods of the supposed “Pax Britannica” and “Pax Americana.” But Russett and Oneal 
(2001) found no evidence that these periods were more peaceful (pp.188-189), though 
they operationalize conflict not as a war (generally defined as at least 1,000 battle deaths 
a year), but as any form and degree of a “militarized interstate dispute.”  
 Population size of nation. One of the most robust findings of the cross-national 
research on civil wars is that nations with larger populations are more at risk for civil war 
(Hegre and Sambanis 2006). History suggests that many large nations are more 
belligerent, while small nations rely on diplomacy more consistently. 
 History of war vs. history of significant nonviolent movements. The effectsof 
successful nonviolent movements on mass attitudes has not been studied in a systematic 
cross-national analysis, but it was assumed that these movements would buttress 
confidence in nonviolent efficacy measured at the nation-level. In a study of the U.S. and 
13 European nations, Listhaug (1986) found that historical experiences of defeat and 
sufferings in war shaped reported levels of “fear of war” and “willingness to fight.” 
Citizens in nations that lost during WWII including Italy, West Germany, and Japan 
report being less willing to fight a new war (p.73). Listhaug (drawing samples from 
320 
Europe in the early 1980s) found that citizens in European nations that had experienced 
more suffering and costs during WWII were more likely to fear a future war and less 
willing to fight in a future war (p.73). Similarly, Basabe and Valencia (2007) found that 
willingness to fight was influenced by victory in WWII (p.417). Of course, in general, the 
history of war variable may also be a proxy for factors that are difficult to disentangle 
including: a sense of grievance or resentment which might motivate additional violence, 
“learning” the lessons of war/ gaining antiwar knowledge through experiences of war, 
and/ or feelings of geographical/ geopolitical vulnerability (Listhaug 1986).    
 Population density. Research on the role of population density in wars and 
conflicts has produced mixed results. In a cross-national study covering the periods 
between 1930-1989, Tir and Diehl (1998) found that population growth pressures had a 
significant but modest effect on the likelihood that a state would become involved in wars 
and militarized disputes.  
 Ehrlich and Ehrlich (1996) critique a Malthusian over-reliance on population 
density as an indicator of “population pressure” or a resource base crisis, naming it the 
“Netherlands fallacy.” However, they proceed to point out that the Netherlands “imports 
large amounts of food and extracts from other parts of the world much of the energy and 
virtually all the materials it requires. It uses an estimated seventeen times more land for 
food and energy than exists within its borders” (p.71). Thus, in poorer nations unable to 
import such vast quantities of food and resources, it seems unreasonable to dismiss as a 
fallacy the notion that higher population densities might contribute to forms of stress and 
conflict. In fact, studies of war and conflict propensities have had divergent findings 
depending on whether developed or undeveloped nations are sampled. A study by 
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Bremer et al. (1973) of the more developed European nations between 1816-1965 found 
that population density and population density change were not related to war propensity. 
But Choucri’s (1974) analysis of 45 underdeveloped nation between 1954-1972 found 
that population factors played a role in 35 out of 45 cases of war and lower-order 
conflicts. Population distribution (i.e., density, movement, and population pressure) and 
composition (i.e., youth bulges) played a bigger role than population size and change. 
Furthermore, we should note regional and time period differences in these two studies, as 
throughout the period of Bremer et al.’s study, Europeans often had viable immigration 
options to North America and Australia, serving as a release valve for population 
pressures, and changes in technology and the pace of globalization made the importation 
of food and resources more viable in the 20th century, especially in the developed nations. 
 In case study research, population density is often linked to conflict in 
underdeveloped nations. For instance, many agree that the 1994 genocide in Rwanda “is 
best understood as a contest between too many people on too little land” (Perry 2007, 
p.39). And, Durham (1979) contended that population pressures and land stress 
contributed to the Soccer War between Honduras and El Salvador. Likewise, the bloody 
civil war in Darfur (in western Sudan) has roots in ecology: overpopulation has been 
interacting with the shrinking size of fertile land as well as ethnic divisions (Perry 2007). 
Obviously, this demonstrates how it is actually the accumulation of factors (e.g., land 
fertility and availability, drought and climate change, ethnic dominance patterns, etc.) 
that interact with population density (or just population size relative to fertile land or 
wealth) which make it a significant factor, but in sometimes unpredictable ways. Thus, 
Urdal (2005) found some evidence that scarcity of potential cropland can have a 
322 
“pacifying effect,” but where scarcity combines with high rates of population growth, 
“the risk of armed conflict increases somewhat” (p.417). Sharply rising wheat prices 
appear to be one underacknowledged stressor contributing to civil conflicts in 7 Arab 
nations in 2011 (this region leads the world in reliance on wheat imports). And, a 
contributing factor in the ongoing civil war in Syria is that 60% of Syria’s land suffered 
the worst drought on record between 2006 and 2011, causing an exodus in which 800,000 
Syrians completely lost their livelihoods (Friedman 2013, March 5). Similarly, sudden 
changes in income linked to rainfall patterns in 41 African countries were found to drive 
civil conflict (Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti 2004). Some have theorized that 
population pressures are most likely to contribute to intrastate violence, especially ethnic 
civil wars (Homer-Dixon 1995), and low-intensity conflicts (Urdal 2005).  
 Democracy. Are democratic nations more peaceful/ less belligerent? As the 
number of democratic nations grew during the late 20th and early 21st centuries, 
Immanuel Kant’s theory of the “democratic peace” has become one of the most debated 
topics in political science. The empirical evidence is somewhat mixed (for reviews, see 
Hess and Orphanides 2001, pp.780-781; Cortright 2008, pp.249-251). Lending empirical 
support, Weart’s (1998) comprehensive study found that well-established democracies 
have never made war on each other. However, he distinguished among types of 
democratic regimes, and demonstrated that “democratic republics” have often fought 
with “oligarch republics” – defined as regimes which repress an internal “enemy” class. 
Hence, rather than reifying democracy, we must recognize an important mediating 
variable is whether democracies perceive one another as “democratic.” Russett and Oneal 
(2001) maintain, “The higher the level of democracy a state achieves the more peaceful 
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that state is likely to be” (p.122). Findings challenging the theory include the fact that 
major democratic nations frequently wage war against nondemocracies, especially 
developing nations (Cortright 2008, pp.250-251). In addition, Hess and Orphanides 
(2001) contend that even democratically elected incumbent leaders in an entirely 
democratic world would often engage in diversionary wars (i.e., an avoidable war/ war of 
choice/ “wag the dog” scenario) as they attempt to hold on to power and to compensate 
for poor economic performance.  
 And, we should recall the Marxist critique that industrial capitalism brings in its 
train not only the enslaving liberal capitalist ideology of individualism but also the “false 
veneer of democratization” (Cohen 1986, p.255). Taking up a critique of the Marxist 
tradition, Dwight Macdonald argued that Marxism had missed the significance of the 
ideology of “permanent war” (Hedges 2010, p.20). Lacking an analysis of the 
significance of permanent war, Macdonald argued that “modern socialism will continue 
to have a somewhat academic flavor” (p.20). Indeed, Hedges (2010) argues that it was 
permanent war which killed the liberal, democratic classes in Israel and the U.S. as well 
as the liberal, democratic movements in the Arab world (e.g., in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, 
and Iran). That is, it was permanent war, not Islam, that killed progressive movements in 
the Arab world in recent decades. Of course, such a notion denies the significance of the 
purported “clash of civilizations” hypothesis in which Western democracies are 
conceived as the good guys. Instead, Macdonald would have us consider how 
permanentwar cuts across many national projects, festering within capitalism and 
severely compromising the health of democracy.     
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 Democratic civil peace theory holds that democracies are more internally 
peaceful. But while some researchers have found the level of democracy to be 
significantly associated with lower rates of civil war (Esty et al. 1998, Gurr 2000), others 
have detected few significant relationships (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler 2004, Fearon and 
Laitin 2003). Mansfield and Snyder (1995) find that newly democratizing nations 
experience an increased risk of civil war. Another reason for the mixed findings may be 
that civil  war is less likely in strongly autocratic societies as well as strongly democratic 
ones (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009, p.328). In their meta-analysis of the civil war 
literature, Hegre and Sambanis (2006) found that only one “level of democracy” variable 
was robustly related to civil war, but several “inconsistency of political institutions” 
variables were robust (p.527).   
 World-systems position. Are core nations more belligerent? I contend that world-
system position is a proxy measure for the power which flows from geopolitical factors 
as well as the relative strength of a nation’s political-economic structural base. Much like 
a “mode of production,” it seems likely that this base has a key shaping influence on the 
superstructure (i.e., the ideological legitimation of social policies). Hence, it is assumed 
that ideologies of violence/ nonviolence that predominate in within a nation will stem 
from real historical conditions. 
 Industrialization. Different theoretical camps have held opposing hypotheses on 
the effect of industrialization on the war proneness of states (Cohen 1986). Following 
Norris and Inglehart (2004), one proxy indicator for industrialization, type of society 
(“typesociety”), is based on the 1998 Human Development Index scores. But Norris and 
Inglehart (2004) band the HDI data at thresholds for “post-industrial” societies (those 
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nations with HDI scores over .898) and “industrial” nations (those nations with HDI 
scores ranging from .740 to .886), and “agrarian” nations (defined as those with an HDI 
below .740). Here, I simply utilize the HDI scores to provide an interval-level variable 
that captures more variation and is more suitable for regression. Of course, a key problem 
with assessing the impact of industrialization is separating out the influence of co-variates 
such as urbanization, GDP per capita, capitalism democracy, education variables, etc. 
Here, multiple regression will be helpful, allowing us to partially control for some these 
factors. 
 Capitalism/ trade/ globalization. A large cross-national study found that a 
nation’s openness to the global economy is significantly associated with peace (Russett 
and Oneal 2001).Conversely, Collins (1974) builds on Marx as he theorizes: “Where 
social relationships are organized on a regular basis along impersonal lines...callous 
cruelty is maximal. This of course is the theme of Marx, especially in terms of the 
callousness of the wage system in an impersonal market economy” (p.432). This leads us 
to expect that highly capitalist societies will exhibit more belligerent attitudes, more 
“callous cruelty.”  
 Inequality. Structural inequality is likely to produce legitimation structures and 
ideologies that overlap with social dominance, otherization, and violent attitudes. For 
instance, not only Marx but also Alexis de Tocqueville theorized that ideas and beliefs 
are closely related to social contexts of inequality and equality. Zeitlin (2001) 
summarizes Tocqueville’s views: “Where inequalities are great and of long duration, the 
members of different social classes tend to regard one another as if they were members of 
distinct races. Inequality, therefore, militates against a general view. In democratic-
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egalitarian societies, in contrast, people tend to recognize their common humanity” 
(p.95). But for Tocqueville, it was “political equality” (i.e., measures of civil liberties and 
democracy are proxy measures of this) that made empathy possible in the U.S. (Collins 
1974, p.416).  
 Urbanization. Max Weber (1958) argued that pacifist moralities have arisen 
among city people, “especially those in crafts and commerce who never come in contact 
with animals” (Collins 1974, p.438). A supportive thesis on human-animal interactions 
has arisen more recently, proposing that herding cultures cultivate norms of violent 
retaliation and self-help justice because they live on rural frontiers and feel threatened by 
the potential theft of their assets (i.e., the herd of sheep or goats). This thesis has been put 
forth to explain why Southern culture in the U.S. exhibits more pro-violent attitudes – it 
was because many Southern immigrants came from Scotch-Irish herding cultures (Felson 
2010, Nisbett and Cohen 1996). Alternatively, theories of the Leviathan state maintain 
that the reason Southern culture has more pro-violent attitudes stems from the rural 
character of life, i.e., the relatively weak states that historically prevailed there (as well as 
among the Scotch-Irish), forcing individuals to seek forms of justice by taking violence 
into their own hands (self-help justice, vigilantism, and frontier justice). Ironically, the 
same Leviathan theory has been offered for the violence found in the rural frontiers of 
history and the abandoned inner-city cores of the U.S. today: the poor, the uneducated, 
and members of minority groups “are effectively stateless” (Pinker 2011, p.84). Hence, in 
this view what would matter more than the proportion of rural or urban residents is some 
finely tuned measure of the “state reach” variable. The mountainous variable has also 
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been a proxy measure of this same Leviathan phenomenon – measuring pockets of 
relative statelessness where rebel groups can safely hide.       
 Like Weber above, it has often been assumed that cities are more likely to 
produce peaceful strains of “cosmopolitan” attitudes (Carlier 2011). For many theorists, 
cognitive cosmopolitanism includes nonviolent and post-nationalist attitudes. But long 
before World War I, thinkers like Nietzsche and Spengler believed that urbanization, 
industrialization, and popular democracy would be fuel nationalism and be 
...background causes for unwise, pugnacious government and increased violence. 
The reasons for this lay in the unregulated, inexperienced, yet increasingly more 
powerful regimes associated with the enormous increase in productivity, and in 
the democratization of the postindustrial societies. They further believed such 
increased power would lead to conflicts over extraterritorial claims on other parts 
of the globe and over trade and its international control. Industrialization was thus 
seen as increasing power and decreasing internal discipline while leading to 
greater external conflict, more wars, and more civil strife. (Cohen 1986, pp.254-
255) 
  
 But in cross-national perspective today, urbanization is exceedingly complex, and 
where it seems to foster political violence, its effects are strongly shaped by interactions 
with other factors – such as rural resource scarcity or fresh water scarcity (Klare 2001, 
Homer-Dixon 1999). Goldstone (2002) argues that urbanization is associated with 
increased risk of political violence if it is not accompanied by job creation and increased 
economic growth. Homer-Dixon (1999) proposes that urbanization can contribute to 
political violence in contexts of economic crisis or where the state is weakening. 
Nevertheless, many studies have found little correlation between urbanization and civic 
strife (Homer-Dixon 1999).  
 Against the urban-cosmopolitan thesis, in a sample from Mississippi, Day and 
Quackenbush (1942) found that urban residents were slightly more hawkish and 
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supportive of an imperialistic war than rural residents (p.19). The regionally limited and 
dated nature of that study suggests that replication is needed.   
 Education. Drawing from poll data, Loewen (2007) points out that in the U.S. 
increasing levels of education have been associated with more hawkish attitudes. 
Conversely, Pinker (2011) argues that increasing literacy and education have brought us 
an “escalator of reason” which has helped drive global declines in multiple forms of 
violence over recent centuries. On a related note, but one which speaks to validity issues 
in survey data, Bishop (1976) found that “ideological consistency” increases with the 
completion of progressively higher levels of education (i.e., grade school, some high 
school, high school, some college, college). But on average, higher degrees of education 
in the U.S. correlates with Republican party affiliation (Loewen 2007), and Republicans 
are consistently more hawkish (pro-war) in their attitudes.  
 Even after the two world wars (when Europe, which was more developed and 
better educated than the rest of the world, imploded from within in orgies of violence) the 
Enlightenment optimism that still drives a great many positive aspects in Western culture 
leads us to believe more education leads to more rational and ethical thinking and 
behavior – i.e., to dovish, nonviolent attitudes. Thus, Kofi Annan (2012), the former head 
of the UN, has argued, “Education is, quite simply, peace-building by another name. It is 
the most effective form of defense spending there is.” My data will cast doubt on 
Annan’s argument and suggest that we must be careful to not reify “education” as an 
inevitably progressive or modernizing force. After all, many children in places like 
Pakistan only receive a religious education (Krueger and Malečková 2003). The author 
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has observed young people in rural Ladakh (in northern India) where the only education 
option was a Tibetan Buddhist monastery that primarily taught ancient religious texts.  
 The assumption that education can combat the roots of terrorism was explicitly 
articulated by President George Bush after the September 11th attacks, however, there is 
no evidence to substantiate this on an individual level. In fact, multiple studies conclude 
that terrorists are likely to be better educated (and more politically engaged) than others 
in their societies (Krueger and Malečková 2003). In one large cross-national study 
(n=160), four indicators of educational investment and attainment were significantly 
associated with a reduced risk of civil war (Thyne 2006). Of course, the pacifying effects 
of schooling are likely related to several effects (increased work opportunities, giving 
young males incentives, increasing trust in the government, etc.), rather than simply the 
idea that people become more rational or smarter (Pinker 2011, p.666). 
 Religion/ civilization. Bellah (2006) andInglehart and colleagues (e.g., Pippa and 
Inglehart 2004,Inglehart and Carbalio 1997) have demonstrated that the historically 
predominant religious tradition of a nation can have long-standing and resilient effects in 
shaping psychocultural attitudes. Huntington’s (1996), by now, infamous “civilizations” 
hypothesis has been challenged by numerous scholars, including Fox (2004) who finds 
evidence that religion has a greater impact on civil wars than does civilization.  However, 
admittedly, there are significant areas of overlap between religion and civilization. 
 Ethnic/ linguistic/ religious fractionalization. It might be assumed that 
increasing diversity, especially in urban settings, is associated with cosmopolitan 
tolerance and nonviolent attitudes. Alternatively, others may surmise that increasing 
diversity is often associated with the cultural reproduction of intolerant attitudes that 
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overlap with violent attitudes. This line of thought has been called the “diversity-breeds-
conflict school” (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009, p.329). To restate the later view, 
many have assumed that cultural homogeneity tends to reproduce peace. After making a 
presentation on Costa Rica’s tradition of peace, a gentleman came up afterwards and 
suggested, “Isn’t part of the reason for their peaceful culture due to the fact that they are 
95% Catholic? They don’t have the sectarianism, the ethnic conflicts other places do – 
look at India.” As another example, Fry (2006) states, “Norway fits the criteria of an 
internally peaceful society...The population...is relatively homogeneous in terms of many 
cultural and ethnic features...” (p.77). However, Ross (1993) contends that within 
Norway, regional differences often are conceived in racial terms, and thus, “Norwegian 
society appears more homogeneous to outsiders than to Norwegians themselves” (p.161). 
 Fearon and Laitin (2003) found that ethnic fractionalization did not predict civil 
war once poverty and income levels are controlled for. Hegre and Sambanis’s (2006) 
meta-analysis found that ethnic fractionalization was significantly associated with low-
intensity armed conflict, but not full-scale civil war (p.529). Moreover, they show that the 
most robust predictor for low-intensity armed conflict (internal armed conflict) is ethnic 
heterogeneity index and 6 more variables including linguistic diversity, an ethnic 
fractionalization index, the ethnic fractionalization index squared, religious diversity, 
ethnolinguistic diversity, and ethnolinguistic diversity squared are among the 20 most 
robust predictors of low-intensity conflicts.         
 Ethnic polarization and dominance. Rather than diversity and fractionalization in 
itself, some have argued that two variables related to fractionalization are much more 
important: “polarization” (a small number of large groups) and “dominance” (one very 
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large group) (see Fearon and Laitin 2003, p.521). Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (2009) 
found that diverse states are not more likely to suffer from violent conflict, but “ethnic 
exclusion” is a very robust predictor of armed conflict. And, Reynal-Querol (2002) and 
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a, 2005b) have demonstrated that ethnic polarization 
helps to explain the likelihood of civil wars and low-intensity conflicts. Hegre and 
Sambanis (2006) show that ethnic dominance is one of the 18 most robust predictors of 
civil war and among the 20 most robust predictors of low-intensity conflicts.  
 Militarization indicators. We now turn to military spending indicators (proxies 
for political power of military sector/ elite policy cues), and the size of military forces 
(proxies for socialization into militarism). Nations with large militaries or with a large 
percentage of GDP spent on the military are two indicators that power elites favor these 
policies and perhaps the mass public will tend to accept these policies as legitimate. 
Grussendorf et al. (2002) found that national mean peace attitude scores (sampling from 
secondary students on the “Peace Test”) were significantly and negatively associated 
with (r = -.57, significant at the .05 level) percent of GNP spent on the military, but the 
sample only included 21 nations. Some researchers note that nations with low rankings 
on the Global Militarization Index “experience high levels of internal unrest and 
violence” (BICC 2009, p.21). This returns us to Pinker’s (2011) “Leviathan” argument – 
where strong states exist, intra-state violence is likely to decline.  
 Female empowered societies. Are female empowered societies more peaceful 
when compared with societies still shaped by patriarchal sexism? Two studies found that 
nations with higher levels of gender equality are significantly associated with more 
peaceful conduct in the international arena (Caprioli and Boyer 2001, Marshall and 
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Marshall 1999 cited in Cortright 2008, p.258). Several anthropological studies conclude 
that the status of women is lower in more violent societies, and a sample of 37 nations 
found that nations with higher female labor force participation rates tended to have 
significantly lower homicide rates (Iadicola and Shupe 2003, p.114). The correlation was 
negative .50, but the sample size was small and the study did not control for other 
variables.  
 Age, age cohorts, and youth bulges. Mannheim ([1928] 1952) argued that 
“generations” are deeply shaped by historical conditions and events transpiring in their 
formative years (which he defined as ages 17 to 25), such that cohort effects are likely to 
be as significant as effects based on social class. Inglehart (1977, 1990, 1997) has 
fruitfully tested this theory, finding significant support for it in his many cross-national 
studies of World Values Survey data.  However, Hellevik (2002) has challenged 
Inglehart’s interpretations by controlling for life cycle effects in longitudinal survey data 
from Norway.   
 “Historical generations,” youth movements which attempt to bring radical reform 
to their society, have been documented around the world (Braungart 1984).  Similarly, 
Ryder (1965) argued that youth cohorts are distinctively shaped by their historical context 
(which is marked by contingent historical experiences, changes in educational content 
and peer-group socialization), and demographic replacement brings both threats to social 
stability and opportunities for social transformation.  In the context of the U.S., which 
spent more years in war (though fighting transpired on foreign soil) than almost any other 
nation in the twentieth century, support for military action was stronger among the youth 
age cohort during the Vietnam War, and weaker among youth in the post-Vietnam era 
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(Burris 2008).  Assessing Vietnam-era data, Lunch and Sperlich (1979) offered four 
hypotheses explaining why older cohorts were more anti-war, but surprisingly little other 
theorizing on generational gaps in violent/ nonviolent attitudes has taken place (for a 
recent exception, see Burris 2008).  Schuman and Rieger (1992) demonstrated that 
generational experiences had a significant effect on which of two analogies from the past, 
World War II or the Vietnam War, were most relevant for interpreting the prospects of a 
U.S. war with Iraq (1990-1991).  In brief, there are important theoretical and empirical 
reasons to test cohort effects in this cross-national study of violent/ nonviolent attitudes, 
and where longitudinal data is available to control for life cycle effects.        
 Large youth cohorts, or “youth bulges,” have been linked to increased political 
crisis and violence in several nations (Goldstone 2002, Huntington 1996). A variant of 
this theory specifies the proportion of males aged 15 – 29 appears to be linked to 
increased political violence (Gat 2006). One of the reasons this theory makes sense is that 
empirically, most violence is performed by young men of peak reproductive age (Collins 
2008). Revolutionary and activist activities in general have often depended on youth 
mobilization. As noted above, data limitations will not allow us to test a male youth 
bulge, but we will test whether youth bulges are associated with changes in violent/ 
nonviolent political attitudes. 
 The temperature hypothesis. Do cooler climates equal cooler heads? Are lower 
average temperatures will be associated with more peaceful attitudes? The link between 
ambient heat and aggression has sometimes been theorized as direct, short-term and 
physiological, much as in conventional notions that “hotter heads” prevail in hot weather 
conditions. Reifman, Larrick, and Fein (1991) found a significant, positive, and linear 
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heat-aggression relationship in that, even after controlling for potentially confounding 
variables, higher temperatures led major league baseball pitchers to become more 
aggressive in their pitching, resulting in more batters hit by pitched balls per game. 
Zajonc, Murphy, and Inglehart (1989) proposed that brain temperature and temperature-
related neurochemistry may provide the physiological mechanisms for heat-aggression 
effects.  
 But concerning the role of ambient temperature in cross-national conflicts, it is 
hazardous to generalize from an outdoor summer sport in temperate North America. 
Indeed, Van de Vliert et al.’s (1999) study of 136 nations from 1948 to 1977 found that 
riots and armed attacks occur more frequently in warm countries than in either hot 
countries or cold countries after controlling for several variables linked to conflict. 
Anthropological studies suggest that compared to warm climates, very hot and very cold 
climates tend to produce nurturing parental behaviors and reduce violence and extreme 
forms of cultural masculinity – though the effects tend to be more pronounced in cold 
climates (pp.300-303). According to Paternal Investment Theory, the hardships of very 
cold and very hot climates requires increased parental care and cooperative behavior for 
survival. Van de Vliert et al. argue that this has shapes degrees of cultural masculinity, so 
that masculinity mediates the association between temperature and violence. In a 
subsample of 53 nations, Van de Vliert et al. found that temperature predicted 13% of the 
variance in masculinity, with warm countries higher in masculinity than hot or cold 
countries (p.304).  
 Yet, numerous studies have found some evidence of a link between high ambient 
temperatures and forms of aggression including collective violence (e.g., riots), assault, 
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homicide, rape, domestic violence, and some forms of crime like burglary – though the 
results have sometimes been inconsistent (Cohn 1990). Several criminological studies 
have found a link between hot weather and increased homicide rates, and the mediating 
variable has often been theorized as the increased interpersonal interactions (leading to 
the increased incidence of conflict) during summer as people, at least in hot-summer 
regions without widespread air conditioning, are more likely to be outside their homes 
and interacting with others in the summer (Landau and Fridman 1992).  
 Temperature has also been theorized as interactive over the long-term with 
structural and environmental factors. Burke et al. (2009) found significant increases in 
African conflicts during warmer years (even when controlling for precipitation/ drought 
as well as country-level measures of per capita income and democracy). They theorize 
that hot years facilitate conflicts by creating shocks to agricultural and economic 
productivity (pp.20673-20674). However, Buhaug (2010) analyzed the same data and 
strongly challenged Burke et al.’s findings, concluding there was no significant 
relationship in the short-term, especially when various definitions of civil war are 
employed (p.16749). But existing data is imperfect due to its country-level measures (i.e., 
in large nations many weather patterns are better measured at the regional-level), and the 
long-term security implications of warmer weather is less well known (p.16481).  
 On a methodological note, although the sample was relatively small and 
geographically specific, Doob (1968) found that extreme seasonal fluctuations in the 
temperature/ weather of the tropical climate of East Africa, such that one season is 
commonly thought of as “unpleasant,” did not effect survey responses in conventional 
interviews.    
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 Mountainous geography. In James Hilton’s utopian novel Lost Horizon (1933), 
the mountain barriers surrounding Shangri-La are imagined as a bulwark for the peaceful 
society, shielding it from the violence of other nations. Switzerland’s track record of 
staying out of European wars is one historical example of this. But ironically, most 
theorists have held the opposite of Hilton’s vision of Shangri-La, suggesting that 
mountainous nations are at greater risk for civil war. Sambanis (2004) and Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004) found no evidence of any effect, but the mountainous terrain variable 
ranks in Hegre and Sambanis’s (2006) list of the “25 most robust variables” predicting 
civil war. Fearon and Laitin (2003) also found that mountainous terrain is significantly 
related to higher rates of civil war: “A country that is about half ‘mountainous’ (ninetieth 
percentile) and otherwise at the median [on ethnic diversity] has an estimated 13.2% 
chance of civil war over the course of a decade. A similar country that is not mountainous 
at all (tenth percentile) has a 6.5% risk” (p.85). Fearon and Laitin theorize that 
mountains/ “rough terrain” provide opportunities (in keeping with “opportunity structure” 
theorizing of social movements (e.g., Tilly 1978)) for rebels to hide from government 
forces in a rural base (p.80) and to engage in rural guerrilla warfare, in part because the 
rebels possess superior “local knowledge of the population” (p.76, p.88). Fearon and 
Laitin (2003) found no significant effect for forest coverage (i.e., the proportion of a 
country’s terrain which is covered in woods and forest) (p.570, p.594), so that indicator 
was not tested in the present sample.   
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Do Urban Environments Reproduce Pacifist Moralities? 
 
 Above we cited Max Weber’s theory that pacifist moralities tend to arise among 
city people. Of course, the conditions which foster the emergence of a particular ethos, 
need not necessarily be an ongoing source for cultivating and reproducing that ethos, as 
Weber’s (1930) analysis of the Protestant Ethic suggests (i.e., the ethic became unmoored 
from its religious roots). Analyzing the Gallup World Poll 2008 data can approximate a 
test of an urban-pacifist link, but only approximate since the Gallup data is proprietary 
and we are limited to nation-level rather than respondent-level analyses. Moreover, as 
discussed above, the three Gallup questions are hardly robust indicators of “pacifist 
moralities,” instead they are merely indicate acceptance/ rejection of moral constraints on 
total war (i.e., targeting civilians) and pragmatic nonviolence.  
 Correlations between percent urban (i.e., percent of the population in each nation 
which resides in an urban locale) and national-level mean responses to the Gallup World 
Poll’s three violent/ nonviolent questions as well as the GPI were performed (see Table 
87). The “nvworks” variable had a weakly negative though not significant relationship to 
percent urban. Thus, there is no relationship between percent urban and mean national 
affirmation that peaceful means alone will work. However, “milnerverjust” was 
positively correlated to percent urban, r(93) = .25, p < .05, and “indneverjust” was also 
positively and strongly correlated to percent urban, r(93) = .40, p < .001. These findings 
offer mixed support for the notion that urban environments tend to instill pacifist 
moralities. These findings are only suggestive, but they indicate that cities tend to 
reproduce attitudes of moral restraint in the conduct of warfare, i.e., protecting civilians, 
but cities do not necessarily reproduce confidence that peaceful means alone will work 
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for oppressed groups. Apart from the pragmatic nonviolence item, these findings are 
consistent with broad theorizing about the possible effects of urbanization on forms of 
“cognitive cosmopolitanism” (Eddy 2011) including respect for human rights. 
 Similarly, regression analyses were conducted on the Gallup World Poll’s three 
violent/ nonviolent questions with the percent urban variable for each nation serving as 
the sole independent variable. Results revealed that percent urban did not significantly 
predict national means on “nvworks.” Percent urban did predict national means on 
“milneverjust” (F(1, 93) = 6.18, t = 2.49, p < .05, R² was .06 and adjusted R² was .05). 
Hence, 5% of the variance in national mean responses to the “milneverjust” item is 
associated with the percent of urban citizens. Percent urban also predicted national means 
Table 87. Nation-Level Data: Pearson Correlations Between Mean Nonviolent Attitudes 
(Gallup World Poll 2008 data) and Other Characteristics of Nation  
Index %urban indneverjust nvworks milneverjust GPI 2008 population 
indneverjust .40***      
nvworks -.15 -.08     
milneverjust .25* .82**** .05    
GPI 2008 .37*** .18 -.14 .13   
population -.14 -.16 -.12 -.19 -.14  
arms exports .20 .06 -.02 -.07 -.07 .20* 
Notes: N=95 nations; Pearson correlations with pairwise deletion of missing values; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = 
p < .0001; “indneverjust” = % affirming terrorism never justified; “milneverjust” = % affirming state terrorism never justified; 
“nvworks” = % affirming peaceful means alone will work for oppressed groups; Sources: %urban = percent of citizens residing in 
urban locale (CIA World Factbook 2012); population = population in millions (CIA World Factbook 2012); GPI 2009, transformed 
scores; arms exports data (SIPRI 2012)  
 
on “indneverjust” (F(1, 93) = 17.71, t = 4.21, p < .001, R² was .16 and adjusted R² was 
.15). Hence, 15% of the variance in national mean responses to the “indneverjust” item is 
associated with the percent of urban citizens. However, far more robust tests of multiple 
regression will be conducted below.     
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Results: Analysis of Nations By Cultural and Structural Attributes 
 
 Below in Table 88, it is striking that sorting nations by “religious cultures,” the 
highest national mean percentages on the nonviolence efficacy item are the “indigenous 
beliefs/ animism” cultures. That is, the religions generally regarded by Western observers 
as the most “primitive” have the most peaceful attitudes on nonviolent efficacy (but note 
these cultures score very low on the two principled nonviolent indicators). Although the 
sample size is small, these “primitive” cultures trump Protestant and Catholic nations by 
about 14% points and Buddhist/ Eastern nations by over 30% in affirmations of 
nonviolent efficacy for the oppressed. The second most robust beliefs in nonviolent 
efficacy are among the Orthodox Christian nations. This is almost certainly a reflection of 
the legacy of the nonviolent movements that led to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and 
the break-up of the USSR in 1990-1991. Also of note, Muslim nations have slightly 
higher confidence in nonviolent efficacy than Protestant and Catholic nations. Israel, the 
soleJewish nation, exhibits the lowest confidence in nonviolent efficacy. Chris Hedges 
(2010) contends that a “prolonged state of permanent war killed the liberal classes in 
Israel and the United States...Permanent war...corrodes and diminishes democratic debate 
and institutions” (p.20). Arguably, the “peaceful means alone” question is one proxy 
indicator of faith in nonviolent democratic processes. 
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Table 88. Nation-Level Data: Nonviolent Attitudes (Gallup World Poll 2010) by Type of 
Culture 
Type of Society Frequency Nonviolence Works (% 
affirming nonviolence 
will work) 
State Terrorism: 
Military Attacks on 
Civilians (% Never 
Justified) 
Terrorism: Individual 
Attacks on Civilians 
(% Never Justified) 
All 130-136 
(frequencies below 
are for largest 
sample) 
 
57.9 (n=136) 
 
65.4 (n=131) 
 
71.9 (n=130) 
Religious Culture (n=135)    
Protestant 26 58 65.1 75.7 
Catholic 43 57.6 67.8 72.2 
Orthodox 10 63.1 73.1 77.4 
Buddhist/ Eastern 11 39.4 60.1 74.8 
Muslim 38 61.3 65.6 70.2 
Hindu 2 58 44.5 42.5 
Jewish 1 33 56 80 
Other (indigenous beliefs/ 
animism) 
4 71.75 46.8 48.3 
Secularization (n=66)    
Most people religious 22 58.5 62.6 69.6 
Moderate 16 54.4 70.6 78.2 
Most people secular 28 54.8 70.5 78.6 
Difference by religious 
culture (eta2) 
 .222**** (a) .130* .197*** (b) 
Difference by 
secularization (eta2) 
 .020 .083 .116 * 
 
Note: * = Significant at the .05 level; ** = Significant at the .01 level; *** = Significant at the .001 level; **** = Significant at the 
.0001 level; The significance of the difference between groups without any controls is measured by ANOVA. Eta2 (i.e., Eta squared) 
was computed using a user written “effectsize” program for Stata (see UCLA (2012)). Eta2 is interpreted as the percent of the 
dependent variable accounted for by the effect in the sample (UCLA 2012). That is, Eta2 represents the same measure as R-squared: 
the proportion of the variance in the dependent variable that is explained by the independent variables. As a rule of thumb for effect 
size, an Eta2 of .01 is small, .06 is medium, and .14 is large.  Additional notes from table: (a) The only significant differences (at the 
.05 level) in the Scheffe table involved comparisons with Buddhist/ Eastern cultures and the following cultures respectively: 
Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox, Muslim, and “Other.” (b) The only significant differences (at the .05 level) in the Scheffe table 
involved comparisons with “Other” and the following cultures respectively: Protestant and Orthodox. In the Scheffe tables, the small 
sample sizes from Jewish and Hindu societies are a factor in preventing the group mean differences from rising to statistical 
significance. The “nonviolence works” question has the largest sample size because more nations were asked this in the Gallup World 
Poll. “Religious Culture” variable represents the “Historically predominant major religions” from Norris and Inglehart (2004) among 
other sources (see Appendix P); “Secularization” variable from Norris (2009) 
 
 Above, on the secularization dimension, we see that the differences are only 
significant on terrorism, with the secular and moderately religious nations more likely to 
reject terrorism. However, the patterns overall suggest that religious nations (largely the 
poorer nations) are slightly more likely to embrace pragmatic nonviolence, while secular 
nations (largely the wealthier nations) are more likely to embrace principled nonviolent 
norms against terrorism and state terrorism.  
 In Table 89 below we see that confidence in nonviolent efficacy is highest in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Yet, fewer citizens rejected terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa than any 
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other region. The region with the second highest confidence in nonviolent efficacy is 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia, again, reflecting the collective memory of the largely 
nonviolent breakup of the Soviet Union. Principled stands against state terrorism are 
highest in the Middle East and North Africa, and principled stands against terrorism are 
highest in Western Europe, Canada, and the US, very closely followed by the Middle 
East and North Africa. Overall, regional differences are most significant on the terrorism 
item, closely followed by the nonviolent efficacy item. 
Table 89. Nation-Level Data: Nonviolent Attitudes (Gallup World Poll 2010) by Region 
Type of Society Frequency Nonviolence Works (% 
affirming nonviolence 
will work) 
State Terrorism: Military 
Attacks on Civilians (% 
Never Justified) 
Terrorism: Individual 
Attacks on Civilians (% 
Never Justified) 
All 130-136 
(frequencies 
below are for 
largest sample) 
 
57.9  
(n=136) 
 
65.4  
(n=131) 
 
71.9  
(n=130) 
Region  (a) (b) (c) 
Western Europe, Canada 
& US 
20 54.7 68.5 80.9 
Eastern Europe & Central 
Asia 
19 60.1 67.7 71.6 
Middle East & N. Africa 18 53.9 72.4 80.1 
South & East Asia & 
Oceana 
21 49.9 58.6 68.4 
Latin America 22 57.5 66.1 69.4 
Sub-Saharan Africa 36 65.6 62.6 66.3 
Difference by region 
(eta2) 
 .153*** .086* .167*** 
 
Note: * = Significant at the .05 level; ** = Significant at the .01 level; *** = Significant at the .001 level; **** = Significant at the 
.0001 level; (a) Bartlett’s test for equal variance showed the sample variances in this column are significantly different and this casts 
doubt on the certainty of ANOVA, and Scheffe multiple-comparison tests revealed the only significant difference in this column were 
between “Sub-Saharan Africa” and “South and East Asia and Oceana”; (b) Bartlett’s test showed no significant differences in sample 
variances, and Scheffe tests revealed no significant differences in this column; (c) Bartlett’s test for equal variance showed the sample 
variances in this column are significantly different and this casts doubt on the certainty of ANOVA, and Scheffe multiple-comparison 
tests revealed the only significant differences in this column were between “Sub-Saharan Africa” and “Western Europe, Canada & 
US” as well as between “Sub-Saharan Africa” and “Middle East and North Africa.” 
 
 Below in Table 90, we see that agrarian societies and economies with low GDP 
per capita are significantly more likely to embrace beliefs in nonviolent efficacy. Post-
industrial societies and economies with high GDP per capita are least likely to embrace 
nonviolent efficacy. These patterns are largely reversed for principled objections to state 
terrorism and terrorism. But, compared with less developed nations, post-industrial 
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Table 90. Nation-Level Data: Nonviolent Attitudes (Gallup World Poll 2010) by Type of 
Culture (Continued) 
Type of Society Frequency Nonviolence Works (% 
affirming nonviolence 
will work) 
State Terrorism: 
Military Attacks on 
Civilians (% Never 
Justified) 
Terrorism: Individual 
Attacks on Civilians 
(% Never Justified) 
All 130-136 
(frequencies below 
are for largest 
sample) 
 
57.9 (n=136) 
 
65.4 (n=131) 
 
71.9 (n=130) 
Type of Civilization (n=130)    
Western Christianity 28 52.3 68.1 79.6 
Muslim 36 61.2 64.6 69.2 
Orthodox (Russian and 
Greek) 
9 65.8 72.4 76.9 
Latin American 20 57.6 70.7 73.1 
Sinic/ Confucian 4 33 69.3 79.3 
Japanese 1 34 87 91 
Hindu 2 58 44.5 42.5 
Buddhist 6 44.5 49.5 68 
Sub-Saharan Africa 24 65.9 63.7 67.2 
Type of Society (n=134)    
Agrarian 74 61.9 62.1 66.8 
Industrial 40 53.2 69.2 75.6 
Postindustrial 20 52.5 68.6 81.7 
Type of Economy (n=133)    
Low GDP per capita 64 63.7 62.2 66.2 
Medium GDP per capita 43 55.1 68.1 74.8 
High GDP per capita 26 50.4 68 79.8 
Difference by type of 
civilization (eta2) 
 .302**** .171** .222*** (a) 
Difference by type of 
society (eta2) 
 .100*** .058* .170**** 
Difference by type of 
economy (eta2) 
 .157**** .042 .159**** 
 
Note: * = Significant at the .05 level; ** = Significant at the .01 level; *** = Significant at the .001 level; **** = Significant at the 
.0001 level; Additional notes from table: (a) The only significant differences (at the .05 level) in the Scheffe table involved 
comparisons between Western Christianity and Hindu.; Type of Civilization (Norris and Inglehart (2004); Type of Society (Norris and 
Ingelhart 2004) using the “reversetypesociety” variable (reverse-coded); Type of Economy (Norris 2009) 
 
nations are more robustly different (and more peaceful) on the terrorism item, than on the 
state terrorism item. 
 Below in Table 91, we observe that full democracies are less peaceful on the 
nonviolent efficacy question compared with other regimes. This undermines the theory of 
the “democratic peace” from a novel direction – the realm of public attitudes towards 
pragmatic nonviolence. The core nations are significantly less likely to embrace 
pragmatic nonviolence, but significantly more likely to reject terrorism, with no 
significant differences on the state terrorism item.   
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Table 91. Nation-Level Data: Nonviolent Attitudes (Gallup World Poll 2010) by Regime 
Type and World-System Position 
Type of Society Frequency Nonviolence Works (% 
affirming nonviolence 
will work) 
State Terrorism: 
Military Attacks on 
Civilians (% Never 
Justified) 
Terrorism: Individual 
Attacks on Civilians 
(% Never Justified) 
All 130-136 
(frequencies below 
are for largest 
sample) 
 
57.9 (n=136) 
 
65.4 (n=131) 
 
71.9 (n=130) 
Type of Regime (n=134)    
Authoritarian 39 59.6 67 70.5 
Hybrid regimes 30 62.3 61.2 66.1 
Flawed democracies 41 56 64.7 71.8 
Full democracies 24 53.4 69.3 81 
Level of Freedom (n=132)    
Not free 27 57.7 69.3 74.2 
Partly free 47 62.5 60.9 65.3 
Free 58 54.8 66.9 75.8 
World system position (n=115)    
Periphery 55 61.3 63.3 67.8 
Semiperiphery 19 58.7 67.2 73.8 
Core 41 51.9 65.7 76.3 
Difference by type of 
regime (eta2) 
 .050 .037 .121 ** 
Difference by level of 
freedom (eta2) 
 .064* .054* .124*** 
Difference by world 
system position (eta2) 
 .090** .010 .076* 
 
Note: * = Significant at the .05 level; ** = Significant at the .01 level; *** = Significant at the .001 level; **** = Significant at the 
.0001 level; Type of Regime (Democracy Index 2010);  Level of Freedom (Freedom House 2008); World system position (Clark and 
Beckfield 2009) 
 
 Below in Table 92, we see an additional test of democracy. It is shocking that 
electoral democracies are not more likely to say nonviolence will work. But much 
depends on how “electoral democracy” is coded – and the dichotomous nature of the 
variable may be problematic. The coding of four types of regimes according to levels of 
democracy above tells a slightly different story, but in neither coding scheme are the 
differences significant. These patterns will be further fleshed out in additional tests of 
correlation and multiple regression below. Immediately below, correlational analysis will 
help us to establish many of the predominant patterns in expected co-variates of peaceful 
attitudes, which will aid in interpretations of the more robust multiple regressions.  
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Table 92. T-Tests on Nonviolent Attitudes by Electoral Democracy 
 
Type of Society Frequency Nonviolence Works (% 
affirming nonviolence 
will work) 
State Terrorism: 
Military Attacks on 
Civilians (% Never 
Justified) 
Terrorism: Individual 
Attacks on Civilians (% 
Never Justified) 
All 130-136  57.9 (n=136) 65.4 (n=131) 71.9 (n=130) 
Type of Regime (n=136)     
Electoral democracies 77 57.1 66.2 73.6 
Other regimes 59 59 64.3 69.4 
Difference between group 
means 
 1.9 - 1.9 - 4.2  
Note: None of the differences between group means are significant at the .05 level. Type of Regime: Electoral democracies (Freedom 
House 2012) 
 
 In Table 93 below, we see that the Cosmopolitanism Index and Globalization 
Index (see Appendix P for information on the construction of these indexes) have very 
similar effects on national attitudes on these three dimensions of violence/ nonviolence. 
Ironically, both of these measures of cosmopolitanism are negatively and significantly 
associated with confidence in nonviolence. The only peaceful attitude associated with 
these indicators of cosmopolitanism is rejection of terrorism. There is no significant 
association with attitudes towards state terrorism. This raises doubts about Pinker’s 
(2011) broad theorizing that cognitive and relational forms of cosmopolitanism, and 
openness to global markets (i.e., “gentle commerce”) might cultivate peaceful attitudes.    
Table 93. Correlations of Globalization Indices with Gallup World Poll (2010) Items 
 
 % military 
attacks on 
civilians never 
justified 
% terrorism 
never justified 
% nonviolence 
will work 
Cosmopoli-
tanism  
Index 
Globali-
zation  
Index 
% military attacks on 
civilians never justified 
1.0     
% terrorism never 
justified 
.8315**** 1.0    
% nonviolence will 
work 
.0026 -.121 1.0   
Cosmopolitanism Index .0045 .3031** -.3173** 1.0  
Globalization Index -.002 .2783* -.3755*** .8914**** 1.0 
Notes: Tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001 
 
 Below in Table 94, we see that increasing linguistic and ethnic fractionalization 
clearly correlates with declines in nonviolent attitudes towards terrorism. That is, 
increases in these two forms of fractionalization are significantly associated with an 
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attitudinal climate which is less likely to condemn terrorism as “never justified.” Less 
robustly, but still significant is the association between increases in linguistic 
fractionalization and declines in nonviolent attitudes towards military attacks on civilians. 
Interestingly, increases in ethnic fractionalization is significantly associated with 
increases in confidence that nonviolent methods will work. One tentative conclusion here 
(but see below on the ethnic polarization indicator) would be that increasing ethnic 
heterogeneity leads to more ethnic conflict and opportunities to learn that nonviolent 
methods will work and have worked. But, the indicator of ethnic dominance (“% in 
largest group”) reveals that as the percentage of the population in the largest ethnic group 
rises, there is a significant rise in peaceful attitudes which reject the legitimacy of 
terrorism, while confidence in nonviolent efficacy significantly declines. At the same 
time, as the percentage of the population in the second largest ethnic group rises (the 
ethnic polarization indicator), there is a significant decline in peaceful attitudes regarding 
terrorism. All of this supports the notion that terrorism is the weapon of the numerically 
weak, and it is seen as legitimate by ethnic groups not enjoying cultural dominance.  
 Below in Table 95, we see that increasing democracy, political rights, and civil 
liberties tends to correlate with the perception that terrorism is “never justified.” But we 
also see that increasing freedoms, political rights, and civil liberties tend to have the 
opposite effect (cultivating less peaceful attitudes) on beliefs in nonviolent efficacy and 
they have no significant effect on objections to military attacks on civilians. These 
findings are relatively shocking. It seems that, on average and worldwide, democracy 
does nothing to instill ethical objections to one of the most basic violations of existing 
international law: the targeting and killing of civilians by a state military. Rather, it seems 
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Table 94. Correlations of Ethnic Dominance and Fractionalization with Gallup World 
Poll (2010) Items 
 
 % military 
attacks on 
civilians 
never 
justified 
%  
terrorism 
never 
justified 
% non-
violence 
will work 
Ethnic  
fract 
Lang 
fract 
Rel 
fract 
% Largest 
group 
% 2nd 
largest 
group 
% military 
attacks  
on  
civilians 
never 
justified 
1.0        
%  
terrorism 
never 
justified 
.8315**** 1.0       
% non-
violence 
will work 
.0026 -.121 1.0      
Ethnic  
fract 
-.1464 -.3334**** .2023* 1.0     
Lang  
fract 
-.1942* -.3269*** .1364 .7317**** 1.0    
Rel  
fract 
-.1165 -.0541 -.059 .2834*** .3508**** 1.0   
%  
Largest 
group 
.1620 .2856*** -.1886* -.9013**** -.6868**** -.3491**** 1.0  
% 2nd 
largest 
group 
-.1526 -.2665** .0530 .6387**** .3261*** .0764 -.6287**** 1.0 
Notes: Tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001; “Ethnic fract” = ethnic fractionalization; 
“Lang fract” = Language fractionalization; “Rel fract” = Religious fractionalization 
 
Table 95. Correlations of Democracy Indicators with Gallup World Poll (2010) Items 
 
 Variable name Sample size 
(n=) 
% military 
attacks on 
civilians never 
justified 
% terrorism 
never justified 
% nonviolence 
will work 
Democracy Index 2010 DemIndex2010score 134 .0557 .2740** -.2012* 
Political Culture 2010 PolCulture2010 134 .1155 .3745**** -.2348** 
Civil Liberties 2010 CivLib2010 134 .0126 .1621 -.1253 
Political Rights Index 
2012 
transPolRights2012 136 .0563 .175* -.1103 
Civil Liberties Index 
2012 
transCivLib2012 136 .0594 .2207* -.1408 
Notes: Tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001; Democracy Index 
2010, Political Culture Index 2010, and Civil Liberties Index 2010 are all scored with 10=Highly Functioning, 0=Poorly Functioning; 
Source: Democracy Index 2010 by Economist Intelligence Unit; Political Rights 2012 and Civil Liberties 2012 scores were 
transformed so that 7= most free, and 1=least free; Source: Freedom House 2012 
 
democracies are effective in socializing their citizens into “moral disengagement” 
(Bandura 1990) from state military actions. Similarly, as Collins (1974) theorized about 
modern bureaucracies, it seems democracies socialize their citizens into “callous cruelty,” 
as when they accept the “collateral damage” of military actions. This represents a 
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challenge to the much heralded recent optimistic assessments that civilization is 
becoming more peaceful (e.g., Pinker 2011).  
 Further, it seems democracy does nothing to instill faith that “peaceful means 
alone” “will work.” How do we make sense of this finding? It could be because modern 
democracies are not educating their citizens about the efficacy of nonviolence. Below, 
this dissertation will argue from a qualitative analysis of state-approved textbooks that 
schools systematically cultivate historical amnesia about collective action, mass 
movements, general strikes, and social movement organizations. For example, a recent 
sample of U.S. college students found that most have no memory of leading U.S. civil 
rights movement organizations (Eddy 2012). Why? One answer is that our educational 
systems are shaped by the memories and interests of the 1% and perpetuate, in Marx’s 
terms, forms of false consciousness regarding the potential power and historical record of 
collective protest. But much more also seems to be going on, raising questions about 
whether collective memory processes are biased towards the privileging of violent events.  
 In Table 96, we see that hotter average temperatures are associated with national 
publics who are less likely to reject state terrorism and especially less likely to reject 
individual acts of terrorism. Hence, hotter temperatures are associated with less peaceful 
attitudes on these two indicators. Of course, nations with hotter climates tend to have  
Table 96. Correlations of Geography and Temperature with Gallup World Poll (2010) 
Items 
 
 Sample size 
(n=) 
% military attacks 
on civilians never 
justified 
% terrorism never 
justified 
% nonviolence will 
work 
Avg Temp 134 -.2013* -.3067*** .0636 
Avg High Temp 133 -.2045* -.3271*** .0767 
Mountainous 124 .1344 .0581 .1337 
Log of mountainous 124 .1312 .0724 .0653 
Notes: Tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001 
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historical legacies of poverty,colonialism, and neo-colonialism which have exacerbated 
multiple forms of violence and war. Post-independence, many of former colonies have 
had weak governments, and with the lack of a Leviathan, civil wars have plagued former 
colonies in Africa. Although Fearon and Laitin (2003) found mountainous terrain to 
significantly predict the chance of civil war (while controlling for ethnic diversity), this 
geographical factor has no significant effect on these three indicators of violent/ 
nonviolent attitudes. 
 Below in Table 97, we consider indicators of human development and inequality. 
The HDI represents the potential human development if no inequality in a society. The 
Inequality HDI takes into account inequality, so in effect, it is the actual Human 
Development Index. The Loss HDI is the loss in potential human development due to 
inequality (i.e., it is the difference between the HDI and the Inequality HDI). The results 
show that nations with greater human development (HDI and Inequal HDI) tend to be 
associated with higher rates of objection to state terrorism (i.e., military attacks) and 
especially to terrorism, but lower rates of confidence that nonviolence will work. The 
signs (positive/ negative) on Loss HDI and Gini (2000-2010) are opposite those of 
theHDI and Inequal HDI variables on these 3 indicators of violent/ nonviolent attitudes 
because a higher Loss HDI score and a higher Gini coefficient represent greater 
inequality in a nation. In Table 97, we see that greater inequality as measured especially 
by Loss HDI is associated with significantly greater confidence in nonviolent efficacy 
and lower rates of objection to state terrorism and especially to terrorism. All three of the 
HDI indicators point in a consistent direction – poorer, less developed nations have more 
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confidence in nonviolent efficacy and less morally principled objections to violence in 
the form of state terrorism and terrorism. 
Table 97. Correlations of Human Development and Inequality with Gallup World Poll 
(2010) Items 
 % military 
attacks on 
civilians 
never 
justified 
% terrorism 
never 
justified 
% 
nonviolence 
will work 
Gini 2000- 
2010 
Loss HDI 
2010 
HDI  
2010 
Inequal 
HDI 
2010 
% military attacks 
on civilians never 
justified 
1.0       
% terrorism never 
justified 
.8315**** 1.0      
% nonviolence will 
work 
.0026 -.121 1.0     
Gini 2000-2010 -.0993 -.2289* .1396 1.0    
Loss HDI2010 -.1982* -.4040**** .2978** .6086**** 1.0   
HDI2010 .1847* .3786**** -.3940**** -.3368*** -.8704**** 1.0  
InequalHDI2010 .2039* .4131**** -.3293*** -.4625**** -.9400**** .9812**** 1.0 
Notes: Tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001 
 
 In the Table appearing in Appendix Q, the first three columns are our main 
concern. The first column of data is striking: more peaceful nations, according to the 
criteria in the GPI, the PPI, the WPI, and the WPI’s three sub-indexes, exhibit only 
moderate to weak associations with peaceful responses on the military attacks question. 
Only two variables are significantly associated with the military attacks question at the 
moderate .05 level, the transformed GPI 2009 score correlation (.1911) and the decade 
average WPI score (2001-2010) correlation (.1938).Note, the WPI decade average was 
computed because it was observed that the yearly fluctuation between WPI scores is 
somewhat volatile. On the terrorism question, the WPI and two of the WPI’s sub-indexes 
are associated with more peaceful answers. On the efficacy of nonviolence question, we 
again observe a consistent pattern and a striking contradiction: citizens in more 
“peaceful” nations according to the WPI and GPI indicators, exhibit significantly weaker 
confidence in nonviolent methods. 
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 Below in Table 98, we see that increases in national wealth are significantly 
associated with decreased confidence in nonviolent means, but with the increased 
rejection of terrorism. Meanwhile, increases in national wealth are not significantly 
associated with peaceful attitudes on state terrorism. These findings likely reflect 
historical experiences – many wealthy nations have been the victims of terrorism, but 
state terrorism tends to happen to others far away. Thus, it is easier for citizens in wealthy 
nations to morally disengage from state terrorism (i.e., it is harder for them to take the 
perspective of the civilian victims). Nevertheless, if these divergent historical experiences 
are the explanatory link, the question arises why, given so many successful nonviolent 
campaigns around the world, why is confidence in nonviolent efficacy not higher?   
 We also see that larger nations (total population) are associated with less peaceful 
attitudes on all three attitude measures, but the only associations that achieve significance 
at the moderate .05 level involve military attacks on civilians. Larger nations have 
significantly less peaceful attitudes (at the .05 level) on the military attacks on civilians 
question, with a -.1741 correlation.   
 As we saw previously (above), nations with a larger percentage of urban citizens 
are significantly less confident that peaceful means alone “will work,” but are 
significantly more peaceful on the military attacks question, and especially on the 
terrorism question. Similarly, nations with a higher percentage of rural citizens have 
significantly more faith in nonviolent methods, but fewer object to terrorism and state 
terrorism. Hence, the patterns are consistent – on many variables, belief in nonviolent 
efficacy does not trend in the same direction as moral/ principled objections to terrorism 
and state terrorism. And, indicators of development and modernity are far more robustly 
351 
related to peaceful attitudes on terrorism than they are to peaceful attitudes on state 
terrorism.  
Table 98. Correlations of Structural Factors with Gallup World Poll (2010) Items 
 
 Variable name Sample 
size (n=) 
% military 
attacks on 
civilians never 
justified 
% terrorism 
never justified 
% nonviolence 
will work 
Population total 
(World Bank 2009) 
WB_Population_total 135 -.1741* -.1424 -.1146 
Log of population 
(World Bank 2009) 
lnpop_total 135 -.0963 -.0257 -.0414 
Population total (in 
millions), CIA 2011 
pop_in_millions_CIA2011 135 -.1741* -.1441 -.1164 
% urban (CIA 
2010) 
per_urban_cia2010 133 .2003* .3343**** -.2845*** 
% urban (World  
Bank 2009) 
percent_urban_pop 135 .1881* .3172*** -.2716** 
Urban population Urban_population 134 -.1293 -.0529 -.1215 
Log urban 
population 
lnUrban_population 134 -.0242 .0719 -.1049 
% rural  Ruralpopulation_ 
percent_of_total 
134 -.1845* -.3154*** .2707** 
Population density Population_density 135 -.2373** -.1618 -.3396**** 
GDP per capita PPP GDPpercapitaPPP 
constant2005inter 
130 .1387 .3472*** -.3980**** 
Log GDP per capita 
PPP 
lnGDPpercapita 130 .1834* .3966**** -.4447**** 
GNI per capita PPP GNIpercapitaPPP 
currentinternat 
129 .1007 .3531*** -.4080**** 
Log GNI per capita lnGNIpercapita 129 .1640 .3886**** -.4382**** 
Notes: Tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001; GDP per capita = GDP per capita in PPP 
(purchasing power parity in constant 2005 international dollars, World Bank data 2009; GNI per capita = GNI per capita in PPP in 
current international dollars, World Bank data 2009 
 
 Much like the effect of higher urbanization but even stronger, higher population 
density is associated with lower faith in nonviolent efficacy. However, on the military 
attacks question, the effect of higher population density is opposite the effect of higher 
urbanization. This is almost certainly because percent urban correlates much more 
strongly with GDP per capita (.67), GNI per capita (.6858), and Human Development 
(.7275), than population density does. That is, higher population density is more 
associated with poverty, while urbanization is more associated with wealth. We see this 
in Table 99 below.  
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Table 99. Correlations of Population and Income Variables 
 Population 
density 
% urban (CIA 
2010) 
GDP per  
capita 
GNI per  
capita 
Inequal  
HDI 2010 
Population density 1.0     
% urban (CIA 2010) .2310** 1.0    
GDP per capita .2862*** .6700**** 1.0   
GNI per capita .3236*** .6858**** .9888**** 1.0  
Inequal 
HDI 2010 
.0283 .7275**** .8361**** .8610**** 1.0 
Notes: Tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001; Population density (people per sq. km of 
land area, World Bank data 2009); GDP per capita = GDP per capita in PPP (purchasing power parity in constant 2005 international 
dollars, World Bank data 2009; GNI per capita = GNI per capita in PPP in current international dollars, World Bank data 2009; 
Inequal HDI 2010 = The inequality-adjusted human development index, UN Human Development Report 2010 (this represents the 
actual level of human development)  
 
 Several variables were logged because it is commonly expected that for variables 
with wide variation between states (e.g., population size, income, etc.), there are 
diminishing effects as we move towards the extreme values on any given variable. The 
variables for total population, urban population, and military expenditure (Local 
Currency Unit) were also logged, but no association with the three violent/ nonviolent 
attitudes achieved significance.   
 Below in Table 100, we see that increases in military spending as a percentage of 
the government budget is significantly (at the .0001 level) associated with decreases in 
the percentage of citizens who reply that military attacks on civilians are never justified. 
Certainly, higher government expenditures on the military is one indication that power 
elites have bought into a military-industrial-congressional/ legislative complex. We 
observe here that where this happens, elites in tandem with social structures and 
institutions are able to shape public opinion in such a way as to legitimize military 
attacks, even attacks in which civilians are targeted.  
 On the other hand, this same variable (military spending as a % of government 
budget) is also associated with decreases in the percentage of citizens who claim terrorist 
attacks are “never justified.” Hence, it may be that in some nations with a large military 
budget (as % of government budget), violent means in general are more likely to be seen 
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Table 100. Correlations of Military Sector Indicators and Gallup World Poll (2010) Items 
 
 Sample size 
(n=) 
% military attacks on 
civilians never 
justified 
% terrorism never 
justified 
% nonviolence 
will work 
% labor force who are soldiers 131 .0058 .0901 -.2197* 
Total soldiers 131 -.0960 -.0355 -.1595 
Log total soldiers 131 -.0659 .0380 -.2010* 
Military expenditure as % of govt 
budget 
105 -.3946**** -.3165** .0241 
Military expenditure as % of GDP 
(SIPRI 2009) 
128 -.0732 .0107 -.0227 
Military expenditure as % of GDP 
(CIA 2010) 
132 .0051 .1381 -.0787 
Military expenditure (LCU) 128 .0996 .0971 -.2317** 
Natural log of Military expenditure 
(LCU) 
128 -.1211 .0056 -.0946 
Military spending per capita (US$) 133 -.0041 .2308** -.3141*** 
Notes: Tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001 
 
as legitimate, or it may be that some citizens in these countries are violent dissenters 
against their militarized governments. However, this finding is undermined by the reverse 
pattern (i.e., an increase in the percentage of citizens claiming terrorist attacks are “never 
justified”) associated with Military spending per capita (US$), a .2308 correlation which 
is significant at the .01 level. The latter finding draws from a larger sample size (n=133), 
so it is possible that some of these findings are artifacts of sample bias.   
 In the table above, we also observe four patterns which lead to significant 
decreases in the belief in nonviolent efficacy: increases in the percentage of the labor 
force who are soldiers, the natural log of the total number of soldiers, total military 
expenditure (Local Currency Unit), and military spending per capita (US$). Military 
expenditure (LCU) was also logged, but no association with the three violent/ nonviolent 
attitudes achieved significance. 
 Below in Table 101, apart from the % of government spending on education 
variable, which does not achieve significance on any of the three questions, the direction 
of influence is entirely consistent in each of the columns (recognizing that the final 
variable, Pupil-teacher ratio, is the only variable in which a higher number represents a 
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lower quality educational system, and so the positive/ negative signs are switched on this 
variable). Hence, we see that the pattern is clear with each of the educational variables: 
increasing literacy, increasing mean years in school, increasing school enrollments, 
increasing educational spending (as a % of GDP), and lower pupil-teacher ratios all are 
associated with less confidence in nonviolent efficacy, but more peaceful attitudes 
regarding military attacks on civilians (state terrorism) and especially terrorism.  
 The robustness of the findings on terrorism and nonviolent efficacy merits 
comment. Elias (1997) has argued that nation-states reproduce an entire set of pervasive 
double-standards regarding violence such that some forms of violence are “officially 
illegitimate,” but other forms are “officially legitimate” (i.e., “what the state does or finds 
acceptable”) (p.133). For instance, violence by the government and against activists, 
foreigners, or terrorists is always legitimate, while violence against the government and 
by activists, foreigners, or terrorists is always illegitimate. Centralized state-directed 
educational systems are likely to socialize citizens into internalizing these “basic social 
rules” (Loewen 2007, p.350), these patriotic, “conservative double-standards” on 
violence (Bell 1968). It seems plausible that this helps explain the robust association 
between education and rejecting terrorism compared to the weaker association between 
education and rejecting state terrorism.  
 We have to keep in mind here that the form of state terrorism posed by the 
question is the most extreme form – targeting and killing civilians. Presumably, other 
forms of state violence, such as soldiers killing foreign soldiers would likely be met by 
respondents with far greater approval under a variety of conditions. Indeed, Loewen  
(2007) reports that more educated U.S. citizens were significantly more supportive of the 
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Table 101. Correlations of Educational Variables and Violent/ Nonviolent Attitudes 
 Variable name Sample 
size  
(n=) 
% military 
attacks on 
civilians 
never 
justified 
% terrorism 
never justified 
% 
nonviolence 
will work 
Literacy rate, adult Literacy_rate_adult 126 .2157* .3427*** -.3016*** 
Mean years of 
schooling 
Mean_yrs_school 132 .1405 .3280*** -.2944*** 
Primary school 
enrollment (% net) 
primary_enrol_ratio_net 126 .1946* .3439*** -.2486** 
Secondary school 
enrollment (% net) 
secondary_enrol_ratio_net 109 .1945* .3495*** -.2683** 
Tertiary enrollment 
(% gross) 
enroll_tertiary_percentgross 122 .2311* .4299**** -.2044* 
Population with 
secondary education 
(%) 
pop_with_secondary_ed 112 .1690 .3182*** -.2578** 
% of govt spending 
on education 
educ_percent_govt_spent 124 .0211 -.0930 .0952 
% of GDP spent on 
education 
educ_spent_percent_GDP 127 .1806* .2080* -.0291 
Pupil-teacher ratio pupil_teacher_ratio 101 -.2149* -.3735*** .3356*** 
Notes: Tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001 
 
Vietnam War in 1966, 1968, and 1971, and the Iraq War in 2004 (p.351). To many 
Americans such findings are surprising, as we “tend automatically to equate educated 
with informed or tolerant” (p.351). But these findings are less surprising when we 
consider that during the Vietnam War and today, on average, educated people are more 
likely to be Republicans (p.352). Hence, to make sense of the education variable we must 
break it down by party affiliation (or left-right ideology) as well as income. Burris (2008) 
found that, in the days prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March of 2003, 37% of 
Democrats with a college degree favored the military invasion versus 64% of Democrats 
with a high-school education, while 85 – 90% of Republicans at all education levels 
favored the invasion (pp.469-470). Thus, there are interactions and nuances, but party 
politics and ideology often trumps education when it comes to attitudes on particular 
wars.       
 The question on nonviolent efficacy may be a proxy question of historical 
knowledge. We now know that, on average, nonviolent groups have experienced 
significantly more success than violent groups (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). But it 
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seems that educational systems in nations around the world have not helped their citizens 
to learn this. Loewen (2007) writes, “Only in [the subject of] history is stupidity the result 
of more, not less schooling” (p.353).               
Testing the Youth Bulge Theory 
 
 The presence of a large youth cohort has been linked to increased political crisis 
and violence in several nations (Goldstone 2002, Huntington 1996). A variant of this 
theory specifies the proportion of males aged 15 – 29 (Gat 2006). But World Bank data 
could only provide a proxy indicator, using cohort statistics on “Population ages 0-14” 
(% of total population) without gender breakdowns. Nevertheless, the cross-national 
variation in sex ratios is relatively small (though data was lacking from China). For 
instance, World Bank data shows that the sex ratio at birth (females per 1,000 males) in 
1992, varied from a low of 909 in South Korea to a high of 990 in Rwanda. In order to 
test the proportion of youth aged 15 – 29 when the Gallup World poll data was collected 
(about 2009), I simply selected the population data from 15 years earlier (i.e., the year 
1994). Of course, this indicator is a proxy measure of a youth bulge, since the younger 
cohort might also be a disproportionately large percentage of the population. The 
proxyindicator tells us how large a percentage of the population this age cohort was 15 
years previously, but its use as a proxy measure is defensible. In fact, for our purposes, 
the size of the younger cohort is probably irrelevant. Thus, our proxy measure may 
represent a better indicator (than the proportion of ages 15-29 matched to the time of the 
survey data) of the social stresses and strains which emerge as a large birth cohort arises 
within a society and moves through its institutions as they age. Nevertheless, the 
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Encyclopaedia Britannica (Time 2012) includes country-level data on the proportion of 
the total population who are youth ages 15-29, so this indicator was also tested.  
 In Table 102, we see that larger youth bulges (larger youth populations) are 
associated with less peaceful attitudes on the military attacks question (it achieves 
significance at the .05 level), with significantly less peaceful attitudes on terrorism, and 
with significantly more peaceful attitudes on the nonviolent efficacy question. The proxy 
youth bulge measure has very similar effects. Thus, whatever the effects of youth bulges 
on violent political behaviors, youth bulges are associated with confidence in nonviolent 
efficacy and declines in moral condemnation of terrorism and state terrorism. Of course, 
the effect of youth bulges may be difficult to disentangle from other associated factors. 
The youth bulge variable is negatively and significantly correlated with GDP per capita, 
GDP per capita, and low human development (Inequal HDI). That is, poorer nations have 
much larger youth bulges. 
Table 102. Correlations of Youth Bulge, Income, and Gallup World Poll (2010) Items 
 
 % military 
attacks on 
civilians 
never 
justified 
% terrorism 
never 
justified 
% 
nonviolence 
will work 
Proxy youth 
bulge 
measure 
Youth 
bulge 
GDP per 
capita 
GNI per 
capita 
Inequal 
HDI 
2010 
Proxy 
youth 
bulge 
measure 
-.1597 -.3571**** .3028*** 1.0 
 
    
Youth 
bulge 
-.1875* -.3670**** .2798** .8616**** 1.0    
GDP per 
capita 
.1387 .3472*** -.3980**** -.7689**** -.7383**** 1.0   
GNI per 
capita 
.1007 .3531*** -.4080**** -.8368**** -.8230**** .9888**** 1.0  
Inequal 
HDI 2010 
.2039* .4131**** -.3293*** -.9265**** -.7691**** .8361**** .8610**** 1.0 
Notes: Tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001; 
 
The Major Episodes of Political Violence Data Set 
 
 Marshall’s (2012) data set, “Major Episodes of Political Violence, 1946-2012,” 
was utilized to provide statistics on number of years at peace, number of years at war, and 
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estimated casualty counts. Research has shown that the definition and operationalization 
of war matters a great deal in statistical analyses of correlates and predictors of war. For 
instance, Hegre and Sambanis (2006) found that “civil war” (which they define as over 
1,000 deaths in total and in at least a 3-year period) and “internal armed conflict” (which 
the Uppsala/ PRIO data set defines as at least 25 battle deaths a year) have numerous 
distinct correlates not shared by both forms of conflict. The Marshall (2012) data set has 
the advantage of capturing conflicts that do not quite meet the standard civil war 
threshold of 1,000 deaths a year, or the 1,000 deaths within 3 years threshold utilized by 
Hegre and Sambanis (2006). Marshall (2012) defines “major episodes of political 
violence” as involving  at least 500 “directly-related” fatalities, and which “reach a level 
of intensity in which political violence is both systematic and sustained (a base rate of 
100 ‘directly-related deaths per annum’). Episodes may be of any general type: inter-
state, intra-state, or communal; they include all episodes of international, civil, ethnic, 
communal, and genocidal violence and warfare” (p.1).       
The Nonviolent History Data Set 
 Cross-national studies with large sample sizes and variables dependent upon 
interpretations for coding are always challenged by the task of achieving comprehensive 
and accurate coverage. Moreover, many of the nonviolent history variables are 
dichotomous and somewhat crude, and thus, the results and interpretations of the results 
should be considered impressionistic. This is quite typical in the field however, as 
dichotomous variables are always crude, and a great deal of the quantitative war and 
peace literature rests upon highly specific operationalizations. For example, defining 
“civil war” as any intra-state armed conflict with over 1,000 battle deaths in a given year 
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(e.g., the UCDP/ PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset) is a mainstay in the literature. 
Researchers often run statistical tests with dichotomous variables (e.g., “war onset” in a 
given year with the codes: 1=yes, 0=no) that do little to capture the magnitude and 
significance of the conflicts.  
 In the present data set, consider the validity issues in testing the following 
variable: Years elapsed since most recent nonviolent campaign achieving “success.” This 
measure is somewhat crude since, for simplicity’s sake, significant nonviolent campaigns 
which failed or which achieved only “limited success,” as well as the presence and 
outcome of significant violent campaigns, are not captured in this variable. Nevertheless, 
the present project is concerned with analyzing collective memory (and its impact on 
attitudes about the efficacy of nonviolence), and it is plausible that successful nonviolent 
campaigns could be more salient in the collective memory than failures or cases of 
limited nonviolent success. However, it is equally plausible that if a successful nonviolent 
campaign is followed by a failed nonviolent campaign, or by a nonviolent campaign 
achieving only “limited success” (or for that matter, a successful violent campaign) 
citizens might perceive that nonviolence no longer “works.” We might recall here the 
U.S. civil rights movement in the years following Dr. King’s assassination and even 
before, when black militants grew impatient with nonviolent methods and viewed them 
as ineffective.  
 Chenoweth (2008) correctly identifies a potential data problem in the ground-
breaking study and dataset of major violent and nonviolent campaigns compiled by 
Stephan and Chenoweth (2008), which provides a key source of codes for the present 
study. The potential problem with the data is the “underreporting bias” of failed 
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campaigns – especially among the failed nonviolent campaigns, due to “extreme 
repression or poor news sources” (Chenoweth 2008, pp.2-3). Their study attempted to 
compensate for this problem by soliciting cases of failed nonviolent campaigns by the 
world’s leading experts on nonviolent conflict. Moreover, I would contend that failed 
violent campaigns would likely achieve more press and historical memory (than failed 
nonviolent campaigns) among both scholars and average citizens due to the systematic 
biases in historical memory which privileges violence and well-documented news media 
penchants for reporting violence. 
 The significance and type of nonviolent campaign is difficult to capture in 
numbers. Path dependency models, which emphasize the important precedent-setting and 
institution-shaping role bound up with national origins, would propose that when a nation 
achieves independence through a nonviolent campaign, as in the case of Ghana, such a 
nonviolent movement is likely to be particularly salient for the culture. But additional 
complications abound – such as regional effects (i.e., if a neighboring nation experiences 
a dramatic, successful nonviolent or violent movement) and subsequent historical 
developments. Many newly independent nations in Africa went on to experience lengthy 
and traumatic civil wars.  
 We are also forced to bracket possible effects on foreign opponents: might 
citizens in target occupying/ imperial nations also “learn” and believe in the efficacy of 
nonviolence through the resistance campaigns of the occupied/ colonized? It was decided 
not to code nonviolent successes under the column of the occupiers/ colonizers, because 
it was theorized that the primary mobilization and potential for developing belief in 
nonviolent efficacy is likely to reside in the people who perceive a grievance and engage 
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in nonviolent social action and thereby develop a praxis. For instance, did the British 
come to believe in the efficacy of nonviolence through the successful (or somewhat 
successful) nonviolent campaigns against them in Egypt (1919-1922), India (1919-1945), 
Ghana (1951-1957), Malawi (1958-1959), Nigeria (1945-1950), or Zambia (1961-1963)? 
Did the Indonesians develop faith in nonviolence through the successful East Timorese 
nonviolent struggle (1988-1999) against the Indonesian occupation? There is some 
evidence that opponents tend to mirror one another in their attitudes where conflicts are 
highly salient. For instance, in the 2009 Gallup World Poll, only 33% of Israelis and 32% 
of Palestinians affirmed that “peaceful means alone” “will work” for oppressed groups.   
 Measuring the long-term significance of a nonviolent campaign is also fraught, 
since how a nonviolent campaign becomes preserved in collective memory is highly 
variable. Ironically, in the present study, the one campaign that was most frequently listed 
as a successful nonviolent revolution by respondents in Costa Rica, and the second most 
frequently listed case by respondents in the U.S. – India’s campaign for independence 
under Gandhi (1919-1945), is coded as achieving only “limited success” by Stephan and 
Chenoweth (2008). Hence, the single campaign which is, in all likelihood, best 
remembered around the worldas a case of successful nonviolent action – Gandhi’s 
campaign for India’s independence, is coded by scholarly experts as achieving only 
“limited success.” Arguably, the measure of “success” is too narrow (focused on short-
term and intra-state effects) when the movement that solidified the practice and ideology 
of Gandhian nonviolence - which has already shaken the world to its foundations in 
nation after nation, is judged and coded as falling short. 
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 Coding cases. The Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) data set provided the initial set 
of major nonviolent movement cases around the world. One problem with this data set is 
that it excludes cases that occurred between the end of 2006, when the Stephan and 
Chenoweth (2008) data ends, and when the Gallup World Poll surveys were conducted in 
each nation (around 2009 in most cases; see Appendix R for dates). In order to fill the 
gap for these years (an important concern for achieving greater data validity in the 
dataset), the online Global Nonviolent Action Database(GNAD), retrieved February 
2013, was analyzed for the inclusion of additional campaign cases resolving in 2007-
2009. Further, since it was observed that some significant cases were missing from the 
Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) data, it was decided that the GNAD would be analyzed, 
seeking to identify additional cases for all 136 nations in the Gallup World Poll data (i.e., 
all existing data on the nonviolent efficacy item).  
 This process was considered to be fraught with potential biases because the 
criteria for inclusion in the GNAD is much broader than that for Stephan and Chenoweth 
(2008). Additionally, the GNAD website claims that additional cases are added each 
week. Although virtually all nations in the GNAD only have a few cases listed (usually 
between one to 5 cases), and roughly 20% of the cases appear to be significant national 
events, the U.S. case file has 232 cases listed. The only other nations with more than 10 
cases listed as of February 20, 2013 are: Bolivia (12), Canada (32), China (22; but this 
was not analyzed since not included in Gallup World Poll data); France (12), Germany 
(13), India (20), South Korea (15), and the U.K. (12). The U.S. case file was the only file 
which was not analyzed to identify possible cases of inclusion (data retrieved in 
February, 2013), because numerous other sources were consulted in identifying the most 
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significant nonviolent campaigns in the U.S. In the future as the GNAD dataset grows, 
other nations will likely also have an abundance of cases, making the determination of 
case significance somewhat more difficult, or at least more time consuming. 
 One modification to the Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) coding scheme includes 
coding all of the former Soviet states as having undergone a “successful” nonviolent 
campaign, as seen in the table below with the following notation:“1991 success, USSR 
break-up.” These thirteen states include: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, and Ukraine 
(two other former Soviet states are not included in the data because they are omitted from 
the Gallup World Poll data or the Global Peace Index: Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). 
 Surprisingly, major nonviolent campaigns achieving “success” or “limited 
success” were not identified for such large nations as Canada, Australia, the U.K., and the 
U.S. in the Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) dataset. Likewise, an analysis of the GNAD 
dataset failed to identify significant campaigns listed for Canada, Australia, and the U.K. 
However, some nonviolent campaigns with outcomes of “limited success” and “success” 
(not yet listed in these datasets) would likely merit inclusion, such as the women’s 
suffrage movements in each nation. 
 In making selections for inclusion, the present author had to interpret which cases 
in the GNAD merited inclusion as a significant nonviolent case. Again, a few cases were 
added though they were omitted from Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) and the GNAD. 
This process depended on the knowledge (based in diverse scholarly sources) of the 
present researcher only and was considered even more fraught with bias, since time 
constraints prevented an analysis of the history of every nation looking for significant 
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nonviolent cases. And, it is one thing to be aware of a significant nonviolent case 
somewhere in the world and to include that in the dataset, but it is quite another to be 
positive that other nations do not have movements deserving inclusion as well. Hence, 
the “sins of omission” are likely to be significant. Nevertheless, such problems are 
common in many cross-national datasets. 
 In keeping with the Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) coding, only “major non-state 
resistance campaigns” were sought, defined as “campaigns with the objective of 
expelling foreign occupations, regime change (i.e. removing dictatorships or military 
juntas), self-determination or separatism, and in some cases, other major types of social 
change (i.e. anti-apartheid campaigns)”; campaigns that were “primarily nonviolent”; and 
campaigns where it is certain that “more than 1,000 people were actively participating in 
the struggle” (Chenoweth 2008, pp.1-2). Thus, they define “major” nonviolent campaigns 
as “those that are already ‘mature’ in terms of objectives and membership” (p.2). And 
again they clarify, “We only included cases where the objective was maximalist (i.e., 
regime change, secession, or self-determination) as opposed to limited (i.e., greater civil 
liberties or economic rights)” (p.2).  
 In all instances, cases were only added to the present data set if the campaigns 
resolved before the Gallup World Poll survey was conducted in each country (see 
Appendix R). Unfortunately, a dramatic case of nonviolent success in Iceland occurred 
just after the survey was conducted in Iceland in December of 2008.  
 The GNAD includes more nonviolent campaigns than Stephan and Chenoweth 
(2008), but at times, it is also less systematic and comprehensive in its coverage of major 
campaigns – such as campaigns that resulted in regime change. For instance, Stephan and 
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Chenoweth (2008) include the 2001 Second People Power Movement in the Philippines, 
and in 1963 and 1974 successful nonviolent revolutions in Greece, but these were all 
lacking in the GNAD database (retrieved February 19, 2013). The GNAD certainly 
includes cases where greater economic civil liberties or economic rights were the goals, 
and as we saw above, such campaigns were not included in Stephan and Chenoweth 
(2008).  
 Considerations of validity in the present data set prompted the recognition that 
there is a slight mismatch between the Gallup World Poll question on nonviolent efficacy 
and the Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) criteria for inclusion as a major nonviolent 
campaign. That is, it is possible many respondents would think of “limited” cases, 
seeking greater civil liberties or economic rights (as opposed to the “maximalist” 
revolutions), as examples informing their answer for the abstract question on whether 
peaceful means alone “will work” for oppressed groups. Thus, in reviewing the more 
inclusive GNAD dataset, an effort was made to include major campaigns seeking civil 
liberties or economic rights. In all cases this was a qualitative assessment guided by 
GNAD’s coding. This process resulted in the inclusion of several campaigns that had 
involved over 1,000 people (and in most cases, well over that number, usually tens of 
thousands), dramatic street actions or general strikes, and significant concessions or 
victories. This inclusion was deemed appropriate since the present project is concerned 
with identifying the most significant nonviolent campaigns, those likely to become 
embedded in collective memory and to shape subsequent attitudes about the efficacy of 
nonviolence.     
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 To fill in the gap in years during 2007 to 2009, the following case of nonviolent 
“success” were added because they met the above stated criteria and resolved in 2007-
2009: 
• Pakistan (2007-2009; Save the Judiciary Movement; activist lawyers engaged in 
numerous nonviolent tactics and pressured President Musharraff to reinstate the 
Chief Justice and 60 other judges who had been dismissed illegally; the President 
was removed from office and civilian control of the army restored; a 4-day long 
march culminated in the participation of 500,000 people; the campaign resolved 
in mid-March, 2009; coded: “success”; the GNAD rated it 6 out of a possible 6 
points in the degree of success in achieving campaign goals)) 
• El Salvador (2007-2008; numerous nonviolent tactics including a 3-day march 
involving 700 people protesting the neo-liberal privatization of water in El 
Salvador and the arrest and imprisonment of 13 anti-privatization activists, called 
the “Suchitito 13”; the last day of the march had 3,500 people; all 13 prisoners 
were released; coded: “success”; the GNAD rated it 6 out of a possible 6 points) 
 Several additional cases were added, though the campaigns resolved before 2006 
and were omitted from the Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) data. These included, for 
example: 
• Benin (1989-1990) strikes by university students and general strikes by public 
sector employees (teachers and civil servants) demanding salaries owed them, the 
President was overthrown, democratic elections held; the majority of the nation’s 
22,000 teachers and 50,000 government employees went on strike; anti-
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government demonstrations with 40,000 people (code: “success”; the GNAD 
ranks its degree of success 5 out of 6 possible points). 
• Liberia’s women’s nonviolent movement (2003-2005) to end the civil war and to 
push for democratic elections; various nonviolent tactics including marches, 
occupations, and a sex strike by over 2,500 women (coded: “success”; the GNAD 
rated it 6 out of a 6 possible points).  
 Nonviolent campaigns were not added if GNAD rated them 0 to 2 (out of 6 
points) in achieving goals, which was considered “failure.” Otherwise, assessments for 
justifying inclusion were both quantitative (considering the score out of 6 points) and 
qualitative (analyzing the narrative description of outcomes in the GNAD). The data from 
Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) was considered more authoritative. Hence, for example, 
Stephan and Chenoweth coded Brazilians’ movement against military rule in 1984-1985 
as a “success” and this coding was adopted, even though the GNAD coded the degree of 
success for this case as only 3 out of a possible 6 points. And, following Stephan and 
Chenoweth, the 1987 South Korean movement against the military government was 
coded a “limited success,” though the GNAD coded the degree of success as 5 out of 6 
points. Generally, campaigns scoring 3 to 5 (out of a possible 6 points) were considered 
as candidates for “limited success,” with the qualitative analysis of the campaign’s 
narrative description helping to decide the proper code.  
 Again, the Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) dataset presents some limitations. For 
instance, significant cases of general strikes and labor strikes are not coded, even if they 
launched movements that eventually resulted in electoral victories which definitively 
undermined the power of the elite 1% and established robust social democracies with 
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strong welfare states. As Lakey (2012a, 2012b) has argued, such movements occurred in 
Norway and Sweden in the 1920s and 1930s.   
 Scholars of contemporary Latin America have noted that in recent years strikes 
and “mass street actions” have brought down governments in Peru (2000), Argentina 
(2001), Bolivia (2003 and 2005), and Ecuador (1997, 2000, and 2005) (Buono and Lara 
2006; Rénique 2006,p.38). In most of these cases, masses were quickly mobilized to form 
largely nonviolent “people power” movements against neoliberal policies. In almost all of 
these cases, the result was the resignation of a president, but there was no “decisive break 
with neoliberal domination” (Buono and Lara 2006, p.10). Hence, the code of “limited 
success” fits for many of these Latin American cases. But this speaks to the challenge of 
coding the degree of “success” in nonviolent campaigns, and much depends on how 
radical are the goals envisioned. One of the elder scholars of nonviolence and director of 
the Global Nonviolent Action Database (GNAD), George Lakey (2012b), has argued that 
he could not think of any violent movements that have: 1) used violence to overthrow a 
regime, and 2) established democracy afterward, and 3) “curbed the dominant power of 
the 1 percent” to borrow language from the Occupy movement. Actually, Costa Rica in 
1948 might be the one case where all three criteria were met, except for the fact that 
democracy had a long tradition in Costa Rica (the violent campaign merely restored 
democratic norms), and the dominant power of the 1% was severely reigned in through 
the progressive “Social Guarantees” legislation under President Guardia just a few years 
prior – a development that some Costa Ricans have called “the real revolution of Costa 
Rica” (Eddy and Dreiling 2013). Lakey only listed two nonviolent movements that he felt 
met this criteria: Sweden and Norway. Indeed, with such a high threshold, perhaps few 
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mass nonviolent movements have achieved “success.” Nevertheless, the campaigns in 
Bolivia resulted in more systemic changes and culminated in the election of Morales, an 
indigenous leader representing a sea change in Bolivian politics. The failure of Stephan 
and Chenoweth (2008) to include these dramatic cases (highlighted in Table 103) is 
puzzling. 
Table 103. Coding of Significant Nonviolent/ People Power Movements: Cases of 
Regime Change Missing from Key Data Sets of Nonviolent Action 
Nation (years of nonviolent 
campaign) 
Included in Stephan and 
Chenoweth (2008), data 
from 1900 to 2006 
(outcome code) 
Included in Global 
Nonviolent Action Database 
(outcome code/ success 
ranked 0 to 6)ᵃ 
Other sources (outcome 
code) 
Liberia (2003-2005) No Yes (success)/ 6  
Peru (2000) Yes (success) Yes (success)/ 6  
Argentina (2001) No No Yes* (limited success) 
Bolivia (2003) No Yes (success)/ 6  
Bolivia (2005) No Yes (success)/ 6  
Ecuador (1944) No Yes (limited success)/ 4  
Ecuador (1997) No Yes (success)/ 6  
Ecuador (2000) No No Yes* (limited success) 
Ecuador (2005) No No Yes* (limited success) 
Venezuela (2002) No Yes (success)/ 6 Yes* (success) 
Notes: (a) I borrow the three-fold coding scheme (success, limited success, or failure) used by Stephan and Chenoweth (2008), but 
base these codes on translations of the Global Nonviolent Action Database (GNAD) coding scheme of 0 to 6 points (with 6 
representing complete success) assessing the movements “Success in achieving specific demands/ goals” (e.g., I coded “4” as “limited 
success” and “6” as “success”); * = clear cases of people power/ street action movements that were largely nonviolent, with some 
limited violence and property destruction as a form of direct action. The President (or Junta leader in the case of Venezuela) resigned 
in each case; Note that the GNAD includes a much larger class of movement cases (e.g., major workplace strikes, etc.) than Stephan 
and Chenoweth (2008), but in the table above, we limit ourselves to the “maximalist” criteria of inclusion i.e., regime change, 
secession, or self-determination) stipulated by Stephan (2008, p.2). 
 
 Caveats. There are many potential problems and imperfections in using these data 
sets as indicators of historical experiences relevant to the Gallup World Poll question on 
the efficacy of “peaceful means alone.” As already discussed, many nations around the 
world are relatively democratic and democracies consist largely of daily and 
institutionalized nonviolent means of negotiation and conflict resolution. Here, 
nonviolent methods become “conventional action,” an are unlikely to be conceived by 
democratic citizens as “nonviolence.” These data sets coding significant nonviolent 
movements and campaigns primarily identifies a type of social action that can be termed 
nonviolent “people power,” mass street protests, strikes and other forms of civil 
disobedience. Nevertheless, just as war is the most dramatic instance of violence, these 
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actions are the most dramatic instance of nonviolence, and both war and people power 
movements are likely to instill in populations a form of faith in the efficacy of either 
violent or nonviolent methods. 
 The data set attempted to include only significant nonviolent campaigns. That is, 
largely nonviolent “people power” campaigns that grabbed national attention, with 
dramatic street actions involving over 1,000 people (and in most cases, well over that 
number), nonviolent events likely to be maintained and reproduced in the collective 
memory. The reason for this criteria is that it was theorized that dramatic nonviolent 
events can become ideological master images and paradigm shifters in the thinking of 
average citizens, just as war is the most dramatic instance of violent methods and war 
furnishes the most socially visible narratives and discourses which undergird the myth of 
redemptive violence. Likewise, people power and mass nonviolent civil disobedience is 
the most dramatic instance of nonviolent methods, and they furnish the most socially 
visible narratives and discourses that undergird the ideas of principled and pragmatic 
nonviolence. Violence and nonviolence in their manifold forms surround us on a daily 
basis, but only extreme forms of these phenomenon are likely to seep into collective 
memory and national narratives.   
 The aim of including only “significant”/ “major” nonviolent campaigns is very 
difficult to achieve given all the potential indicators of significance. For instance, the 
women’s suffrage movement in the U.S. is arguably worthy of inclusion, but in an open-
ended question in the present survey, only 8.8% of students in the 2012 survey and 13.1% 
of students in the 2013 survey listed this case as an example of a successful nonviolent 
movement. By contrast, a higher percentage of students listed the U.S. civil rights 
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movement: 20.6% in the 2012 survey and 24.6% in the 2013 survey. By this measure, the 
U.S. civil rights movement has clearly been more significant in collective memories of 
nonviolent action.  
 The nonviolent history data set and opinion outcomes. In Table 104, a cursory 
analysis suggests that the nationsexpressing the strongest confidence in nonviolent 
efficacy have recently experienced succussful nonviolent revolutions. This qualitative 
assessment will be born out in statisticaly analyses below. We can also observe below 
how universally widespread successful nonviolent campaigns have been, as well as, for 
our purposes, how incomplete Stephan and Chenoweth’s (2008) dataset is and the utility 
of the GNAD and other sources in helping to fill in gaps in the historical record of 
nonviolent campaigns. 
Table 104. Rank/ % Affirming “Peaceful Means Alone” “Will Work”/ Nation/ 
Nonviolent History 
 
Rank % 
Affirming 
“Peaceful 
Means 
Alone” 
“Will 
Work” 
Nation Nonviolent History 
1 85% Madagascar 1991-93 success over Didier Radsiraka – called Active Voices campaign; 2002-
03 pro-democracy movement success over Radsiraka regime 
2 84% Liberia [2003-2005 success] 
3 82% Cote d’Ivoire [1989-1990 pro-democracy movement success] 
 
4 81% Georgia (1991 success, USSR break-up);2003 success over Shevardnadze regime – called 
Rose Revolution 
5 81% Philippines 1986 success against Marcos – called People Power; 2001 success against 
Estrada regime – called Second People Power Movement 
6 80% Kyrgyzstan (1991 success, USSR break-up);1989 Kyrgyzstan Democratic Movement success 
against Communist Regime; 2005 success against Akayev regime – called the 
Tulip Revolution 
7 79% Mongolia 1989-90 limited success against Communist regime 
8 79% Pakistan 1968-69 limited success against Khan regime; [2007-2009 Save the Judiciary 
Movement success] 
9 78% Rwanda None 
10 77% Burundi [2007 civil servant strike success] 
11 77% Greece 1963 success over Karamanlis regime; 1974 success over military rule; [2008, 
success, 13,000 prisoners’ hunger strike for reforms] 
12 76% Uruguay 1984-1985 success over military rule 
13 76% Bangladesh 1989-90 limited success against military rule 
14 76% Sierra Leone [1997-1998 pro-democracy movement success] 
15 76% Central African 
Republic/ CAR 
None 
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Affirming 
“Peaceful 
Means 
Alone” 
“Will 
Work” 
Nation Nonviolent History 
16 76% Benin 1989-1990 limited success over Communist regime 
17 76% Nepal 1989-90 limited success against Monarchy; 2006 limited success against 
Nepalese government/ martial law 
18 75% Tanzania 1992-95 limited success of pro-democracy movement against Mwinyi regime 
19 73% Costa Rica [1919 Women teachers help overthrow Tinoco; 1947 successful strike for electoral 
reforms; 1999-2002 defeat of U.S. oil companies] 
20 72% Tajikistan (1991 success, USSR break-up) 
21 72% Cameroon [1958-1961 successful women’s movement] 
22 71% Moldova (1991 success, USSR break-up) 
23 71% Haiti [1946, Haitians strike & overthrow a dictator; 1956, Haitians strike & overthrow a 
dictator]; 1985 success, overthrow of Duvalier {note: GNAD codes  this 
overthrow as 1984-1986} 
24 70% Sudan [1964 success, overthrow of dictator Abbud]; 1985 success over Jaafar Nimiery 
25 69% Yemen None 
26 69% Ghana 1951-1957 success over British rule {Note: GNAD codes this campaign as 1949-
1951}; 2000 success over Rawlings government 
27 69% Armenia (1991 success, USSR break-up) 
28 69% Kazakhstan [1989-1991, success, Kazakhs stop nuclear testing]; (1991 success, USSR break-
up) 
29 69% Egypt [1919-1922 Egyptian campaign for independence from Britain];2000-2005 limited 
success over Mubarak regime; [2006-2007 success, textile worker strike] 
30 69% Chad None 
31 68% Republic of 
Congo/ Congo-
Brazzaville 
[1990, success, trade union strikes] 
32 68% Finland [1898-1905 limited success, Finns resist Russification] 
33 68% Comoros None 
34 67% Nicaragua None 
35 67% Indonesia 1997-98 success over Suharto rule 
 
36 67% Mauritania None 
37 66% Togo None 
38 66% Mali 1989-1992 success over military rule 
39 66% Iceland [1975 success, women strike for equality] 
40 66% Niger [1991 limited success, women campaign for inclusion in Nat’l Assembly] 
41 65% Kosovo None 
42 65% Argentina 1977-1981 pro-dem mov’t success over military junta; 1986 success over 
attempted coup; [2001 limited success] 
43 65% Cambodia None 
44 65% Portugal 1974 Carnation Revolution success over military rule 
45 65% Ireland None 
46 64% Belarus 1989 limited success against Communist regime; (1991 success, USSR break-up) 
47 64% Jordan None 
48 64% Lebanon 2005 success over Syrian forces – called Cedar Revolution 
49 64% Guinea None 
50 63% Hungary [1859-1867 success, campaign for independence from Austrian  Empire; 1984-
1989 success, Danube river dam prevented]; 1989 pro-dem mov’t  success over 
Communist regime 
51 63% Colombia [1957 success, dictator overthrown] 
52 63% Senegal 2000 limited success against Diouf gov’t 
53 63% Mozam-bique None 
54 63% Cyprus None 
55 62% Spain [1919 success, Barcelona general strike for economic justice; 1962 success, coal 
miner strikes against Franco; 1976-1978 success, mov’t to stop nuclear power plant] 
56 62% Malawi 1958-59 success over British rule; 1992-94 success over Banda regime 
57 61% Russia [1905 limited success, Russian Revolution]; 1990-91 success of pro-democracy 
mov’t against anti-coup 
58 61% Turkey None 
59 61% Canada None 
60 61% Saudi Arabia None 
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Nation Nonviolent History 
61 60% Angola None 
62 60% Slovenia 1989-90 success over Communist regime 
63 60% Dominican 
Republic 
None 
64 60% Ecuador [1944 limited success; 1997 success]; (2000 limited success; 2005 
 limited success) 
65 59% Latvia 1989 pro-dem mov’t success over Communist regime;(1991 success, USSR 
break-up) {Here, the coding follows GNAD’s code: 1989-1991 success, campaign 
for  national independence} 
66 59% Nigeria 1945-1950 limited success over British occupation; 1993-99 success over 
Military rule; [2002 success, Nigerian women over Chevron oil] 
67 59% South Africa [1906-1914 success, Gandhian campaign for Indian’s rights]; 1984-1994 
success against Apartheid 
68 59% Sweden [1931 limited success, general strike] 
69 59% Azerbaijan (1991 success, USSR break-up) 
70 59% Chile 1931 success over Ibanez regime; 1983-9 success over Pinochet 
71 58% Djibouti None 
72 58% Morocco [1992-1994 success, feminist campaign to reform Islamic Family Law] 
73 58% Panama None 
74 58% Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo/ Zaire 
None 
75 58% Ukraine (1991 success, USSR break-up);2001-2004  success over Kuchma regime, called 
Orange Revolution 
76 57% Botswana None 
77 57% Brazil 1984-1985 success over military rule 
78 57% Guatemala 1944 October Revolutionaries success over Ubico dictatorship {Note: the 
nonviolent movement in June and July of 1944 could be included too, but it was 
decided that separate coding was not essential, especially since that case achieved 
only “limited success” as Ubico’s regime largely continued under General Vaides} 
79 57% Zambia 1961-63 success over British rule; 1990-91 limited success over one-party rule; 
2001 success over Chiluba regime 
80 56% El Salvador 1944 Strike of Fallen Arms success over Martinez dictatorship; [2002-2003 
success, mov’t prevented privatization of health care; 2007-2008 success, Suchitito 
13 mov’t] 
81 56% Namibia None 
82 56% Bolivia 1977-1982 success over military juntas; [2000 success, Cochabamba  water 
war; 2003-2005 success, mov’t wins democratic control of gas reserves]; (2003 
success; 2005 success; 2007 success) 
83 55% Bahrain None 
84 55% Australia None 
85 55% Tunisia None 
86 55% Venezuela 1958 success over Jimenez dictatorship; [2002 success, military coup defeated] 
87 55% Algeria [1962 success, citizens non-violently prevent full-scale civil war] 
88 54% Burkina Faso None 
89 54% Afghanistan None 
90 54% Uganda None 
91 54% Taiwan 1979-1985 limited success over autocratic regime 
92 54% Kenya 1989 limited success over Daniel Arap Moi 
93 54% Italy None 
94 54% USA (1955-1965 civil rights movement) 
95 54% Zimbabwe None 
96 53% Honduras None 
97 53% Germany [1920 success, citizens defend democracy against coup]; 1923 Ruhrkampf 
Resistance success over French occupation; 1989 pro-dem mov’t E. German 
success over Communist Regime 
98 52% Iraq None 
99 52% UK None 
100 51% Estonia 1989 success over Communist regime – called the Singing Revolution; (1991 
success, USSR break-up) 
101 50% Syria [1936 success, general strike against French occupation] 
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102 49% New Zealand None 
103 49% Paraguay None 
 
104 49% Mexico 1987-2000 success over corrupt gov’t 
105 48% Romania None 
106 48% Austria None 
107 48% Norway 1944 limited success over Nazi occupation 
108 48% Peru [1971 success, squatter’s movement]; 2000 success over Fujimori 
109 47% Netherlands None 
110 47% Denmark 1944 limited success over Nazi occupation 
111 47% Sri Lanka None 
112 46% Kuwait [2002-2005 success, struggle for women’s suffrage called the Blue Revolution]  
113 46% Qatar None 
114 46% Belgium [1913 success, general strike for universal suffrage; 1950 success, movement 
prevents King Leopold III from resuming the throne] 
115 46% Guyana 1990-1992 success over autocratic regime 
116 45% Lithuania (1991 success, USSR break-up);1989-1991 pro-dem mov’t  success over 
Lithuanian regime 
117 45% South Korea 1960 Student Revolution success over Rhee regime; 1987 limited success against 
military gov’t 
118 45% Luxem-bourg None 
119 45% Belize [2005 success, general strike of unions for reforms] 
120 42% Poland 1956 limited success over Communist regime; 1968-70 limited success over 
Communist regime; 1981-89 Solidarity Movement success over Communist 
regime 
121 41% Trinidad and 
Tobago 
None 
122 40% India 1919-45 limited success over British rule 
123 39% Ethiopia None 
124 39% Malta None 
125 38% Iran 1977-78 Iranian Revolution success over Shah 
126 37% Thailand 1973 success, student protests overthrew military dictatorship;  1992 limited 
success, pro-dem mov’t against Suchinda regime; 2005-6 success, overthrew 
Thaksin regime 
127 37% Malaysia None 
128 37% France [1994 success, over-turning sub-minimum wage; 2006 success, defeat of new 
employment law] 
129 34% Japan None 
130 33% Israel 1981-82 Druze resistance – limited success against Israeli  occupation of 
Golan 
131 32% Palestinian 
Territories 
1987-1990 Intifada limited success against Israeli occupation 
132 26% Hong Kong None 
133 25% Czech Republic 1989 Velvet Revolution success over Communist regime 
134 20% Laos None 
135 19% Singapore None 
136 7% Vietnam None 
 
Notes: years = major nonviolent movements identified in Stephan and Chenoweth’s 
(2008) dataset, only cases whose outcomes are coded “success” or “limited success” are 
listed here; [years] = significant nonviolent campaigns identified by Global Nonviolent 
Action Database (GNAD) and coded as “success” or “limited success,” retrieved 
February 2013; (years) = additional significant nonviolent movements added based on 
other sources; Respondent % in Gallup World Poll (2010) data affirming “peaceful 
means alone” “will work” for oppressed groups struggling to improve their situation. 
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Additional Historical Indicators of Cultures of Peace: Peace Years and War Years 
 
 Drawing from Marshall (2012), nations were also coded according to their “peace 
years” and “war years.” The following 42 nations experienced zero years of war (i.e., 64 
years of peace) from 1945 to 2009 (sorted by region): 
• Western Europe, Canada & U.S.: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden 
• Eastern Europe & Central Asia: Belarus, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, 
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, Ukraine  
• Middle East & North Africa: Bahrain, Qatar 
• South & East Asia & Oceana: Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, Mongolia, New 
Zealand, Singapore 
• Latin America: Belize, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay 
• Sub-Saharan Africa: Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Comoros, Malawi, Togo 
Conversely, the following nations experienced over 30 years of war(see Appendix P for 
details on this “war_years” variable) from 1945 to 2009, sorted by region (number of 
years indicated in parentheses): 
• Western Europe, Canada & U.S.: UK (31), USA (33) 
• Eastern Europe & Central Asia: Turkey (34) 
• Middle East & North Africa: Iran (34), Iraq (64), Israel (61), Palestinian 
Territories (44) 
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• South & East Asia & Oceana: Afghanistan (32), Cambodia (39), India (64), 
Indonesia (64), Pakistan (47), Philippines (64), Thailand (35), Vietnam (45) 
• Latin America: Colombia (47), Guatemala (31) 
• Sub-Saharan Africa: Angola (64), Chad (36), Democratic Republic of Congo 
(32), Ethiopia (36), Nigeria (33), Sudan (42), Uganda (40) 
Results: Nonviolent Campaign History Variables 
 
 Below in Table 105, we see that there is a significant difference (at the .05 level) 
between nations that have experienced two or more major nonviolent campaigns and 
nations that have had no major nonviolent campaigns. And, nations with progressively 
more major nonviolent campaigns with more positive outcomes exhibit more confidence 
in nonviolent efficacy. That is, nations with two or more nonviolent successes enjoy 
slightly higher confidence in nonviolence than nations with only one nonviolent success. 
These results suggest that successful nonviolent campaigns do impact national mean 
attitudes on the efficacy of nonviolence. In short, it seems history matters and people do 
“learn” from experience. 
 The variable “years since nv success” involved the coding choice of how to code 
nations that have not experienced a major nonviolent campaign “success” according to 
the Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) data set and (the author’s assessment of) the GNAD 
data set. In Table 106 below, those with no successful nonviolent campaigns were coded 
as 1900 for the “years since nv success” variable. In a second test, these nations were 
coded as missing data. In the second test, once again the only correlation with the “years 
since nv success” variable that achieved significance was the correlation with “% nv will 
work.” The correlation was -.2578, significant at the .05 level. Thus, as the years elapsed 
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Table 105. Nation-Level Data: Nonviolent Attitudes (Gallup World Poll 2010) by 
Nonviolent History 
Nations Sorted by Nonviolent 
Historical Experiences 
Frequency Nonviolence Works (% 
affirming nonviolence will 
work) 
All (n=136) 57.9  
Nonviolent history   
2 or more nonviolent success 28 62.8 
1 nonviolent success 39 60.8 
nonviolent “limited success” 
only 
15 58.7 
No major nonviolent campaigns 
achieving even “limited success” 
54 53.1 
Difference by nv history (eta2)  .084**(a) 
Note: * = Significant at the .05 level; ** = Significant at the .01 level; The significance of the difference between groups without any 
controls is measured by ANOVA. Eta2 (i.e., Eta squared) was computed using a user written “effectsize” program for Stata (see 
UCLA (2012)). Eta2 is interpreted as the percent of the dependent variable accounted for by the effect in the sample (UCLA 2012). As 
a rule of thumb for effect size, an Eta2 of .01 is small, .06 is medium, and .14 is large.  Additional notes from table: (a) The only 
significant differences (at the .05 level) in the Scheffe table involved comparisons between nations with “2 or more nv successes” and 
those with “no major nv campaigns,” but the difference between nations with “1 nv success” and “no major nv campaigns” was 
significant at the modest .1 level.; Bartlett’s test for equal variance showed the sample variances in this column are not significantly 
different, and this lends support to the significance finding; Source: nonviolent history data comes from Stephan and Chenoweth 
(2008) and the Global Nonviolent Action Database (see Appendix P); public opinion data from Gallup World Poll 2010  
 
since a successful nonviolent campaign increases, the confidence in nonviolent efficacy 
decreases. Or, to put it another way, the more recent a nonviolent success/ the smaller the 
number of years since a successful nonviolent campaign, the stronger the confidence in 
nonviolent efficacy. 
 Surprisingly, casualty counts were not related to cross-national attitudinal 
variation on the three Gallup World Poll violent/ nonviolent items. Also surprisingly, the 
number of “peace years” and number of “war years” (mirror images of one another) were 
related to only one of the attitudinal variables (the state terrorism item) and at only the 
moderate .10 level. Nevertheless, the longer the “peace years” enjoyed by a nation (and 
the fewer the “war years” suffered), the higher the principled nonviolent attitudes against 
state terrorism. The fact that this association only achieves the .10 level of significance 
raises some doubts about the peace-specific capital accumulation hypothesis, which can 
be formulated as: “the longer a country is at peace, the lower should be the risk of 
(another) war as conflict-specific capital remains unused and peace-specific capital is 
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Table 106. Correlations of Nonviolent Attitudes and Historical Experiences of War and 
Peace 
Variable % military 
attacks on 
civilians never 
justified 
% 
terrorism 
never 
justified 
% 
nonviolenc
e will work 
years 
since nv 
success 
peace years war years years since 
war 
% military 
attacks on 
civilians 
never 
justified 
1.0       
% terrorism 
never 
justified 
.8315***** 1.0      
% 
nonviolence 
will work 
.0026 -.1210 1.0     
years since 
nv success 
-.0807 -.0169 -.2917**** 1.0    
peace years .1649* .1029 .0977 -.0881 1.0   
war years -.1649* -.1029 -.0977 .0881 -1.0 1.0  
years since 
war 
.1833** .2111** -.1596* .0817 .6754***** -.6754***** 1.0 
casualties -.1275 -.0969 -.0932 .0940 -.5668***** .5668***** -.3437***** 
Notes: Pearson product-moment correlations. Tests of significance:  * = p < .10; ** = p < .05; *** = p < .01; **** = p < .001; ***** = 
p < .0001; All time period data extends between 1945 and 2009, with the exception of the “years since nv success” which tracked data 
from the years 1900 to 2009; Source: public opinion data from Gallup World Poll 2010  
 
accumulated” (Hegre and Sambanis 2006, p.515). However, it must be remembered that 
these variables count the total/ cumulative and non-consecutive number of years at peace/ 
war since 1945 up to 2009.  
 Hence, the “years since war” variable is a better test of the peace-specific capital 
accumulation hypothesis. The “years since war” variable (i.e., the time at peace since the 
last war), a consecutive count, is significantly associated with peaceful attitudes at the 
more robust .05 level, on the terrorism and state terrorism items. Hence, when peace 
years accumulate in consecutive fashion, this is associated with peaceful, principled 
nonviolent attitudes which reject terrorism and state terrorism. 
 Since “years since war” is more robustly related to peace attitudes than “war 
years” or “peace years,” this may provide indirect evidence for the theory that war events 
tend to re-set attitudes to a new belligerent level, regardless of how common periods of 
peace are or how long a previous period of peace was in a nation. But an obvious 
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alternative interpretation would hold that there are other factors mediating here which 
make some nations both more likely to engage in war and less likely to hold principled 
nonviolent attitudes against state terrorism. 
 Note also that the accumulation of “peace capital” is quite specific. Here, it is 
indicated by principled nonviolent attitudes against terrorism and state terrorism, but it 
does not carry over to pragmatic nonviolent attitudes. The “years since war” variable is 
not significantly associated with the confidence in nonviolent efficacy at the .05 level. 
But the correlation is negative (-.1596) and significant at the moderate .10 level (p= 
.0634). Thus, on average, the more recent a war (i.e., the fewer the number of years since 
a war was fought) the higher the confidence in nonviolent efficacy. Although the effect is 
weak, this suggests that war often creates a reaction and backlash against violent methods 
and a hope in nonviolent methods as an alternative means of conflict resolution. This may 
be mediated by the fact that wars are sometimes at least partly resolved through 
nonviolent methods – namely, negotiations and diplomacy. But, the confidence in 
nonviolent methods can be short-lived. In other words, through engaging in war, many 
cultures “learn” that violence is ineffective and morally problematic, but on average, the 
lessons are not long remembered or sufficiently embedded (e.g., institutionally 
embedded) to prevent new armed conflicts. 
 All of this suggests that the accumulation of peace-specific capital of the 
pragmatic nonviolent variety (i.e., confidence in nonviolent efficacy) is specifically 
related to the praxis of significant nonviolent campaigns, rather than simply the absence 
of war. However, when wars have recently ended they can foster reactions against violent 
methods and also instill hope in alternative nonviolent means of solving conflicts. But the 
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collective memories of war and their link to the collective rejection of violent methods 
can be short-lived. Moreover, the results suggestively support the view that attitudes on 
violence/ nonviolence are linked to collective memories and that these attitudes and 
memories are bounded by nation-state. Hence, the value of cross-national studies rests in 
the fact that nations do reproduce distinctive memories and culture can be understood as a 
form of accumulated praxis (action, reflection and revised strategic action). But this 
praxis is informed by very specific forms of experiential capital (resources) and collective 
memories. Successful nonviolent social movements and nonviolent revolutions are likely 
to reproduce faith in nonviolent efficacy, at least for several years, but such experiences 
do not seem to reproduce higher rates of principled nonviolent stands against state 
terrorism or terrorism. Similarly, when nations enjoy long periods of peace they are not, 
on average, more likely to develop higher degrees of confidence in nonviolent efficacy.            
 Of course, the “years since war” variable strongly and positively correlates with 
“peace years,” and it strongly and negatively correlates with “war years,” indicating that 
there is a set of nations which frequently engage in war and have done so recently, and 
another set of nations that enjoy peace and have not fought a war in many years. As can 
be seen in Table 107 below, two separate dummy variables were created which allow us 
to test the significance of these patterns: “war prone” nations (coded as those nations with 
over 40 years of war since 1945) and “historically peaceful” nations (coded as those with 
0 years of war since 1945). Surprisingly, none of the t-tests on these dummy variables 
and the three nonviolent attitudinal indicators (from the Gallup World Poll 2010) 
achieved significance. This speaks to the complexity of conflict histories and the 
potential for innumerable mediating dynamics, none of which is captured well by the 
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dichotomous variables employed in T-tests. Nevertheless, it is notable that the “war 
prone” nations have less faith in nonviolent efficacy than the “relatively peaceful” 
nations, while ironically, in the alternative dummy code of “historically peaceful” 
nations, the most peaceful nations have less faith in nonviolent efficacy than the set of 
nations experiencing war since 1945 (see Table 108). Thus, both war prone nations and 
nations that have experienced the least conflict demonstrate the least confidence in 
nonviolent efficacy. In the case of the former, war-prone belligerence has solidified in 
attitudes that affirm the utility of violence and the myth of redemptive violence. In the 
case of the latter, it may well be a proxy indication that these peaceful nations have 
lacked the development of a nonviolent praxis which tends to be forged in the fires of 
civil conflict. Alternatively, it could be that some exposure to armed conflict tends to 
make populations recoil against violence, while extended exposure to decades of armed 
conflict tends to make populations believe there is no alternative.  
Table 107. T-Tests of National Mean Attitude Scores: War Prone Nations 
Gallup World Poll item Relatively 
peaceful nations 
(n =121 or 120  
or 125 ) 
War prone 
nations 
(n = 10 or 11) 
 
df 
 
t 
 
x̄ - x̄² 
 
M SD M SD 
% military attacks on 
civilians never justified 
 65.5 14.2 64 16.9 129 .3182 1.51 
% terrorism never 
justified 
72.1 13.8 69.7 15.2 128 .5151 2.36 
% nonviolence will work 58.4 13.0 53.1 22.8 10.58 .7530 5.26 
 
Notes: Two-tailed t-tests of significance: * = p < .1; ** = p < .05; “war prone” = nations with more than 40 years of war since 1945; 
“relatively peaceful” = all nations not coded as “war prone”; Because the variances in the variable “% nonviolence will work” are 
significantly different in the two samples (robvar tests were run in Stata), the t-test commands run in Stata on these items specified 
unequal variances (and  Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom are reported). Source: public opinion data from Gallup World Poll 2010  
 
 Below in Table 109, we see that nations experiencing one nonviolent success 
express significantly higher confidence in nonviolent efficacy at the .01 level. Looking at 
the means across the dummy variables we see that nations experiencing recent nonviolent 
success (since 1998) score even higher than nations with two or more nonviolent 
successes (since 1900). But comparing nations with two or more nonviolent successes 
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with nations lacking two successes, we see that those with two or more successes are 
significantly more confident in nonviolent efficacy, at the .05 level. Similarly, the two 
dummy variables indicating recent nonviolent successes, since 1988 and since 1998, are 
both significantly related to affirmative national mean answers on the nonviolent efficacy 
item at the .01 level. All of this suggests that history matters in shaping attitudes and 
there are empirical grounds for asserting that culture is a form of praxis. But nations with 
more recent nonviolent successes express slightly higher affirmations of nonviolent 
efficacy. The limited nonviolent success variable is not significantly related to the 
national mean attitudes on the nonviolent efficacy item. This is not surprising since a 
campaign with “limited success” is likely to be interpreted as campaign failure by many 
people. 
Table 108. T-Tests of National Mean Attitude Scores: Historically Peaceful Nations 
Gallup World Poll item Nations 
experiencing 
war since 1945 
(n = 90 or 89 or 
94) 
Historically 
peaceful (since 
1945) 
(n = 41 or 42) 
 
df 
 
t 
 
x̄ - x̄² 
 
M SD M SD 
% military attacks on 
civilians never justified 
64.8 14.3 66.8 14.7 129 -.75 -2.05 
% terrorism never 
justified 
70.7 13.8 74.5 13.8 128 -1.49 -3.88 
% nonviolence will work 59.3 14.1 54.8 13.4 134 1.76 4.54* 
 
Notes: Two-tailed t-tests of significance: * = p < .1; ** = p < .05; “historically peaceful” = nations with 0 years of war since 1945; 
Source: public opinion data from Gallup World Poll 2010  
 
Table 109. Nonviolent History and Mean National Attitudes on Nonviolent Efficacy 
Variable % nonviolence will work  
x̄ - x̄² Nations with nv success  
x̄ 
Nations lacking nv success 
x̄² 
Dummy: nv success since 1900 61.6 
(n=67 nations) 
54.3 
(n=69 nations) 
7.3*** 
Dummy: limited nv success since 
1900ᵃ 
58.4 
(n= 26 nations) 
57.8 
(n=110 nations) 
.57 
Dummy: two or more nv 
successes since 1900 
62.6 
(n= 29 nations) 
56.7 
(n= 107 nations) 
6.0** 
Dummy: nv success since 1988 62.3 
(n = 50 nations) 
55.4 
(n= 86 nations) 
7.0*** 
Dummy: nv success since 1998 64.8 
( n= 26 nations) 
56.3 
(n= 110 nations) 
8.6*** 
 
Notes: Two-tailed t-tests of significance: * = p < .1; ** = p < .05; *** = p < .01; (a) This dummy variable did not exclude nations that 
have experienced successful nonviolent campaigns in addition to campaigns of limited success; Source: public opinion data from 
Gallup World Poll 2010  
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 In Table 110, we see that nations with a history of nonviolent campaign successes 
(as measured by these four dummy variables) do not exhibit significantly higher rates of 
principled nonviolent attitudes on the state terrorism item of the Gallup World Poll, not 
even at the moderate .1 level of significance. Identical tests were run on the individual 
terrorism item of the Gallup World Poll, and very similar results were obtained: nations 
with a history of nonviolent campaign successes (as measured by these four dummy 
variables) do not exhibit significantly higher rates of principled nonviolent attitudes on 
the individual terrorism item, not even at the moderate .1 level of significance. Once 
again, this supports my contention that peace capital is highly specific – it is bifurcated 
between principled and pragmatic nonviolence, each of which is related to specific forms 
of historical praxis. 
Table 110. Nonviolent Campaign History and Principled Stand Against Military Attacks 
 
Variable % military attacks on civilians never justified  
x̄ - x̄² Nations with nv success  
x̄ 
Nations lacking nv success 
x̄² 
Dummy: nv success since 1900 66.5  
(n=65 nations) 
64.3  
(n=66 nations) 
2.2 
Dummy: two or more nv 
successes since 1900 
68.5  
(n= 28 nations) 
64.5  
(n= 103 nations) 
4.0 
Dummy: nv success since 1988 66.4  
(n = 50 nations) 
64.8 
 (n= 81 nations) 
1.6 
Dummy: nv success since 1998  67.4 
(n= 26 nations) 
 64.9 
(n= 105 nations) 
2.5 
 
Notes: Two-tailed t-tests of significance: * = p < .1; ** = p < .05; Source: public opinion data from Gallup World Poll 2010  
 
 
 We see another indicator of this dynamic below in Table 111. The mere absence 
of war does not instill beliefs in pragmatic nonviolence. In fact, the nations with no wars 
between 1945-2009 have less faith in pragmatic nonviolence. And, the most war prone 
nations do not hold less faith in pragmatic nonviolence to any statistically significant 
degree. 
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Table 111. Historical Accumulation of War Capital vs. Peace-Specific Capital and 
Pragmatic Nonviolence 
 
Variable % affirming peaceful means alone will work  
x̄² - x̄ Nations experiencing this factor 
(1=yes) 
x̄ 
Nations lacking (0=no) 
x̄² 
Dummy: Historically peaceful  54.79 
(n= 42 nations) 
59.33  
(n= 94 nations) 
4.54* 
Dummy: War prone  53.09 
(n= 11 nations) 
 58.35 
(n= 125 nations) 
5.26 
 
Notes: Two-tailed t-tests of significance: * = p < .1; ** = p < .05; “historically peaceful” = nations with 0 years of war since 1945; 
“war prone” = nations with more than 40 years of war since 1945; When robvar tests were run in Stata, the war prone dummy had 
unequal variances, so the t-test specified unequal variances.; Data source: Marshall (2012), Gallup World Poll (2010)  
 
 Likewise, below in Table 112, on the terrorism and state terrorism items, we see 
that there are no statistically significant attitudinal differences between nations with 
historical experiences coded as the extreme of peace (no war) and the most war prone 
nations.This table suggests that it is difficult to generalize about the attitudinal effects of 
historical experiences of extended periods of war or peace.  
Table 112. Historical Accumulation of War Capital vs. Peace-Specific Capital and 
Principled Nonviolence Against State Terrorism, Individual Terrorism 
 
Variable % military attacks on civilians never justified  
x̄² - x̄ Nations (1=yes) 
x̄ 
Nations lacking (0=no) 
x̄² 
Dummy: Historically peaceful  66.8 
(n= 41 nations) 
 64.76 
(n= 90 nations) 
-2.05 
Dummy: War prone  64 
(n= 10 nations) 
 65.5 
(n= 121 nations) 
1.5 
 
Variable % individual attacks on civilians never justified  
x̄² - x̄ Nations (1=yes) 
x̄ 
Nations lacking (0=no) 
x̄² 
Dummy: Historically peaceful 74.54  
(n= 41 nations) 
70.65 
 (n= 89 nations) 
-3.88 
Dummy: War prone 69.7  
(n= 10 nations) 
72.06  
(n= 120 nations) 
2.36 
 
Notes: Two-tailed t-tests of significance: * = p < .1; ** = p < .05; “historically peaceful” = nations with 0 
years of war since 1945;“war prone” = nations with more than 40 years of war since 1945; Data source: 
Marshall (2012), Gallup World Poll (2010)  
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Results: Multiple Regression on the Pragmatic Nonviolence Item 
 
 The regression models (see Appendix S) on the nonviolent efficacy item (from the 
Gallup World Poll 2010) allow us to analyze predictors of pragmatic nonviolent attitudes 
at the nation level. The strongest predictors of civil war (from the civil war literature) 
were entered into Model 1: GDP per capita, population, and years since war. In addition, 
the nonviolent history variable, years since last nonviolent success, was expected to 
predict strong pragmatic nonviolent attitudes. Building on the civil war literature, 
additional historical and structural variables were added on a theoretical basis.    
 Across the seven models, several consistent patterns emerge. The most significant 
negative associations are: GDP per capita, years since nonviolent success, and population 
density.  
 GDP per capita: A significant negative relationship - as GDP per capita 
increases, confidence in pragmatic nonviolence decreases. This raises some doubts about 
the optimistic theories of modernization by Stephen Pinker (2011) and of Norbert Elias’s 
“civilizing process” bound up with modernity. This finding also pointsto the civil war 
literature where civil wars (the dominant form of war in the contemporary era) are far 
more likely among poorer nations, and a high GDP can be a proxy indicator for strong 
states.Thus, it seems that poverty often leads to civil wars which often leads to suffering/ 
painful learning and the rejection of violent attitudes. From another angle, this data 
reveals the opposite of what might be commonly assumed– the more advanced, modern, 
wealthier nations are less likely to express confidence in nonviolent methods. The finding 
lends credence to Wink’s (1992, 1998) theorizing on the pervasiveness of the myth of 
386 
redemptive violence, a metanarrative which is bound up with the myth of the efficacy of 
violence. 
 Years since last successful nonviolent revolution/ major movement: A 
significant negative relationship was found – the fewer the number of years since a 
nonviolent success, the stronger the confidence in pragmatic nonviolence. This suggests 
that history matters: dramatic nonviolent movement successes do influence public 
attitudes about the efficacy of nonviolence, but on average, over time the belief in 
nonviolence diminishes. Thus, the passage of time presents serious challenges for the 
reproduction of nonviolent attitudes and for embedding nonviolent successes in collective 
memory. To say it another way, the accumulation of this peace-specific capital, belief in 
pragmatic nonviolence, tends to dissipate over the decades. The data suggests that 
successful nonviolent revolution or movement tends to instill faith in nonviolent methods, 
but other forms of peace as in the mere absence of war, do not instill as robust faith in 
“peaceful means alone.” Thus, the “peace years” variable achieves significance only in 
Model 6, and then only marginal significance (at the .10 level).    
 Population density: Population density has rarely been found to predict civil war 
outbreaks (but recall that in the literature, “war” is usually operationalized as over 1,000 
battle deaths in a year) in large cross-national data sets, but it emerges here as a 
significant negative predictor of nonviolent confidence. That is, as population density 
decreases, confidence in nonviolence increases. Or, to state the same relationship in 
different words, as population density increases, confidence in nonviolence declines.  
 While not depicted above, a few other significant negative relationships 
emerged: Religion: The “historically predominant religious culture” variable, 
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typereligion, was transformed into dummy variables. Adding to Model 9 the dummy 
variable for Buddhist/ Eastern religious cultures yielded .4373 (Adj-R²) variance 
explained, and the Buddhist/ Eastern variable was highly significant at the .001 level, 
with the negative Coefficient, -15.049, (S.E. 4.284; p = .001). The maximum VIF was 
5.43, the VIF of the “years since war” variable, and the mean VIF was 2.56.  
 Adding the rest of the religious culture dummy variables (but omitting Catholic as 
the reference variable) to Model 9 yielded .4677 (Adj-R²) variance explained (the most of 
any model), and the following Coefficients were obtained: for Protestant 
.513(S.E.=2.965; p=.863), Orthodox Christian 4.975 (S.E.= 3.775; p =.19), Buddhist/ 
Eastern -11.652(S.E.= 4.44; p= .010), Muslim 7.435 (S.E.= 3.227; p=.023), Hindu 10.229 
(S.E. = 10.546; p= .334), Jewish -10.858 (S.E. = 11.874; p= .363), Indigenous 15.69 (S.E. 
= 6.126; p= .012). The maximum VIF was  5.70 and the mean VIF was  2.55. Thus, in 
this model, the only religious culture which is significant at the .01 level are Buddhist/ 
Eastern, but the relationship to pragmatic nonviolence is negative. Two of the religious 
cultures are positively related to pragmatic nonviolence and significant at the slightly less 
robust .05 level: Muslim cultures and Indigenous religious cultures. On average and 
controlling for other factors in the model, Muslim cultures are 7.4% points higher and 
Indigenous religious cultures are about 15.7% points higher in national mean scores on 
the pragmatic nonviolence item, when compared to Catholic nations (the omitted 
reference category). If Catholic is substituted for Protestant (and Protestant becomes the 
omitted reference variable), the variance explained remains the same (Adj-R² = .4677), 
but the Catholic dummy variable is not significant at even the marginal .10 level, with a 
negative coefficient of -.513 (S.E.= 2.965; p= .863). With Protestant cultures as the 
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reference category, the significance level of the Muslim variable declines to the marginal 
.10 level, and the Buddhist/ Eastern variable and Indigenous religious variable both 
decline to the .05 level. In any case, we see that the religious culture dimension captures 
some significant variance not fully captured by the other factors in the model.  
 As can be seen in Figure 10 below, the variation within the religious cultural 
categories is quite pronounced. Among Hindu nations, India expressed 40% confidence 
in pragmatic nonviolence, while Nepal (site of a 2006 nonviolent campaign achieving 
“limited success” (Stephan and Chenoweth (2008))is approaching 80%. Among 
Buddhist/ Eastern nations, Mongolia is approaching 80%, while Vietnam (the world’s 
most war prone nation historically, according to Sullivan (1991)) ranks the lowest in the 
world at under 10%. Remarkably, the four indigenous religious cultures all score above 
60%. 
 Region: When the dummy variables for region were added to Model 9 (all region 
dummies were added, excluding the dummy for Western Europe, Canada and the USA as 
the reference variable), only .3898 variance (Adj-R²) was explained, an increase of only 
.008 beyond Model 9 (less than 1% additional variance explained). And, only one region 
dummy, Latin America, obtained significance at the .05 level, with the Coefficient -9.056 
(S.E.=4.478; p = .046). Moreover, beyond this finding, no regions obtained significance 
at even the marginal .10 level. That is, controlling for all other factors, only Latin 
America has a regional effect which pushes down confidence in nonviolent methods. 
This makes Costa Rica’s relatively high confidence in nonviolence all the more 
impressive.  
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Figure 10. National Means of Pragmatic Nonviolence by Historically Predominant 
Religious Culture 
 
 
Source: Gallup World Poll 2010; typereligion = historically predominant religion in each nation; 
1=Protestant; 2=Catholic; 3=Orthodox Christian; 4=Buddhist/ Eastern; 5=Muslim; 6=Hindu; 7=Jewish; 
8=Other (indigenous beliefs, animism) 
 
 However, while Costa Rica ranks high in pragmatic nonviolence in the Gallup 
World Poll (which is based on representative cross-national samples), my own survey of 
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University students did not find a difference between Costa Rican and U.S. students in a 
replication of this Gallup World Poll item. However, the Costa Rican survey slightly 
oversampled from University students and engineering and physics majors (who typically 
hold more hawkish pro-violent attitudes), while the UO survey oversampled from 
females and respondents who identify with the Democratic Party (two populations who 
typically hold more dovish attitudes). And, as we have seen above, questions with Likert 
scales probing violent/ nonviolent attitudes did reveal nonviolent attitudes were 
significantly more robust among Costa Rican students as compared with U.S. students. 
Given that the UO survey oversampled from Democrats and females it is perhaps little 
wonder that our sample of U.S. university students expressed more faith in pragmatic 
nonviolence than the general U.S. population. Nevertheless, it remains something of a 
puzzle as to why Costa Rican university students have less faith in pragmatic nonviolence 
than the general population. Public opinion studies in the U.S. (Loewen 2007, pp.346 ff.) 
and Palestine (Krueger and Malečková 2003) have found that higher levels of education 
can be related to more belligerent, pro-violent attitudes. Without longitudinal data it is 
difficult to disentangle possible generational and lifespan effects. 
 A few additional negative relationships emerged which attained marginal 
significance (at the .10 level) in some of the models: population, years since war, 
casualties, and “second” (an indicator of ethnic polarization: the share of the population 
in the second largest ethnic group). Population size: As population increases, confidence 
in nonviolence decreases. This fits with the civil war literature, where larger nations have 
been found to be more likely to suffer civil war. Of course, it is unclear if doubting the 
efficacy of nonviolence is an indicator of belligerent attitudes. That is, if you have no 
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confidence in nonviolent methods, you may be more likely to affirm that violence is 
necessary and effective. Alternatively, one somewhat plausible interpretation here would 
be that saying peaceful means alone “will not work,” is a proxy indicator of political 
alienation and a sense that the political system is so broken that nothing works.  
 Ethnic polarization: As the indicator of ethnic polarization, “second” (i.e., the 
share of the population in the second largest ethnic group), increases, confidence in 
nonviolence decreases. Thus, as polarization increases, belligerent attitudes may increase 
in the form of frustration with peaceful means alone (and believing that violence is 
necessary for oppressed groups to improve their situation).  
 Years since war: The less the number of years since war, the stronger the 
confidence in nonviolence. How can this be? Again, I propose a “backlash” theory: the 
more recent a war, the more people are likely to learn that violence is tragic, to develop 
and hold onto anti-violent attitudes, and to place hope in nonviolent methods as an 
alternative to violent means. When the last war was long ago (controlling for casualties 
and other variables), the public tends to forget how tragic and horrific violence is, 
existential capital (i.e., experiential capital) dissipates, and attitudes become captive again 
to the myth of redemptive violence (Wink 1992). All of this is conjectural and tentative, 
since it is difficult to generalize to all types and magnitudes of war. Nevertheless, this 
line of interpretation is supported by the fact that the “war prone” dummy variable is also 
positively related to faith in pragmatic nonviolence, though it never achieves any robust 
level of significance. In actuality, the 11 “war prone” nations (those with over 40 years of 
war between 1945 and 2009) express less faith in peaceful means alone with a mean 
score of 53.1%, as opposed to the 125 other nations’ mean score of 58.4%. But a t-test 
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showed this difference between the group means was not significant, probably because 
11 is such a small sample size. Again, this finding is notable – the most war prone nations 
do not express significantly lower faith in nonviolent methods.  
 Casualties: As the number of casualties from wars increases (controlling for 
years since war and other variables), confidence in nonviolence decreases. This variable, 
of course, illuminates the magnitude of war in a way in which the “years since war” 
variable does not. This finding fits with broad psychological theorizing that suffering is 
more deeply embedded in memory (discussed below) and that people can perversely 
cling to what causes them pain. Similarly, Koenigsberg (2009), a psychological and 
anthropological theorist of war, has proposed that the human sacrifices of soldiers in 
wartime makes nations come alive, legitimating nationalist ideology as well as faith in 
violent ideology and methods. He writes, “Injuries, wounds and deaths suffered in battle 
function to persuade society members of the truth of their nation’s ideology...Warfare, in 
short, is that cultural activity that seeks to produce dead and wounded soldiers in order to 
establish the truth of a society’s ideology” (p.74). Soldiers are the “sacrificial class” 
(Marvin and Ingle 1999) who legitimate the ideology of war through giving their lives for 
the nation. What the variables “years since war,” “war years,” and “casualties” all leave 
out is the issue of victory in war – a judgment not always as clear-cut as it was at the end 
of WWII, perhaps especially with civil wars. Certainly losing an imperial war abroad 
might cultivate different attitudes than losing a war of self-defense, but again, most wars 
in recent decades have been civil wars. The pacifist A.J. Muste argued, “The problem 
after a war is with the victor. He thinks he has just proved that war and violence pay. 
Who will now teach him a lesson?” (Chomsky 1999, p.8) Vietnam was a potential 
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“lesson” for the U.S., but as we have seen above, collective memory processes have 
muted the lesson of that war for subsequent generations. And, we know that rather than 
“learning” an antiwar lesson, right wing factions in Germany after WWI,and in the U.S. 
after Vietnam were defiant in loss. Japan’s conservatives have now pushed beyond 
postwar pacifism in educational guidelines and history textbooks, while structurally 
according Japan’s generals greater budgetary powers and prestige (Coleman 2006, Hook 
1988, Ienaga 1994). These are examples of how “ideology has no history” (Althusser 
1971, p.160). 
 As for positive relationships, only three variables achieve marginal significance 
(at the .10 level), and only in a few of the models: % urban, civil liberties, and peace 
years. Urbanization: The % urban variable might be theorized as a proxy for 
cosmopolitan attitudes including nonviolent attitudes. Civil liberties: The civil liberties 
variable makes theoretical sense here as well, since nations with strong civil liberties are 
likely to instill confidence that “peaceful means alone” can work for oppressed groups 
struggling to improve their plight. Peace years: Note that the dummy variable 
“historically peaceful” (those nations with no wars since 1945) is also positively related 
to pragmatic nonviolent attitudes, but across the models, it never achieves more than the 
marginal .10 level of significance. The “peace years” variable only achieves the marginal 
.10 level of significance in Model 6. That is, the peace years and historically peaceful 
variables have only weak associations with pragmatic nonviolent attitudes. Again, it 
seems that the accumulation of peace capital is highly specific, and pragmatic nonviolent 
attitudes are not robustly related to the mere absence of war. Indeed, one proof of this is 
found through t-tests conducted on the “historically peaceful” dummy variable. As we 
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have seen above, ironically, the 42 historically peaceful nations (those experiencing no 
wars between 1945-2009) have a lower mean confidence in pragmatic nonviolence, 
54.8%, as compared with the other 94 nations’ mean score of 59.3%. A t-test showed that 
this 4.5% difference is marginally significant at the .10 level. Hence, we have several 
reasons to conclude that pragmatic nonviolent attitudes are most robustly created through 
the historical praxis (a cycle of action and reflection) of social movements. Democracy: 
Across all of the models, democracy, controlling for the other variables, is positively 
related to confidence in nonviolent efficacy, but not robust at even the marginally 
significant .10 level. The lack of significance casts doubt on the long held and much 
debated positive assessments of democracy as reducing belligerent attitudes and war 
proneness among nations.      
 In order to monitor the possibility of collinearity in the models due to co-related 
predictors, I report mean and maximum variance inflation factor (VIF) scores for each 
model. The maximum VIF score across every model is far below 10, suggesting that 
collinearity is never severe (Hamilton 2003, p.167; Chatterjee et al. 2000, p.240). 
However, the mean VIF falls between 2 and 3 in 7 of the 9 models, suggesting the 
presence of mild collinearity. 
 Above, we see that the higher the casualties since 1945, the lower the faith in 
nonviolent efficacy.  In the anthropological literature, population density has long been 
thought to be related to conflict. Hence, the Great Basin Shoshone were theorized to be 
perhaps the most peaceful North American tribe in the pre-contact era because of their 
very low population density. 
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 In an attempt to explain additional variance in the dependent variable (pragmatic 
nonviolent attitudes) serial additions were made to Model 1, including the following 
variables added one at a time:  
• peace indexes (transGPI2009, WPI2009, WPI decade average, MIL2009, 
PPI2012 (2012 was the first year the Positive Peace Index was compiled)) 
• democracy indicators (DemIndex2010score, PolCulture2010) 
• ethnic dominance indicators (plural (ethnic dominance), second (share of pop in 
2nd largest ethnic group)) 
• education indicators (Mean years of schooling, Literacy_rate_adult, 
primary_enrol_ratio_net, secondary_enrol_ratio_net, enroll_tertiary_percentgross, 
pop_with_secondary_ed, educ_percent_govt_spent, educ_spent_percent_GDP, 
pupil_teacher_ratio) 
• military sector indicators (percent_labor_soldiers, percapita_mil_spending, 
total_soldiers, lntotal_soldiers, Military_expenditure_percent_gov, 
Military_expenditure_percentGDP, Military_expenditure_currentLCU, 
lnmilitary_expendLCU) 
• youth bulge indicator (Proxy youth bulge) 
• cosmopolitanism and globalization indicators (Globalization Index 2005, 
Cosmopolitan Index) 
• geography and climate indicators (Mountainous terrain, natural log of 
mountainous terrain (lnmount2), Average Temperature, Average High 
Temperature) 
• inequality indicators (LossHDI2010, Gini2000_2010) 
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• gender indicators (Gender Inequality Index 2011, percent_parliaments_female, 
and Masculinity Index).  
Of the above variables, the only ones which were significant at the .05 level were the 
Cosmopolitanism Index (Coef.= 2.246; p= .035) which explained about 1.5% additional 
variance, and Average Temperature (Coef. = -.222; p= .021) and Average High 
Temperature (Coef.= -.225; p= .02), each of which explained about 2.5% additional 
variance beyond the 26.33% explained by Model 1. The only variable which was 
significant at the .01 level was Military_expenditure_currentLCU(Coef. = -3.78; p = 
.004), but it only explained about 1.7% additional variance beyond the 26.33% explained 
by Model 1.  
Results: Multiple Regression on the State Terrorism Item 
 
 Below in Table 113, we move on to the second Gallup World Poll item that is of 
special interest in the present study, the state terrorism item (i.e., military attacks on 
civilians). The key findings across the various regression models are highlighted below: 
GDP per capita (natural log): The significant positive association (in most of the 
models) between GDP per capita and the rejection of state terrorism fits with the 
optimistic assessments of modernization. As nations become more advanced they are 
more likely to object to state terrorism. But the significance disappears in Models 4 and 
5, and almost in Model 2. And, more problematic for the modernization thesis is the 
finding on democracy below. 
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Table 113. OLS Unstandardized Coefficients for Regression of National Means for State 
Terrorism (% “Never Justified”) Item (Gallup World Poll 2010) on Independent 
Variables 
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Log GDP per capita 4.119** 
(1.479) 
3.213† 
(1.681) 
3.358* 
(1.691) 
3.091 
(2.129) 
2.968 
(2.966) 
6.308* 
(2.470) 
Population total -1.43 
(1.07) 
-1.01 
(1.07) 
-6.81 
(1.06) 
-4.27 
(1.04) 
-4.89 
(9.16) 
9.76 
(1.01) 
Years since war .082 
(.057) 
.096 
(.072) 
.144† 
(.078) 
.123 
(.079) 
.182† 
(.096) 
.176* 
(.086) 
Per capita military 
spending 
-.007† 
(.004) 
-.004 
(.005) 
-.004 
(.005) 
-.007 
(.005) 
-.009† 
(.005) 
-.006 
(.005) 
DemIndex2010score -1.390† 
(.801) 
-2.25** 
(.857) 
-2.772** 
(.882) 
-1.735 
(1.107) 
-5.041* 
(1.915) 
-2.967* 
(1.228) 
Population density -.005*** 
(.001) 
-.007*** 
(.002) 
-.007*** 
(.002) 
-.033*** 
(.009) 
-.033* 
(.014) 
-.034*** 
(.009) 
second (share of pop in 2nd 
largest ethnic group) 
-24.875* 
(11.257) 
-17.485 
(11.998) 
-18.824 
(12.323) 
-22.694† 
(12.600) 
-12.578 
(15.311) 
-27.947 
(17.294) 
transgpi2009  5.168 
(4.487) 
6.116 
(4.542) 
3.488 
(4.670) 
-.329 
(5.769) 
-5.266 
(5.509) 
mountainous   .188** 
(.068) 
.188** 
(.068) 
.092 
(.080) 
.161* 
(.078) 
LossHDI2009    -.036 
(.227) 
-.426 
(.399) 
.034 
(.273) 
Masculinity Index     -.095 
(.091) 
 
Educ % govt spending      .538 
(.367) 
Military % govt spending      -.654† 
(.384) 
N 124 112 104 93 46 72 
Adj R² .1758 .21 .2648 .2954 .3960 .4202 
High VIF (Mean VIF) 2.83 
(1.66) 
3.11 
(1.66) 
3.17 
(1.66) 
4.90 
(2.41) 
8.46 
(3.46) 
5.97 
(2.71) 
 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; † = p≤ .10; * = p ≤ .05; ** = p ≤ .01; *** = p ≤ .001 (two-tailed tests); The 
dependent variable is the national means for the state terrorism/ military attacks on civilians item (Gallup World Poll 2010): % never 
justified 
 
 Years since war: The significant positive association in Model 6 at the .05 level 
(and the marginal significance in Models 3 and 5) between “years since war” and the 
rejection of state terrorism, suggests that the “moral disengagement” of war-time lingers 
for the initial years after a conflict, but this dissipates and with the passage of increasing 
numbers of years, the public becomes more likely to object to state terrorism. 
 Mountainous terrain: The significant positive association (in most of the 
models) between mountainous terrain and the rejection of state terrorism could reflect a 
“backlash effect” against the experience of state terrorism, since several studies (e.g., 
Fearon and Laitin 2003, Hegre and Sambanis 2006) show that nations with a greater 
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percentage of mountainous terrain are more likely to experience civil war (and it is 
theorized that rebels are likely to hide in the mountains). However, if this is the 
mechanism for producing attitudes against state terrorism, it is somewhat puzzling that 
the casualties, war prone, and war years variables do not also produce a significant effect 
when entered into model 3, one at a time, in place of the mountainous variable. And 
when these variables (casualties, war prone, and war years) are added to model 3 one at a 
time, and all together as control variables, they do not reduce the significance of the 
mountainous variable, nor do they achieve significance themselves, nor do they explain 
additional variance except when all 3 are entered together, in which case they explain a 
very insignificant .0003 additional variance. The imperfections in the data may be 
playing a role here. Namely, that there is some imprecision in the casualties and war 
years variables since they conflate together different types of wars (foreign wars fought 
on foreign soil and civil wars). Nevertheless, the vast majority of wars sine World War II 
have been civil wars. 
 Democracy: The significant negative association between the Democracy Index 
2010 and the rejection of state terrorism demonstrates that as democracy increases, the 
rejection of state terrorism declines. This flies in the face of the long-standing optimistic 
assessments of modernization and democracy, and offers support for the “callous cruelty” 
theory of modern bureaucracies including democratic ones (Collins 1974). Similarly, we 
can assert that these results suggest that modern democratic nations have been adept at 
cultivating “moral disengagement” (Bandura 1990, 1996). To approve of the targeting 
and killing of civilians certainly indicates callousness and moral disengagement, attitudes 
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which are buttressed by the rationalizations of political and military elites in modern 
democratic bureaucracies.    
 Population density: The significant negative association between population 
density and the rejection of state terrorism suggests that as population density increases, 
the rejection of state terrorism declines. Thus, controlling for other factors in the models, 
higher population densities are linked to lower national means on the principled 
rejections of state terrorism.   
 Militarization: Per capita military spending and % of government spending 
devoted to the military are negatively related to the rejection of state terrorism. That is, as 
these indicators of militarization and the political power of the military sector increase, 
the rejection of state terrorism declines, even when controlling for the level of 
democracy, but at most (only in some of the models), the associations only achieve a 
marginal .10 level of significance. Consistent with the “elite cues” theoretical model, a 
stronger military sector is likely to shape public discourse and attitudes towards military 
actions and violence. Model 6 was adjusted by dropping the two military variables (per 
capita military spending and % of government spending devoted to the military) and 
adding the Global Militarization Index (GMI) compiled by BICC (2008/ 2009). This 
raised the number of observations (N=81 nations) but the GMI was not significant at even 
the moderate .1 level, and the Adjusted R-squared fell to .3053 and so this variable was 
not explored further. When “percent labor force who are soldiers” was added to the full 
Model 6, one percent more variance is explained (Adjusted R-squared = .4301), but this 
variable did not obtain significance at even the moderate .1 level. When Model 6 was 
adjusted by again dropping the two military variables and adding “percent labor force 
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who are soldiers,” this raised the number of observations (N=86 nations), but the amount 
of variance explained fell (Adjusted R-squared = .2990) and this variable did not obtain 
significance at even the moderate .1 level. While Payne (1989) found that the proportion 
of a nation’s population who are soldiers was the best indicator of its ideological 
adherence to militarism, the results here do not offer corroboration. However, admittedly, 
the state terrorism question is only one indicator of militaristic ideology.      
 Ethnic polarization: The negative association (significant in some of the models) 
between ethnic polarization (the “second” variable - the share of population in the 2nd 
largest ethnic group)and the rejection of state terrorism suggests that as ethnic 
polarization increases, the rejection of state terrorism declines. Thus, increasing ethnic 
polarization seems to foster belligerent attitudes and callousness regarding military 
attacks on civilians. However, this relationship only achieves significance in some of the 
models. 
 Insignificant variables: In an attempt to explain more variance in the dependent 
variable (principled nonviolent attitudes against military attacks on civilians) serial 
additions were made to Model 1, including the following variables added one at a time:  
• peace indexes (WPI2009, WPI decade average, MIL2009, transPPI2012 (2012 
was the first year the Positive Peace Index was compiled)) 
• democracy indicators (CivLib2010) 
• indicators of state functioning (statereach, PolCulture2010) 
• ethnic dominance indicators (plural (ethnic dominance)) 
• education indicators (Mean years of schooling, Literacy_rate_adult, 
primary_enrol_ratio_net, secondary_enrol_ratio_net, enroll_tertiary_percentgross, 
401 
pop_with_secondary_ed, educ_percent_govt_spent, educ_spent_percent_GDP, 
pupil_teacher_ratio)  
• military sector indicators (percent_labor_soldiers, total_soldiers, 
lntotal_soldiers, Military_expenditure_percent_gov, 
Military_expenditure_percentGDP, Military_expenditure_currentLCU, 
lnmilitary_expendLCU) 
• youth bulge indicator (Proxy youth bulge) 
• cosmopolitanism and globalization indicators (% urban, Globalization Index 
2005, Cosmopolitan Index)  
• geography and climate indicators (natural log of mountainous terrain 
(lnmount2), Average Temperature, Average High Temperature) 
• history indicators (casualties, Ryrs_since_lastnvsuccess, war_years, 
peace_years, war_prone, historically_peaceful) 
•  inequality indicators(LossHDI2010, Gini2000_2010) 
• gender indicators (Gender Inequality Index 2011,percent_parliaments_female, 
Masculinity Index) 
Of these variables, none attained significance at the .05 level. The only variables which 
attained significance at the marginally significant (p≤ .10) level were: 
educ_percent_govt_spent (Coef = .540; p=.057; Adj-R² (of Model 1 + variable) = 
.1936)); Military_expenditure_percent_gov (Coef = -.562; p = .057; Adj-R² (of Model 1 
+ variable) = .3027)); Globalization Index 2005 (N = 75; Coef = -.318; p = .089; Adj-R² 
(of Model 1 + variable) = .3132), this explains more variance, but note the smaller 
sample size; and, the natural log of mountainous terrain, lnmount2 (Coef = 1.790; p = 
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.057; Adj-R² (of Model 1 + variable) = .1999). The first two of the above variables were 
added to form Model 6 above (when the Globalization Index was also added, a VIF score 
of 10.05 was found for the Globalization Index, suggesting severe collinearity problems). 
These two indicators on percent of government expenditure are particularly interesting 
because they would seem to point to two mechanisms. First, sectors with a larger 
percentage of government spending obviously have more resources and as a result, more 
power, thereby producing feedback loops and policy streams. Second and relatedly, these 
indicators would seem to reflect national priorities and elite policy cues, especially in 
democratic nations where budget decision-making processes are at least somewhat 
transparent.  
 Meanwhile, the PPI2012 (Positive Peace Index) did not attain even marginal 
significance, yet it explained notably more variance (Adj-R² (of Model 1 + variable) = 
.2558). These patterns were also observed in the Cosmopolitanism Index (Adj-R² (of 
Model 1 + variable) = .2866). However,VIF tests showed that the PPI had a VIF score of 
14.35, and the Cosmopolitanism Index had a VIF score of 11.11, suggesting severe 
collinearity problems 
 Model 6 (42.02%) and Model 5 explain the most variance (39.6%) in the 
dependent variable (peaceful attitudes on the state terrorism Gallup World Poll item), but 
the low sample sizes are problematic (N=72 and N=46, respectively), as are the relatively 
large “high VIF” scores, especially in Model 5, suggesting the presence of collinearity.  
 When Model 7 from the nonviolent efficacy regression is utilized for a regression 
on the state terrorism item, only .1460 (Adj-R²) of the variance is explained, and only two 
variables are significant at the .05 level: the “second” variable on ethnic polarization 
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(Coefficient of -25.9), and population density (Coefficient of -.005). Thus, as expected, 
we see that the nonviolent attitudes probed by these different items are quite distinct. 
Regressions on National Means By Gender 
 
 Below in Table 114, we see that the coefficients for females are larger (whether 
positive or negative) than for males on most of the religious variables, except for Muslim 
and Jewish. Religious fractionalization also had a slightly bigger effect on females than 
on males. This is not surprising since it is virtually a universal law that females are more 
religious than males, with a large amount of empirical data supporting that conclusion. 
Table 114. OLS Unstandardized Coefficients for Regression of National Means, By 
Gender, for Peaceful Means Alone (% “Will Work”) on Independent Variables 
Independent variables Model 1 
(Females) 
Model1 
(Males) 
Log GDP per capita -6.930*** 
(1.314) 
-4.962*** 
(1.402) 
Population total -2.67* 
(1.06) 
-2.57* 
(1.22) 
Females with secondary ed .032 
(.059) 
 
Males with secondary ed  -.051 
(.067) 
Protestant culture 1.482 
(2.837) 
.619 
(3.268) 
Orthodox Chr. culture 8.156† 
(4.192) 
7.041 
(4.817) 
Buddhist/ Eastern -15.357*** 
(4.135) 
-12.554** 
(4.746) 
Muslim 7.30* 
(3.161) 
8.242* 
(3.637) 
Hindu 10.399 
(9.995) 
8.973 
(11.555) 
Jewish -7.203 
(10.565) 
-11.984 
(12.113) 
Indigenous 13.068† 
(7.808) 
12.626 
(9.032) 
Years since last nonviolent success -.054* 
(.022) 
-.059* 
(.026) 
Population density -.002 
(.001) 
-.001 
(.001) 
Religious fractionalization -5.429 
(4.887) 
-4.909 
(5.547) 
second (share of pop in 2nd largest ethnic 
group) 
-17.971 
(9.335) 
-18.189† 
(10.716) 
Civil Liberties 2010 1.713** 
(.643) 
1.884* 
(.725) 
N 120 121 
Adj R² .5214 .3644 
High VIF (Mean VIF) 3.65 
(1.90) 
3.14 
(1.81) 
 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; † = p≤ .10; * = p ≤ .05; ** = p ≤ .01; *** = p ≤ .001 (two-tailed tests); The 
dependent variable is the national means, by gender, for the peaceful means alone item (Gallup World Poll 2010): % will work 
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 When the following variables were added into a regression model of national 
means of female attitudes on pragmatic nonviolence, controlling for log GDP per capita 
and population size (World Bank data), they failed to achieve significance at even the 
marginal .1 level: 
• Indicators of female empowerment: GenderInequalIndex_UN2011, 
percent_parliaments_female, Labor_force_percent_female, 
Labor_participation_fem_over15, Ratio_female_to_male_labor_parti, 
percent_females_in_total_nonagri, adol_fertility, fertility_rate, 
Birth_rate_perthousand 
• Indicators of female education: Literacy_rate_youth_females15_24, 
Literacy_rate_adult_female, Ratio_youngliterate_fem_to_males, 
Primary_completion_rate_female, Progression_to_secondary_female_, 
Ratio_female_to_male_primary_enr, Ratio_female_to_male_secondary_e, 
Ratio_fem_to_male_tertiary_enrol, Ratio_girls_to_boys_primary_n_se, 
enroll_secondary_female_percentg, Secondary_ed_percent_female, 
Totalenroll_primary_female_perce 
 The following variable was significant at the .05 level, but the sample size fell to 
65: enroll_secondary_female_percentn (% net); The following variable was significant at 
the .01 level, but the sample size fell to 87:enroll_tertiaryfemale_percentgro (% gross). 
 
THE GENDER GAP IN NONVIOLENT ATTITUDES 
 Numerous researchers have highlighted a relatively persistent “gender gap” in 
foreign policy attitudes, especially those involving militarism, with women more likely to 
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oppose military spending and war (Burris 2008, Sapiro 2003; Jelen, Thomas, and Wilcox 
1994; Shapiro and Mahajan 1986). A study in Norway found that women were less likely 
to express confidence in the military, less “willing to fight” and less willing to risk their 
lives for their nation (Listhaug 1986, p.75). However, a great deal of this research has 
focused on the U.S. or Western Europe, and it “cannot be taken for granted that these 
results can be generalized to other countries” (Togeby 1994, p.375).  Similarly, Sapiro 
(2003) notes, “there is little truly comparative research on gender differences and 
similarity in public opinion, and even less that attempts to explain cross-national 
variation in the amount of gender difference” (p.609). Because there are enormously wide 
differences between cultures in gender roles, gender equality, and feminist consciousness, 
the present cross-national analysis is well-situated to observe and theorize global 
variations in the gendered production of violent/ nonviolent attitudes and values. The data 
sources employed in this study (including the GPI, WPI, and Gallup World Poll), draw 
from over 100 nations covering the spectrum of traditional/ egalitarian gender roles, 
levels of modernization, political regimes, predominant religious traditions/ degree of 
secularism, and types of historical experiences with violence/ nonviolence.    
 Research on the Arab-Israeli conflict has found no gender gap in attitudes towards 
militarized conflict, leading researchers to theorize that the gender gap disappears when 
the salience of a conflict is extremely high in a culture (Tessler and Warriner 1997; 
Tessler, Nachtwey, and Grant 1999).   
 York and Ergas’ (2011) cross-national study found that where women’s status is 
higher a variety of human needs-centered social policies are more prevalent: military 
expenditures are lower, foreign direct investment is lower (i.e., less dependence on the 
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global economy), and government health care expenditures are higher. The mechanism 
here may be linked to divergent attitudes and values between the sexes. Attitudinal 
research suggests that women often express more concern for the environment than men 
do (Bord and O’Connor 1997, Davidson and Freudenburg 1996). York and Ergas (2011) 
theorize that some cross-national policy differences may be linked to women’s relative 
power within nations and gender valuation differences, which themselves are “...a 
product of differentiated historical, material and social conditions, in particular, women’s 
roles as primary caregivers and nurturers of households,...[thus] women in positions of 
power tend to value different things than do men” (p.159).       
 Jane Addams, one of the most important peace activists of the World War I era 
and an adherent of Tolstoyan nonviolence, argued  
The belief that a woman is against war simply and only because she is a woman 
and not a man, of course, does not hold. In every country there are many, many 
women who believe that the war is inevitable and righteous, and that the highest 
possible service is being performed by their sons who go into the army...The 
majority of women and men doubtless believe that. But the women do have a sort 
of pang about it. (Elshtain 2002, p.230)  
 
Hence, Addams sought to reduce the gender essentialism on the issue, but also affirmed 
an aspect of it – positing that women feel more regret over war. Moreover, Addams 
viewed feminism as an attitude, held by both men and women, that was in “eternal 
opposition” with the attitude of militarism (p.237). Militarists, she wrote, believe 
government “rests upon a basis of physical force,” while feminists “assert the ultimate 
supremacy of moral agencies” (p.237). 
 The Rangecolumn in Table 115 below reveals stark worldwide variations in the 
national means for each demographic category of gender and age. These patterns explode 
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any reified notions that females or older people are “naturally” peaceful in their attitudes, 
or that males or youth are “naturally” belligerent.  
Table 115. Gallup World Poll (2008-2009) Global Means by Gender and Age Cohort 
% affirming military attacks on 
civilians never justified 
Mean Std. Dev. Range N 
All nations sampled 65.4 14.4 20-96 131 
Males 64.5 14.3 22-97 
Females 66.1 14.8 18-95 
15-24 63.6 14.4 24-97 
25-34 65.2 14.9 17-96 
35-49 65.7 14.9 20-95 
50+ 66.7 15.5 17-97 
 
% affirming peaceful means alone 
will work 
Mean Std. Dev. Range N 
All nations sampled 57.9 14.0 7-85 136 
Males 57.2 14.2 7-85 
Females 58.5 14.3 7-88 
15-24 56.7 14.7 9-86 
25-34 56.4 14.7 9-84 
35-49 58.1 14.3 6-88 
50+ 59.5 15.3 4-94 
 
 The age cohort means show that, for the most part, older cohorts are progressively 
more peaceful, but not dramatically so. The largest differences between cohorts are as 
follows: the 50+ cohort is 3.1% more peaceful than the 15-24 age cohort on the military 
constraints item, and the 50+ cohort is 2.8% more peaceful than the 15-24 age cohort on 
the pragmatic nonviolence item. This weakly corroborates previous research finding that 
in the U.S. context, older cohorts tend to be more dovish (Burris 2008,Page and Bouton 
2006), but it must be remembered that the global means obscure significant cross-
national variations.  
 A likely explanation for the muted differences in the cohort data may rest in 
pointing out that these cohort age groupings are very arbitrary when superimposed on 
cross-national data. The salience of historical events and shaping forces vary in their 
timing from nation to nation. In other words, to the extent that attitudinally-linked 
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generational units exist, they are formed through highly particular contexts (and their 
particular historical experiences), and this is missed by forcing all nations into the same 
age cohorts.  
 The Table above shows that the global female mean is 1.6% higher on the “never 
justified” national mean response on the “military attacks on civilians” item and 1.3% 
higher on the “will work” national mean response for the nonviolent efficacy/ pragmatic 
nonviolence item – sex differences which failed to attain statistical significance in t-tests, 
even at the .1 level. However, worldwide, males were more likely to say peaceful means 
alone “will not work,” as 34.9% for males versus 31.0% for females (a difference of 
3.9%) answered “will not work,” and this sex difference was statistically significant at 
the .05 level (t=2.6). Less robustly, worldwide, males were more likely to say “military 
attacks on civilians” are “sometimes justified” (the more violent answer in the 
dichotomous framing of the question), but the sex difference was significant only at the .1 
level, with 20.1% of males versus 17.8% of females affirming “sometimes justified” on 
this item (a 2.3% difference between the sexes).   
 Additional tests showed that females were significantly more likely to give “don’t 
know” responses to the two questions on civilians attacks (see methodological note in 
Appendix L on Gallup’s acceptance of “don’t know” responses). T-tests showed that on 
the “military attacks on civilians” item, for the “don’t know” response there was a 
significant difference between males and females at the .01 level (t= -2.9), as worldwide 
(N=128) females were slightly more likely to answer “don’t know,” with 6.8% of females 
versus 4.8% of males (a 2% difference) claiming “don’t know.” Similarly, on the 
“pragmatic nonviolence” item, there was a significant difference between males and 
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females at the .01 level (t= -3.0), as worldwide (N=136), females were slightly more 
likely to answer “don’t know,” with 10.5% of females versus 8.0% of males (a 2.5% 
difference) claiming “don’t know.”  
 As can be seen in the figures below, these global means by sex clearly obscure the 
cross-national diversity that actually exists. But the muted global mean differences 
between the sexes may be partly explained by the dichotomous nature of the question. 
That is, given that many nations continue to reproduce patriarchy, rigid traditional gender 
roles, and educational deficits for females, it may be that females are more likely to 
respond “don’t know” to these survey items which ask about political attitudes, and for 
which political knowledge would be useful. That is, a lack of education may disempower 
women from holding strong opinions on these topics.  
 Moreover, females may be more likely to respond “depends” to a dichotomous 
question, as males are socialized into assertiveness in patriarchal cultures. That is, some 
of the gap between the genders might be explained by the relative indecisiveness or 
appreciation for nuance of females when faced with a dichotomous political question as 
compared with the relative decisiveness (through socialization in masculine assertiveness 
and certainty) of males.  
 These two assumptions were tested. Nations were coded in dummy variables 
according to their mean responses by sex on the “military attacks on civilians” item and 
the “pragmatic nonviolence” item. For each item, the nations were sorted into two 
groups: nations in which female mean scores were more peaceful were coded 1, and 
nations in which there was no difference or males scored more peaceful than females 
were coded 0. Against expectations, no significant differences existed between these two 
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groups on the national mean percentage of female respondents answering “depends” on 
the “military attacks on civilians” item.  
 However, as expected, tests showed that on both items, the higher percentage of 
women answering “don’t know” helps to explain some of the gender gap in peaceful 
attitudes. But these relationships were not very robust. On both items, there was a 
difference between group means in the percentage of “don’t know” responses, but only at 
the .1 level of significance for the “military attacks on civilians” item (p=.07), as well as 
the “pragmatic nonviolence” item (p=.07). The group of 48 nations where male means 
scored more peaceful or where there were no gender differences in the“military attacks 
on civilians” item, had a higher percentage of women saying “don’t know” by a 
difference of 8.2% of females versus 5.9% of males (or a 2.3% difference).  On the 
“pragmatic nonviolence” item, in the group of 65 nations where males scored more 
peaceful or there were no gender differences,these 65 nations had a higher % of women 
saying “don’t know” by a mean difference of 11.7% of females versus 9.4% of males (or 
a 2.3% difference). Hence, on both of these items there is mild support for my hypothesis 
that males outscored females in peace in cases where females were more likely to answer 
“don’t know,” when faced with these dichotomous questions. 
 The figures in Appendix T help to describe the cross-national attitudinal variation 
that exists on the gender variable. These pattern are particularly interesting to explore 
since one of the most persistent findings on attitudes towards war has been the gender 
gap, with women universally thought to be more peaceful. Here, we do well to recall 
Scheuch’s (1993) warning that “Comparisons that include both modern and developing 
nations produce differences that are very hard to interpret – if they make sense at all” 
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(p.190). In the Figure depicting nations where males are more peaceful than females on 
the “military attacks” item, it seems most of the nations exhibiting this surprising pattern 
are patriarchal or developing nations in which we would expect women’s status to be 
relatively low. The more developed nation of Chile seems to be the main exception here. 
In the Figure depicting nations where males are more peaceful than females on the 
“nonviolent efficacy” item (i.e., “peaceful means alone will work”), we see the U.S. joins 
a wide mix of different types of societies exhibiting this pattern. 
In-Depth: Gender and Nonviolent Attitudes 
 
 Below in Table 116, we see that increasing gender inequality (as measured by the 
Gender Inequality Index 2011) is significantly associated (.3837) with more peaceful 
attitudes on the nonviolent efficacy question, but with less peaceful attitudes on terrorism 
in the Gallup World Poll (2010). To state this differently, modernity’s trend towards 
increasing gender equality (i.e., decreasing gender inequality) is associated with less 
peaceful attitudes on the nonviolent efficacy question, but with more peaceful attitudes 
on terrorism. Modernity’s trends towards lower fertility rates, increased female literacy 
and increased rates of female education are all associated with the same pattern: less 
peaceful attitudes on nonviolent efficacy, but more peaceful attitudes on terrorism. Of 
course, it may simply be that wider trends of modernity are driving these shifts, rather 
than female empowerment. But note that of all of the educational variables (including 
female enrollment rates at the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels (higher education)), 
not one is associated with increased confidence in peaceful methods of protest. 
 However, increased rates of female literacy and female education are associated 
with increases in some types of peaceful attitudes measured at the national level. In fact,  
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Table 116. Correlations of Female Empowerment Indicators and Gallup World Poll Items 
 Variable name Sample 
size (n=) 
% military 
attacks on 
civilians never 
justified 
% terrorism 
never justified 
% 
nonviolence 
will work 
Masculinity Index MasculinityIndex 59 -.0305 -.0683 -.0713 
Gender Inequality 
Index 2011 
GenderInequalIndex_UN2011 123 -.1714 -.3609*** .3837**** 
% parliaments 
female 
percent_parliaments_female 128 .0403 .0444 -.0398 
Adolescent fertility adol_fertility 134 -.1370 -.3212*** .3353*** 
Birth rate per 
thousand 
Birth_rate_perthousand 135 -.1365 -.3123*** .3598**** 
Fertility rate fertility_rate 135 -.1105 -.2668** .3422**** 
Ratio, female to 
male labor 
participation rate 
(%) 
Ratio_female_to_male_labor_parti 134 -.0680 -.0551 .0964 
Labor force, % 
female 
Labor_force_percent_female 134 -.0979 -.0676 .0988 
Labor force, % 
female (ages 15 and 
older) 
Labor_participation_fem_over15  134 -.0927 -.1237 .1210 
% female in 
nonagricultural 
labor 
percent_females_in_total_nonagri 54 (low 
n) 
-.2074 -.0809 .0457 
Literacy rate, adult 
females 
Literacy_rate_adult_female 70 .3202** .3919** -.3192** 
Literacy rate, youth 
females (15-24) 
Literacy_rate_youth_females15_24 70 .3050* .3625** -.3331** 
Ratio young literate 
females to males 
Ratio_youngliterate_fem_to_males 70 .2762* .3062* -.1706 
Ratio female to 
male primary 
enrollment  
Ratio_female_to_male_primary_enr 111 .1434 .2456* -.2130* 
Total enrollment, 
primary school, 
female % 
Totalenroll_primary_female_perce 81 .1965 .2924** -.2213* 
Primary school 
completion rate, 
female (% of 
relevant age group) 
Primary_completion_rate_female 91 .3128** .4196*** -.3149** 
Progression to 
secondary school, 
female 
Progression_to_secondary_female_   42 (low 
n) 
.0670 .1797 -.4003** 
Ratio female to 
male, secondary 
enrollment 
Ratio_female_to_male_secondary_e 97 .1310 .2749** -.2355* 
Secondary 
education, % female 
Secondary_ed_percent_female 101 .0986 .2233* -.1937 
Female secondary 
enrollment (% 
gross) 
enroll_secondary_female_percentg 95 .2035 .4313**** -.3344*** 
Female enrollment 
secondary (% net) 
enroll_secondary_female_percentn 66 (low 
n) 
.2976* .5031**** -.3131* 
Females with 
secondary educ. (% 
ages 25 and older) 
females_w_second_ed 125 .1278 .2590** -.2550** 
Ratio girls to boys, 
primary & 
secondary 
Ratio_girls_to_boys_primary_n_se 97 .1593 .2929** -.2032* 
Ratio female to 
male tertiary 
enrollment 
Ratio_fem_to_male_tertiary_enrol 88 .2891** .3410** -.1613 
Tertiary enrollment, 
female % gross  
enroll_tertiaryfemale_percentgro 88 .2761** .4958**** -.1812 
Notes: Tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001 
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increases in all of the female literacy and female educational variables (including female 
enrollment rates at the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels (higher education)) are 
associated with increases in peaceful attitudes on the state terrorism and terrorism 
questions, but not all of these findings are significant. Looking at which variables are 
most strongly linked to more peaceful attitudes in both the terrorism and state terrorism 
questions, higher rates of female literacy, female completion rates in primary school, and 
female tertiary school enrollments present the most significant associations.    
 But note that if we omit the variables on labor force participation and the 
percentage of females in parliament, a clear and consistent pattern emerges: all of the 
below indicators of increasing female empowerment (recognizing that for the fertility 
these variables means less female empowerment) are associated with the increased 
prevalence (and the inculcation/ reproduction) of attitudes which rejects terrorism much 
more strongly than state terrorism.  
 Hence, we would appear to stand on solid ground in asserting that modernity and 
modern education systems inculcate forms of nationalism and conservativism (i.e., 
identification with the nation state) which condemn terrorism, while reproducing some 
degree of “moral disengagement” (Bandura 1990) or “callous cruelty” (Collins 1974) on 
issues of state terrorism (i.e., military attacks on civilians). Alternatively, in Durkheimian 
terms we could note here the evidence that modern nations reproduce social solidarity 
that is sufficiently robust to shape moral conceptions in terms of jingoistic insider-
outsider patterns. Thus, citizens of developed nations readily affirm that outsiders, even 
civilians, sometimes have to be killed for the needs of the state and for security. Rather 
than inculcating morally principled objections to violence of all sorts, with increasing 
414 
rates of development, education, and female education in nations around the world, 
military violence is more likely to be given a pass by the average citizen, than is 
terrorism.  
 Thus, while Walter Wink (1992, 1998) has forcefully argued that the world’s 
number one religion or faith is faith in “the myth of redemptive violence,” it seems that 
modernity does inculcate attitudes which question this faith, when it comes to political 
violence, especially in the case of terrorism. The violence of the state is more likely to be 
seen as justified than terrorism, but rejection of even state violence does increase (though 
not always at significant levels) with increasing female empowerment.    
 Meanwhile, the same forces of modernity are associated with decreasing 
confidence that peaceful means alone can help oppressed groups improve their lives. 
Could it be that modern educational systems and textbook accounts of history are partly 
to blame for this trend as well? 
 Table 117 isolates female responses at the national level on the question of 
military attacks on civilians. Here, we see that column of “sometimes justified” data is 
consistently negative (recognizing that for the fertility variables and Gender Inequality 
Index, the signs are reversed because a higher score on these variables means less female 
empowerment): that is, higher female empowerment (in education and increasing gender 
equality more generally) is associated with declines in the belligerent/ less peaceful 
answer “sometimes justified.” Likewise, the column of “never justified” data is 
consistently positive (again, recognizing that the signs are reversed for the fertility 
variables and Gender Inequality Index): that is, increasing female empowerment is 
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associated with increases in the percentage of respondents offering the peaceful answer of 
“never justified.”  
Table 117. Correlations of Nation-Level Female Attitudes (on Military Attacks on 
Civilians) with Full Menu of Answer Choices by Indicators of Female Empowerment 
 
 Variable name Sample 
size (n=) 
% females 
military 
attacks on 
civilians 
“never 
justified” 
% females 
“sometimes 
justified” 
% females 
“depends” 
% females 
“don’t know” 
Gender Inequality 
Index 2011 
GenderInequalIndex_UN2011 123 -.2490** .3609*** -.0998 .0801 
% parliaments 
female 
percent_parliaments_female 128 .0886 -.0867 -.0353 -.0241 
Adolescent fertility adol_fertility 134 -.1788* .3729**** -.1078 -.0716 
Birth rate per 
thousand 
Birth_rate_perthousand 135 -.1801* .3599**** -.0583 -.1028 
Fertility rate fertility_rate 135 -.1558 .3506**** -.0641 -.1438 
Ratio, female to 
male labor 
participation rate 
(%) 
Ratio_female_to_male_labor_
parti 
134 -.0291 .0354 .0849 -.0611 
Labor force, % 
female 
Labor_force_percent_female 134 -.0384 .0362 .1215 -.0878 
Labor force, % 
female (ages 15 and 
older) 
Labor_participation_fem_ove
r15  
134 -.0711 .0930 .0370 -.0020 
% female in 
nonagricultural 
labor 
percent_females_in_total_non
agri 
54 (low 
n) 
-.0876 .0962 .1686 -.2482 
Literacy rate, adult 
females 
Literacy_rate_adult_female 70 .3813** -.5262**** -.1359 .1047 
Literacy rate, youth 
females (15-24) 
Literacy_rate_youth_females
15_24 
70 .3637** -.5091**** -.1379 .1182 
Ratio young literate 
females to males 
Ratio_youngliterate_fem_to_
males 
70 .3186** -.03843** -.1896 .0766 
Ratio female to 
male primary 
enrollment  
Ratio_female_to_male_prima
ry_enr 
111 .1671 -.2878** .1018 -.0235 
Total enrollment, 
primary school, 
female % 
Totalenroll_primary_female_
perce 
81 .2319* -.3295** .0022 .0445 
Primary school 
completion rate, 
female (% of 
relevant age group) 
Primary_completion_rate_fe
male 
91 .3305** -.4761**** -.0631 .0495 
Progression to 
secondary school, 
female 
Progression_to_secondary_fe
male_   
42 (low 
n) 
.0687 -.3776* .1353 .3045 
Ratio female to 
male, secondary 
enrollment 
Ratio_female_to_male_secon
dary_e 
97 .1481 -.3244** .0807 .1782 
Secondary 
education, % female 
Secondary_ed_percent_femal
e 
101 .1361 -.2961** .0843 .1460 
Female secondary 
enrollment (% 
gross) 
enroll_secondary_female_per
centg 
95 .2426* -.3499*** .0450 .0076 
Female enrollment 
secondary (% net) 
 
enroll_secondary_female_per
centn 
 
 
 
66 (low 
n) 
.3107* -.3265** .0181 -.2291 
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 Variable name Sample 
size (n=) 
% females 
military 
attacks on 
civilians 
“never 
justified” 
% females 
“sometimes 
justified” 
% females 
“depends” 
% females 
“don’t know” 
Females with 
secondary educ. (% 
ages 25 and older) 
females_w_second_ed 125 .1920* -.3145*** .1019 -.0655 
Ratio girls to boys, 
primary & 
secondary 
Ratio_girls_to_boys_primary
_n_se 
97 .1742 -.3356*** .0949 .1213 
Ratio female to 
male tertiary 
enrollment 
Ratio_fem_to_male_tertiary_
enrol 
88 .2521* -.3679*** .-.0569 .2077 
Tertiary enrollment, 
female % gross  
enroll_tertiaryfemale_percent
gro 
88 .3398** -.3652*** -.0621 -.0672 
Notes: Tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001 
 
 In addition, no significant changes are observed in the “depends” and “don’t 
know” columns (see Appendix L for a methodological note). It is fairly striking that, on 
average, responses of “depends” and “don’t know” do not change significantly with 
rising levels of female education and female empowerment. Hence, with increasing 
education, respondents are not increasingly lost in nuances (as with a “depends” answer), 
but neither do we see a significant decrease in women who feel disempowered in 
answering the question (as with a “don’t know” answer). This means that increasing 
female empowerment is associated with a clear shift from the perception that military 
attacks are “sometimes justified,” to the morally principled view of the illegitimacy of 
military attacks on civilians.  
 Below in Table 118, we see that increases in female literacy, female education, 
and general female empowerment leads to increases in “don’t know” responses and 
declines in attitudes affirming nonviolent efficacy/ nonviolence “will work” responses. If 
we interpret “don’t know” responses to represent disempowerment in answering a survey 
question with confidence, it seems education and modernity disempowers women in 
answering this item. All the evidence here is remarkably consistent: increasing female 
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Table 118. Correlations of Nation-Level Female Attitudes (on Peaceful Means Alone 
Will Work) with Full Menu of Answer Choices By Indicators of Female Empowerment 
 
 Variable name Sample size 
(n=) 
% females 
nonviolence 
“will work” 
% females 
“will not 
work” 
% females 
“don’t know” 
Gender Inequality 
Index 2011 
GenderInequalIndex_UN2011 123 .3855**** -.2413** -.3398*** 
% parliaments 
female 
percent_parliaments_female 128 -.0447 .0394 .0306 
Adolescent fertility 
 
adol_fertility 134 .3479**** -.2077* -.3307*** 
Birth rate per 
thousand 
Birth_rate_perthousand 135 .3702**** -.1638 -.4454**** 
Fertility rate 
 
fertility_rate 135 .3522**** -.1461 -.4415**** 
Ratio, female to 
male labor 
participation rate 
(%) 
 
Ratio_female_to_male_labor_
parti 
134 .1238 -.0975 -.0798 
Labor force, % 
female 
Labor_force_percent_female 134 .1364 -.1372 -.0390 
Labor force, % 
female (ages 15 and 
older) 
Labor_participation_fem_ove
r15  
134 .1478 -.0746 -.1621 
% female in 
nonagricultural 
labor 
percent_females_in_total_non
agri 
54 (low n) .0907 -.1465 .0815 
Literacy rate, adult 
females 
 
Literacy_rate_adult_female 70 -.2867* .0320 .4849**** 
Literacy rate, youth 
females (15-24) 
Literacy_rate_youth_females
15_24 
70 -.3110** .0953 .4334*** 
Ratio young literate 
females to males 
Ratio_youngliterate_fem_to_
males 
70 -.1508 .0087 .2686* 
Ratio female to 
male primary 
enrollment  
 
Ratio_female_to_male_prima
ry_enr 
111 -.2094* .1156 .2056* 
Total enrollment, 
primary school, 
female % 
 
Totalenroll_primary_female_
perce 
81 -.2558* .1072 .2751* 
Primary school 
completion rate, 
female (% of 
relevant age group) 
Primary_completion_rate_fe
male 
91 -.3346** .1246 .3950*** 
Progression to 
secondary school, 
female 
Progression_to_secondary_fe
male_   
42 (low n) -.4288** .1300 .5693*** 
Ratio female to 
male, secondary 
enrollment 
Ratio_female_to_male_secon
dary_e 
97 -.2639** .0982 .3302** 
Secondary 
education, % female 
Secondary_ed_percent_femal
e 
101 -.2123* .0760 .2775** 
Female secondary 
enrollment (% 
gross) 
enroll_secondary_female_per
centg 
95 -.3623*** .2002 .3574*** 
Female enrollment 
secondary (% net) 
enroll_secondary_female_per
centn 
66 (low n) -.3336** .2365 .2312 
Females with 
secondary educ. (% 
ages 25 and older) 
females_w_second_ed 125 -.2607** .0644 .3952**** 
Ratio girls to boys, 
primary & 
secondary 
Ratio_girls_to_boys_primary
_n_se 
97 -.2153* .0879 .2555* 
418 
 Variable name Sample size 
(n=) 
% females 
nonviolence 
“will work” 
% females 
“will not 
work” 
% females 
“don’t know” 
Ratio female to 
male tertiary 
enrollment 
Ratio_fem_to_male_tertiary_
enrol 
88 -.1823 -.0460 .3997*** 
Tertiary enrollment, 
female % gross  
enroll_tertiaryfemale_percent
gro 
88 -.1925 .0002 .3424** 
Notes: Tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001 
 
empowerment (as measured by the Gender Inequality Index, fertility rates, and female 
education rates) results in decreases in faith in nonviolent efficacy and increases in the 
“don’t know” response. For most of the variables above, both of these patterns are 
statistically significant.   
 In Table 119 below, we see that with the exception of the education spending 
variables, these education variables are consistent in their effects on male attitudes: 
increasing literacy, increasing mean years of schooling, increasing school enrollments, 
and lower pupil-teacher ratios are all associated with increases in the percentage of males 
responding “don’t know” to the nonviolent efficacy question, and decreases in the 
percentage of males responding that nonviolence “will work” for oppressed groups. 
Hence, the shift is from affirming that nonviolence will work, to uncertainty (i.e.,  
Table 119. Correlations of Nation-Level Male Attitudes (on Peaceful Means Alone Will 
Work) with the Full Menu of Answer Choices by Education Indicators  
 Variable name Sample 
size  
(n=) 
% male 
nonviolence 
“will work” 
% male “will 
not work” 
% male “don’t 
know” 
Literacy rate, adult Literacy_rate_adult 126 -.2841** .1241 .4017**** 
Mean years of 
schooling 
Mean_yrs_school 132 -.2778** .1115 .4054**** 
Primary school 
enrollment (% net) 
primary_enrol_ratio_net 126 -.2275* .1390 .2326** 
Secondary school 
enrollment (% net) 
secondary_enrol_ratio_net 109 -.2314* .0628 .3951**** 
Tertiary enrollment 
(% gross) 
enroll_tertiary_percentgross 122 -.1888* .0406 .3417*** 
Population with 
secondary 
education (%) 
pop_with_secondary_ed 112 -.2714** .1135 .3655*** 
% of govt spending 
on education 
educ_percent_govt_spent 124 .0822 .0005 -.1909* 
% of GDP spent on 
education 
educ_spent_percent_GDP 127 -.0321 .0091 .0459 
Pupil-teacher ratio pupil_teacher_ratio 101 .2983** -.1345 -.4348**** 
Notes: Tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001; These educational indicators include both 
genders. 
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answering “don’t know”). 
 As for the nonviolent efficacy question, the consistent effects in the above 
indicators is startling. Trends of modernity and development are associated with declines 
in confidence in nonviolent efficacy. Perhaps issues of validity can be raised about the 
nonviolent efficacy question. Perhaps citizens of modernizing and modern nations are 
more likely to feel political alienation and frustration at the pace of change. This might 
lead them to be more likely to question whether “peaceful means alone” will work for 
oppressed groups. In any case, this is one possible critique of the question’s validity. 
Other possible critiques include – how was “peaceful means” translated around the 
world, and what did people understand the terms to represent? 
 Below in Table 120, we see that indicators of educational advancement in a nation 
consistently and significantly correlate with declines in the percentage of males who 
claim that military attacks on civilians are “sometimes justified.” However, the shift in 
attitudes is not clearly linked to growth in robustly peaceful attitudes, as there is no 
significant rise in the percentage of civilians claiming such attacks are “never justified.” 
Instead, the shift in opinions is split between increases in “don’t know,” “depends,” and 
“never justified” responses. 
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Table 120. Correlations of Nation-Level Male Attitudes (on Military Attacks on 
Civilians) with the Full Menu of Answer Choices By Education Indicators 
 
 Variable name Sample 
size  
(n=) 
% males 
military 
attacks on 
civilians 
“never 
justified” 
% males 
“sometimes 
justified” 
% males 
“depends” 
% males 
“don’t 
know” 
Literacy rate, 
adult 
Literacy_rate_adult 126 .1628 -.2521** -.0223 .0998 
Mean years of 
schooling 
Mean_yrs_school 132 .0791 -.2307** .1119 .0626 
Primary school 
enrollment (% 
net) 
primary_enrol_ratio_net 126 .1438 -.2795** .0567 .0926 
Secondary school 
enrollment (% 
net) 
secondary_enrol_ratio_net 109 .1371 -.2649** .0808 .0291 
Tertiary 
enrollment (% 
gross) 
enroll_tertiary_percentgross 122 .1733 -.2497** .0492 -.0733 
Population with 
secondary 
education (%) 
pop_with_secondary_ed 112 .1084 -.3036** .1789 .0308 
% of govt 
spending on 
education 
educ_percent_govt_spent 124 .0229 .0416 .0081 -.1581 
% of GDP spent 
on education 
educ_spent_percent_GDP 127 .1349 -.1264 .0564 -.1798* 
Pupil-teacher 
ratio 
pupil_teacher_ratio 101 -.1862 .2537* .0020 .0309 
Notes: Tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001; These educational indicators include both 
genders. 
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CHAPTER IV 
SEARCHING FOR CULTURES OF PEACE 
CRITIQUE OF THE GLOBAL PEACE INDEX 
 This chapter sketches out a critique of the Global Peace Index (GPI). The GPI 
2008 nation scores and ranks are reported in Appendix U. The researcher elected to focus 
on the GPI because it is better known, and because, in any case, the World Peace Index 
(WPI) robustly correlates with the GPI. Although the indicators of these two peace 
indexes are different, they share many parallel or roughly parallel indicators (see 
Appendix V). Nevertheless, in many ways the WPI indicators (see Appendix W) are 
superior since they encompass historical indicators with longer time spans. Thus, the WPI 
better captures the historical track record of the peace propensities of nations. In addition, 
as discussed below, the WPI data is superior for researchers since three sub-indexes are 
reported (as opposed to the GPI which refuses to release nation scores on the Internal and 
External peace indexes).  
 In even a cursory analysis of the GPI rankings (see Appendix U), questions arise. 
Given the unparalleled military power and overseas adventurism of the U.S., how can it 
be that the U.S. does not score more poorly in the GPI? When comparing military 
budgets in 2011 of the 30 nations with the largest armed forces , the U.S. spends more 
(US$739.3 billion) than the other top 29 combined (US$645.7 billion) (Time 2012). The 
closest competitor is China which spent US$89.8 billion. Thus, the U.S. spent over 8 
times more than its closest competitor. The U.S. has 11 major aircraft carrier ships, while 
the closest competitors are Japan and Italy which have 2 each (Time 2012). The U.S. has 
122 major warships, while the closest competitors have 78 (China), 48 (Japan), and 32 
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(Russia). The U.S. has 3,591 combat aircraft, while the closest competitors have 2,004 
(China), 1,909 (Russia), 829 (India), and 603 (North Korea). Only China has more active 
military personnel than the U.S. Clearly, the U.S. exhibits the most pervasive military-
industrial complex, even though a handful of nations do rival the U.S. in such statistics as 
the number of military reserves (only on this indicator do some nations vastly exceed the 
U.S.), battle tanks, and submarines (Time 2012). And, any accounting of propensities for 
war and peace must take into account the fact that only 9 nations possess strategic nuclear 
weapons: the U.S., China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Russia, France, the U.K., and 
almost certainly Israel.  
 In 2001, the U.S. had about 725 military bases in 38 countries, with over 250,000 
military personnel deployed in 153 countries (Johnson 2004). By 2007, the U.S. had 
about 300,000 military personnel stationed abroad (Duffy 2007). No other nation in the 
world even comes close to rivaling those numbers. Over the years, the GPI has been 
something of a moving target for critique, as some of the GPI’s indicators have been 
changed. The main reason that the U.S. ranked as more “peaceful” in the 2009 GPI 
compared to previous years, is that a key indicator of militarism was dropped: Non-UN 
deployments. Clearly, the organizers of the GPI decided to give the U.S. a pass for its 
empire of bases. The GPI’s own explanation for this change is revealing:  
The indicator of Non-UN deployments was initially included on the assumption 
that a country deploying troops overseas cannot be considered free of violence. 
However, members of the panel of experts acknowledged that the indicator is 
potentially ambiguous – should the deployment of troops overseas, whose mission 
is to prevent genocide in a foreign country, be recorded as a ‘negative’ indicator 
in the GPI? In order to avoid making such judgments, the consensus view was to 
remove the indicator. (IEP 2009a, p.3) 
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Arguably, this change in the GPI criteria cloaks the imperial activity of core nations, 
while uncritically accepting the human rights rhetoric increasingly used to legitimate core 
nations’ military interventions abroad (Chomsky 2008).    
 Although the GPI includes among its 23 indicators (see Appendix O), the 
“Aggregate number of heavy weapons per 100,000 people,” the “Military 
capability/sophistication,” and “Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP,” these 
indicators are not weighted as heavily as some of the measures of internal peace such as 
“homicides per 100,000 people.” Thus, to some degree the distinctive characteristics of 
the U.S. military presence in the world (i.e., the “empire of bases” abroad (Johnson 
2004), nuclear arsenal, pre-eminence in air and sea) is given a pass by the GPI.         
 Beyond defining peace as the absence of war/ war preparation, we can also briefly 
consider peace as international justice and question the pragmatic effects of U.S. 
hegemony. Through international financial institutions and agreements, the U.S. routinely 
extracts wealth from poor underdeveloped nations and perpetuates unfair double 
standards. For example, during the 1960’s the Alliance for Progress facilitated a transfer 
of wealth from Latin America to private investors in the US on the order of five dollars 
for every one dollar sent to Latin America, and this does not even count the billions of 
dollars in loan debt incurred (Agee 1975, pp.569-571). More recently, Bourdieu (2003) 
points out that IMF requests that the U.S. “reduce its persistent public deficit have long 
fallen on deaf ears, whereas the same body has forced many an African economy, already 
greatly at risk, to reduce its deficit at the cost of increasing levels of unemployment and 
poverty” (pp.94-95). Similarly, Bourdieu argues the WTO allows  “the dominant powers 
and particularly the United States to resort to the very protectionist measures and public 
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subsidies they deny to developing countries” (p.89). However, for our purposes it is 
worth noting that Bourdieu misses the fact that Japan (ranked #3 in the GPI 2011) and 
EU nations (many of which rank in the top 20 in peace in the GPI, year after year) have 
been even greater beneficiaries of the WTO than the U.S. (Ellwood 2001, p.33; Lane 
2006, p.162). Thus, neoliberal economic policies and the world-system’s structural 
violence are off the radar screen of the GPI. As we will see below, that is not all that is 
missing from the GPI’s criteria. 
Comparing the WPI and the GPI 
 While the GPI has reported annual cross-national scores and rankings in peace 
since 2007, a second cross-national peace index, the World Peace Index (compiled by the 
World Peace Forum of Seoul, South Korea), has reported annual scores and rankings 
since 2000. A strength of the WPI is that it in addition to reporting an overall score (for 
76 nations in 2007), it breaks down national scores into three dimensions: a Political 
Peace Index (for 140 nations in 2007), a Military-Diplomatic Peace Index (for 140 
nations in 2007), and a Socio-Economic Peace Index (for 76 nations in 2007). These 
three peace indexes are averaged to produce the overall WPI score for each nation (see 
Appendices O, U, and V  for a comparison of GPI and WPI indicators). 
 The correlation between the GPI 2007 and WPI 2007 is quite high (r = .8035).  In 
preparation for testing the correlation, the GPI score for each nation was transformed 
(GPI score X (-1) + 4) so that the most peaceful countries in the GPI have the highest 
scores as in the WPI. Squaring the r value (.8035) yields a coefficient of determination of 
0.65 (r2 = 0.65), which suggests that the indicators used in the WPI can explain 65% of 
the total variation in the GPI. The WPI 2007 scores 76 nations in the overall index, 
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making possible a comparison with 72 nations that are also scored in the GPI 2007.  We 
will revisit these indexes below, since later versions of these indexes have expanded their 
sample sizes. 
 Figure 11 below indicates that the WPI and GPI really only noticeable diverge on 
a few cases. Israel is ranked very low in peace by the GPI, while the WPI ranks Israel 
much closer to the middle. Conversely, the WPI ranks Syria almost near the very bottom 
in peace, while the GPI ranks Syria near the middle. These divergences are likely traced, 
at least partly, to the WPI’s inclusion of a longer span of years for conflict data.  
Figure 11. Scatterplot of GPI 2007 and WPI 2007 Scores with Trendline 
 
NOTE: N=72.  The GPI score for each nation was transformed (GPI score X (-1) + 4) so that the most 
peaceful countries in the GPI have the highest scores as in the WPI. Source: Global Peace Index 2007; 
World Peace Index 2007 
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The Gallup World Poll 
 Comparing peace indexes (the GPI and WPI) with cross-national attitude polls 
opens up additional areas for critique. Simply put, many of the most peaceful nations 
according to the objective indicators in the peace indexes, do not rank as particularly 
peaceful in their attitudes when compared with other nations. This raises questions about 
the adequacy of the GPI and WPI as indicators of “cultures of peace,” as well as the 
relative influence of structural factors (many of which are captured by the indicators of 
the GPI and WPI) upon peaceful attitudes in general. The Gallup World Poll 2008 
provides adequate initial operationalizations and measurements of two theoretically 
important dimensions of nonviolence, pragmatic nonviolence and principled objections to 
very particular and egregious forms of violence (constituting the weakest form of what 
can be called “principled nonviolence”): terrorism and state terrorism. Analysis of this 
cross-national public opinion data is likely to yield theoretical dividends due to the 
relatively large sample of nations, and the very wide ranges in the responses of national 
publics (see Table 121 below).In addition, these questions were replicated in the surveys 
(e.g., Appendix A, Q4-Q6). 
Table 121.  Descriptive Statistics for Nation-Level Data on Three Questions Probing 
Nonviolent Attitudes in the 2008 Gallup World Poll (N=104 Nations)  
 % respondents claiming 
individual attacks on civilians 
are “never justified” 
% respondents claiming 
nonviolent means “will work” 
for oppressed groups 
% respondents claiming 
military attacks on civilians 
are “never justified” 
Mean (x̄) 70.92 56.47 64.60 
Standard deviation 15.11 14.32 14.97 
Range 95% - 8% 85% - 8% 93% - 11% 
 
 The specificity of the Gallup World Poll questions are worthy of comment. The 
two questions on violent tactics do not discuss civilian deaths as “collateral damage” – 
the term Chalmers Johnson (2001) refers to as “another of those hateful euphemisms 
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invented by our military to prettify its killing of the defenseless” (p.14). Rather, these 
questions posit cases where a military or individuals “target and kill civilians.” Such 
tactics are clearly against international law including the Geneva Conventions, yet about 
35% of respondents worldwide refused to condemn such military tactics as “never 
justified,” and about 29% of respondents worldwide refused to condemn individual 
attacks on civilians – or what is commonly called “terrorism.” Hence, worldwide, there is 
only a 6% gap in the number of people willing to condemn terrorism as opposed to the 
number of people willing to condemn military attacks targeting civilians. Of course, 
within many nations the gap is much wider. If we adopt the language of “terrorism” for 
individual attacks, we can also use a parallel term – as Chomsky often does – for military 
attacks on civilians: “state terrorism.” As actor Peter Ustinov once said, “Terrorism is the 
war of the poor and war is the terrorism of the rich.” This frame obviously undermines 
the legitimacy state violence is often accorded, as Young (2007) notes, “The idea that the 
state is nothing but monopoly on the legitimate use of violence slides easily for many 
people into the idea that the use of violence by legitimate agents of a legitimate state is 
itself legitimate” (p.98). 
 It is doubtful whether many respondents were aware that the question on the 
legitimacy of militaries targeting and killing civilians presents a war crime according to 
international law. In fact, as the civil war continued to rage in Syria during early 2013, 
the Secretary-General of the UN, Ban Ki-moon felt he had to remind the world that 
targeting civilians is against international law, as Robert Siegel of National Public Radio 
noted below.   
The head of the United Nations has harsh words for whoever carried out an attack 
on Syrian University students, as they were taking exams. Two explosions at the 
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university in Aleppo killed more than 80 people yesterday and injured some 200. 
Today, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said such heinous attacks are 
unacceptable. And he added that deliberate targeting of civilians constitutes a war 
crime....Now, as I mentioned, Ban Ki-moon reminded all that deliberate targeting 
of civilians is a war crime... (NPR 2013, January 16) 
 
But consider Sam Wineburg, professor of education and history at Stanford University, 
who, in an often reactionary critique of Howard Zinn’s landmark book A People’s 
History of the United States, rationalizes U.S. military bombing campaigns during World 
War II. Wineburg (2013) defends the U.S. bombing of Dresden, which claimed between 
20,000 to 30,000 lives, by noting that it occurred near the end of the war in February 
1945, “...when all bets were off and long-standing distinctions between military targets 
(‘strategic bombing’) and civilian targets (‘saturation bombing’) had been rendered 
irrelevant” (p.30). This rationalization is just one form of “moral disengagement” that is 
pervasive in common views of war (Bandura 1990, 1996).  
Cross-National Contexts and the Gallup World Poll Indicators 
 The three Gallup World Poll questions are likely to be “heard” differently in 
democratic and non-democratic contexts. In core nations, the question on state terrorism 
likely evoked scenarios in which civilians in nations far away are targeted. Conversely, in 
nations of the periphery, the same question likely evoked scenarios in which the 
respondents themselves could be killed by the government’s armed forces, or equally 
plausibly, scenarios in which ethnic minorities or rebel factions are targeted by state 
forces. Similarly, in some peripheral nations, the question about individual terrorism was 
likely a proxy question on the perceived degree of legitimacy of the government in 
power, or whether terrorist groups had emerged in their national context and received 
popular support.   
429 
 The Gallup World Poll question on nonviolent efficacy furnishes one of the 
empirical touchstones of this dissertation. The question posits a scenario where 
“oppressed groups” strive to “improve their situation” and lessen their “suffering from 
injustice” through a strategy termed “peaceful means alone.” The scenario involves 
significant ambiguities and will almost certainly be heard differently in different contexts. 
In a democratic society, individuals might be more likely to think of conventional action 
such as democratic processes (e.g., petitions, lobbying of politicians, lawsuits in the 
context of an independent judiciary branch of government, etc.), whereas citizens living 
under dictatorship might be more likely to envision nonviolent mass street protest 
actions/ “people power” movements. The scenario they envision will likely depend 
heavily on the recent historical experiences of their own nation as well as neighboring 
nations. 
 Again for democratic citizens, the “peaceful means alone” question likely framed 
the degree to which electoral politics might resolve conflicts involving oppressed groups. 
Indeed, Meyer and Tarrow (1998) argue that modern democratic states tend to be 
“movement societies” in which social protest movements are institutionalized within the 
polity.Given that democratic nation states have institutionalized forms of political 
contention (e.g., electoral politics) and also experience more disruptive forms of 
contention, such cross-national survey questions remain somewhat muddy in terms of 
what they are operationalizing in each national context. As Zald (2000) observes, “we do 
not know much about the population’s consciousness of movements and how it compares 
with the consciousness of institutionalized politics,” but he ventures the following: 
“Compared to social movements, in most nations institutionalized politics is a larger part 
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of everyday life” (p.7). Thus, especially in democratic nations, election rituals tend to 
figure more prominently than protest rituals in the discourse of most families (p.7).  
 Perhaps the salience of election rituals in family discourse and experience helps 
explain the political socialization literature finding that families of origin impact political 
party identification more than attitude and policy orientation. During the competitive 
“horse race” of election campaign rituals, parties attract emotional and financial 
investments, jingoistic identity links, attachment to particular charismatic leaders, etc. so 
that changing political parties – even later in life, can make people feel like sports fans 
who betray the “home team” by rooting for the “other side.” Zald (2000) proposes that 
the link between identity and family of origin traditions can be quite resilient in the arena 
of self-identified labels like political party adherence, while attitudes and policy 
orientations are “more open to experience and societal events” (p.8). But one of the 
reasons for this might be that most families simply do not engage in social movement 
campaigns, discourse, emotional investments, hero worship, and celebration linked to 
particular issues and policy debates, like they do in electoral rituals. All of this speaks to 
a possible bias towards conventional action, and the potential disadvantages of 
nonviolentprotest in collective memory processes 
 Below, Figure 12 graphs national rankings (ordinal variables) on the GPI and the 
Gallup World Poll question. It is descriptive of the wide range and diversity among 
nations and hints at the disconnect between objective and subjective indicators of peace. 
Looking at the bottom right-hand quadrant, we see that several nations ranking in the top 
30 for belief in nonviolent efficacy, rank in the bottom 20 of the GPI. But a more 
accurate test of the relationship between these twovariables appears in Figure 12 below, 
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as a scatterplot of the same data as ratio level variables demonstrates that as national 
scores on the transformed GPI go down (as nations become less peaceful according to the 
GPI’s objective indicators of peace), confidence that peaceful means alone “will work” 
goes up (the subjective indicator of peace becomes more robust). Hence, ironically, the 
more objectively/ structurally “peaceful” nations (as measured by the GPI) tend to 
express less confidence that peaceful means alone “will work.” Indeed, as we see in 
Table 122 below, the correlation between the GPI’s objective indicators and the 
subjective indicator (mean% of citizens affirming peaceful means alone “will work”) is a 
weakly negative (-0.1402). 
 Table 122 shows that the correlations between the GPI 2008 (using objective 
indicators for peace) and the nonviolent attitudes (subjective indicators) operationalized 
by the Gallup World Poll 2008 are very small, suggesting that there is little relationship 
between them. As illustrated in Figure 13, the GPI scores are negatively related to the 
nonviolence works item (i.e., on average and ironically, the more peaceful nations are 
according to the GPI’s objective measures, the less confident they are that nonviolence 
works for oppressed groups seeking justice). To re-phrase this finding, it seemsto suggest 
that more objectively “peaceful” nations (according to the GPI’s objective indicators)are 
more convinced that violent methods must be used by the oppressed. Theonly alternative 
tothat interpretation would be that the more objectively “peaceful” nations tend to believe 
that nothing can improve the conditions of the oppressed, neither nonviolence nor 
violence.  
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Figure 12. Scatterplot of GPI and Gallup World Poll Nation Ranks in Pragmatic 
Nonviolence 
 
NOTE:  Q: “Some people believe that groups that are oppressed and are suffering from injustice can 
improve their situation by peaceful means alone.  Others do not believe that peaceful means alone will 
work to improve their situation for such oppressed groups.  Which do you believe?1. Will work 2. Will not 
work 3. Depends [not read by survey conductor] 4. DK/ RF [not read by survey conductor].” Rank of 
national percentage citizens affirming peaceful means alone “will work” (affirming pragmatic 
nonviolence).Source Data: Gallup World Poll 2008 (Rank of 1 = nation with highest % of citizens 
affirming pragmatic nonviolence (i.e., peaceful means alone will work); Global Peace Index 2008 (Rank of 
1 = most peaceful nation) 
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Figure 13. Scatterplot of GPI and Gallup World Poll Nation Means in Pragmatic 
Nonviolence 
 
Note: The GPI score for each nation was transformed (4 - GPI score) so that the most peaceful countries in 
the GPI have the highest scores (with 3 the most peaceful score and 0 the least peaceful score possible).   
Data sources: Gallup World Poll 2008; GPI 2008; The GPI score for 4 nations (Burundi, Georgia, Guyana, 
and Nepal) come from the GPI 2009 because this is the first year they appeared in the index.  However, it 
should be noted that the scoring methodology in the GPI 2009 did change slightly from the GPI 2008. 
 
 In Table 122 we also see that the GPI scores are more strongly related to the 
terrorism variable (“indneverjust”) than to the state terrorism variable (“milneverjust”). 
All things considered, this seems to reflect the fact that modern industrial Western 
nations tend to score more highly on the GPI, and the citizens in these populations object 
more to terrorism than they do to state terrorism. This is not surprising since citizens of 
modern Western nations are unlikely to be the victims of military attacks on civilians, 
while fear of terrorism, though often relatively irrational, has been cultivated through 
several dramatic and tragic attacks on civilians in Western nations in recent years. 
Among the subjective indicators themselves, the relationships are also very weak, with 
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Table 122. Correlation Matrix for Nonviolent Attitudes of World Publics (Gallup World 
Poll 2008) and Nation Scores in Global Peace Index 2008 
 gpi2008 indneverjust nvworks milneverjust 
gpi2008   1.0000    
indneverjust   0.1820  1.0000   
nvworks  -0.1402 -0.0781 1.0000  
milneverjust   0.1287  0.8221*** 0.0549 1.0000 
NOTE: Pearson product-moment correlations between variables. N=95 nations. *** = p < .0001 
GPI 2008 scores range from 1.176 for Iceland (the most peaceful country) to 3.514 for Iraq (the least peaceful country).  The GPI 
score for each nation was transformed (4 - GPI score) so that the most peaceful countries in the GPI have the highest scores (with 3 
the most peaceful score and 0 the least peaceful score possible).  “nvworks” = % of respondents affirming that peaceful means alone 
will work for oppressed groups; “indneverjust” = % of respondents affirming that individual attacks on civilians are never justified; 
“milneverjust” = % of respondents affirming that military attacks on civilians are never justified; Data sources: Gallup World Poll 
2008; GPI 2008; The GPI score for 4 nations (Burundi, Georgia, Guyana, and Nepal) come from the GPI 2009 because this is the first 
year they appeared in the index.  However, it should be noted that the scoring methodology in the GPI 2009 did change slightly from 
the GPI 2008. 
 
the exception of the robust correlation between objecting to terrorism and military attacks 
on civilians. The weakness of the relationships between the pragmatic nonviolence item 
(peaceful means alone “will work”) and each of the principled nonviolent items (i.e., 
views on terrorism and military attacks on civilians) is particularly striking.  
 This is part the theoretical puzzle we shall explore. Why is there no cross-national 
relationship between objective and subjective indicators of peace?See Appendix Q for a 
fuller analysisof the GPI and WPI vis a vis the Gallup data than was depicted in Table 
122 above. Clearly, with the sole exception of the terrorism item, there is little 
relationship between ranking high in the GPI or the WPI (which primarily employ 
objective measures of “peace”) and ranking high in the subjective attitude dimensions of 
nonviolence. In general, can the current peace indexes be said to really measure a 
nation’s peace propensities when there is little relationship to the scores of these nations 
on more subjective measures like attitudes relating to nonviolence and militarism? Are 
structures irrelevant to the cultivation of attitudes? In terms of shaping attitudes, is the 
mediating role of historical experience more important than structure? 
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A Closer Look: How Nations Perform in Objective Vis a Vis Subjective  
Indicators of Peace 
 Large data sets of cross-national data presents numerous theoretical and empirical 
challenges. When the data set include nations from different levels of development, 
interpretation is likely to be especially difficult (Scheuch 1993). In analyzing global 
means, there is an obvious risk in overlooking substantial cross-national variation. For 
this reason, scatterplots are constructed below which demonstrate variation in the 
subjective attitudinal indicators and the objective indicators of the peace indexes. The 
global means are highlighted in each case. In the scatterplot with “nvworks” and the 
transformed GPI scores (see Figure 14), there is no nation occupying the space of the 
upper right hand corner. That is, no single nation clearly outcompetes others in both of 
these indicators. Thus, to select the most peaceful nations based on both of these 
indicators would require us to weight either the objective or subjective indicator more 
highly.  
 However, at the other extreme, Israel is a clear outlier in occupying the lower left 
hand space of the graph. Using these two indicators (and weighting them equally), Israel 
is the least peaceful nation sampled. Below in Figure 15, when we graph GPI scores by 
the national mean score on the “military attacks on civilians” (% never justified) item, 
Japan is the clear leader since it performs very well on both of these indicators of peace. 
Again, Israel joined by Central African Republic are outliers performing very poorly on 
both of these indicators of peace. Likewise, when we substitute the “individual attacks on 
civilians” (% never justified) item (see Figure 16), Japan and Finland are clear leaders in 
both indicators. Hence, they occupy the upper right hand space of the graph. Finland, like 
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Germany, has large numbers of youth applying to be conscientious objectors (Cortright 
2008). Bordering Russia, it is easy to imagine that Finland’s peaceful attitudes have been 
shaped by being small and having a “wolf at the door.” And, the Central African 
Republic is alone in occupying the lower left hand corner as the least peaceful nation by 
these two combined indicators. Israel ranks as the 3rd most militarized nation in the world 
out of 151 nations ranked in the Global Militarization Index (BICC 2009). In 2004, the 
Central African Republic, one of the world’s poorest nations, became embroiled in a civil 
war. Many citizens favored government attacks on rebel groups (IRIN 2006). By 2007, 
Figure 14. Scatterplot of GPI Score by National Means on Pragmatic Nonviolence 
 
Notes: nvworks mean line at 55.5; gpi mean line at 1.96; “nvworks” = % of respondents affirming that 
peaceful means alone will work for oppressed groups; “gpi2008trans” = transformed GPI 2008 scores; See 
Appendix X for key to 3-letter abbreviations for nations; Source: Gallup World Poll 2010, GPI 2008 
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there had been 11 attempted coups or rebellions in the previous decade (Melander 2007). 
These recent historical experiences certainly impact its scores on both the attitudinal 
indicators as well as the GPI. 
Figure 15. Scatterplot of GPI Score by National Means on Military Attacks Item 
 
Notes: milneverjust mean line at 64.8; gpi mean line at 1.96; “milneverjust” = % of respondents affirming 
that military attacks on civilians are never justified; “gpi2008trans” = transformed GPI 2008 scores; 
Source: Gallup World Poll 2010, GPI 2008 
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Figure 16. Scatterplot of GPI Score by National Means on Individual Attacks Item 
 
Notes: indneverjust mean line at 71.67; gpi mean line at 1.96; “indneverjust” = % of respondents affirming 
that individual attacks on civilians are never justified; “gpi2008trans” = transformed GPI 2008 scores; 
Source: Gallup World Poll 2010, GPI 2008 
 
A Second Look at Gallup World Poll Data: Nonviolent Attitudes Around the World 
 At the level of national means, correlations between the pragmatic nonviolence 
question and the two dimensions of principled nonviolent attitudes are quite low.  
However, a closer analysis (see Table 123) using threshold attitude scores (nation-level 
data) reveals that a number of countries have a relatively high percentage of citizens 
affirming nonviolent attitudes in all three of the Gallup World Poll questions. These 
countries present something of a theoretical puzzle, unexpected and unexplained by the 
peace studies literature. In their attitudes, these nations appear to be “cultures of peace,” 
but as can be seen in Table 123, their GPI rankings suggest that many of these nations 
lack objective structures peace. Such discontinuities will help to guide the analytical 
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focus of the present project. Isolating nations by threshold values, detailed in Table 123, 
reveals that in some cases, the principled and pragmatic nonviolent attitudes in national 
mass publics overlap to a large degree.   
Table 123. Nation-Level Data: Nations Scoring High in 3 Measures of Nonviolent 
Attitudes 
 
High Thresholds 
(met on all 3 
nonviolent 
questions) 
Nations (GPI 2009 ranking) 
At or over 79% Georgia (134) 
At or over 77% Liberia (NR) 
At or over 73% Costa Rica (29) 
At or over 72% Uruguay (25), Ghana (52) 
At or over 71% Nicaragua (61), Kazakhstan (84) 
At or over 69% Mauritania (124) 
At or over 68% Finland (9), Tunisia (44), Greece (57) 
At or over 67% Philippines (114) 
At or over 66% Sierra Leone (NR), Madagascar (72), Mali (96) 
At or over 65% Pakistan (137), Argentina (66), Burundi (127), 
Ireland (12) 
At or over 63% Colombia (130), Kenya (113), Armenia (NR), 
Russian Federation (136) 
At or over 62% Spain (28), Hungary (27), Morocco (63), Nigeria 
(129) 
At or over 61% Turkey (121), Canada (8), Chile (20), Ukraine (82) 
At or over 60% South Africa (123), Chad (138), Ecuador (109)  
 
NOTE: Case studies highlighted in bold. The 3 questions: % citizens affirming individual attacks on 
civilians “never justified”; % citizens affirming military attacks on civilians “never justified”; and, % 
citizens affirming peaceful means alone “will work” for oppressed groups. Data sources: Gallup World Poll 
2008 (n=104); GPI 2009 ranking (1 = most peaceful; 144 = least peaceful); the GPI 2009 (n=144) was 
employed here because it ranks more nations than the GPI 2008 (n=140); NR = not ranked in the GPI 
 
 Because this nonviolent attitudinal coherence occurs in some nations, a 
“Nonviolent Index” was constructed. However, it must be remembered that on average 
national means for the nonviolent efficacy item and the principled stands against 
terrorism and state terrorism items respectively, do not correlate at significant levels. The 
only significant correlation is between principled stands against terrorism and state 
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terrorism. Of course, a key problem with the constructed Nonviolent Index(see Appendix 
Y) is that extreme values on any one indicator become obscured by the aggregate index 
score. That is, in a real sense the Nonviolent Index presents us with less information since 
the three variables often only weakly correlate. 
Who Are the Most Peaceful Nations? 
 Since the Nonviolent Index reveals that some nations do hold high peaceful 
attitude thresholds on all three Gallup World Poll indicators, we will utilize this Index 
(constructed from 2010 Gallup World Poll data since it has a larger sample size than the 
2008 data) to help isolate cultures of peace by correlating this subjective Index with the 
objective peace indexes. In Appendix Z, in scatterplot graphs we see that a handful of 
nations consistently rise to the top upper-right-hand quadrant representing the most 
peaceful nations on both indicators, including: Iceland, Finland, Slovakia, Costa Rica, 
Uruguay, Hungary, and Spain. While the WPI and the GPI are flawed, and the Gallup 
World Poll indicators are very incomplete, together they represent more information 
about the attitudes and the socio-structural bases of nations than we have ever had before. 
 Nonviolence and collective memory. Many of the nations reporting high 
thresholds in Table 9 have experienced successful nonviolent revolutions in recent 
decades, such as Georgia, Liberia, the Philippines, and South Africa. Alternatively, and in 
accordance with path dependency theory (which posits that the origins of a nation have 
an enormous impact on subsequent developments) some of these nations experienced 
nonviolent independence movements (e.g., Ghana), or major nonviolent transitions (e.g., 
Costa Rica’s demilitarization in 1948-1949). Is it possible that collective memory plays a 
major role in reproducing nonviolent attitudes? 
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 Of the three questions on violence/ nonviolence in the 2008 Gallup World Poll, 
the lowest global mean by far concerned the issue of pragmatic nonviolence – can 
peaceful means alone work for an oppressed group? Compared with 70.92% objecting to 
terrorism and 64.60% objecting to state terrorism (military attacks on civilians), an 
average of only 56.47% of respondents world-wide affirmed that “peaceful means alone” 
“will work” for an oppressed group, at least one with a reformist or revolutionary agenda 
as the question implied. After Gandhi, after Dr. King and the U.S. civil rights movement, 
after “people power” in the Philippines, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, how is it possible 
that faith in the potential efficacy of nonviolent means is not higher? Below, we will 
consider whether there is something about cases of nonviolent social movement success 
that contain the seeds of their own forgetting. 
 
Testing Objective and Subjective Peace Indicators with Outcomes of Peace/ Militarism:  
Arms Exports and Treaty Ratification 
 A good test of whether these discontinuities between objective and subjective 
measures might be significant – and whether one or the other might do a better job of 
predicting the peace propensities of nations, can be found by analyzing behavioral 
outcomes for nation-states which represent peaceful/ militaristic policy choices. 
International treaties are one policy outcome of significance.  
 For all the influence and purported influence of regional, hemispheric, and world 
hegemons like the U.S., it is striking how many small nations and U.S. allies defy the will 
of the U.S. state through their ratification of international peace and disarmament treaties. 
For example, few nations if any nations in Latin America have had a closer relationship 
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to the U.S. than Panama (Perez 1999, p.3), yet Panama has ratified many of the treaties 
considered below (e.g., the Cluster Bomb Treaty, the Land Mine Treaty, the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, and the Rome Statute (creating the 
International Criminal Court)), while the U.S. has ratified none of these. On the other 
hand, like the U.S., Panama has not signed or ratified the Inter-American Convention on 
Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions, but smaller nation allies like 
Canada, Mexico, and Costa Rica have signed and ratified it. Similarly, the U.S. has not 
ratified the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and 
Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials; but 
Mexico, Costa Rica, and Panama have ratified it. In sum, it seems that many smaller 
nations defy the will of the U.S. hegemon through their support of international treaties of 
peace and disarmament.  
 First, we analyze which nations have ratified, as of February of 2012, the 
Convention on Cluster Munitions (i.e., the treaty in which nations pledge to ban cluster 
bombs), which 107 nations adopted at a conference in Dublin in May 2008 (MAC 2008). 
To date, 108 nations have signed the treaty (UN 2012). Jody Williams, the Nobel Peace 
Prize winner has called the treaty “...the most important disarmament and humanitarian 
convention in over a decade” (Nebehay 2010). Cluster bombs have been a key method 
for targeting and killing civilians, including children who often think the unexploded 
bomb particles are toys. Thus, cluster bombs are highly relevant to the Gallup World Poll 
question on whether it is legitimate for the militaries to target and kill civilians. Indeed, 
advocates of the treaty well-understood the link between banning cluster bombs and 
protecting civilians. Portia Stratton, Advocacy Manager for Landmine Action, which is 
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on the Steering Committee of the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) has said, “By 
banning cluster bombs, the UK has made its priorities clear - protecting civilians is more 
important than protecting stockpiles of outdated weapons” (LA 2010). 
 To test the relationship between objective and subjective peace indicators and 
participation in international conventions aiming to protect civilians in international war, 
independent group t tests (difference of group means) were conducted on the four treaties 
for ratifying and non-ratifying nations. Results showed that ratifying nations had more 
peaceful national mean scores on the “nvworks” and “milneverjust” variables (from the 
Gallup World Poll 2008) than the non-ratifying nations on all four treaties, but the 
differences did not attain statistical significance. Ratifying nations also had more peaceful 
GPI scores (GPI 2008) than the non-ratifying nations on all four treaties, and the 
differences were statistically significant for the Landmine Treaty (at the .05 level), for the 
ICC (at the .001 level), and for the CNBT (at the .0001 level), but not significant for the 
Cluster Bomb Treaty (at the .05 level).   
 Regression analyses were conducted (entering independent variables in one at a 
time rather than in multiple regression), with the results reported inTable 1 in Appendix 
AA. We see that compared with GPI scores, national means on the subjective attitudinal 
indicator for military attacks (from the Gallup World Poll 2008), better predicted whether 
a nation was a Cluster Bomb Signatory State. And, national means on the subjective 
attitudinal indicator for pragmatic nonviolence (“nvworks”), predicted whether a nation 
was a Landmine Treaty State Party almost as well as the GPI. However, GPI scores better 
predicted whether states ratified the CNTBT and ICC than the attitudinal indicators. In 
any case, these results suggest that the GPI does not fully capture the peace propensities 
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of nations, and in some of the peaceful behaviors/ outcomes of nations, attitudinal 
indicators may have greater predictive value. The Cluster Bomb Treaty and the Landmine 
Treaty are recognized by human rights NGOs as vitally important steps, yet nations 
scoring high in peace in the GPI were not significantly associated with signing the 
Cluster Bomb Treaty, and GPI scores were associated with the Landmine Treaty at only 
the moderately robust .05 level.      
 Arms exports. One way in which militaristic practices are not fully accounted for 
in the GPI is in arms production and distribution. The GPI’s methodology shields larger 
nations from harsh scoring penalties on a variety of militaristic dimensions by utilizing 
indicators which are weighted by the nation’s population or GDP. Hence, among the 24 
indicators of the GPI score we find: “Volume of transfers of major conventional weapons 
as supplier (exports) per 100,000 people” (see Appendix O). To some degree, large 
nations are also shielded from harsh scoring penalties through the GPI’s method of giving 
nations a standardized or “banded” score, using a 1 to 5 scale on many variables (GPI 
2008 results, p.5). And imperialistic nations like the U.S. are given a pass for having 725 
military bases abroad, and generally, protected from harsh scoring penalties for military 
adventurism abroad in that the GPI’s external peace indicators are weighted at 40%, 
while the internal peace indicators are weighted at 60%.  
 Rather than giving larger nations a pass for distributing military weapons, a 
simple dollar figure on arms exports would be a better choice, if we assume that larger 
nations carry a larger responsibility for creating a world climate of peace. Indeed, an 
analysis of arms export data is illuminating. Between 1996 and 2000, the U.S .was the 
world’s largest arms dealer, “responsible for 47 percent of all munitions transfers” 
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(Johnson 2004, p.63). Clearly, Dr. King’s (1967) prophetic claim still holds today, that 
the U.S. is “the greatest purveyor of violence in the world today.” Though, as we shall 
see in a chapter below, only 24.29% of University of Oregon students in 2010 “strongly 
agree” with Dr. King’s quote. The SIPRI (2012) Arms Transfers Database shows that 
between 2000 and 2010, the USA was the world leader in arms exports, exporting 
$74841 million USD (almost $75 billion) worth of arms. Russia was second with $60198 
million USD, and Germany third with $21321 million USD. A span of ten years was used 
for the arms export indicator because if only one year is selected, data can be misleading, 
as the arms industries in some nations are marked by boom and bust. For example, in the 
decade of our sample (2000-2010), in 2004, the Czech Republic only exported arms 
worth one million, but in 2001 it exported arms worth 87 million. Likewise, Chile 
exported 0 to 2 million each year of the decade, except in 2008 when it exported 133 
million. 
 As another outcome indicator, how do GPI scores compare with the amount of 
arms exported by each nation? In Figure 17 below we see that two variables are not 
significantly correlated at the .05 level, r(93) = 0.07. 
 After removing the two clear outliers, the USA and Russia, Figure 18 below 
shows us that the two variables are negatively correlated,r (91)= -0.21, p < .05. Hence, 
the more “peaceful” a nation is according to the GPI’s criteria, the higher their volume of 
arms exports. This suggests a serious weakness in the GPI. Moreover, after removing the 
two outliers, the largest arms exporters are populated by a number of nations ranking in  
446 
Figure 17. Scatterplot of GPI and Arms Exports by Nation, 2000-2010 
 
Notes: N=95. Data sources: GPI 2008 (1=most peaceful score, 4=least peaceful score); SIPRI (2012) data on arms exports – figures 
are SIPRI Trend Indicator Values (TIV) expressed in US$ million at constant (1990) prices. 
 
the top 50 and even top 20 of the GPI 2008: Germany (ranked 14th), France (36th), Great 
Britain (49th), the Netherlands (22nd), Sweden (13th), Italy (28th), Spain (30th), and Canada 
(11th). In addition, Switzerland (12th),which is not included in our sample (because it was 
not included in Gallup World poll data), scores extremely close to Canada in both the 
GPI and in arms export volume. Hence, it is clearthe GPI gives modern industrial nations 
a pass for purveying military technology aroundthe world, as they maintain highrankings 
in the Global Peace Index. Table 124 below highlights GPI inadequacies in several areas 
in which structure, culture, and history interact and overlap. 
 Anthropological research has documented divergent causes for external and 
internal conflict.Ross’s (1986) study of 90 preindustrial societies argues that the causes of 
external violence and warfare stem from particular structural roots (high socioeconomic 
complexity, a lack of polygyny, and in the case of uncentralized societies – those with  
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Figure 18. Scatterplot After Removing the Two Outliers (USA and Russia)  
 
Notes: N=93. Data sources: GPI 2008 (1=most peaceful score, 4=least peaceful score); SIPRI (2012) data 
on arms exports – figures are SIPRI Trend Indicator Values (TIV) expressed in US$ million at constant 
(1990) prices.  
 
Table 124. Critiques of the Global Peace Index 
Critique Explanation 
Attitudinal indicators neglected Analysis in the present study shows that correlations between the objective GPI indicators of 
peace are not significantly associated with the Gallup World Poll’s subjective indicators of 
peaceful attitudes. 
Internal and external indicators 
should be reported separately 
The GPI weights external peace indicators at 40% of the overall GPI score, while internal 
peace indicators are weighted at 60%. This  helps to give some core nations like the U.S. a 
higher peace score. The correlation between the external and internal measures of peace have 
been relatively weak in a number of years. Anthropological research suggests that there are 
discrete social causes for internal and external warfare (Ember and Ember 1971, Divale 1974, 
Ross 1986).  
Need more indicators of peaceful 
policies/ behaviors: Peace and 
disarmament treaty support is 
neglected 
Analysis in the present study shows that in some cases, subject indicators of peace (attitudinal 
data) better predicts treaty support than the objective indicators of the GPI. 
Indicators of military spending 
shield wealthy nations 
The GPI utilizes % of GDP devoted to military spending. An important additional indicator 
should be used: total military spending.  
 
Arms exports do not significantly 
penalize GPI scores 
Analysis in the present study shows that after removing the two clear outliers, the GPI and 
arms exports are negatively correlated (r = -0.21), significant at the .05 level. Hence, the more 
“peaceful” a nation is according to the GPI’s criteria, the higher their volume of arms exports. 
Limited historical indicators The GPI includes only a limited record of historical conflicts (spanning a 5-year period). The 
WPI is an improvement in that it includes conflict data back to 1945. However, consider the 
data on war experiences by Sullivan (1991) graphed below. Although this data set from 1990 
is old, it clearly shows that some nations are far more war prone than others (e.g., the U.S.), 
yet they are not penalized by the GPI for this track record.   
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Critique Explanation 
Indicators of gender violence 
neglected 
Gender violence, as well as sexism and institutionalized forms of patriarchal violence are 
neglected. 
 
Peace-as-justice neglected The GPI neglects to include domestic indicators of inequality and poverty. 
 
Peace defined as international 
justice neglected 
The consequences of core nation dominated institutions like the WTO are neglected. 
Similarly, the greater responsibility/ resources of core nations in the potential for peace and 
justice promotion are neglected. The failure of the U.S., for example, to lead the U.N. through 
fighting global poverty, arms trade treaties, and democratic reforms of the U.N.’s governance 
structure has perpetuated structural and physical violence around the world. 
American hegemony assumed to 
be benign 
American hegemony is neglected. For instance, there is no indicator for the number of 
military bases abroad, and the indicator for the number of non-UN deployed troops was 
dropped from the GPI in 2009. Some might assume that U.S. military bases around the world 
help to keep the peace, as if there is a “Pax Americana” or a “Pax Britannica” before this. But 
Russett and Oneal (2001) found no evidence that these periods were more peaceful (pp.188-
189). Moreover, there is strong evidence that between 1898 to 1994, the U.S. intervened 
“intervened successfully to change governments in Latin America a total of at least 41 times” 
(Coatsworth 2005).  
 
weak cross-cutting ties and martial endogamy (the custom of marrying only within one’s 
tribe or group)) which are distinct from the causes of internal violence (weak cross-
cutting ties, polygyny, and in the case of uncentralized societies – those with strong 
localized male groups). Similarly, cross-cultural anthropological studies have found that 
matrilocality is linked to external warfare, while patrilocality is associated with internal 
fighting (Ember and Ember 1971, Divale 1974). 
 Of course, we should be very cautious about generalizing from preindustrial 
societies to industrial and postindustrial nations. In any case, the findings cited above 
should give us pause and grounds for accepting the utility of a single composite GPI 
score for each nation. Unfortunately, the producers of the GPI have not been transparent 
about reporting individual and external scores for each nation, but the GPI has reported 
correlations between the internal and external scores (see Table 125).  
Table 125. Nation-Level Correlations Between Internal and External GPI Scores 
GPI 
Year 
Correlation Coefficients 
External Peace 
& Internal Peace 
External Peace & 
Overall GPI Score 
Internal Peace & 
Overall GPI Score 
2007 0.28 0.53 0.96 
2008 0.40 0.62 0.97 
2009 0.40 0.62 0.97 
2010 0.32 0.59 0.96 
2011 0.28 0.56 0.95 
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Gender Inequality 
 One of the most glaring failures of the GPI is its failure to include indicators of 
gender violence and gender inequality. Below, we see that Qatar (QAT), Botswana 
(BOT), Laos (LAO), and Malawi (MAW) score clearly above the mean of the GPI 2009, 
ranking as among the more “peaceful” nations, yet they score below the mean of the 
Gender Inequality Index, ranking among the nations with the least gender equality. 
Similarly, Mali (LMI) ranks in the top 5 nations with the greatest Gender Inequality, yet 
it falls just barely below the mean GPI score, and in the WPI, Mali scores above the mean 
(see below). While these may be outliers, they demonstrate that the GPI and WPI do not 
penalize nations for systemic forms of gender violence and inequality. However, gender 
inequality (as measured by the Gender Inequality Index) tends to be strongly and 
negatively associated with GPI scores (r = -0.6594, significant at the .0001 level) and 
with WPI scores (-0.7247, significant at the .0001 level). The scatterplots below (Figure 
19 and Figure 20) depict these relatively robust correlations as most of the nations fall 
close to a trendline with a negative slope (i.e., a diagonal stretching from the upper left 
corner to the bottom right corner of the graphs).   
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Figure 19. GPI by Gender Inequality Index 
 
Figure 20. WPI by Gender Inequality Index 
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Tracking U.S. Exceptionalism 
 I have briefly argued above that U.S. militarism is not accurately captured by the 
GPI’s indicators. Although the U.S. is one of the most war prone nations (ranking in the 
top 4 (see Appendix BB)), it merely ranks near the middle of the pack in the GPI 2008. 
But, American exceptionalism (in a negative sense) finally emerges if we graph GPI 2008 
nation ranks by type of society, type of state, and world-systems position (see Appendix 
BB). Among post-industrial nations and core nations, the U.S. is a clear outlier, ranking 
far lower in the GPI than nations enjoying similar levels of development and world-
system position. Among older democracies, both the U.S. and India are clear outliers, 
ranking far lower in the GPI than other established democracies.  
 
INDICATORS FROM OTHER CROSS-NATIONAL POLLS 
 Because the Gallup World Poll operationalizes violent/ nonviolent attitudes with 
only three indicators, additional cross-national data (from Pew and the World Values 
Survey (WVS)) was analyzed with the sole purpose of identifying possible “cultures of 
peace.” Unfortunately, the samples sizes are limited, and Costa Rica is not included in 
these data sets (see Appendix CC). Again, the multidimensionality of nonviolent attitudes 
is suggested as we observe that any one attitudinal indicator can offer an inadequate basis 
from which to generalize. The task of weighting objective and subjective indicators of 
peace appropriately introduces significant challenges. A simple visual strategy is adopted 
through the presentation of a series of scatterplot graphs, helping us to identify possible 
candidates for “cultures of peace.” 
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 In Figure 21 below, we see the pattern identified by Listhaug (1986) found in data 
decades before: citizens in nations that lost during WWII including Italy, West Germany, 
and Japan report being less willing to fight a new war (p.73). Of course, Sweden was 
neutral during World War II. In the bottom right-hand quadrant we see that in nations 
such as Sweden, Mexico, and Peru, citizens are much more “willing to fight” in a 
hypothetical war, though they reject military prioritization (i.e., military spending) to a 
degree that rivals Germany, Italy, and Japan. Once again, this suggests the complexity 
and multidimensionality of peaceful attitudes. For instance, views of war are likely to 
interact with such context-dependent factors as a nation’s previous experiences with war 
– victory or defeat, imperialist wars abroad, civil wars, “total wars” with civilian 
victimization, etc. 
Figure 21. Two World Values Survey Indicators of Peaceful Attitudes with Trendline 
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  Appendix CC charts national rankings in peace indicators from the recent large-
scale cross-national polls in existence, while Appendix J charts rankings in smaller cross-
national polls. In Table 1 of Appendix J we see that Costa Rica ranks very highly in 
peace in most indicators, but in Table 2 involving interpersonal violence, Costa Rica 
ranks merely in the middle on some measures, but still much more peaceful than the U.S. 
In Appendix CC we see that, among our case studies, Germany is a leading nation in 
peaceful attitudes in the 2007 Pew Global Attitudes (PGA) survey and the 2005 World 
Values Survey (WVS), except on the domestic violence item where it falls to the rank of 
38th. The USA hovers near the bottom or the middle of the rankings on all items. Chile 
ranks in the top 13 or better on all items. Ghana ranks in the top 20 on the 2007 PGA, but 
in the bottom 20 on the 2005 WVS items. As will be discussed below in the Ghana 
chapter, Ghana’s low rankings on the peace indicators in the WVS suggest that any “path 
dependency” notion (i.e., Ghana won independence through a nonviolent movement, and 
thus, might be expected to harbor a high percentage of nonviolent attitudes, according to 
path dependency theory’s emphasis on the importance of national origins) must be 
sufficiently complex in accounting for national origins. Hence, accounts of Ghana’s 
“national origins” should include the military coup that deposed Nkrumah as well as the 
nonviolent movement that helped bring independence (i.e., led by Nkrumah and inspired 
by Gandhi) and the election of Nkrumah. Note as well that India, another nation born 
partly through nonviolence (i.e., Gandhi’s independence movement), partly through 
violence (i.e., the violent partition with Pakistan), hovers near the very bottom of all of 
these peace indicators from the PGA and WVS.  
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 Below in Table 126, we consider further indications of how multifaceted attitudes 
towards violence and nonviolence are. Although the data spans several years, these are 
the largest cross-national datasets to date probing attitudes towards violence/ 
nonviolence. The world means on some of these items reveals relative global consensus 
in some peace attitudes including the following: those who affirm that wife beating is 
never justified (83%), political assassinations are never justified (78%), terrorism is never 
justified (76%), and a strong military should not rank in the top two priorities of our 
nation (73%). On other items, only minorities affirm peaceful attitudes, including the 
following: those who affirm that killing in self-defense is never justified (29%), that 
military force is not necessary to maintain order in the world (30%), and those not willing 
to fight for the nation in a war (38%). On still other issues, world publics appear to be 
relatively split, as suggested by the following: those who strongly approve of the 
disarmament movement (50%), those who believe nonviolence “will work” for oppressed 
groups (52%), and those who view state terrorism as never justified (66%).   
 From these ten indicators, a “Peace Attitudes Index” was constructed. Below in 
Figure 22, we see that 3 Hispanic cultures ranked in the top 5 of the Peace Attitudes 
Index: Spain, Argentina, and Chile. We also see that Japan and Germany rank highly in 
both the GPI and the Peace Attitudes Index. Of course, both nations experienced the 
extremes of militarism during World War II, heavy civilian victimization, and defeat. The 
U.S. “disarmed and occupied [Germany and Japan] and imposed an elaborate system of 
domestic institutional safeguards and external alliances designed to prevent their 
reemergence as military threats” (Berger 1998, p.4). In Japan, the U.S. Occupation even 
censored school textbooks to reinforce penitent views of Japanese war activities (Ienaga 
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Table 126. Large Cross-National Survey Items Testing Peaceful Attitudes 
Variable name Survey Question Response 
Tracked 
World 
Mean 
(N=18) 
Std. 
Dev. 
Source N 
(sample 
size of 
nations) 
indneverjust “Some people think for an 
individual person or a small group 
of persons to target and kill civilians 
is sometimes justified while others 
think that kind of violence is never 
justified. Which is your opinion?” 
%  responding: 
“Never 
justified” 
76.17 10.72 Gallup 
World Poll 
2008 
104 
milneverjust “Some people think that for the 
military to target and kill civilians is 
sometimes justified, while others 
think that kind of violence is never 
justified. Which is your opinion?” 
% responding: 
“Never 
justified” 
66.22 13.64 Gallup 
World Poll 
2008 
104 
nvworks “...Which do you believe, peaceful 
means alone will work, or peaceful 
means alone will not work for 
oppressed groups?” 
 
% responding: 
“Will work” 
52.39 10.09 Gallup 
World Poll 
2008 
104 
notwilling “Of course, we all hope there will 
not be another war, but if it were to 
come to that, would you be willing 
to fight for your country?” 
 
% responding:  
“No” 
38.16 16.34 WVS 2005 99 
beatneverjust “For a man to beat his wife” % responding: 
“Never 
justifiable” 
82.76 10.26 WVS 2005 99 
no_military 
_priority 
“People sometimes talk about what 
the aims of this country should be 
for the next ten years...please say 
which one of these you, yourself, 
consider the most important” 
[Choices: “A high level of 
economic growth”; “A strong 
defence forces”; “People have more 
say about things”; “Trying to make 
our cities more beautiful”] 
% NOT listing 
“A strong 
defence forces” 
as their first or 
second choice 
for the nation’s 
priorities 
73.06 14.00 WVS 2005 99 
killneverjust “Killing in self-defense” % responding: 
“never justified” 
29.28 10.38 WVS 1990; 
EVS 1981, 
1990 
41 
strongly_approve 
_disarm 
“Disarmament movement” % responding: 
“strongly 
approve” 
49.69 18.05 WVS 1990; 
EVS 1990 
38 
neverjust_assass “Political assassinations” % responding: 
“never justified” 
78.39 10.04 WVS 1990; 
EVS 1981, 
1990, 1999 
45 
pewnomilitary “It is sometimes necessary to use 
military force to maintain order in 
the world” 
% who 
“disagree” 
(“Mostly 
disagree” + 
“Completely 
disagree”) 
29.89 12.11 Pew Global 
Attitudes 
survey 2007 
47 
Note: N=sample size of nations (and in a few cases: regions); WVS = World Values Survey; EVS = European Values Survey 
 
1994, p.123). Hence, even many of the ruling elites in Japan and Germany were virtually 
forced to embrace a kind of nonviolent posture in defense policies. In this way, the robust 
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peaceful attitudes in Germany and Japan suggest possible support for the “elite cues”/ 
“policy cues” model and the structural model of peace culture, as well as the historical/ 
experiential/ “learning” model.  
Figure 22. Graphing GPI Scores By Peace Attitudes Index Scores 
 
Notes: N =18 nations; Peace Attitudes Index consists of mean national averages on 10 survey questions 
taken from the international surveys (the 10 questions listed in Table 126 above) 
 
 The U.S., Germany, and Japan could all be considered outliers on the world stage, 
due to their particular histories and traditions of militarism (Ehrenreich 1997). The degree 
to which the mass publics of Japan and Germany turned toward pacifism following 
World War II is a matter of debate (Kim 2008, Rathburn 2006). There are strong grounds 
for asserting that Germany (Schrafstetter 2004), as well as Japan did turn decisively away 
from militarism, though some emphasize that in Japan it was forced upon them by 
General MacArthur, “not the result of self-reflexive internal consensus” (Kim 2008, 
p.67). Recently, the pacifist policies structurally enshrined in their Constitution (Article 
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9), have become an increasingly contested issue (Samuels 2004). In both nations, 
demilitarization began to be reversed as the U.S. sought military allies during the Cold 
War (Berger 1998), and this turn towards limited re-militarizing even contributed to 
subtle shifts away from pacifism in Japanese history textbooks (Ienaga 1994).  
 If Alice Walker (2004) is correct in her claim about oppressors that “nothing short 
of total destruction will ever teach them anything” (p.363), Japan and Germany are likely 
candidates for learning through their WWII experiences of “total destruction.” Some 
scholars have theorized on this proposition, but primarily in off-handed or non-systematic 
ways. Norman Finkelstein (2009), scholar of the Holocaust and human rights advocate, 
offered a theory that the militarism and racism of Germany was purged through WWII: 
It’s a real paradox that the best thing that ever happened to Germany was Nazism.  
It was God- awful, the worst thing to happen to its victims, but to Germany it was 
Nazism and the defeat of Nazism that finally knocked sense into that society.  
And post-war Germany, the Germany of today, the young people – are by far and 
away the most morally serious, the most intelligent of all the European countries. 
 
Finkelstein did not define what he means by “morally serious,” but his suggestive 
explanation for the production of morals is compelling. However, in terms of principled 
and pragmatic nonviolent attitudes measured by the Gallup World Poll (the most 
comprehensive survey to date), Germany does not rank particularly high. In the military 
attacks on civilians item, German ranked 28th out of 105 nations with 73% of respondents 
affirming that military attacks on civilians are “never justified” (Gallup World Poll 
2008). In the nonviolent efficacy item, German ranked 82nd out of 109 nations with 48% 
of respondents affirming that peaceful means alone “will work” for oppressed groups 
(Gallup World Poll 2008).This is somewhat surprising given the fact that, among other 
indicators of nonviolent attitudes, the number of conscientious objector applications in 
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Germany has grown (accompanied by a streamlined rubber-stamp process of approval) 
from 6,000 a year in 1967, to 68,000 in 1983, and 189,000 in 2002 (Cortright 2008).   
Comparing Pew and Gallup data 
 Because the Pew Global Attitudes 2007 survey and Gallup World Poll 2008 only 
share 37 nations in their respective samples, only a limited comparison of survey items 
can be made. Table 127 documents the correlations. Graphing the Pew and the Gallup 
indicators revealsthat Japan ranks decidedly low in the Pew indicator (% affirming that 
miltary force is sometimes necessary) suggesting for all of the discussions about Japanese 
pacifism, there is more than a touch of political realism/ just war ideology that is 
prominent in the culture. Likewise, Berger (1998) argues that neither Germany nor Japan 
can be described as “pacifist,” but “antimilitarist” is accurate for both nations (p.1). In 
Figure 23 below, we see that Japan ranks very highly in the Gallup World Poll indicator 
concerning military attacks on civilians. In fact, Japan tied with Iraq for 3rd in the world 
on this item, out of 105 nations, with 90% of Japanese affirming that military attacks on 
civilians are never justified. 
Table 127. Nation-Level Data: Pearson Product-Moment Correlations 
 nvworks milneverjust indneverjust GPI 2008 
pewnomilitary -.27 .45** .46** .34* 
 Notes: N=37. * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; “pewnomilitary” = % of citizens who “disagree” (“Mostly disagree” + “Completely 
disagree”) on question: “It is sometimes necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world” (Pew Global Attitudes Survey 
2007). Sources: Gallup World Poll 2008; Pew Global Attitudes 2007 
 
 If Costa Rican student results from the present survey sample could be graphed 
below, they would rank more peaceful than Argentina (ARG) on both indicators, as 41% 
of Costa Rican students Disagreed that “Military force is sometimes necessary” 
(replication of the Pew question); 89% of Costa Rican students affirmed that “military 
attacks on civilians are never justified” (Gallup question). This would place them 
spatially directly above Japan and make them one of the top 5 most peaceful nations in 
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the graph below, if the indicators were weighted equally. However, we established in 
Chapter 5 that Costa Rican University students’ means score is +14% higher on the 
“military attacks” item than the general Costa Rican population. On the other hand, we 
saw above that the Costa Rican University students perceived the general population to 
be more peaceful on the Pew question than they are themselves (see Questions Q6.gg and 
Q6.hh in Appendix B).   
Figure 23. Graphing Mean Attitudes Towards State Terrorism and Military Force In 
General 
 
  
 In Figure 24 below, we see that the trend line has a negative slope (i.e., the 
correlation (r = -.27) is negative), but it is not significant at the .05 level. As further 
evidence of a pervasive disconnect between these two attitudes at the nation-level (i.e., 
nonviolence works and military force is not necessary), there is a completely blank space  
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Figure 24. Graphing Mean Attitudes Towards Pragmatic Nonviolence and Military Force 
 
Note: In the graph above, based on replications included in the present survey, Costa Rican students would rank almost exactly where 
Mexico (MEX) falls (actually directly below Mexico) in the scatterplot, as 41% of Costa Rican students Disagreed that “Military force 
is sometimes necessary” (replication of the Pew question); 61% of Costa Rican students affirmed that “peaceful means alone will 
work” (Gallup question). This would make Costa Rica one of the most peaceful nations above, if the indicators were weighted 
equally. However, we established in Chapter 5 that Costa Rican University students’ means core is -12% lower on the “peaceful 
means alone” item than the general Costa Rican population.  
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legitimated in and through moral frames. Strategies that are perceived to “work,” become 
seen as moral. Thus, nations like Germany and Japan would seem to be caught in 
ideological contradictions: a clear majority rejects military force, and yet less than half of 
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respondents affirm that peaceful means will work for oppressed groups.Japan ranked 
close to last in the world on the nonviolent efficacy item, ranking 103rd out of 109 
nations, with only 33% of respondents affirming that peaceful means alone “will work” 
for oppressed groups (Gallup World Poll 2008). 
 Additional graphs crossing indicators from the GPI, and the Pew and Gallup polls 
(see Appendix Z), show Japan and Germany ranking as the most peaceful nations in 
many of the graphs, if we assume “most peaceful” is indicated by an equal weighting of 
the two variables of each graph (i.e., occupying the upper-right hand corner of the graph, 
where the maximum values of each indicator merge). Once again, the exception to this 
pattern is that Germany and especially Japan, rank low in confidence that nonviolence 
works. In addition, Spain, South Korea, and Egypt rank quite highly in several of the 
graphs. Nevertheless, given the fact that the Gallup World Poll draws from a larger 
sample size, and Germany and Japan do not rank especially high in some of the Gallup 
items, it is difficult to conclude, relative to other nations around the world, that Germany 
and Japan really are exemplary “cultures of peace” in the realm of attitudes, though they 
do perform very well on some indicators. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
SEARCHING FOR COLLECTIVE MEMORIES OF NONVIOLENCE 
 
TEXTBOOK PORTRAYALS OF NONVIOLENCE: SHADOW CASES 
 
 This chapter undertakes a cross-national analysis of collective memories of 
nonviolence. Table 128 below lists the key nonviolent episodes selected for analysis, and 
Appendix DD lists the textbooks analyzed, by nation. Many of these events transpired 
over 60 years ago. This time lag is ideal in that it allows for collective memory processes 
to unravel and gel into relative consensus. Recent events and even recent decades are 
very often excluded from government-approved and corporation-produced history 
textbooks. This is likely linked to the felt imperative to avoid controversy. 
Table 128. Cases Studies and Outcomes    
Nation Campaign Outcome: Coded by 
Stephan and 
Chenoweth (2008) 
Indicator of collective 
memory outcome: 
National mean % 
affirming nonviolence 
will work (Gallup World 
Poll 2010) 
Chile 
 
1931 nonviolent overthrow of Ibanez regime success 59% 
1983-1989 nonviolent overthrow of Pinochet regime success (ousted) 
Costa Rica 1919 partly nonviolent overthrow of the dictator Tinoco NA [success] 73% 
1947 Arms Down Strike NA [limited success] 
1948-1949 nonviolent demilitarization process NA [success] 
El Salvador 1944, Strike of Fallen Arms against Martinez 
dictatorship 
success 56% 
Germany 1920 noncooperation with a military coup NA [success] 53% 
1923 nonviolent resistance of French occupation 
(Ruhrkampf resistance) 
success 
1940-1945, nonviolent resistance of Danes against Nazis limited success 
1944, nonviolent resistance of Norwegians against Nazis limited success 
1943, nonviolent resistance of German wives of Jews 
against Nazis 
NA [success] 
Ghana 1951-1957, nonviolent independence movement success (ousted) 69% 
2000, Rawlings government ousted success (ousted) 
Guatemala 1944, nonviolent overthrow of the Ubico regime and a 
few months later, the Vaides regime 
success 57% 
Norway 1942, nonviolent resistance of Norwegians against Nazis limited success 48% 
U.S.A. 1946-1948 Jackie Robinson and Branch Rickey lead 
racial integration efforts with an explicit nonviolent 
strategy   
NA [success] 54% 
Note: NA = Not analyzed by Stephan and Chenoweth (2008); [success] = the consensus view of scholars 
 
 Rather than arguing that textbooks are definitive instruments of student 
indoctrination, which they may be to some degree, I emphasize that textbooks are 
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indicators of hegemonic ideology reproduced through a social and bureaucratic process 
of knowledge selection, interpretation, and construction. The creation of these consensus 
views of national historical narratives serves to center power, center knowledge, and 
center ideology. The power and knowledge that is centered demarcates the legitimate/ 
realistic (i.e., ideological) boundaries of the imagination – a process that instills reified/ 
naturalized concepts. The capacity to imagine a different world is severely handicapped. 
 I argue that the failure of history textbooks around the world to theorize 
nonviolent action and their frequent glossing over of successful nonviolent revolutions, 
nonviolent movements, and nonviolent tactics is significant. The omission of nonviolent 
history and failure to give nonviolent adherents voice serves to perpetuate hegemonic  
ideologies of violence.  
The Equal Neglect of Military Strategies?: An Exception that Proves the Rule 
 A counter-argument presents itself. It can be argued that violence is also not 
theorized and the strategies and tactics of war and armed conflict are also rarely discussed 
in the textbooks. But I contend that violence is widely taken for granted as a necessary 
and effective means of conflict resolution around the world. Thus, there is no need to 
theorize or explain what is widely assumed and hiding in plain sight: the myth of 
redemptive violence (Wink 1992).  
 Of course, textbook narratives are shaped by a variety of constraints, including 
concision and avoidance of controversy. The result is as if textbooks were reverse 
engineered to be boring - with less narrative arcs and colorful details and more a 
collection of stripped down facts (Loewen 2007). As an example of how not just 
nonviolence, but also the tactics and strategies of military leaders are also ignored by 
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textbook authors, consider the case of the Siege of Detriot during the War of 1812 – 
surely one of the more interesting battlefield tactics in the history of warfare, and one that 
produced a quick and nonviolent resolution to the battle. Tecumseh directed his 400 to 
700 warriors (sources vary in their estimates; Gilber (1989) states that General Brock had 
600 men and General Hull had 1,500 men inside Fort Detroit and 500 outside (pp.284-
285)) to emerge from the woods in a clearing visible to the fort, and circle back and 
repeat in a steady line of rushing men, so that to the soldiers in the fort, it appeared to be 
surrounded by thousands of warriors. Tecumseh’s tactic in the siege was brilliant, and yet 
simple and entertaining enough to delight my 6-year old son during a 2-minute bed-time 
story that I improvised, with the laughable largely bloodless surrender. A Canadian 
militia captain recounted the tactic: “Tecumseh extended his men, and marched them 
three times through an opening [in the woods at the rear of the fort] in full view of the 
garrison, which induced them to believe there were at least two or three thousand 
Indians” (Sugden 1997, p.303). Berton (1980) recounts the incident in this way, Brock 
ordered Tecumseh and his Indians to “march in single file across an open space, out of 
range but in full view of the garrison. The spectacle has some of the quality of a 
vaudeville turn. The Indians lope across the meadow, vanish into the forest, circle back 
and repeat the maneuver three times. Hull’s officers, who cannot tell one Indian from 
another, count fifteen hundred painted savages, screeching and waving tomahawks. Hull 
is convinced he is outnumbered...is on the verge of giving up without a fight...appears on 
the edge of nervous collapse (p.177). Subsequently, a couple of fired cannonballs hit the 
fort, killing a few American soldiers, and within hours, Hull offered a full surrender. 
While it is certainly possible that Brock ordered Tecumseh to perform the ruse (as Berton 
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(1980) records), it is also plausible that the idea came from Tecumseh, especially given 
circumstantial evidence that Brock honored and thanked Tecumseh to an unusual degree. 
At noon on August 16, Tecumseh rode on horseback side by side with Brock into Fort 
Detroit to accept the American General Hull’s formal surrender. And at that time, 
Tecumseh wore the formal wide red sash of Brock, which Brock had given him as a 
token of thanks (Gilbert 1989, p.285).     
 Gilbert (1989) pushes us to reflect on collective memory processes, writing that 
this was a “moment of delicious triumph” for Tecumseh: “It is not remembered as such 
because it was such an easy, bloodless thing but the capture of Detroit and an entire army 
of the United States was the most strategically significant red [Native American] 
accomplishment during the nearly 300 years of conflict in North America...it was a 
collective, racial victory” (p.285). Consistent with the thesis we are advancing, Gilbert 
suggests that Tecumseh’s triumph at Detroit has not been remembered as a triumph 
because it was bloodless, nonviolent. It seems even unusual, tactically brilliant nonviolent 
action of military leaders is outcompeted in the collective memory by the pain and 
suffering of ordinary violent acts. Tecumseh’s military tactics are the exception that 
proves the rule – nonviolence is routinely forgotten. 
 The historical evidence suggests that the presence of the Indian warriors had 
played the crucial role in the surrender, in particular because General Hull was afraid that 
a massacre was imminent – and many women and children were inside the fort. The 
British General Brock (the leader allied with Tecumseh), in a clear attempt at 
psychological warfare, even sent Hull a message in which he stoked fears of a massacre 
and again emphasized how many Indians were gathered outside the fort. Brock wrote, “It 
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is far from my intention to join in a war of extermination, but you must be aware, that the 
numerous body of Indians who have attached themselves to my troops, will be beyond 
control the moment the contest commences” (p.284). Hull “was overcome by a 
generalized fear of savages, one fed by hundreds of the hordes-from-hell stories which 
had been circulating among western whites for three generations” (pp.285-286). 
 Brock engaged in still more tactical trickery during the Siege of Detroit. Brock 
wrote a bogus document exaggerating the number of Indian warriors gathered outside the 
fort and as a ruse, deliberately had the document “captured” by the Americans (Heidler 
and Heidler 1997, p.153; Hickey 1995, p.24; ). For his cowardice and neglect of duty on 
this occasion, Hull was later court-martialed and sentenced to death, but President James 
Madison “commuted the sentence because of Hull’s age and Revolutionary War service” 
(Heidler and Heidler 1997, p.154).  
 Unfortunately, the shorthand style of the high school history textbooks obscure 
every engaging detail of battlefield tactics. In the text by Davidson and Lytle (1990), the 
credit for the tactic is also taken away from Tecumseh: “At Detroit, the British tricked 
Hull into believing that he faced a much larger force than was actually the case. Hull 
abruptly surrendered his army without firing a shot” (p.210). Even more economical is 
the text by Ayers et al. (2009): “Tecumseh then joined the British in a campaign to 
capture Detroit and invade Ohio” (p.226). Not to be outdone, the text by Lapsansky-
Werner et al. (2008) limits discussion of this event to one sentence as well as a map of 
the “Major Battles of the War of 1812” in which we read: “2. Detroit, Aug. 1812 – 
British capture the city from Hull” (p.217). Within the text, the “battle” and tactics are 
obscured more than clarified, as we read, “One blundering general, William Hull, 
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surrendered Detroit to a much smaller British force commanded by Isaac Brock and 
assisted by Indians led by Tecumseh” (p.216). Similarly, the text by Appleby et al. (2005) 
tells us that Tecumseh was a “superb commander” but presents no example of his 
battlefield leadership (p.230). Again, the surrender of Detroit is misrepresented and 
obscured. We are told in one sentence that “The British navy on Lake Erie rapidly 
shuttled troops to Detroit and forced the American commander, General William Hull, to 
surrender” (p.230). On the next page a supplementary map of the War of 1812 labels “Ft. 
Detroit – Aug.16, 1812” with a golden explosion outlined in red, the symbol for a British 
victory (p.231). The fact that there were so few explosions in the battle are obscured on 
the map as well as the text.  
 So, if violent tactics also receive short shrift in textbooks, why is the neglect of 
nonviolent tactics and strategies significant? I suggest it is because nonviolent 
movements can challenge conventional assumptions about the utility of violence, but 
only if nonviolent tactics are explicitly recognized as “nonviolent” and if their efficacy is 
theorized. That is, nonviolent movements introduce a counter-frame than undermines the 
hegemonic ideologies of violence including militarism, just war, and the myth of 
redemptive violence. We can see the hegemonic ideology at work, when we consider that 
nonviolent leaders like Gandhi and King have been compelled to explain why 
nonviolence works much more than military generals and other practitioners of violence 
are called upon to explain why violence might work.  
 Moreover, I contend there is an unacknowledged problem of great sociological 
significance in the peace studies/ nonviolence literature. The problem is that a great many 
of the published case studies of nonviolent social movements need a caveat, which should 
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read: “Incidentally, there is virtually no collective memory of this event. It is a non-event 
in the ‘official history’ of the nation.”  
The Latin American Cases 
 Inthe 2010 Gallup World Poll, 59% of Chilean respondents said peaceful means 
alone “will work,” compared with 57% in Guatemala and 56% in El Salvador  These 
national averages score very close to the worldwide average of 57.9%.When we consider 
that all three of these nations have experienced spectacular nonviolent movement 
successes in their history, we might interrogate the public opinion data within a different 
frame. Rather than purely an opinion question, the question probes for historical and 
contemporary knowledge of political events. That is, it is likely to push respondents to 
draw upon their historical knowledge and to recall cases where peaceful means alone 
worked for oppressed groups, or did not work. Why is the popular awareness of the 
efficacy of nonviolence not stronger, given that mass street actions have brought down 
governments in Peru (2000), Argentina (2001), Bolivia (2003 and 2005), and Ecuador 
(2000 and 2005)? (Buono and Lara 2006) Do Chileans recall that in 1931, the president 
of Chile was overthrown in a mass nonviolent movement? More recently, is the 
overthrow of Pinochet remembered by Chileans in terms of specificallynonviolent action, 
or “peaceful means alone”/ primarily peaceful means? And, do Guatemalans recall that in 
1944, mass nonviolent movements played pivotal roles in overthrowing not one but two 
home-grown dictators? Do El Salvadorans recall the 1944 nonviolent movement that 
toppled their own dictator? And, do state-approved textbooks in each country depict these 
events accurately? 
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 El Salvador. El Salvador’s textbook representation of the 1944 nonviolent 
revolution is a case where an outsider – a U.S. academic – perceived and named the 
revolution as nonviolent, and a government bureaucracy, the Ministry of Education under 
a conservative President (President Elías Antonio Saca), sponsored a collective memory 
that is an accurate portrayal of a nonviolent revolution transpiring some 60 years before. 
This suggests a role that outsiders/ third-parties can play in preserving the collective 
memory of dissident history, a theme we will return to again in the case of Guatemala. 
 Saca’s administration (2004-2009) was not progressive in its policies. In fact, 
when a New York-based foundation linked to the Vatican curiously awarded a Catholic 
peace prize to Saca in 2008, representatives of 40 human rights NGOs and church groups 
delivered a letter bearing 750 signatures protesting the decision to give Saca the award 
(Marrin 2008). Moreover, Saca was a member of the conservative ARENA party, a party 
founded by the man who is said to be the “intellectual author” of the assassination of 
Archbishop Oscar Romero and also responsible for thousands of deaths linked to death 
squads during the civil war (p.16). And, Saca’s administration resisted attempts to 
investigate war crimes during the civil war of 1980 to 1992 (p.16).  
 But the crucial factor is that Saca’s ARENA party, though conservative, had no 
historical ties to the Martinez dictatorship. Hence, the Ministry of Education’s account of 
the 1944 nonviolent revolution does not reflect political bias or sharp ideological 
leanings, but rather the distance and relative objectivity that such long time lags bring. 
Today, there is no political capital at stake in defending or distorting the memory of the 
dictator General Hernandez Martinez. In fact, in a survey of 8 nations, El Salvador had 
the lowest percentage of respondents affirming that “In some occasions, dictatorship is 
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good,” with a national mean even lower than Costa Rica (see Appendix I). This helps 
explain why the 1944 nonviolent revolution is depicted relatively accurately in El 
Salvador’s 2009 government-approved high school history textbook.   
 A practical issue also shapes the textbook’s content. The Ministry of Education 
chose a digital file format accessible via the internet. Compared to other Central 
American nations, this allowed the Ministry to roughly double the textbook’s coverage 
while saving costs on publication. With more coverage, there are likely to be fewer 
egregious omissions in coverage.  
 The textbook portrait of the 1944 nonviolent revolution relies on U.S. collective 
memory and knowledge production resources in three ways. First, the U.S. academic 
Patricia Parkman’s analysis of the revolution is drawn upon and cited. Second, 
“Historians in the United States National Archives...” are drawn upon in their analysis of 
letters from the U.S. ambassador (MINED 2009, p.125). Third, the textbook’s portrait of 
the President Hernandez Martinez relies heavily on an interview conducted by a Time 
magazine correspondent. Thus, the role of U.S. resources (financial, archival, journalistic, 
and intellectual) in helping to chronicle the history of a developing nation like El 
Salvador is demonstrated.  
 The text adopts Time’s description of General Martinez as a “grumpy grandpa” 
(MINED 2009, p.118). The text does not flinch from describing him as a “dictator,” as 
“totalitarian,” as an army man exercising “vertical” power [hierarchical], who “served the 
interests of the few” – “his idea of ruling was very distant from the idea of a democracy.”  
 This transparent depiction of the dictator is matched by a straightforward account 
of the general strike. Unlike portrayals of pivotal general strikes in many other nations, 
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the events are recounted accurately, though in the typical highly abbreviated form of 
textbooks. Few significant details are missing, a real rarity for textbook portraits of 
nonviolent revolution. A few critiques can be made. The textbook’s shorthand narrative 
utterly fails to capture how the strike spread day by day, from town to town, from sector 
to sector of the economy and the government. For this reason, Parkman’s (1990) 
abbreviated timeline of events (pp.33-34), ironically, offers far more drama than the 
prose of the textbook narration. A significant omitted detail which merits inclusion is the 
fact that business owners “...financed the movement both by paying their own employees 
for the enforced vacations [i.e., strikes] and by contributing to the expenses of the 
movement” (p.10). Other missing details are relatively minor, but the text neglects to 
mention, for instance, that on May 8, all government employees walked out, bus drivers 
joined the strike and buses disappeared from the streets of the capital city, and a “huge 
crowd” gathered in front of the National Palace (p.34).    
 In an excerpt from the Time interview, Martinez dismisses and trivializes the 
student strike, then ongoing, saying that “students do not like to attend school in any part 
of the world” (p.118). Martinez rants against utopian intellectuals who, he says, fomented 
the student strike: “Our intellectual read a lot of books, and try to reform the world 
according to the writings of their favorite authors. The workers have nothing to do with 
the sedition that is happening at the moment” (p.118). But a few pages later the text 
shows that Martinez’s claim about workers was wrong. 
 The text reports that some intellectuals like Joaquin Castro Canizales 
“...advocated for a peaceful opposition like the one that Gandhi was leading in India...” 
(MINED 2009, p.121). And in two places in the text the strike is called “the strike of 
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fallen arms” (p.121, p.124). The text also suggests that a failed military coup and the 
government’s harsh repression of the conspirators (sentencing numerous soldiers to be 
executed) meant that “the military solution was ruled out” and the nonviolent strategy 
advocated by Castro Canizales was now “taken more seriously” (p.121). Moreover, the 
government’s repression resulted in “massive opposition, for which the government 
found itself unprepared” (p.121). This is a clear instance of popular distaste for violent 
repression, which nonviolent theorists have called “political jiu-jitsu” (Sharp 1973), “the 
paradox of repression” (Smithey and Kurtz 1999), and the “critical dynamic” (McAdam 
1999). Later in the strike, on May 7, when police shot at boys protesting in the street, 
killing one, popular reaction against violent repression may have again played a role in 
the escalation of protests (Parkman 1990, p.34).   
 But there are few other clues in the text that the movement had an explicit 
nonviolent strategy, except in a couple of quotations (taken from a book by the U.S. 
historian Patricia Parkman, who is credited) from the first leaflet issued by the Student 
Strike Committee on April 19, 1944. The student authors of the leaflet admit to readers, 
very much in the mode of pragmatic nonviolence: “We are not in any condition to initiate 
a revolution nor is it necessary to have more innocent blood shed” (p.124). The strategic 
rationale here at least comes close to nonviolence chosen as a fallback position simply 
because arms are lacking. And, the leaflet urges readers to “Behave like a man and not 
like an animal” (p.124). Recognizing that nonviolent protest will take courage they write, 
“Let us unite...and...shake with manliness the yoke that is oppression” (p.124).  
 After university students went on strike on April 26, the text reports on the 
emergence of a general strike: “Soon, high school students, teachers, theater employees, 
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market vendors, doctors, dentists, lawyers, judges and railway workers joined. Closures 
of commercial establishments spread quickly, a good number of workers joined the 
strike” (p.121). The text recounts that strikers refused to work until Martinez resigned. It 
tells how Martinez made threats against the strikers, mobilized hundreds of supporters, 
and realized violence could not put down the strike. The text emphasizes that it was “an 
extraordinary strike that employed only peaceful tactics” (p.119). With “crowds on the 
streets of the capital” on May 8, Martinez resigned (p.121). When Martinez left the 
country on May 11th, the strike ended.  
 Perhaps the most interesting addition in the textbook beyond Parkman’s (1990) 
account, is that a young U.S. citizen and “member of one of the elite families” was shot 
by police in one of the protests in El Salvador in early May of 1944 (p.121). This 
prompted a visit by the U.S. ambassador to President Martinez and his Foreign Minister. 
Citing letters written by the U.S. ambassador, the text documents serious fears by 
Martinez and his advisors that this incident could lead to “the humiliation of armed 
intervention from the government of the United States” (p.125). It seems clear that the 
U.S. ambassador was quite annoyed that the Martinez administration expressed no regret 
(though two police officers had been detained, with charges pending against them), and 
this annoyance was misinterpreted as serious hostility, leading to fear of U.S. 
intervention. In fact, the U.S. had no such plans, but apparently the U.S. ambassador 
advised Martinez to resign which he did the very next day (p.121, p.125). So the text 
strongly implies the incident may have played a role in Martinez’s decision to step down. 
Ironically, the nonviolent revolution may have received a little help from dumb luck (the 
odds that a U.S. citizen would be killed in the protests were remote) and the deeply 
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engrained fear of the regional Leviathon, U.S. hegemony. U.S. intervention and fears of it 
have played a role in the overthrow of many Latin American leaders, but usually for more 
systemic economic and political concerns, not, as in this case, for the accidental killing of 
a single U.S. citizen.     
 Chile: The context. National history is taught in Chile during the sophomore year 
of high school. The national standards mandating in-class time allotments recently 
lowered history instruction from 4 to 3 hours per week. Textbooks are approved by 
Chile’s Ministry of Education, and a convenience sample of a handful of teachers in 2011 
revealed that at least some teachers perceive they could be fired for straying from the 
curriculum. Private schools however can use their own textbooks, and in many of these 
schools, parents monitor teachers and also help to shape the curriculum. We should note 
that private schools have boomed in Chile since the 1980s when education became more 
decentralized (shifting authority from the federal to municipal government), funding for 
public education was cut deeply, and a voucher system was implemented. In 1980, 
private school enrollment was 12%, today over 50% of Chilean students attend private 
schools (Pons 2012), while neoliberal elites in the U.S. like the Cato Institute, have 
watched this development with admiration (e.g., Elacqua et al. 2011). Such a neo-liberal 
driven abandonment of public institutions is worthy of serious investigation. The 
consequences of decentralizing education for collective memory-making processes and 
outcomes inclusive of social justice perspectives is poorly understood, though it could 
open pockets of space for memory entrepreneurs by shifting the site of contention to local 
contexts. Still, when you remove middle-class parents (who enjoy greater cultural and 
social capital) from the public schools, “the most vocal advocates for quality in the 
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schools are eliminated” (Arnove et al. 1997, p.283). The decentralization/ 
municipalization of the Chilean educational system continues to be debated, with the 
right-wing supporting it and leftists seeking more state control (Burton 2012). In any 
case, the present project maintains a focus on government-approved public school 
textbooks because they represent one institutionalized outcome of contentious collective 
memory processes.     
 Given Chile’s history of dictatorship and stark ideological shifts, what effect has 
government control of public school textbooks had? Consider developments in the 
Allende era, the Pinochet era, and today. Joseph Farrell (1986) argues that the Allende 
administration’s brazen attempt at Marxist indoctrination of Chile’s schoolchildren 
through the National Unified School (ENU) curriculum, proved to be the key factor in 
“destroying” the Allende revolution. Although Barnard (1987) believes Farrell overstates 
his case, she agrees the ENU was one important factor in mobilizing opposition forces 
and Allende’s eventual overthrow. One lesson here may be that the 36% plurality of 
votes that elected Allende did not represent a mandate for sweeping social change (Ellner 
2006, p.102).   
 The Pinochet era institutionalized curriculum that swept the recent past under the 
rug. Patricio Guzmán’s (1997) documentary film “Chile, Obstinate Memory” shows 
Guzmán screening his earlier film “The Battle of Chile” on the 1973 coup, to Chilean 
students who had little knowledge of the events other than sanitized government-
sanctioned accounts. In the 1997 film, many Chilean students register shock and disbelief 
at Guzmán’s documentary on the coup. Turning again to opinion poll data, one indicator 
of collective memories of Pinochet can be discerned in a survey conducted in the late 
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1990s which asked Chileans to respond to the following statement: “In some occasions, 
dictatorship is good.” The percentage of Chileans answering “strongly agree” or “agree” 
on this item was 11.8% (McAlister, Orpinas, and Velez 1999). 
 Recent government leaders have waffled in their approach to state-sanctioned 
history. Some have felt even sanitized accounts are less than ideal, compared to the 
option of enforced silence. In 2009, under the conservative Sebastián Piñera 
administration, the government-approved Chilean high school history textbook by 
Montero et al. (2009) ends coverage of the 20th century around 1920. Of course, this cut-
off point conveniently omits any discussion of the controversial Allende and Pinochet 
eras. In context, the preference for official silence makes perfect sense. In late 2009, the 
right-wing Piñera, while running for President, surrounded himself with Pinochet cabinet 
leaders (Barrionuevo 2010b), and in 2012 it was noted that Piñera’s “majority in 
parliament depends in part on the right-wing Independent Democratic Union, which 
supported General Pinochet” (BBC 2012). Back in 1998, Piñera reflected a pro-Pinochet 
bias as he objected to efforts by Spanish judge Baltasar Garzon to extradite Pinochet for 
human rights violations, a move which Piñera called a violation of Chile’s sovereignty 
(La Nacion 2009). But leftist Chilean Presidents like Eduardo Frei (President 1994-
2000), had also opposed Spanish attempts to prosecute Pinochet abroad, though his 
loyalty to Pinochet may have changed with recent findings that the Pinochet regime 
killed Frei’s father through poisoning (Barrionuevo 2010a). At the end of 2011, this 
textbook omitting most of the 20th century was still the government-mandated history 
textbook.  
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 In 2012, the National Education Council announced specific changes in the 
history curriculum’s account of the Pinochet era. Although the Education Minister denied 
that the center-right Piñera administration had directly influenced the changes, the 
changes outraged the political left in Chile who accused the administration of “trying to 
whitewash history” (BBC 2012). The key change at issue – Pinochet’s rule will no longer 
be called a “dictatorship,” instead it will be called a “regime” or “military regime.” Just a 
few months later, a pro-Pinochet documentary film about his “regime” was released by 
wealthy right-wing pro-Pinochet supporters, again sparking outrage and protests 
(Bonnefoy 2012).     
 Pushing past these recent trends, we analyze the 2006 government-mandated 
textbook by Rivas et al. (2006). Soon after the election of Michelle Bachelet (a center-
leftist of the Socialist party) as President of Chile, the Rivas et al. (2006) government-
approved textbook (for use in 2007-2008) covered history through 2003, including the 
controversial periods of Chile’s recent past. Nevertheless, in this textbook key events of 
nonviolent action in Chile’s history are neglected and distorted. Though Bachelet herself 
was a torture victim of Pinochet’s regime (Barrionuevo 2010c), criticism of Pinochet in 
the textbook is somewhat muted. For example, we are never told in the text itself that 
Allende died or was killed. Instead, two small photographs of newspapers appear in the 
text, one with a headline, “Allende dead,” the other with a headline, “Allende commits 
suicide” (p.314). In the text itself, readers are left to fill in the blanks.  
 If the violence of the recent past is still too painful and controversial for some 
Chileans to look in the eye, one might expect that nonviolent actors in the historical 
narrative might earn a place in the collective memory, since nonviolent action itself 
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prefigures the fragile turn towards national reconciliation. But no, the textbook curiously 
omits mention of prominent nonviolent leaders in key junctures of national history.         
 Chile has long been cited as an exemplary case of nonviolent resistance. Dudouet 
(2008) lists Chile (1983-1989) among the 32 most significant cases of nonviolent 
resistance campaigns since 1945 (p.9). In a large cross-national study of nonviolence, 
Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) classify Chile (1983-1989) as the site of a “nonviolent” 
movement that achieved “success” by ousting the Pinochet regime, and Chile (1931) as 
the site of a “nonviolent” movement that achieved “success” in removing the Ibáñez 
regime from power. Let us first consider the textbook’s description of this overthrow of 
Chile’s president in 1931: 
The consequences of the Great Depression were so deep… Due to the crisis, there 
was a strong, popular and radical middle, represented by students and professional 
associations, which generated a political crisis that ended with the overthrow of 
Ibáñez in July 1931. (Rivas et al. 2006, p.264) 
 
While such abbreviated narrative shorthands are the nuts and bolts of textbooks which 
cover centuries of national history, in this case we should note how many interesting 
details are left out, especially since they illustrate so well a larger cross-national pattern: 
the omission of significant nonviolent movements in hegemonic national collective 
memories. One explanation may rest in the fact that “leaderless” movements (or 
leaderful), like Chile in 1931, often seem to escape a resilient place in collective memory. 
Scholars have noted that collective memories of social movements tend to coalesce 
around one iconic leader, in whose shadow even prominent social movement 
organizations tend to be forgotten within a few generations (Eddy 2012, pp.190-191). 
Schwartz (2009) argues that this process exemplifies “oneness,” society’s need for 
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personified ideals. But the deeper explanation for the omissions must push towards more 
explicitly political accounts of collective memory processes. 
Table 129. Significant Omissions of the Rivas et al. (2006) Textbook Portrayal of Chile’s 
(1931) Struggle Against Ibáñez’s Dictatorial Rule 
 
1) The words “nonviolent”/ “nonviolence,” “peaceful struggle,” “passive resistance”  and 
cognate terms are never used, though protestors themselves used the latter two phrases to 
mobilize citizens and frame their actions. 
2) There is no mention of the street demonstrations. 
3) The general strikes and threats of strikes by numerous professions and trades are never 
mentioned. 
4) A clear historical case in which nonviolent methods proved effective is obscured 
through a form of extreme narrative shorthand. The result is that readers are not exposed 
to a significant case of national history in which nonviolent methods were a successful 
tool for social change. 
 
 What really happened in 1931? Parkman (1990) recounts that strikes probably 
placed the biggest role in bringing down the dictator, but demonstrations with mixed 
violent and nonviolent tactics played a role. Some anti-Ibáñez demonstrators shot at 
police, some carried guns in marches, some rioted, but most demonstrations were 
nonviolent. And, activists framed their actions and attempted to mobilize fellow workers 
and citizens by appealing to nonviolent ideals and tactics. For example, a leaflet urging 
Chilean bank employees to strike stated: 
WITHOUT ARMS, WITH IDEALS ALONE WE WILL OVERTHROW THE 
MURDERERS AND THIEVES.…Yes, comrades, peaceful struggle is necessary 
since we do not have violent means to overthrow the TYRANT. WE ARE 
GOING TO STRIKE. LET US PARALYZE THE NATION…If you are 
Patriots…grasp the arm of passive resistance. (p.15) 
 
The textbook account glosses over key details and neglects to describe or explain how 
ordinary people organizing and engaging in non-cooperation brought down a dictator. 
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Table 130. What Really Happened: Timeline of 1931 Ibáñez Overthrow  
 
July 
13  
□ Financial crisis escalates, President Ibáñez appoints a new cabinet to restore 
constitutional liberties 
July 
17  
□ Cabinet proposes austerity measures 
□ Opponents of Ibáñez found Union Civilista to resist return to dictatorial rule 
July 
21  
 
□ Cabinet resigns 
□ Union Civilista prepares for action 
□ Anti- Ibáñez demos begin 
July 
22   
 
□ National University students strike, occupy main university building (and in 
mostly symbolic action, shoot guns at police) 
□ Union Civilista, National & Catholic University students plan for a general 
strike by all citizens, network with professional organizations and workers, to 
bring down Ibáñez 
July 
23   
 
□ Assembly of doctors declare solidarity with students, call on Ibáñez to resign, 
declare readiness to strike  
□ Second cabinet resigns 
□ Students, still occupying the University, exchange fire with police 
July 
24 
□ Joining the general strike, doctors suspend all but emergency care 
□ Lawyers and architects vote to strike 
July 
25 
 
□ Shops in Santiago are closed; Courts shut down 
□ Dentists, school teachers, pharmacists, accountants, bank employees, and others 
declare themselves on strike. Bakers, slaughterhouse workers, and railroad 
workers will strike beginning on July 27. 
□ Engineers vote to suspend work and cut light and water in Santiago on July 27 
July 
26 
□ Ibáñez resigns  
Source: Parkman (1990) 
 
As the timeline above clearly suggests, the plans and threats to strike, the beginning of a 
general strike and the rapid escalation in participation in the general strike played key 
factors in the overthrow of Ibáñez. We must keep in mind, that presidential politics is the 
home terrain of national history textbooks. That is, aside from accounts of war, textbooks 
around the world are preoccupied with the history of presidents (or comparable leaders) 
above all else. Yet, this dramatic display of people-power resulting in the overthrow of 
Ibáñez, is meagerly described by the textbook as a “political crisis that ended with the 
overthrow of Ibáñez in July 1931” (Rivas et al. 2006, p.264).  
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 Chile (1983-1989). Secondly, let us consider the Rivas et al. (2006) textbook’s 
portrayal of the nonviolent movement against Pinochet’s military regime. Wink (1992) 
recounts the scene in Chile during 1983: “On May 11, at 8 P.M., the Chilean copper 
miner’s union calls a countrywide protest. People respond by banging on pots and pans 
and blowing whistles, and discover for the first time that the vast majority oppose the 
dictator, General Pinochet. Peruvian women use the same tactic when a man starts 
beating his wife” (p.248). Ironically, this is much more information than we find in 
government-approved national history textbooks in Chile.  
 The textbook’s bias in privileging narratives of violent events is clear. It is as if, 
like so many, the authors believe subconsciously that history is primarily violent events, 
or as a poet has said, they assume that “history…must sleep inside the belly of a bomb” 
(Smith 2012), but certainly not in pots and pans, not in nonviolent activists taking to the 
streets to bang pots and pans. The tactic of banging pots and pans is not even mentioned 
in the text. It was a distinctive tactic sending a symbolic message that resonated – and the 
messaging was pitch perfect nonviolent action and egalitarianism – since every 
household has pots and pans, and the people united have immense power – to withdraw 
their consent, to refuse to cooperate, to disobey.  
 The domestic symbol of pots and pans resonated so widely that it soon spread to 
Uruguay and helped to mobilize nonviolent protests that brought down Uruguay’s 
military regime. Gillespie (1991) writes of Uruguay in late 1983, “Nothing gave the 
opposition radicals such hope as the massive pot-banging and blackouts of 25 August 
(copied from those in Chile) that greeted the new wave of repression” (p.125). Sosnowski 
and Popkin (1993) concur, “Mass demonstrations occurred regularly. In a show of truly 
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peaceful resistance Uruguayans took to the streets chanting slogans about the fall of the 
regime; turning off their lights, they banged on empty pots and pans” (p.39). Stephan and 
Chenoweth (2008) consider this Uruguayan movement to be nonviolent and successful, 
overthrowing the military regime in 1985. A variety of nonviolent tactics were employed: 
a successful general strike was launched and workers occupied factories and staged sit-
ins (Weinstein 1988, p.84; Reuters 1984, January 20; AP 1984, January 19), three church 
leaders undertook hunger strikes in protest of human rights violations (Reuters 1983, 
August 26), some protests turned out over 300,000 Uruguays, a tenth of the country 
(Reuters 1983, November 28; Sosnowski and Popkin 1993, p.40). With knowledge of 
nonviolent movements in our own national histories and in the examples of other nations, 
forms of tactical innovation become live options grounded in historical praxis.  
 Below, I name the key omissions of the Rivas et al. (2006) textbook portrayal of 
Chile’s (1983-1989) struggle against Pinochet’s dictatorial rule.1. The words 
“nonviolent”/ “nonviolence” and cognate terms are never used. Nonviolence is un-named 
and untheorized – as is typical for textbooks in the present sample. However, Ackerman 
and Duvall (2000) argue that the mass protests were “deliberately nonviolent” (p.285). 
 2. Important nonviolent leaders like Ana Gonzalez, Monica Jiménez, and Rudolfo 
Seguel (president of the Copper Mine Workers’ Confederation of Chile) are never 
mentioned by name. Seguel has said he was influenced by the movie “Gandhi” which 
showed in Chilean theaters in 1983. He and many Chilean activists in his network saw it 
“at least twice” (Ackerman and Duvall 2000, p.291). Similarly, during the Montgomery 
bus boycott, Dr. King and other leaders of the movement showed “old movies of Gandhi 
to demonstrate again and again how victory – real victory – come from non-violence” 
483 
(Barrett 1957, March 3, p.196). The cross-national diffusion of nonviolence has long 
depended on activists’ knowledge of successful historical cases.  
 3. The strategic debate among resistance movements is briefly covered in the text, 
but the debate is framed as a debate over “violence,” and the alternative option (i.e., 
nonviolent resistance/ protest) is not named. Instead, words like “protest” and “street 
protests” and “social mobilization” (p.326) are used as descriptors.  
 4. The narrative of the debate over violent resistance ignores the fact that 
eventually the radical Socialists renounced violence (Ackerman and Duvall 2000, p.298). 
Even more important, the warranted perception (e.g., see Ackerman and Duvall 2000) 
that opposition violence extended Pinochet’s rule is never considered by the text.    
 5. There is no mention of nonviolent tactics that were central to the opposition 
movement, for example, the widespread public banging of pots and pans in the first 
protest against Pinochet on May 11, 1983. Realizing that a Copper miners strike would 
result in a bloody crackdown by the Pinochet regime, they resorted to nonviolent tactical 
innovation, as Kurtz (2009) describes: 
In an ingenious tactical move, the miners called instead for a nationwide, 
decentralized action for all Chileans who support them to walk and drive slowly, 
turn lights off and on at night, not buy anything or send children to school, and at 
8pm in the evening bang pots and pans. These low-risk, decentralized actions 
helped to dissolve people’s fear and develop a sense of confidence among the 
opposition. (p.2)  
 
Similarly, Smithey (2011) explains: 
In 1983…Chileans used public ‘slow-down strikesto spread awareness of dissent 
against the Pinochet regime. As ordinary people, including taxi drivers and 
pedestrians, slowed their activities, they communicated the widespread nature of 
public dissatisfaction with Pinochet's rule. Through their participation, Chileans 
became empowered. 
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 6. There is no mention of the role that the U.S. played in overthrowing Allende, 
sustaining Pinochet (more on these issues below), or how a new U.S. ambassador, Harry 
Barnes, was more critical of Pinochet and helped bring Pinochet down by decisively 
supporting a fair democratic election (Ackerman and Duvall 2000, p.299, p.290).  
 7. There is no mention of the key role played by Pinochet’s military commanders 
who ultimately, refused to obey him and thereby ended his dictatorial rule (Ackerman 
and Duvall 2000). Such noncooperation and defections within militaries are crucial 
factors in many successful nonviolent revolutions (Nepstad 2011). 
 During the Pinochet era, Ana Gonzalez organized and led protests, sit-ins, and 
hunger strikes against the Pinochet regimes’ disappearances and human rights violations. 
She and her husband were members of Communist activist networks. When the Pinochet 
regime tortured and disappeared her husband, Gonzalez began a courageous life of 
organizing with other families of the disappeared, confronting the military dictatorship 
and appealing to the conscience of the regime and Chileans through nonviolent protest 
actions. She also traveled to the U.S. to highlight the human rights violations and put 
pressure on Chile’s government. Observers of Ana Gonzalez have noted that she speaks 
with “no hatred” (Barrionuevo 2010c), a key marker of a principled nonviolent 
orientation. It is difficult to understand why Chilean textbooks do not highlight figures 
like Ana Gonzalez, aside from the probability that her links to communism make her 
unfit for mainstream history.  
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 Guatemala. In Guatemala, an assistant to the researcher could only locate junior 
high/ middle school history textbooks. Here is the account from a 7th grade Guatemalan 
social studies textbook (EE 2011, p.125): 
General Jorge Ubico Castaneda assumed the presidency of the Republic on 
February 14, 1931. His regime was marked by terror. He imposed an intelligence 
service through which he denounced citizens in order to prosecute, imprison or 
shoot them if they were suspect by the regime. The regime applied martial law.  
 Jorge Ubico was a man who loved himself. On his birthday he mandated 
special events around the country and the people offered him gifts. The Assembly 
annually earmarked the amount of two hundred thousand quetzals as a gift to the 
president...He ordered the closure of several colleges and schools in the country, 
which brought stagnation in the intellectual life of the citizens. Some colleges and 
schools were requisitioned for military use. He did complete some important 
works, such as the construction of the National Palace, the improvement of border 
security, payment of the foreign debt, and most of the paved roads that still 
remain.  
 The dictatorship imposed by Jorge Ubico resulted in the people 
demonstrating their rejection through mass rallies in the streets, a situation which 
led to the suspension of constitutionally guaranteed rights and resulted in 
tremendous persecution. The teachers, students and workers held important 
demonstrations, but the government fell into using the intimidation and terror of 
police force. In the demonstration of June 25, 1944, a teacher named Maria 
Chincilla was killed by police. This event increased the people’s hatred against 
the dictator Ubico, until he was forced to resign on July 1, 1944 and fled to the 
USA. He died in New Orleans on February 14, 1946. 
 
 Unfortunately, the textbook focuses on demonstrations and neglects to mention 
the pivotal general strike. From the 1930s to the 1960s, general strikes proved to be the 
essential tactic of noncooperation and nonviolent coercion in at least eleven cases of 
insurrection throughout Latin America (Parkman 1990, p.16). In fact, the role of 
demonstrations in Guatemala rapidly receded in importance as “Opposition leaders 
received word from the chief of police that any further demonstrations would be fired 
upon, even if the protesters were only women and children” (Paulson 2005, p.153). 
Indeed, Chincilla was killed during a women’s march (p.152).  
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 As activists deemed continued demonstrations suicidal, beginning on June 26, the 
general strike took center stage as the main strategy in the movement to overthrow Ubico. 
For five days a general strike was carried out with “nearly complete participation...The 
streets were emptied...Guatemala City was paralyzed. Students distributed leaflets calling 
on the public to remain nonviolent and to continue resisting” (Paulson 2005, p.153). 
During the general strike, people remained at home and the widespread participation led 
people to lose their fear. Meanwhile, the police and army felt powerless, unsure of who to 
arrest or repress. It was the general strike which played the pivotal role in forcing Ubico’s 
resignation (Paulson 2005), yet the textbook fails to narrate these events between June 26 
and July 1. 
 With the fall of Ubico, several months of power struggle ensued. General Ponce 
Vaides became the junta leader. As the textbook narrates, Vaides “continued with the 
same dictatorship as Ubico, committing many injustices against the people, including 
persecution, murder, torture, disappearances and forced deportation. The repression 
against the people continued, enforced by the police” (EE 2011, p.125). The textbook 
recounts that all of this “...provoked the people to begin the popular uprising of October 
20, 1944, and with it came the fall of the regime” (p.125). The textbook vaguely informs 
us that “The October Revolution was carried out by teachers, students, workers and 
soldiers who became conscious and aware. The dictator Ponce Vaides was overthrown 
and a revolutionary junta took over” (p.126). While this description alludes to the 
nonviolent “people power” character of the takeover, the narration obscures the specific 
tactics and strategies of the movement.  
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 Once again, as in the account of Ubico’s overthrow, the textbook fails to mention 
the role of strikes undertaken by opposition parties and students against the Vaides 
regime. The role of striking students is not unusual here. Parkman (1990) documents 
eight cases of insurrectionary civic strikes in Latin America between 1931 and 1961 that 
began with student strikes or student demonstrations (p.9). The key role of “reform-
minded junior officers” in actually carrying out the coup d’etat (Paulson 2005, p.154) is 
also neglected by the textbook, though the text vaguely mentions “conscious and aware” 
soldiers. The result is that methods of resistance, including nonviolent strikes, are 
seriously obscured and hidden in a hypersimplified account of events. A key opportunity 
to highlight nonviolent methods and their efficacy is lost in this reproduction of collective 
memory.  
 In addition, since the revolutionary junta of October 1944 initiated important 
democratic reforms, a key opportunity to highlight the link between nonviolent methods 
and democratic transitions is neglected. In fact, extensive cross-national research on 67 
nations undergoing political transitions found that nonviolent methods are much more 
effective in fostering democratic institutions (Karatnycky and Ackerman 2005). 
Moreover, in over 70% of successfully overthrown authoritarian regimes, nonviolent 
civic resistance played key roles. Similarly, Karatnycky and Ackerman found that 
nonviolent civic coalitions lead to better outcomes (using indicators of democracy and 
freedom) than elite-initiated coups. The two Guatemalan cases of 1944, the June 
movement and the October movement, were primarily instances of people power/ 
nonviolent civic coalitions. However, political elites also played a key role, as lawyers 
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were prominent leaders in the June movement, and junior military officers helped lead 
the October movement.  
 Although the Guatemalan text fails to name these important links between 
nonviolent means and democratic ends, the text does emphasize the democratic reforms 
undertaken by the junta of October 1944: “During this brief regime, they tried to 
eliminate many previous orders such as forced unpaid labor...To lift the country from 
ignorance, they created the National Literacy Committee. They released the university 
from government control and it was given autonomy. In order to organize the political 
life of the country they convened presidential elections” (EE 2011, p.126). In fact, as a 
result of the revolutionary junta, “Fair elections soon followed, and Guatemala entered 
into its 10-year ‘springtime of democracy’ (Paulson 2005, p.154). The text describes this 
period as “the revolutionary period of 10 years...an era of real economic, political, and 
social development” (EE 2011, p.127). This would be a “springtime” cut short through 
covert U.S. intervention, and some of the Guatemalan textbooks fail to accurately narrate 
this national tragedy (Eddy, forthcoming). 
The Ghana Case 
 Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) code the 1951-1957 Convention People’s Party 
(CPP) movement against British rule in Ghana (then called the Gold Coast) as a 
“successful” “nonviolent” movement which “ousted” the British. Leading peace scholars 
often list Ghana’s independence movement as another case demonstrating the efficacy of 
nonviolent movements (e.g., Cortright 2008, p.212; Wink 1992, p.247). Wink (1992) 
writes that Ghana won independence “after a ten-year nonviolent struggle” (p.247). 
Similarly, scholarly narratives of the Ghanaian independence movement often describe 
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the campaign of “positive action” which Kwame Nkrumah initiated in 1950, as 
“involving nonviolent protests, strikes, and noncooperation with the British colonial 
authorities” (NEB 1998, p.735). These versions of Ghana’s history, viewed through the 
lens of path dependency theory (Mahoney 2000) might lead us to surmise that since 
Ghana’s origins as an independent nation are rooted in nonviolent action, nonviolence 
should be commemorated and celebrated within the culture. However, as a test of the 
collective memory and hegemonic narrative of the independence movement, the 
Ghanaian textbook is rather ambiguous on whether nonviolent methods played a crucial 
role. Thus, historians who question the significance of Nkrumah’s Gandhian repertoire in 
Ghana (Carter, Clark, and Randle 2006, p.26) may have a point. 
 Textbook depictions of the Ghanian independence movement. In describing the 
independence movement the Ghanaian history textbook by Gadzepko (2005) never once 
uses the words “nonviolent”/ “nonviolence” or “noncooperation,” nor does it use the 
similar terms “passive resistance,” “pacifist,” or “peaceful.” The conspicuous failure to 
name nonviolent action begs the question of how the independence movement is framed 
in the text. In fact, several nonviolent actions are narrated by the text in an ad hoc 
fashion, but the rhetoric, strategies, tactics, and motivations of the social movement 
actors are never named in nonviolent terms, and never linked to nonviolent ideology, 
strategy, or moral principles (i.e., principled nonviolence). Moreover, no nonviolent 
actors or leaders are given voice, as no one articulating nonviolence is quoted in the text. 
 At the climax of the independence narrative, rather than pointing to the role of 
mass noncooperation, the textbook emphasizes the role of British cooperation. It is 
argued that independence came “due to the positive attitude of the local British Colonial 
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officials and the British Government to the independence issue” (Gadzepko 2005, p.206). 
The text informs us that the British Government had “relaxed her repressive measures on 
Nkrumah” – but we are not told why, only that now there was “so much co-operation” 
between the British and the CPP (p.206). Here the text would have done well to refer 
back to an earlier point which was made somewhat obliquely, that of the British Labor 
party’s relative openness to de-colonization movements in Asia and Africa (p.189). 
Nkrumah himself at the time, made this point very directly, citing a potential threat to the 
political opportunity structure:a crucial reason for demanding “self-government NOW” 
was because the Labor Party was in power in Britain, and if the Conservatives returned to 
power in the next year they would be more likely to suppress the independence 
movement (Fitch and Oppenheimer 1966, p.26).  
 The role of mass nonviolent action in pushing the hand of the British is not at all 
clarified in the textbook, and there may be several important reasons for this. For one, 
multiple and contested versions of the independence narrative have been in circulation. 
Second, the degree to which nonviolent mass action played a key role is debatable, as is 
the question of which mass actions were most important. Third, a very strong case can be 
made that Nkrumah and other CPP leaders sent mixed signals regarding their 
endorsement of strikes and other nonviolent mass actions. This ambivalence is partly 
because CPP leaders sensed that the British were cooperating with the goals of self-
government and because the independence movement was quickly channeled into 
electoral politics (i.e., conventional action).   
 It seems the textbook has adopted and synthesized two of the most prominent 
versions of the independence movement. First, there is the nationalistic Ghanaian version 
491 
which emphasizes the role of the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) leaders as well 
as Nkrumah and the CPP leaders to varying degrees (the UGCC was a nationalist 
“organization of wealthy lawyers and traders” (Fitch and Oppenheimer 1966, p.15), 
together with a mass movement that forced the British to concede to demands for self-
government. Second, there is the British version which denies that the colonial rulers 
were forced to grant independence. Rather, this version maintains, the British were happy 
to turn governing duties over to the colonized, “through an orderly process of 
constitutional devolution,” as soon as the people proved themselves “capable of 
managing their own affairs” (Fitch and Oppenheimer 1966, p.11). The British claimed 
that the Gold Coast’s 90% illiteracy proved they were not yet ready for self-government. 
But an editorial by Nkrumah in the Accra Evening News (May 19, 1949) pointed to the 
hypocrisy of this claim, since the British had done little to advance education in the 105 
years of their rule in the Gold Coast. Nkrumah also pointed out that Britain granted 
independence to India though over 90% of the population was illiterate (Timothy 1955, 
p.91).  
 Initially the British did repress the independence movement, and the textbook 
glosses over the extent of British repression, episodes which offer crucial lessons for 
social movement actors. Indeed, Dr. King emphasized this point while counseling 
perseverance in his sermon on Ghana’s independence, delivered in Montgomery, 
Alabama in the middle of the U.S. civil rights struggle (King 1957). The British did come 
around to cooperation with independence, and Dr. King argued that it was only due to the 
nonviolent means of the Ghanaians that the British, miraculously, harbored no ill will. At 
the official independence celebrations, the Duchess of Kent even danced the fox-trot with 
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Nkrumah at the State Reception and Ball. Although not included in the Ghanaian 
textbooks sampled, a photograph of the dance can be found in Kennard (1958, p.68). 
King (1957) remarked on the role nonviolence played in avoiding bitterness and making 
such a symbolic dance possible, though Louis Armstrong’s wife, Lucille Armstrong, also 
played a role as she gave Nkrumah a half-hour dance lesson (Kennard 1958, p.65, p.70). 
Marxist historians would promote a different reading, seeing in such symbols of 
friendship and tolerance, a sure sign that the CPP had made too many accommodations to 
British financial interests – and whether those were furthered through colonial or 
neocolonial structures made little difference to the British power elite (Fitch and 
Oppenheimer 1966).    
 The textbook posits that Ghanaian ex-soldiers played a pivotal role in the 
nationalist movement and suggests two factors that shaped the consciousness of the ex-
soldiers. First, the text argues that the travel experiences of the soldiers during World 
War II exposed the myth of white superiority: “The African army was exposed to the 
dirty, the illiterate, the drunken, the stupid and the poor of Europe overseas” (Gadzepko 
2005, p.187). The soldiers, many of whom had fought in Burma and India, also began to 
question their own internalized racism as they saw the “defeats inflicted on white-men by 
‘yellowmen’,” (p.189) that is, a “coloured race” (p.188). With the ideology of white 
supremacy debunked, the ex-soldiers were no longer afraid of the “white terror” (p.186), 
and “no longer ready to meekly succumb” to colonialism (p.188).  
 Second, the text reports: “These soldiers were also impressed by the ideas of the 
Indian nationalist movement led by Mahatma Gandhi” (Gadzepko 2005, p.186; the same 
line is repeated on p.189). We are not told what the “ideas” were, and thus, an important 
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opportunity to name, if not theorize, nonviolence is missed. Moreover, Gandhi is never 
linked as an influence on Nkrumah, though he had been called the “Gandhi of Ghana” by 
the local press as early as 1949 (Nkrumah 1961, p.19). 
 We are told almost nothing about Nkrumah’s biography, except that he was living 
in London when invited to be the general secretary of the UGCC, and that he “acquired 
the taste” for revolutionary nationalism “through his studies abroad where he also met 
many African nationalists” (Gadzepko 2005, p.184). The textbook frames him as the 
leader of a group of “young, revolutionary and radical politicians” (p.191), “full of 
youthful exuberance” (p.192). He is called “a personality with ideology which appealed 
to the politically awakened masses” (p.191), and is praised for his charisma (p.194), 
“dynamism and organizational ability” (p.191). As he emerges as a leader in his own 
right, Nkrumah is termed a “radical” and contrasted with the conservatives in the UGCC 
who favored “legitimate and non-confrontational means to attain eventual self-
government” (p.191). Exactly how Nkrumah differed strategically is not spelled out, but 
the reader has little reason to fill in the blanks with nonviolent resistance. Indeed, violent 
militance seems to be hinted at, though this would be historically inaccurate in the early 
stages of Nkrumah’s rise. We are told that the UGCC considered Nkrumah “too radical 
and confrontational” (p.193), and that the British repression during the 1948 riots 
radicalized the masses, so that: “Aggression was injected into the political attitude of the 
Ghanian” (p.191). Nkrumah and other movement leaders are called “martyrs” for being 
arrested and going to jail, and the text suggests they were arrested on general charges of 
“subversion” or “sedition,” (p.195). We are not informed of any acts of nonviolent civil 
disobedience which would warrant their arrest – a significant sin of omission. 
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 After several pages of such vague descriptions, the program of the CPP and 
Nkrumah is finally articulated: “to fight relentlessly by all constitutional means for the 
achievement of full ‘self-government’ now…” (Gadzepko 2005, p.194). To fight “by all 
constitutional means” certainly suggests a type of nonviolent movement, though it is not 
categorized as such. The author’s preference for militant language and avoidance of the 
term “nonviolence” is by now quite clear, but more significant is the fact that the 
Ministry of Education evidently did not find the omission of nonviolent ideology 
problematic.  
 Finally, the text details the tactics of the CPP which consisted of organizing 
branches of the CYO (Committee on Youth Organisation), building coalitions (of other 
existing youth organizations, local tribal chiefs, and the trade unions), organizing 
conferences, promoting “effective propaganda machinery,” and holding mass rallies 
(Gadzepko 2005, p.194). In addition to mentioning the barest details of the mass rallies 
(“improvised songs” were sung, Nkrumah and other CPP leaders spoke (pp.194-195)), 
the fast moving narrative only reserves space for a two sentence account of prototypical 
nonviolent action, though it is portrayed as pivotal: on January 9,1950, “the CPP called 
upon workers to stage a sit-down strike. By this the workers felt their Messiah had now 
appeared” (p.194). However, the actual strike and its effects are left unexplained. 
Messiah or no Messiah, the narrative’s use of extreme shorthand serves to de-emphasize 
the importance of the strike. By contrast, Fitch and Oppenheimer (1966) argue that the 
general strike, the first in sub-Saharan African, “forced the concessions which brought 
Dr. Nkrumah from Fort James prison to the position of ‘Leader of Government Business’ 
in the first popularly elected parliament in colonial Africa” (p.3). 
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 Two other nonviolent actions receive more coverage in the textbook: a boycott of 
European goods in 1948 and a march of military veterans on February 28, 1948. We are 
told that “the leaders of the UGCC were not responsible for organizing either” (Gadzepko 
2005, p.183). Nevertheless, six UGCC leaders were held responsible and arrested by the 
British colonial government, a move that backfired and turned the “Big Six” into national 
heroes and symbols of resistance, though they were only detained for about 8 weeks 
(p.183). The text claims, without fully substantiating it, that these actions amounted to a 
“relentless attack on colonial structures and institutions” (p.183). Again, this militant 
language fits the mold of the nationalistic account of independence, though there are 
reasons to doubt its complete accuracy, as we will explore below.     
 A few pages later, the text explains that there was a sharp rise in the cost of living 
and food scarcity, as well as a growing perception that the Colonial Government 
cooperated with European and Asian firms to exploit the indigenous people (Gadzepko 
2005, p.187). As a result, a “general boycott of all European imports” was organized by 
“Nii Kwabena Bonne III (Osu Alata Mantse)” in January, 1948 (p.187). The extent of the 
boycott, the organizer, his rhetoric, and goals are not described, only his name is given. 
But we are told that a series of riots followed.  
 In fact, a brief New York Times article from the period, does much more to set the 
scene. Published a week after the boycott had been in effect, it reports the boycott 
“brought trade to a virtual standstill” with losses estimated at one million British pounds 
(NYT, Feb. 10, 1948, p.14). Though the boycotted imports were “mainly textiles,” many 
stores run by foreign merchants had closed. The article clarifies that tribal chiefs were the 
pivotal actors backing the boycott, and reports: “Nii Kwanena Bonne III, a chief of Osu, 
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has been touring the country telling the Africans that high prices are evil. In many towns 
Africans are restricted by tribal oaths from buying all kinds of imported goods” (p.14). 
Aside from the “othering” of the chief by portraying his message in dismissively crude 
terms, the article suggests that tribal structures and traditions (i.e., tribal leadership and 
tribal oaths) were being harnessed for nonviolent action – a narrative detail missing in the 
textbook.    
 In addition, the text informs us that African military veterans who had served 
Britain during World War II were mobilizing around a series of grievances that were 
linked to the growing sense of economic crisis and discontent. In addition, the veterans 
had received promises that never materialized, including jobs, and their pensions were a 
“mere pittance” or were not honored (Gadzepko 2005, p.184, pp.186-187). The text 
explains that their “resentment exploded in protest marches to petition the colonial 
governor” (p.187). However, only one march is narrated. 
 The protest march of February 28, 1948 was far from the last time that soldiers 
seriously impacted the direction of the country. They would function again as an 
organized political force looking out for their own interests in the military coup d’etat 
overthrowing Nkrumah in 1966 (Gadzepko 2005, p.260), orchestrating a coup in 1972 
(p.245, pp.246-247, p.261), again in 1978 (pp.262-263), and splits in the military also led 
to the coups in 1979 (pp.252-253) and in 1981 (pp.258-259, p.263).     
 The march of “unarmed” ex-soldiers on February 28 and subsequent rioting 
receives relatively extensive coverage in the textbook (Gadzepko 2005, p.184). Again, 
the word “nonviolent” is not used in the text, though the use of “unarmed” makes this 
implication plausible. However, the use of “unarmed” is somewhat conspicuous, since 
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journalists and scholars often utilize the descriptor “unarmed” when forms of 
spontaneous “limited violence” occur at a protest. Indeed, my hunch proved correct. A 
New York Times article reported that stones were thrown, with the word order implying 
that the protesters began the violence: “Stones were thrown, police used tear gas and 
shots were fired” (NYT, March 1, 1948). The Times’ headline accuses the veterans of 
rioting, as its subtitle states: “African Ex-Servicemen Riot in Protest on Grievances.” By 
contrast, the textbook makes no mention of stonethrowing, nor does it link the rioting to 
the veterans. Instead, the text says the veterans were “shot at by Police Superintendent 
Imray when the procession refused to obey the order to halt marching” (Gadzepko 2005, 
p.184). Thus, the text seems to cast the action in terms of nonviolent civil disobedience. 
Meanwhile, the rioting and looting is blamed on an “angry mob” who were reacting to 
the police killing of three of the marching veterans (pp.184-185).  
 Although days of rioting followed, the textbook points out that secondary school 
students engaged in a “demonstration in protest against the detention of nationalist 
leaders” on March 14, 1948 (Gadzepko 2005, p.185). With typical shorthand that omits 
dramatic detail, the text does not inform us that student marchers were kicked out of their 
schools, and faced criticism from some Ghanaians for participating (Timothy 1955, p.88, 
p.92). Overall, the textbook clearly portrays the key February 28 march as more 
nonviolent than we find in the Times’ account, but still without using the word 
nonviolence.   
  James (1977), using the report of a Colonial Office investigation among other 
sources, offers a still fuller account. Once the ex-servicemen began their march they were 
quickly joined by large numbers of sympathizers. The march of about 2,000 people 
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headed toward Christiansborg Castle, seat of the colonial government, as some marchers 
shouted: “This is the last European Governor who will occupy the Castle” (p.44). James 
(1977) argues that such anti-imperial chants and the march itself are indications of the 
rising sense of efficacy and power gained through the month-long boycott. The boycott 
had mobilized the people quickly, and on a national scale “because the first step was 
taken under their traditional leaders, their chiefs” (p.45). During the boycott, when a local 
chief was on trial for supporting the boycott, “posters had appeared in Accra calling upon 
the police to strike and to refuse to obey the orders of the European officers” (p.45). Such 
appeals to the African police recur below, as James’ account of the march continues: 
The crowd directed a heavy fussilade of stones against the police. When the 
police tried to stop them, they shouted insults at the European officers and invited 
the Africans in the ranks to abandon their duty. It seems that they were successful. 
For when the Superintendent [Imray] finally gave the order to fire, the Africans 
did not shoot and he himself had to seize a rifle from the nearest man to fire the 
shots that caused the casualties…The crowd retreated… (p.44)  
 
James rightly emphasizes that such defections by security forces often occur at the 
beginning of revolutions. More specifically, the refusal of soldiers or police to obey 
orders is often a key factor in successful nonviolent revolutions (Sharp 2005, p.482, 
p.282; Schell 2003, p.171; Nepstad 2011, pp.128-131). 
 Textbook depictions of the nonviolent replacement of the Rawlings regime. 
Historians and peace scholars have classified the 2000 movement which “ousted” 
Rawlings as “nonviolent” (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). The movement revolved 
around emergent independent media, civil society organizations (e.g., new watchdog 
groups like the Center for Democracy and Development (Onishi 1999)), and political 
parties in preparation for the 2000 presidential election which resulted in the “first 
nonviolent transfer of power” since Ghana’s independence (AFP 2000, December 31, 
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p.12). As such, the movement might be better categorized in terms of a mix of 
“conventional action” and “nonviolent action” (Martin 2008). Hence, the Ghanian 
textbook which covers the 2000 election should not be too harshly critiqued for failing to 
describe the movement as a case of nonviolent action (which it does fail to do), since, 
compared to the other cases analyzed in this project, this case involves relatively more 
conventional action.  
 However, the case demonstrates how nonviolent movements often elude naming 
and narrative description in journalistic coverage as well as textbook coverage – as peace 
is viewed as a non-event, while violence fills the news. Indeed, The New York Times was 
careful to describe the one case of violence in some detail, but not the mechanisms that 
ensured peace: “The elections were generally peaceful, although there was news today 
that four people had been killed in a polling center dispute that turned into an ethnic clash 
in the town of Bawku in the far north of the country on Election Day” (AFP 2000, 
December 10, p.36). 
 Still, the 2000 movement was a case of “nonviolent action” in the sense that, in 
context, the lack of democratic institutions meant that mass organizing under the nose of 
the Rawlings regime still in power, was marked by courage, improvisation, and 
nonviolent mass movement protest methods, rather than working through established 
political structures. Such nonviolent action “goes beyond routine behavior, often by 
challenging conventional practices” (Martin 2008, p.236).  
 In the months preceding the 2000 election, the ruling party’s monopoly over the 
media rapidly crumbled, as over 30 FM radio stations and two independent TV stations 
emerged and helped level the playing field in the political arena (Gocking 2005, p.249). 
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The international community provided funding for voter-identification cards and 
election-monitoring projects, while civic and religious organizations helped to ensure a 
peaceful election. Transparency and accountability in the political process had finally 
come to Ghana, fears of violence were proved wrong, and all of this while the incumbent 
Rawlings was only 53 years old and at “the height of his power” (pp.250-253). The 
election was celebrated as Ghana’s “second independence,” a demonstration of the power 
of the vote over the power of the gun (p.253). In addition, the winner of the presidential 
election, J.A. Kufour had promised to create a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to 
investigate past abuses, leading Rawlings to hedge his bets by offering an apology in his 
last address to Parliament in January 2000 (p.254). As an act of reconciliation, the Kufuor 
government organized a joint religious memorial service and allowed reburials of the 
three former heads of state and five military officers executed in 1979. However, some 
Ghanian leaders denounced this gesture, including those who feared they could be held 
accountable for their role in the executions (p.259).   
 Unfortunately, the 2000 election is not depicted at all in the secondary school 
national history textbook “approved and recommended by the Textbooks and Educational 
Equipment Committee of the Ministry of Education” (Gadzepko 2005, p.v). In Prah’s 
(2010) Government text, the 2000 election is given condensed coverage highlighting 
eight factors which purport to explain why Rawlings and the National Democratic 
Congress (NDC) were defeated in the 2000 elections. The only listed factor that even 
hints at nonviolent action is the following: “4. The campaign style of the New Patriotic 
Party [NPP]:...youth wholeheartedly embraced the NPP and openly stumped for the party 
in view of its message of hope and reassurance...” (p.401). The 8th factor argues that the 
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NDC’s “antagonistic posture toward the press” backfired, as independent media like 
private newspapers reacted “by playing up the soft underbelly (or weaknesses) of the 
party for public consumption. These weaknesses brought grist to the mill of the NPP, the 
largest opposition party” (p.402). Hence, in the context of a ruling party which grew out 
of Rawling’s military dictatorship and had never lost its grip on power, in the context of a 
“culture of silence” that had long prevailed in Ghana (Onishi1999, p.A3; Prah 2010, 
p.405), the consciousness-raising role of media activism can be considered a sign of an 
emerging “democratic culture” (Onishi 1999, p.A3) as well as a form of nonviolent 
action.  
 The Gadzepko history textbook was printed in 2005, but the last historical event 
covered in any depth in the text concerns the installation of the Rawlings regime on 
December 31, 1981. Thus, there is essentially a 25-year time lag in the textbook, plus the 
five years elapsed since publication (the textbook was still being used in schools in early 
2011), giving us a 30-year lag. Indeed, the only events narrated in the text after 1981 
concern a mention of the undoubtedly controversy-free Pan African Fair for Arts and 
Music in 1990 (p.267), the barest detail that Kofi Annan from Ghana served as Secretary 
General of the U.N. (p.270) – though we are not informed when (he served in this post 
from 1997 to 2006), and a vaguely positive reference to the role of the IMF and World 
Bank in the “planning and restructuring of the country’s economy since 1983” (p.270).  
 This development is framed in terms of “Ghana’s effort to attain a high level [of] 
economic development,” and it is uncritically stated that “Loans were granted to ensure 
growth in all sectors of the economy” (Gadzepko 2005, p.270, emphasis added). 
However, by 1996 Ghana was “spending one-fourth of its revenue on debt servicing” and 
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facing intense pressure from the U.S. and U.K. to engage in further restructuring through 
an IMF/ World Bank HIPC Initiative for “poor and heavily indebted” nations (Gocking 
2005, pp.262-262).    
 In any case, such significant time lags warrant reflection. Obviously, time lags 
dissipate culpability for ugly truths. Hence, official government apologies – when they 
arise at all – typically surface many decades after the fact. In addition, it is no 
exaggeration to claim that generations of school children all around the world are 
disempowered from understanding the zeitgeist and engaging in political action in the 
present and near future partly due to such time lags in the social studies curriculum. The 
neglect of live issues misses an opportunity to model civil discussion and debate, a vital 
skill for democratic citizens and one that could be fostered in the context of a classroom.  
 Sins of omission: What is missing in the Ghanaian text? Any national history 
textbook is subject to accusations of selection bias as well as descriptive bias, but we will 
limit ourselves to a few issues relevant to the present study on the place of nonviolence in 
collective memories. Ironically, the U.S. history textbook, from my Junior year in High 
School, which I happen to still own, relates details about Ghana’s history that are missing 
in the Ghana textbook. In a text box entitled, “New Nations in Africa,” my U.S. history 
text reports,  
As a young man, Nkrumah had studied Western political systems in the United 
States and Britain…In 1950, inspired by the example of Gandhi in India, he 
organized a campaign of civil disobedience in the Gold Coast…Some leading 
black Americans, including W.E.B. Du Bois, later moved to Ghana to show their 
support for the new country. (Graff 1986, p.363) 
 
These three sentences merit comment. First, the Ghana text stripped Nkrumah’s 
biographical details to the barest summaries, for example, only informing us that he 
503 
“studied abroad” (p.184). How can it be that the U.S. text actually gives us more details? 
The Ghanaian text’s minimal biographical coverage of Nkrumah likely illustrates how 
Nkrumah’s dictatorial turn made him an object of derision, held in Ghana’s collective 
memory with significant ambiguity.  
 This official ambivalence about Nkrumah may fade with time. Already by 1997, 
the 40th anniversary of Ghana’s independence was accompanied by a new appreciation 
among Ghanaians for Nkrumah’s accomplishments and his pan-Africanist vision 
(Gocking 2005, p.241). And even before the anniversary, Nkrumah was rehabilitated as 
“Africa’s hero” among those who understood neocolonialism as a grave threat to Africa, 
just as Nkrumah had preached (Birmingham 1998, pp.110-111). But the fact remains that 
Nkrumah did rapidly transform the democratic government into a repressive dictatorship, 
a “personal political machine” (Bretton 1966, p.43, p.49). The textbook informs us of 
detentions of political enemies, but does not delve into other details, opting instead for a 
general condemnation of Nkrumah.  
 A few more suggestive details of Nkrumah’s coercive rule will suffice to point 
out what is ignored in the text. From 1961 on, media censorship (especially targeting any 
criticism of Nkrumah or socialism) was enforced and extended to all media outlets 
including virtually all bookstores in the country (Bretton 1966, pp.89-90). A committee 
was appointed to “look into the content of books in our schools, colleges, universities and 
libraries, to eliminate those in direct conflict with the ideology of the Party and the 
nation, and to ensure that these vital means of molding the thoughts of the people, young 
and old, are attuned to the aims of the society we are building” (p.90). Bretton casts doubt 
on the significance of this committee, noting, “In practice, all that the committee really 
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had to guide them was the fact that the ideology of the party was Nkrumaism and 
Nkrumaism was what the Leader said it was” (p.90). However, control was further 
tightened when the State Publishing Corporation was established in 1965, creating a 
complete monopoly on publishing and distribution in Ghana (p.201). When Nkrumah 
was overthrown in the military coup, the CPP, with its two million members and 500,000 
militants pledged by traditional African oaths to support Nkrumah, allowed itself to be 
dissolved and did not organize a single protest in support of Nkrumah (Fitch and 
Oppenheimer 1966, pp.2-3).        
 Second, of particular note to sociologists, the Ghanaian textbook credits W.E.B. 
Du Bois as the “father of Pan-Africanism” (p.129), but no mention is made of him again. 
While my U.S. high school textbook ascribes some significance to Du Bois’s move to 
Ghana, the Ghana text ignores this event, perhaps due to Du Bois’s Marxist leanings. 
Ghana, like most of the world, experienced deep political fissures over contending cold 
war ideologies, and power elite backlashes against forms of socialism and Marxism 
continues today. Other omissions are more puzzling, such as a failure to recount Ghana’s 
independence ceremonies. Incidentally, those in attendance included leading nonviolent 
civil rights activists from the U.S. such as Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and A. Philip 
Randolph. King (1998) narrates how people walked through the streets of Accra crying, 
“Freedom! Freedom!” and “All hail, Nkrumah!,” but he also sets the scene for the 
challenges ahead – again, 90% of Ghanaians were illiterate (p.112, p.115).     
 Third, while the Ghana text twice mentions Gandhi’s influence on Ghanaian 
soldiers returning from World War II (Gadzepko 2005, p.186, p.189), Gandhi’s 
nonviolent ideology and tactics are never discussed and Gandhi’s influence is never 
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connected with Nkrumah – the key leader of the independence movement. Again, 
according to the theoretical tradition of path dependency, the origins of a nation are likely 
to play a significant constraining role in the future structural, institutional, and ideological 
direction of a nation (Mahoney 2000). This likely holds true if national origins are 
understood with sufficient complexity, i.e., as a dynamic and somewhat extended 
process. The Ghana text, directly and indirectly, by its narrative and its omissions, gives 
us reason for widening the template of national origins beyond the independence 
movement itself, to include a longer episode marked by three processes: independence/ or 
regime change, the new leader’s turn towards dictatorship (with Nkrumah being only the 
first instance), and a military coup. In fact, this is a template that is repeated throughout 
Ghana’s six decades of existence. This template helps to account for why the text 
mystifies important details of the independence movement – including the guiding 
nonviolent ideology of the movement.  
 Recovering the nonviolent independence movement. There are solid reasons for 
asserting that the independence movement was conceived and led as a nonviolent 
movement. In September of 1948, Nkrumah founded a newspaper, the Accra Evening 
News, as a mouthpiece of the CPP. He contributed daily editorials to the paper which 
document his advocacy of nonviolence and democracy and his critique of imperialism. 
He offers up the example of India: “When India found her continuance under British rule 
an indignity that belittled her nationality, and was unable by peaceful and constitutional 
means to obtain her freedom, Gandhi appeared on the scene with the weapons of non-co-
operation and civil disobedience movement [sic]” (Nkrumah 1973, p.78). He then 
proceeds to theorize “organized people’s power” (p.91) as he writes, “we have moral and 
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spiritual forces at our disposal which out-number all physical weapons…” (p.78). And in 
speeches, Nkrumah urged crowds to maintain absolute nonviolent discipline: “there 
should be no looting or burning of buildings, no rioting, damage or disturbance of any 
sort; that the success of our cause depended on the non-violent and peaceful character of 
our struggle” (p.114). Before launching “positive action,” in a December 15, 1949 
editorial in the Accra Evening News, Nkrumah had also urged his followers to refrain 
from violence against strikebreakers and added, “REMEMBER THE STRIKE IS ON 
THE BASIS OF PERFECT NONVIOLENCE …NON-VIOLENCE IS OUR CREED” 
(Timothy 1955, pp.96-97; emphasis in original). 
 A detailed statement on nonviolent strategy was also produced by Nkrumah in 
1949, in the early stages of the independence movement. Nkrumah’s pamphlet, What I 
Mean by Positive Action, clarified:  
The weapons of Positive Action are: 
1) Legitimate political agitation;  
2) Newspaper and educational campaigns and 
3) as a last resort, the constitutional application of strikes, boycotts, and non co-
operation based on the principle of absolute non-violence. 
(Nkrumah 1973, p.94) 
 
The pamphlet begins by refuting charges that Positive Action means “riot, looting and 
disturbances, in a word violence” (p.92). He clarified that he understood Gandhi to have 
“liquidated British Imperialism” by “moral pressure,” and added: “We believe that we 
can achieve self-government even now by constitutional means without resort to any 
violence” (p.93). This emphasis on “constitutional means” can be called a “conservative 
interpretation of Gandhi, who never stipulated that non-violence must be ‘constitutional’” 
(Fitch and Oppenheimer 1966, p.28).    
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 In the pamphlet Nkrumah also reports that the CPP has adopted a “programme of 
non-violent Positive Action to attain Self-government for the people of this country and 
their Chiefs” (p.93). Taking yet another page from Gandhi’s nonviolent action template, 
he rejects the idea that strikes and boycotts should be planned in secret and launched as 
surprises, stating: “As for us, our faith in justice and fair play forbids us to adopt such 
sneaky methods. We like to use open methods and to be fair and above board in our 
dealings” (p.94). Nkrumah then quotes two sentences from C.V.H. Rao’s book Civil 
Disobedience Movement in India, which argue that a country like Britain “…can 
appreciate only force or its moral equivalent” (p.94). Rao’s wordy rationale points to the 
moral dimension of nonviolent protest: “An important contributory factor to the 
satisfactory settlement of a disputed issue is the extent and the nature of the moral force 
and public sympathy generated by the righteousness of the cause for which the suffering 
is undergone and the extent of the moral reaction it has produced on the party against 
which it is directed” (p.94). It seems the passage may have raised more questions than it 
answered for its readers, but this is as close as the pamphlet comes to theorizing 
nonviolent action. The morality of nonviolence is not specifically defended, and in fact, 
“armed revolution and violent overthrow” are discussed as another means of achieving 
independence. Without condemning the violent means per se, the pamphlet does contrast 
violent means with “constitutional and legitimate non-violent, methods” (p.93; emphasis 
added). The pamphlet closes by reiterating that Positive Action is “based on the principle 
of absolute non-violence” and that if necessary, the “final stage” of Positive Action will 
be called into play: “namely Nation-wide Non-violent Sit-down-at-home Strikes, 
Boycotts, and Non-co-operation” (p.95). Nkrumah (1973) later recalled:  
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In What I Mean by Positive Action, I called for non-violent methods of struggle. 
We had no guns. But even if we had, the circumstances were such that non-
violent alternatives were open to us, and it was necessary to try them before 
resorting to other means. In those days, when we talked of tactics of non-violence 
we meant the kind of tactics employed by Gandhi in India. (p.86) 
 
After his arrest by the British colonial authorities for inciting others to take part in an 
illegal strike aimed at coercing the government, Nkrumah stated at his trial that he was a 
disciple of Gandhi and that his Positive Action campaign was based on Gandhi’s 
nonviolent methods, and included strikes in which he advocated that people “should 
follow proper methods; sit down at home and follow absolute non-violence” (Timothy 
1955, p.108, p.111).  
 There is some evidence that Nkrumah’s respect for nonviolence was sincere, 
though Nkrumah’s own writings must be read with deep skepticism and many of his 
biographers also lack a sufficiently critical stance (Bretton 1966). Bretton argues that 
Nkrumah appeared “decidedly humane” in public, but at times he acted with “cold 
brutality” (p.21). Other biographers have described Nkrumah’s “horror of violence” from 
a young age and his admiration for Gandhi and Gandhian nonviolence (Davidson 1989, 
p.19). Nkrumah (1961) wrote admiringly of Gandhi and “his adherence to non-violent 
resistance” (p.3, see also p.155). Moreover, Nkrumah (1957) wrote in his autobiography 
against the death penalty: “I have always been against the death penalty…I believe that it 
is a relic of barbarism and savagery and that it is inconsistent with decent morals and the 
teaching of Christian ethics” (p.132). Nkrumah’s autobiography describes how after 
“months of studying Gandhi’s policy” of nonviolence, he came to understand it as “the 
solution to the colonial problem” (p.viii).  
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 In a sermon on Ghana given in Montgomery, Alabama on April 7, 1957, Martin 
Luther King, Jr. (recently returned from Ghana’s independence ceremonies) approvingly 
cited this passage of Nkrumah’s autobiography, and drew several lessons from the 
example of Nkrumah in Ghana, underlining how it was further support for the efficacy of 
nonviolence (King 1957). Incidentally, what King did not mention was the next sentence 
in Nkrumah’s (1957) passage: “In Jawaharlal Nehru’s rise to power I recognized the 
success of one who, pledged to Socialism, was able to interpret Gandhi’s philosophy in 
practical terms” (p.viii). Nkrumah’s comfort with using the word “socialism,” even 
leaving aside his policies, made him something of a marked man in the context of the 
cold war. Moreover, the idea that Gandhi had to be translated into “practical terms” 
would be anathema to Gandhi and King, and it offers an important clue to Nkrumah’s 
conception of Gandhi and Nkrumah’s later movement beyond nonviolence to his 
legitimation of armed struggle as well as his ruthless realpolitiks in order to maintain 
power at home.      
 As mentioned above, also missing from the textbook narrative is the extent of the 
repression, propaganda, and intimidation the British employed in trying to put down the 
nonviolent movement. Offering a clearer account than the textbook, Nkrumah (1973) 
recounts how curfews were imposed, public meetings banned, newspapers shut down, 
newspaper editors arrested, CPP leaders arrested one by one and “homes and offices 
ransacked by the police” (pp.88-90). The textbook recounts some of these details but with 
much less detail and clarity. For example, we are merely told that there were “Attempts 
by government to suppress these papers…” (Gadzepko 2005, p.197). In addition, in a key 
meeting between Nkrumah and the British Colonial Secretary Reginald Saloway, 
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Saloway tried to threaten and scare Nkrumah out of initiating his Positive Action 
campaign. Saloway, who had also been a civil servant in British India, was aware that 
Nkrumah’s campaign was modeled after Gandhi’s movement in India, and Saloway 
pointedly argued that Gandhi’s nonviolent action template would not work in Africa: 
India was a very different matter. The Indian was used to suffering pains and 
deprivations, but the African has not the spirit of endurance. Mark my words, my 
good man: within three days the people here will let you down – they’ll never 
stick it. Now, had this been India… (Nkrumah 1957, p.116)    
 
In the days that followed, civil servants who participated in positive action were fired 
(Timothy 1955, p.117). The British propaganda machine launched misinformation 
campaigns to undermine the resolve of the movement. For example, radio news declared 
the Positive Action campaign was cancelled, and Nkrumah’s (1957) account claims radio 
news falsely reported that workers in various parts of the country had abandoned their 
strikes (pp.117-118). However, the New York Times, in a highly reactionary tone, called 
the CPP “nationalist extremists” (NYT, March 19, 1950), and reported on January 17 that 
“More strikers, out since Jan. 9…went back to work during the day” (NYT, January 18, 
1950). Whether the Times was repeating British misinformation, or the strikers did in fact 
return to work cannot be verified.   
 It is not hard to imagine that the relative success of the movement, disproving 
Saloway’s theory, could have figured prominently as a point of national pride in the 
textbook (i.e., the people did possess “the spirit of endurance”). But the narrative neglects 
this episode, perhaps because the campaign was so short-lived and the CPP rapidly 
shifted their agenda into electoral politics.  
 This brings up the larger point that the British colonial authorities remain 
nameless and faceless in the text (e.g., the names of Saloway and the colonial Governor 
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Charles Arden-Clark never appear in the text), and so the opponent targeted by 
nonviolent action never clearly emerges from the shadows. Perhaps Ghana’s ongoing 
membership in the British Commonwealth of Nations, which is approvingly celebrated in 
the text (Gadzepko 2005, pp.264-266), fosters a subtle reluctance to fully recount the 
ugly repression of the colonial authorities during the independence movement. We do 
find general condemnations in the textbook, such as: “Whatever form the Colonial 
administration took it remained, until its termination in 1957, obnoxious, arbitrary and 
exploitative” (p.150). But the heated rhetoric of Nkrumah never surfaces, and pericopes 
from his newspaper editorials would seem somewhat out of place in the textbook: e.g.,  
“…even when imperialism appears to give way, it tries to sabotage it by the back door” 
(Nkrumah 1973, p.81). 
 Nkrumah’s turn from the comic to the tragic. At Nkrumah’s trial, the Magistrate 
sentenced him to three one-year terms to be served concurrently (Fitch and Oppenheimer 
1966, p.31), but Nkrumah was released early on February 12, 1951, because, while in 
prison, he had been elected to the Legislative Assembly in the first general election in the 
Gold Coast (Timothy 1955, pp.113-114). The speech he gave the next day, makes clear 
how conscious he was of the Cold War, of the importance of building the opponent’s 
trust, and advocating modest reforms – typical of the “comic” rhetorical frame that 
Gandhi so often utilized (Carlson 1986):  
I would like to make it absolutely clear that I am a friend of Britain. I desire for 
the Gold Coast Dominion Status within the Commonwealth. We shall remain 
within the British Commonwealth of Nations. I am not even thinking of a 
republic. I am a Marxian Socialist and an undenominational Christian. I am not a 
Communist and never have been one. I come out of gaol [prison] and into the 
Assembly without the slightest feeling of bitterness to Britain. I stand for no 
discrimination against any race or individual, but I am unalterably opposed to 
Imperialism in any form. (Timothy 1955, p.114) 
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Utilizing the conceptual apparatus of Burke’s (1959) tragic-comic frames, a brief sketch 
of Nkrumah’s transition from a “comic frame” to a “tragic frame” can help us understand 
the seeds of his fall. Nkrumah’s transition from nonviolence to violence is an obvious 
shift from the comic to the tragic, as defined by Burke. 
 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. noted that when Nkrumah gave his speech to 
Parliament during the independence ceremonies, Nkrumah and his colleagues wore their 
prison caps and coats, as if a badge of honor but also a startling image of humility (King 
1998, p.113), and an image clearly in tune with the “comic frame.” But Nkrumah’s turn 
to the “tragic frame” was swift, as we see in his many proclamations of utopian visions – 
a key marker of the tragic. After assuming the reins of power he promised that Ghana 
would become a “paradise” within a few years (Nugent 1995, p.5). His extremely 
ambitious, utopian pan-Africanist vision “…gradually deteriorated into a form of escape” 
(Bretton 1966, p.29). Similarly, Davidson (1989) argues that Nkrumah’s extensive 
writings tended to be “theorizing in a vacuum. It had little or no impact on the political 
machine” (p.195).       
 The tragic rhetorical frame is also marked by megalomania. As the country 
struggled in an economic crisis early in his reign, Nkrumah ordered 9 bronze statues of 
himself made in Italy at an exorbitant price (Gadzepko 2005, p.232). A twenty-foot high 
statue of him was erected in front of Parliament House in Accra, bearing an inscription – 
a quote from Nkrumah: “Seek ye first the political kingdom and all other things shall be 
added to you” (Addo 1997, p.65). Here, Nkrumah seems to have aimed for frame 
alignment with Christians, as the line borrows heavily from the New Testament, Matthew 
6:33: “seek ye first the Kingdom of God and his righteousness; and all things shall be 
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added unto you.” But combined with the larger than life statue, some Christians saw it as 
sacrilegious (Addo 1997), and one can readily consider a reading which sees Nkrumah as 
an egotistical, self-proclaimed Messiah. But defenders have argued this is a misreading: 
“the statement specifically referred to his belief in the primacy of politics and the need to 
address the question of national sovereignty as an index to socio-economic development” 
(Addo 1997, p.66).  
 Critics maintain that the ideology of Nkrumaism became a “religious 
phenomenon” with Nkrumah filling a divine role, but perhaps few were more than 
superficially loyal to Nkrumah (Bretton 1966, pp.87-88). Still, with Nkrumah’s face on 
coins, bills, and stamps, and with streets and squares named after him (p.88), the 
personality cult pervaded the symbols of the young state, making his fall all the more 
devastating. The tragic frame extends all the way to the words inscribed in Guinea on his 
coffin: “THE GREATEST AFRICAN” (Milne 1990, p.x). Yet, after the coup ousting 
Nkrumah, few had misgivings about his overthrow. The next day, one of his top advisors 
pledged loyalty to the new police/ military government saying, “The Army has taken 
power to liberate the people from oppression. The Ghanaian people will now have a free 
country and will not idolize a single man” (Fitch and Oppenheimer 1966, p.2). 
 The text byGadzepko (2005) describes Nkrumah’s increasingly authoritarian 
regime, writing that Nkrumah “never intended giving the opposition a respite. Right from 
the word go, he was ready to scare the small puppies to death before they could even 
open their eyes” (p.207). Thus, Nkrumah’s dictatorial suppression of any political 
opposition, along with the warranted perception that his government had generally 
become “corrupt, tyrannical and incompetent” (pp.259-260, pp.230-232), were key 
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driving factors in his Shakespearean fall from grace: “He became obsessed with his own 
power and ambition” (p.230). The textbook argues: “it is crystal clear that, by removing 
the Government of Nkrumah, Ghanians were saved from a ‘reign of terror’” (p.237). But 
the textbook offers some details on how a reign of terror had already begun (pp.230-231), 
and Nkrumah’s coercive methods are said to extend beyond Ghana’s borders as the 
textbook alleges that Nkrumah may have played a role in several assassinations of 
African leaders in other nations (p.232). 
 Nkrumah’s pan-African vision and his role in mentoring revolutionary leaders and 
in fostering anti-colonial liberation movements throughout Africa receive prominent 
coverage in the text. Nkrumah’s role seems to be portrayed as one of strategic counselor, 
but again, “nonviolence” never appears and the tactics of the anti-colonial movements are 
not discussed, though references to “freedom fighters” and “radical methods” appear 
(Gadzepko 2005, pp.227-229).  
 Thus, there are vague hints in the text that Nkrumah had abandoned nonviolence 
as he pursued his pan-Africanist vision. In fact, before the coup in 1966, Nkrumah had 
already written a manual (later published as a book in 1968), Handbook of Revolutionary 
Warfare: A Guide to the Armed Phase of the African Revolution, dedicated “To the 
African Guerrilla” (Milne 1990, p.9, p.446). Writing from Conakry, Guinea in July of 
1968, Nkrumah argued that the Black Power movement in the U.S.A. and the struggles of 
African descendents in the Caribbean and South America were signs of a new phase of 
“African politico-military revolutionary struggle” against “imperialist and neo-colonialist 
aggression” (pp.446-447). Like his turn to violent means, Nkrumah’s previous adherence 
to nonviolence drew inspiration from the spirit of the times. In the mid-1940’s, anti-
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colonial movements were inspired by Gandhi’s example, and when Nkrumah attended 
the Sixth Pan-African Congress in 1945 in Manchester, the core themes included 
“nonviolence and positive action” (Fitch and Oppenheimer 1966, p.19). Thus, we should 
not overlook how the emerging interpretive community of pan-Africanists shaped 
Nkrumah’s embrace of nonviolence, as well as his later turn away from it. 
 The “Handbook” outlines a six point argument for why “anti-imperialist pacifism 
is dying, and on a continental scale,” while declaring that “Violence clears the ‘neo-
colonialist fog’…The issues are made clear” (Milne 1990, p.484). Nkrumah argues that 
“pacific political action” was potent during the “national phase of the liberation 
movement,” though mainly in sub-Saharan Africa, but there were also exceptions to that 
pattern such as in Kenya where “recourse to peaceful political action was denied to the 
masses” and the Mau Mau emerged (p.483). He envisions a Pan-Africanist military 
struggle against “imperialist aggression” and states “Revolutionary warfare is the logical, 
inevitable answer to the political, economic and social situation in Africa today. We do 
not have the luxury of an alternative” (p.476). It seems Nkrumah’s ideological transition 
beyond Gandhian nonviolence was complete, and influenced by the spirit of his time and 
context.  
  
Why Nonviolence is Muted in the Ghana Textbook 
 I suggest four reasons why nonviolent action does not figure more prominently in 
the textbook’s independence narrative – all of them linked to Nkrumah, the key leader of 
the independence movement. First, Nkrumah’s fall, the dominant narrative of his 
“corruption” and “moral disintegration” (Bretton 1966, pp.28-29), his “idiosyncratic, 
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one-man rule” (Blum 1995, p.198) served to focus the collective memory away from the 
entire independence movement. What could have conceivably been a glorious narrative 
of national origins, a point of reference for patriotic as well as nonviolent norms in the 
culture, retrospectively transformed into an episode that was de-emphasized and 
mystified through neglect and disillusionment. The textbook even neglects to mention 
that Nkurmah was one of the heroic “Bix Six” arrested by the British in 1948, as if to 
redeem that episode by writing him out of it!  
 Second, the military coup served the same mystifying function, and for good 
reason. Though fledgling democratic institutions were severely compromised as 
Nkrumah rapidly turned dictatorial, the military coup brought a complete overhaul in the 
political opportunity structure. Beliefs in the efficacy of nonviolent political action must 
have been shattered. Perhaps some Ghanaians even argued the refrain heard around the 
world, “Nonviolence worked against the British, but it won’t work against…” Fill-in-the-
blank here, in this case: Ghana’s military leadership. 
 Third, the potential survival of Nkrumah’s nonviolent norms in the collective 
memory was undermined by the fact that Nkrumah soon explicitly endorsed armed 
struggle as the next phase of anticolonialism, the official positive action campaign only 
lasted two weeks (though rallies, marches, and threats to undertake positive action long 
preceded it), and Nkrumah and other CPP leaders showed deep ambivalence about mass 
nonviolent action and especially civil disobedience. Some have argued that Nkrumah’s 
commitment to non-violence had been “abstract” (Fitch and Oppenheimer 1966, p.19). 
And, we must emphasize Nkrumah’s explicit endorsement of violent revolutionary 
methods in his book.  
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 Yet, as late as April of 1960, Nkrumah (1961) still took pages from the Gandhian 
repertoire as he convened a conference in Accra on “Positive Action and Security in 
Africa” and in his opening speech threatened a mass nonviolent march into the French 
nuclear testing zone in the Sahara, where France had already detonated two nuclear 
bombs (pp.214-215). He argued that “the result could be as powerful and as successful as 
Gandhi’s historic Salt March,” putting pressure on the De Gaulle government and 
winning over French and world opinion (p.215). However, the march was never planned 
and that this was a bluff was probably transparently obvious, as asking people to walk 
towards the nuclear contamination carried serious health risks. Though in fairness, he 
seems to have imagined that all protesters would be arrested before reaching the test site 
(p.215). Nevertheless, Nkrumah’s speech praises Gandhi and the contemporary struggle 
in South Africa: “We salute Mahatma Gandhi and we remember in tribute to him, that it 
was in South Africa that his method of non-violence and non-co-operation was first 
practiced…But now positive action with non-violence, as advocated by us, has found 
expression South Africa in the defiance of the oppressive pass laws” (p.215). It is not 
entirely clear here if Nkrumah is claiming South African nonviolence to be modeled 
partly on his own “positive action” repertoire during Ghana’s independence movement, 
but in truth he initiated no new tactical innovations to the Gandhian repertoire.     
 At the height of the independence movement, CPP leaders set an ambiguous tone 
regarding nonviolent action. The Trade Union Congress (TUC) actually declared the 
general strike to begin on January 7, 1950. This forced the hand of the CPP. Had they 
failed to endorse the strike they would have appeared far more moderate than their 
rhetoric, and risked letting the labor movement’s revolutionary momentum pass them by. 
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On January 8, Nkrumah announced that the positive action campaign would begin the 
next day on January 9 (Gocking 2005, pp.92-93). Once again, it seems the reality was 
more complex than the textbook’s portrayal, in which the CPP is said to call for the 
general strike and it was said to be the sign that the workers’ “Messiah” had come 
(Gadzepko 2005, p.194). In fact, positive action only lasted two weeks, as Nkrumah 
called off the campaign the day he was arrested on January 21 (Fitch and Oppenheimer 
1966, p.31). There were sporadic outbreaks of violence during the 2 weeks of the general 
strike, but the violence was effectively repressed by a “new force of mobile police” 
(p.30). Working-class solidarity was lacking and scabs were hired (p.30). Narratives of 
the movement typically fail to report that at least in working-class districts, the sentiment 
was that the strike and the positive action campaign had failed (p.31).  
 If failure is likely to lead social movement actors to doubt their tactics, how much 
more so when movement leaders waiver in their advocacy or even denounce those tactics. 
After several meetings between Nkrumah, Arden-Clarke, and Saloway, Nkrumah tried to 
get the TCU to call off the general strike, the CPP newspaper twice postponed positive 
action, and at one point Nkrumah called positive action off completely (Fitch and 
Oppenheimer 1966, p.29). After the government prosecuted TUC and CPP leaders for 
promoting an illegal strike, the “entire party leadership denounced the General Strike” 
during their trials (p.127). Fitch and Oppenheimer have pointed to this as part of CPP’s 
first and last mistake – taking it as a sign of their “coalition with colonialism” (p.127).  
 What were the reasons for this ambivalence about nonviolent tactics, and more 
specifically, for the denunciation of the strike? To some degree, the behavior of the CPP 
leaders bears resemblance to other prominent nonviolent leaders. Perhaps we should 
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recall that unlike Gandhi, who insisted on truth telling in the courtroom, Dr. King and his 
colleagues engaged in evasions and prevarications in the court room (Burns 2004, p.98). 
In addition, Gandhi often sought to negotiate with his opponents, to gain leverage 
through the threat of launching a campaign, and often called off his campaigns. King 
repeatedly delayed the start of the Birmingham campaign (see Burns 2004, p.166). In 
Birmingham, King and the SCLC even considered abandoning direct action in favor of 
voter registration, in part because local conservative and moderate black leaders were 
reluctant to endorse civil disobedience as they hoped new political leaders would “make 
protests unnecessary” (p.167). Arden-Clark recalled that some CPP leaders were 
moderate in this sense as well, saying they “would have preferred not to resort to 
‘positive action’ but to await the results of the general election, the outcome of which 
they were fairly confident” (Fitch and  Oppenheimer 1966, p.29). In these senses, 
Nkrumah and other CPP leaders were not so unusual. Nonviolent protest involves 
strategic maneuvering and at times during a protest cycle, civil disobedience might be ill 
advised. Thus, Dr. King had always obeyed court orders but, partly because such 
obedience had proved too constricting in the failed Albany campaign, King defied a court 
injunction in the Birmingham campaign, finally merging civil disobedience and the 
nonviolent movement (Schulke and McPhee 1986, pp.123-125).  
 However, the way in which CPP leaders so completely denounced the strike and 
“positive action” during the trials must have been demoralizing to any CPP followers 
who had been inspired by Nkrumah’s call for nonviolent action and civil disobedience. 
Fitch and Oppenheimer (1966) note of the trials: “The spirit of courageous defiance was 
clearly absent” (p.30). Nkrumah was the only CPP leader who admitted to any 
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connection to the positive action campaign, but even he distanced himself from the strike. 
Nkrumah “denied having called on anybody to strike,” he “maintained that he even tried 
to stop the strike when he heard of it,” and he claimed those who did strike were not 
influenced by the CPP (Fitch and Oppenheimer 1966, p.31). 
 Fourth, accounts of Nkrumah and the independence movement omit any evidence 
that he might have framed nonviolence in terms of native tribal traditions or Christian 
moral norms (Assensoh 1989, Fitch and Oppenheimer 1966, Gocking 2005, Timothy 
1955). Nkrumah’s frequent editorials in the Accra Evening News seemingly neglect the 
opportunity to theorize nonviolence, though references to “relentless” “struggle” abound, 
and anecdotes from the military battles of Churchill and Garibaldi appear (e.g., Timothy 
1955, pp.83-86). The crucial statement of nonviolent strategy encapsulated in the 
pamphlet, What I Mean by Positive Action, attempts no frame alignment or frame 
resonance with the moral and religious traditions of the Ghanaian people. This is 
somewhat puzzling given that, as we have seen above, in Nkrumah’s autobiography, he 
clearly denounces the death penalty using Christian ethics frames (Nkrumah 1957, 
p.132). In addition, CPP gatherings often included Christian prayers, traditional sheep 
sacrifices, oath taking (taken from tribal traditions of loyalty oaths (Fitch and 
Oppenheimer 1966, pp.63-64)), and libation rituals (“a form of prayer directed to the 
Supreme Being and to the ancestors, in gratitude, for petition and protection” (Addo 
1997, p.120, p.104). This syncretic, eclectic mixing of traditions was a hallmark of many 
post-colonial African leaders and governments, though some Christians in Ghana viewed 
the appropriation of some of these practices with “horror” (pp.104-105). Fitch and 
Oppenheimer (1966) inform us that CPP members were “pledged by oath to support Dr. 
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Nkrumah” (p.2). But it seems Nkrumah did not employ the tribal tradition of oaths to 
secure nonviolent commitments during the independence movement. 
 On this last point, we should note that Nkrumah studied Christian theology and 
preached in U.S. churches, but on several occasions he was also observed practicing 
African religious traditions (Assensoh 1989, pp.55-56; Bretton 1966, pp.31-32). 
Nevertheless, he called himself an “undenominational Christian” at the height of the 
independence movement. If Nkrumah had aligned his nonviolent frames with Christian or 
traditional African religious traditions (or more likely, a syncretic version of these), 
nonviolent strategies may have obtained more stickiness in the collective memory, 
especially if the frames resonated as organically related to pre-existing tribal and 
Christian traditions. The potential for pan-tribal frames would seem to be high given 
many common features of cultural practice, including language and chieftancy, between 
the tribes, coupled with the fact that the Akan peoples constituted up to 45% of the 
population (Gadzepko 2005, p.210).  
 However, there are practical reasons it may have been difficult to attempt frame 
resonance with existing traditions. Some argue that Nkrumah’s political agenda aimed to 
reduce the salience of the tribal (Assensoh 1989, p.194), that bitterness quickly developed 
between Nkrumah and the chiefs (Gocking 2005, p.94), and that Christianity in Ghana 
has tended to be quite conservative politically (Addo 1997; Nugent 1995, p.9), “other-
worldly” theologically (p.31), and culturally European or phobic about indigenous 
African traditions including African drums and clothing styles (Addo 1997). However, 
some Protestant Christian clergy did throw themselves into ardent support of the CPP and 
took up leadership positions in the CPP (Addo 1997, pp.103-104). 
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 The symbols and frames surrounding Nkrumah’s “cult of personality” are 
strongly contested. It seems the challenges of creating, virtually overnight, pan-tribal 
Ghanaian unity along with a Ghanaian “civil religion” (Bellah 1967) were destined to 
appear as too radical and disconnected from existing cultural and religious traditions. To 
be sure there was a “cultural and psychological void arising from the colonial 
experience” (Bretton 1966, p.11), but it could also be said that Nkrumah’s CPP, with 
ideology and organizations modeled on Soviet and Eastern European Communist parties 
imported “tactics and practices” that “bore no relationship to either the culture or polity in 
Ghana (p.10). There is a sense in which the personality cult of Nkrumah was more 
organically related to a culture of chieftans, and in fact, the “most practical way of 
providing the new ship of state with a stable keel” (p.12). And in years to come, there 
was a void from the “deflating experience” of witnessing a charismatic independence 
leader pass from power (Geertz 1973 cited in Addo 1997, p.197). For example, Nkrumah 
was given a traditional title, Osagyefo, meaning “victor in war” (somewhat ironically for 
the leader of a nonviolent movement), but some translated this as “redeemer” to the 
delight of his ardent followers as well as his critics who took it as a sign of his 
megalomania (Davidson 1989, p.192). Just as Messianic titles were adopted for 
Nkrumah, Christian hymns, prayers, and Biblical passages were re-written (Addo 1997, 
pp.101-102). The CPP’s propaganda machine even produced political versions of the 
Lord’s Prayer, the Apostle’s Creed, and the Beatitudes with Nkrumah and the CPP cast in 
pseudo-divine roles (Timothy 1955; pp.80-81, pp.101-102).   
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A Second Opinion: The Account of Another Ghanaian Textbook 
 The Prah (2010) Government textbook (i.e., a political science text) for senior 
high schools offers much more concise coverage of Nkrumah, independence, the rise and 
fall of the CPP. But the text includes a number of critical strengths. For instance, one 
chapter briefly but laudably critiques the widespread pattern of military coups and 
military rule in West Africa, while appealing to democratic and human rights norms. In 
addition, Prah’s coverage of “positive action” is somewhat more comprehensive than 
Gadzepko’s. For example, positive action is explicitly linked to Gandhi’s “peaceful 
tactics”: 
In 1950 Kwame Nkrumah, the leader of the CPP, declared ‘positive action’ by 
which he called upon workers in the country to stage a sit-down strike and boycott 
British good and refuse to co-operate with the colonial authorities to back their 
demand for an end to colonial rule. Nkrumah’s positive action was influenced by 
the peaceful tactics of Mahatma Gandhi, known as Satyagraha. (p.385) 
 
As in the Gadzepko (2005) text, Prah’s (2010) coverage of the ex-serviceman’s 
demonstration is vague. Unlike Gadzepko, Prah names the demonstration as “violent” – 
but again, with vague and unclear descriptors. Prah does signal the significance of the 
violence by giving it one of the six numbered paragraphs covering the CPP’s “methods 
toward the attainment of independence” (p.385): 
6. Violent confrontation: The declaration of positive action in 1950 by Nkrumah 
degenerated into rioting, demonstrations and violent confrontation when as ex-
servicemen’s demonstration clashed with the police and resulted in the death of 
two African policemen. Nkrumah and some of his party colleagues were tried and 
imprisoned. (p.386)  
 
Unfortunately, the reader is then abruptly introduced to Nkrumah’s rule as head of state, 
with little narrative of the intervening developments. For example, the nonviolent 
demonstration of students protesting the arrest of Nkrumah among the “Big Six” is left 
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out. A few pages prior, however, we were told that the arrest of Nkrumah and the other 
leaders “made them heroes in the eyes of the masses who regarded these leaders as 
martyrs...This development strengthened the people’s loyalty to the [CPP] party” (p.384), 
and helped lead to the CPP’s electoral victory in 1951 (p.383). In fact, the British 
decision to arrest the CPP leaders led to significant blowback in the form of mass protests 
which were ultimately a factor in British abdication of colonial rule.  
 Nkrumah consistently ranks as one of the most important African leaders of the 
20th century. His legacy is complex. Some believe he was mediocre, merely 
opportunistic, while others claim he showed flashes of brilliance. The textbook by Prah 
(2010) demonstrates that Nkrumah’s Gandhian phase has certainly been remembered in 
Ghanaian collective memory. In this sense, the omissions and selectivity of Gadzepko’s 
(2005) text do not yet indicate collective forgetting. But in some ways it is hard to 
imagine how a successful independence leader who explicitly framed his movement in 
accordance with a Gandhian nonviolent “memory template” (Eddy 2012), could do more 
to tarnish his own legacy and bury the significance of nonviolent action in Ghana’s 
collective memory. Some nonviolent movements may recede into collective forgetting 
for lack of a charismatic leader, but Nkrumah shows how a tarnished leader can also 
obscure the memory template of a nonviolent movement.  
 Yet for all his failings, Nkrumah was at least partly a victim of the Cold War and 
the reach of U.S. power. Nkrumah’s socialist leanings set him up for stiff opposition 
abroad and at home. In the end, it seems Nkrumah was not subservient enough to U.S. 
interests, and his penchant for writing and talking about socialism and revolutionary 
violence did little to endear him to U.S. power elites. The final irony of Nkrumah’s 
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political career is that he was overthrownby a military coup in which the CIA played a 
significant supportive role (Stockwell 1978, Milne 1990, Blum 1995). The textbook by 
Prah (2010) reports: “Nkrumah’s overthrow in 1966 was believed to have been financed 
by the Central Intelligence Agency of U.S.A....” (p.404).The textbook by Gadzepko 
(2005) offers no hint of U.S. involvement in Nkrumah’s overthrow. It states that a coup 
led by the Army and Police deposed Nkrumah while he was on a “peace mission to 
Vietnam” (p.232). In fact, he was traveling to Hanoi “with peace proposals for ending the 
war in Vietnam” when the coup occurred (Milne 1990, p.3). His final act as President 
was to seek the peace abroad that he could not establish at home. 
 
The Case of Norway 
 Three Norwegian secondary school history textbooks from two different eras 
were analyzed. The first, Figved et al. (1976), has been called “the dominant” history 
textbook of the late 1970s in Norway (Lorentzen 1990, p.108). The second, Grimnes et 
al. (2008), offers much more comprehensive coverage of Norwegian and world history, 
as the size of the school history textbook has grown much more expansive, paralleling 
developments in U.S. textbooks. Figved at al. (1976) covers Norwegian and world history 
from 1800 to 1948 in 52 pages in a 6 ½ by 9 inch format, versus Grimnes et al. (2008) 
which covers from 1800 (beginning on p.43) to 1945 (ending on p.306), in a larger 8 by 
11 inch format and in 263 pages. That is, the newer text offers over five times more 
coverage.   
 Norway’s experiences during World War II involved far less suffering and 
bloodshed than countries such as France and Poland (Halle 1966). But survey data 
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revealed that during World War II, 14% of Norwegians lost close friends, 10% lost close 
relatives, 12% of experienced material losses (to oneself or family), 4% performed forced 
labor or were prisoners of war, and 1% experienced wounds or damage to their health 
(Halle 1966). Such a significant historical episode would seem to merit significant 
coverage in history textbooks. 
 After the Nazis invaded Norway on April 9, 1940, numerous pockets of violent 
and nonviolent resistance began to evolve. Stephan and Chenowith (2008) code the 1944 
Norwegian resistance of the Nazi occupation as nonviolent and the outcome as “limited 
success.” Unfortunately, they do not code the 1942 resistance campaign of Norwegian 
teachers, parents, and Church leaders, which also resulted in at least “limited success.” 
Perhaps if Norwegians interpreted, remembered, or celebrated these cases of nonviolent 
methods bringing “limited success,” then they would tend to generalize beyond it and 
report belief in the potential efficacy of nonviolence. However, it seems this learning 
process has been thwarted through neglect. In the 2008 Gallup World Poll, Norway ties 
with Germany and Austria, ranking 71st out of 94 nations with only 48% of citizens 
responding that peaceful means alone “will work,” well below the global mean of 57.9%.  
 Figved et al.’s (1976) coverage of Norway’s nonviolent resistance of the Nazi 
occupation is extremely sparse. Judging from this popular textbook it would seem that 
only some aspects of Norway’s nonviolent resistance of the Nazis and the NS-regime (the 
National Smling regime, i.e., the Norwegian Nazi party led by the Norwegian fascist 
“Minister-President” Vidkun Quisling) are embedded in collective memory, and it is not 
conceptualized as specifically nonviolent resistance. Such under-named and under-
theorized nature of nonviolence is commonplace in school history textbooks around the 
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world. In retrospective interviews, at least one Norwegian teacher active in the resistance 
was aware of this dynamic: “Nowhere through all these discussions did the idea of 
nonviolent resistance come in. Instead of an idea, it developed as a way to work – a way 
to do something” (Sharp 2005, p.136). While Sharp (1959) notes that pacifists were 
associated with the teachers’ struggle, it was “not in such a way as to permeate the 
struggle with an aura of moral superiority of nonviolent over violent methods of 
resistance, or in sufficient numbers, as to warrant its classification under ‘peaceful 
resistance’” (p.54). Hence, Sharp designates this episode as an example of “passive 
resistance” (p.53). However, while Sharp’s 1959 typology includes nine types of generic 
nonviolence, there is little question that nonviolent theorists in recent years have tended 
to classify nonviolence as either principled or pragmatic (Eddy 2011, Eddy 2012). Here, 
Sharp’s description of the Norwegian teachers’ resistance names pragmatic nonviolence.      
 However, some elements of nonviolent resistance are described in the text, 
namely, underground newspapers and radio broadcasts:  
The German objective was to win the war. Quisling’s goal was to nazify 
Norwegian society. The Norwegians’ battle on the home front was aimed at 
preventing both. The Norwegians multiplied small newspapers that went from 
hand to hand, and the home front had firm leadership who organized resistance 
against all attempts at nazifying Norway. Everything that the German military 
was doing was reported to London [the Norwegian government in exile], and after 
a while armed forces, popularly called ‘the guys in the woods,’ were established. 
British airplanes dropped weapons and supplies to them by parachute. Quisling 
has managed to create national unity, the people said, he has gathered all the 
Norwegian people against him. 
 
[Caption accompanying a photo of an anonymous woman typing:] The Germans 
had seized people’s radios, and it could be dangerous to listen to Norwegian radio 
broadcasts from London and type them up on typewriters and let them circulate 
among the people. This young woman is sitting in the secret headquarters of 
‘Hjemmefrontledelsen’ [the name of the group that organized the resistance in 
Norway] typing code messages from London. That was even more dangerous 
because if caught she could expect that the secret German police would torture 
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her, attempting to force her to reveal the names of Hjemmefrontledelsen 
members. (p.47)  
 
Again, this account emphasizes high-risk underground media activism. We are told that 
the homefront’s resistance movement, Hjemmefrontledelsen, offered “firm leadership 
who organized resistance against all attempts at nazifying Norway” (p.47).  
 But beyond underground media, we are given few clues as to the strategies or 
scope of the nonviolent resistance efforts. As is typical of textbooks around the world, the 
word “nonviolence” is never used. We are not told the names of any of the “firm” leaders 
of the resistance movement – a narrative choice which, needless to say, serves to obscure 
their role. We are not told about the resistance of Norwegian teachers, parents, or church 
leaders (see below). Incidentally, in the photo appearing on p.47, there is a pistol beside 
the radio. The pistol is not remarked upon, but elements of violent resistance are 
highlighted, such as the armed “guys in the woods.” In addition, the text tells us that 
Norwegian pilots were trained in Canada and many of the 40,000 Norwegians who fled 
to Sweden were secretly trained as soldiers. Thus, we are led to believe that the 
Norwegians were unified (with the exception of Quisling), and underground media and 
pockets of armed resistance were important tools of resistance.       
 The text does include two additional details which might escape notice as 
potential elements of nonviolent resistance. First, we are told that the Parliament and the 
King escaped to the United Kingdom so that the government in exile could “safeguard 
Norwegian interests” from afar (p.47). As such, it was a variant of the “parallel 
institutions” strategy relied upon by many nonviolent resistance movements. Second, the 
flight of 40,000 Norwegians to Sweden represent a type of nonviolent response even if 
the character and scope of resistance becomes drastically altered through exile. On both 
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of these counts we might be reminded of Tibetans who have fled China, and created a 
government in exile. This strategy born of necessity has preserved the Tibetan leadership, 
traditions, collective memory, and critical human rights documentation regarding the 
Chinese takeover of Tibet, while operating freely at a safe distance. Much like the 
Norwegian government in exile did, Tibetans in exile have served as an information 
clearinghouse, utilizing nonviolent methods of consciousness-raising through news 
media, publications, and activist networks, as well as international diplomacy.     
 In the much more lengthy and comprehensive Grimnes et al. (2008) text, very 
important details are still left out. Like the text above, we are not told the names of any 
resistance movement leaders. Though one activist in the underground press, PetterMoen 
is highlighted, the narrative here only focuses on his diary while imprisoned by the Nazis. 
The textbook’s most significant omission is Quisling’s tirade against teachers in a school 
near Oslo on May 22, 1944, in which he said, “You teachers have destroyed everything 
for me!” (Sharp 2005, p.139). Here, Quisling’s admission of defeat casts the nonviolent 
noncooperation of the teachers as the fulcrum point, tipping the momentum decisively 
against Quisling’s agenda of nazifying Norway and establishing “the Corporative State” 
based on Mussolini’s model (p.136). On Quisling’s admission, a teacher recalls, “That 
sentence was a triumph for us. It became a slogan and was taken up and quoted 
everywhere afterwards” (p.139; emphasis added). Sharp (1959) concurs that the teachers’ 
resistance was “the most important of several actions in halting Quisling’s plans for 
instituting the Corporate state in Norway” (p.54).  
 Ironically however, despite the enormous significance of Quisling’s statement and 
the significance teachers themselves attached to it (as well as the fact that this sound bite 
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clearly meets standard textbook demands for concision), it was not quoted in any one of 
the three textbooks. Hence, though the teachers took this up as their slogan, it is not 
“quoted everywhere afterwards” in major vehicles of collective memory, far from it. 
Norwegian teachers – who because of this historical episode have reason to be proud of 
their predecessors and their profession – were not equipped by the textbooks to reproduce 
this collective memory.  
 Omitting Quisling’s admission deprives nonviolent resistance in Norway of the 
“slogan” that had once been “taken up and quoted everywhere afterwards” (Sharp 2005, 
p.139). With this slogan, the efficacy of the teacher’s nonviolent noncooperation comes 
into focus. Through remembering this slogan, the “cognitive praxis” (Eyerman and 
Jamison 1991) of their social movement, their lessons learned through experience, is 
reproduced. Without it, like in so many textbooks around the world, the efficacy of 
nonviolent action is obscured.    
  Nevertheless, the Grimnes et al. (2008) text deserves credit for naming “non-
violent” (“ikk-voldelige” in Norwegian) protest and for presenting a relatively detailed 
account of Norwegian nonviolent resistance to the Nazi occupation:  
As time went on, the occupation forces met an increasing resistance in the 
population. The resistance was diverse, but roughly speaking it is possible to split 
it into two. It was firstly a civil resistance movement that was mainly directed at 
the NS, although it also had the Germans as a target. Secondly, there was a 
military resistance that primarily targeted the German military power. 
 The core of the civil resistance movement was the many large and small 
resistance actions that the NS’s ‘nazifying’ offensive elicited. The actions came 
across a broad front, taking the form of a large number of non-violent group and 
mass protests.  The protest action that was the most dramatic and seemed to have 
the biggest impact on public opinion, was directed against the NS’s attempts to 
nazify the teachers and the youth in the spring of 1942. Quisling’s new 
government announced the fact that all teachers had to join an NS-directed 
teacher organization, and that all young people had a duty to participate in the 
party’s Youth League. The vast majority of teachers protested against the order, 
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and tens of thousands of parents overwhelmed the Ministry with protest letters. 
Terbovens’ [the German officer in charge of the Nazi occupation of Norway] 
answer to the teachers’ action was to arrest 1,100 teachers, and send a few 
hundred of them to Kirkenes on forced labor.   
 The church supported teachers and parents. At the same time it fought its 
own battle against the NS-state. Bishops and priests announced that they would 
continue their activities as clergymen, but that they would no longer have any 
connection with the state. The Church’s action, as the actions by teachers and 
parents, made a large impression. (pp.290-291) 
 
Here the Grimnes et al. (2008) text, much like the Figved et al. (1976) text, highlights the 
role of the underground radio broadcasts and newspapers as important forms of “civil 
resistance” which “accommodated the enormous need for information in a society under 
censorship” (p.291). The text includes a large picture with this caption:  
The teacher action in the spring of 1942 was among the largest and most 
important civil resistance actions during the war. The Germans were afraid that it 
would lead to unrest in the population at a time when they feared an Allied 
invasion. Therefore Terboven took decisive action. Here are some of the teachers 
who were sent to Kirkenes on forced labor. (p.291)  
 
The text then makes the efficacy of nonviolent noncooperation explicit: 
It was because of the civil resistance that the NS failed with its nazification. In 
retrospect it seems obvious that it had to go that way. At the time, when the 
Germans won on all fronts, it was not so obvious. Far from everyone was sure 
who would win the battle of the Norwegian public in 1940-42. The civil 
resistance continued and peaked in the spring of 1944 in a new big action. This 
time, the resistance was able to prevent the NS-regime from convening three age 
groups of young people in conscripted work. It was feared that the work was in 
reality a preparation for the war effort on the German side. (pp.291-292) 
 
Such a reflection on the efficacy of civil resistance is a rarity in textbooks. However, note 
how even here it is under-theorized, as we are told that in “retrospect it seems obvious...” 
On the contrary, the efficacy of nonviolent resistance seems to remain “not so obvious.” 
Again, under half of the Norwegian population concedes that “peaceful means alone” 
“will work” for oppressed groups (2008 Gallup World Poll). Some might argue that the 
wording of the Gallup World Poll question, “peaceful means alone,” is imperfect, since 
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forms of violent and nonviolent resistance are often mixed in large movements. Such 
would be the case if Norwegians perceived violent resistance to have played an important 
role alongside the civil resistance – but this seems to be far from the truth, as the textbook 
itself implies.  
 Additional details left out of, or only vaguely described, in both textbooks include 
the following. We are not told about sabotage efforts or the rescue groups who saved 
about 800 Jews by smuggling them into neutral Sweden, sometimes through harrowing 
escapes that could furnish brief, engaging  textbook-worthy narratives (e.g., Sherrow 
2000, pp.207-208). We are not told how symbolic acts of resistance cultivated solidarity 
such as the wearing of paper clips in lapels or as necklaces and bracelets to signify “stick 
together” (Sharp 2005, p.136).  
 The Grimnes et al. (2008) text narrates, “The vast majority of teachers 
protested...” against the NS orders (pp.290-291). Such shorthand obscures what “protest” 
means and how it was organized. Sharp (2005) fills in key details here, many of which 
are so memorable, their omission from all three textbooks well illustrates the intellectual 
travesty of standard textbook modes of telling history. It is as if the texts have been 
reverse-engineered to be deliberately boring. Sharp explains that a “secret small 
resistance leadership group” in Oslo mobilized networks which asked every teacher to 
write protest letters, signing their names and addresses, and mail them to the NS officials. 
In their letters, each teacher refused to join the new teacher’s organization and refused to 
cooperate in fascist education. Sherrow (2000) explains that Norwegian schoolteachers 
were “ordered to tell students that the Germans were ‘friends’ and that their takeover of 
Norway was an effort to ‘protect’ Norwegian citizens from the British, not an invasion” 
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(p.207). It is estimated that between 8,000 and 10,000 of the nation’s 12,000 teachers 
wrote letters of refusal. That detail alone (left out of all of the textbooks) is incredibly 
memorable, and speaks to the scope and power of the noncooperation effort. The NS 
officials first threatened to terminate their jobs, then closed all of the nation’s schools for 
a month – another memorable detail whose inclusion (if textbook authors could be 
bothered to be artistically skillful in retelling history) would begin to build a plot with 
suspense and turning points. In response, teachers and students met in private homes (yet 
another memorable detail). Censorship meant that news of these protests circulated only 
in the underground media, but eventually “almost every home in the country” became 
aware of these developments (Sharp 2005, p.137). The extent of noncooperation even 
within the governmentbureaucracy is well illustrated by the fact that throughout their 8 
months of incarceration, the teachers’ salaries continued to be delivered to their families 
(p.138). Many of the detained teachers endured death threats, forms of torture, and harsh 
living conditions in concentration camps in the South as well as in a labor camp in 
Kirkenes above the Arctic Circle. 
 Sharp (2005) summarizes the outcome: 
Fearful of alienating Norwegians still further, Quisling finally ordered the 
teachers’ release...Quisling’s new fascist organization for teachers never came 
into being, and the schools were never used for fascist propaganda. After 
Quisling encountered further difficulties in imposing the Corporative State, Hitler 
ordered him to abandon the whole project. (p.140; emphasis added)    
 
It supplies a classic case of noncooperation, bearing out Gandhi and Thoreau before him 
who theorized that power is rooted in cooperation and can be withdrawn through 
noncooperation. But none of the three textbooks document the magnitude of these 
nonviolent victories: the schools were never used for fascist propaganda, the teachers 
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were released because Quisling was afraid, the teachers “ruined everything” for Quisling, 
and Hitler order Quisling to abandon the whole project of nazification in Norway.  
 The third Norwegian textbook analyzed (Abrahamsen, Dyrvik, Nielsen, and Aase 
2008) introduces resistance to the Nazis writing, “The resistance in Norway during WWII 
was made up of two categories – the military and the civil resistance” (p.292). For both 
the military and civil resistance sections of the text, the historical accounts are swift 
moving, vague, bare bones facts, never pausing to develop plot or introduce characters. 
There is no narrative arc, no suspense, no tension, and thus, no real turning points that 
could sustain real human interest. The historical participants are not humanized, and very 
few are even named.  
 But organizations are named including the “Utefronten” (Norwegian armed forces 
abroad), the “Milorg” or “Hjemmefronten” (the Homefront military), and the following 
civil resistance groups: the “Kretsen” (the Circle, comprised of elites from the Church 
and the Supreme Court, among others), the Coordination Committee, the Homefront 
Leadership, and people in the labor movement are also said to have “joined in” (p.293). 
Nevertheless, the text emphasizes that the resistance movement was mostly comprised of 
“many self-run networks” (p.294): “the majority of those who carried out civil resistance 
worked in their own, partly or wholly, self-operated networks, and had no idea that there 
was a Homefront Leadership...” (p.293). The resistance networks are vaguely described, 
as are multiple conflicts: “From time to time there were large conflicts between the Circle 
and the government. Also within the civilian resistance movement there were large 
differences of opinion, and at times between the civil resistance movement and Milorg.” 
The vagaries here can only cultivate boredom for students. Finally, a few specifics are 
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offered: “One topic of conflict was how Norway would be run in the first period after 
German capitulation...” (p.294).   
 The military resistance is covered first, but statements on its significance are 
limited to two: the 24,000 Norwegian merchant seamen who delivered military supplies 
to the Allies, and the Milorg (military homefront/ “secret shadow army”) who “...often 
kept a low profile in anticipation of an allied invasion, and became particularly important 
by maintaining law and order when Germany capitulated in May of 1945” (p.292). Thus, 
the significance of the army was limited to serving as a police force after Germany 
surrendered. The hypothetical allied invasion never happened.  
 Abrahamsen, Dyrvik, Nielsen, and Aase (2008) never use the word nonviolence, 
only “civil resistance.” This text emphasizes the civil resistance of youth and parents: 
Among the first civilian actions were a number of spontaneous protests at the high 
schools during the 1940-1941 school year by students who protested against NS-
students [i.e., NS is the Nasjonal Samling, the Nazi-friendly political party in 
Norway during WWWII], who had begun wearing their paramilitary uniform at 
school. The actions were quelled with expulsions. But from the spring of 1942, 
the civilian resistance increased. Especially important was a comprehensive action 
by parents against nazification of the schools and against conscription to the labor 
service for youth, which NS had introduced... (p.293)  
 
At this point, the text barely mentions the triumphant Norwegian teachers – limiting their 
appearance to one sentence: “Also actions among teachers and priests inspired resistance 
against nazification” (p.293). Thus, we are never told of the arrest of the 1,100 teachers, 
or the detention and forced labor of hundreds of teachers. 
 The text returns again to other elements of resistance: 
The civilian resistance also led to other outcomes. The sports clubs and many 
other organizations stopped working. Many boycotted the labor service for youth, 
a boycott that caused many youth to flee into the forests during the last year of the 
war. They have been referred to as ‘the lads in the wood.’ Many of them 
established contact with Milorg [the shadow army] and received weapons and 
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training. There were also many civilians who, at the risk of reprisals, provided 
help for prisoners of war and others who were on the run from the German police. 
Others worked on the border between Sweden and Norway and helped people get 
over to Sweden, which was neutral during the war. (p.294)  
 
In this way the text catalogs several forms of civil resistance, but because of the narrative 
is so stripped of plot and personality, these acts of courage and creative resistance are not 
memorably told. And so, they are unlikely to connect with students at the deep emotional 
level which is more likely to foster memory and learning. 
 
The Case of Germany 
 In the first half of the 20th Century, Germany  experienced several major instances 
of nonviolent noncooperation and general strikes. In these events, Germany was 
sometimes the agent of nonviolent resistance and sometimes the target. In 1920 
Germany’s fledgling Weimar Republic faced a coup d’etat led by extreme right-wing 
military leaders. The retreating democratically elected leaders urged noncooperation and 
a general strike. Sharp (1985) recounts that in addition to the general strike of workers,  
Civil servants and conservative government bureaucrats refused to cooperate with 
the usurpers. Qualified men rejected posts in the upstart regime. All along the 
line, people denied authority to the usurpers and refused to assist them...The coup 
was defeated by the combined citizens’ action of workers, civil servants, 
bureaucrats, and the general population. (p.32) 
 
 Just a few years later, in 1923, as the French and Belgians occupied the Ruhr 
region, Germany was the scene of “probably the first case in history of nonviolent 
resistance being official government policy against a foreign invasion” (Sharp 1985, 
p.35). Post-WWI constraints on Germany (including the partial disarming and reduction 
of German forces) made military resistance impossible (Ackerman and Duvall 2000). In 
addition, in support of the scorched earth theory of nonviolent attitude formation, some 
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have observed that so soon after WWI “most Germans had no stomach for violence” 
(p.191). In this context, the German government pledged to finance the nonviolent 
resistance which included diverse forms of noncooperation, sabotage, strikes (of coal 
miners, rail workers, and steelworkers) with up to 800,000 German workers on strike 
(p.195, p.202), and demonstrations with up to 20,000 people in the streets (p.187). The 
strategy of strikes and noncooperation had been devised by German trade unions (Sharp 
1985, p.35), but German Chancellor Cuno himself repeatedly endorsed “passive 
resistance” and instructed Rhur railroads to disobey orders of the occupying forces 
(Ackerman and Duvall 2000, p.184, p.197). French attempts to ship coal by rail back to 
France were constantly sabotaged. But virtually all resistance was harshly and 
systematically repressed by the occupation forces, merely singing patriotic German songs 
resulted in 6-months imprisonment or a heavy fine (p.191), and 140,000 Germans were 
expelled from the Ruhr with still others imprisoned (pp.196-197).  
 Sharp argues that the addition of demolition tactics which killed occupation 
personnel (rather than machinery alone) hurt “the previous unity of the resistance” as 
well as international sympathy for Germany (Sharp 1985, p.36). It also provoked 
occupation soldiers. Moreover, the resistance sometimes failed to maintain nonviolent 
discipline, probably because no overarching nonviolent strategy, no pragmatic or 
principled stand against violent retaliation was embraced (Ackerman and Duvall 2000, 
p.199). In this sense, the problem with the resistance was it was not nonviolent enough, 
not disciplined – a very common social movement failure, at least in the eyes of 
Gandhian theorists (see Ackerman and Duvall 2000, p.206). To illustrate this, consider 
that Chancelor Cuno, the steadfast advocate of passive resistance, later strongly endorsed 
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Hitler (p.203). Right-wingers including Hitler himself argued that violence was needed, 
not passive resistance, which Hitler called a “united front of weakness” (p.201, p.206). 
Eventually, the German government secretly promoted lethal attacks on the French and 
Belgian soldiers (p.199). Nevertheless, because the resistance had been largely 
nonviolent, especially early on, some French became sympathetic advocates for the 
German cause (Sharp 1985, p.36), as did many Americans (Ackerman and Duvall 2000, 
p.185). A January 17, 1923 article in The Nation magazine editorialized, “what Germany 
needs in this hour is a Gandhi...” (p.185).  
 The occupation was aimed at securing Germany’s reparation payments as well as 
separating Rhineland from Germany. Neither goal was achieved by the occupation, but 
negotiations involving the UK and the USA resulted in the Dawes Plan to deal with 
German reparations, and the occupation forces were withdrawn by June 1925 (pp.35-37).        
 These were pivotal episodes in early 20th Century German history, yet consider 
that Lyons (1999) has written, “In 1972, the concept of nonviolent civil disobedience was 
little known in the [Federal Republic of Germany]. Twelve years later, it had become a 
central factor in West German politics, widely endorsed and used by the peace 
movement, the largest social movement in postwar German history” (p.81). If the former 
part is true, that nonviolent civil disobedience was little known in West Germany in the 
1970s, it is deeply ironic given that major national events – the 1920 military coup, the 
French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923, and the Nazi occupations of Denmark, Norway, 
Bulgaria, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, and Italy in the early 1940s were all marked 
by significant nonviolent actions of disobedience and noncooperation (Sharp 1985). 
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 How do the German textbooks perform in their coverage of these events? Table 
131 provides a concise summary. Describing the 1920 military coup in Germany, the 
textbooks by Sellen (2010) and Bahr (2011) accurately use the words “general strike.” 
Sellen (2010) does accurately narrate that the German government itself called for 
“passive resistance” against the French occupation of the Ruhr region of Germany in 
1923, and that worker strikes and acts of sabotage were carried out (p.98), but this 
nonviolent resistance campaign is omitted from Bahr’s (2011) coverage.   
Table 131. Coverage of Major Successful/ Relatively Successful Nonviolent Resistance 
Campaigns in German History Textbooks 
 
Nonviolent historical event Horizons II (Bahr 2011) History 2 (Sellen 2010) 
noncooperation with military coup 
(1920) called the “Kapp Putsch”  
Accurate descriptors: “general 
strike,” calls for a “general 
strike” were “unanimously 
supported” by workers (p.282) 
Accurate descriptors: “passive 
resistance,” “general strike” 
(p.96) 
nonviolent resistance of French 
occupation of the Ruhr region 
(1923) 
Very brief coverage of the 
occupation, but no coverage of 
the nonviolent resistance. 
The text inaccurately describes 
the resistance as a failure (p.98); 
Accurate descriptors: “passive 
resistance,” “refusing to work,” 
“acts of sabotage” (p.98) 
nonviolent resistance of Danes 
against Nazis (1940-1945) 
No coverage  No coverage  
nonviolent resistance of 
Norwegians against Nazis (1942) 
No coverage No coverage 
nonviolent resistance of German 
wives of Jews against Nazis (1943) 
No coverage No coverage 
 
 Of the 1923 resistance, Sellen (2010) describes some of the violent repression by 
French troops and quickly and curiously concludes that “Despite the broad support for 
the Ruhr resistance from the German population, it is eventually doomed to fail” (p.98). 
Why it was “doomed to fail” is not at all clear. Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) code the 
Ruhr nonviolent resistance a full “success.” Ackerman and Duvall (2000) conclude that it 
was both a success and a failure, but note that France lost in multiple ways (p.206). The 
notion that the resistance “failed” is implicitly questioned by Sellen’s own observation a 
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few pages later that France had “become morally discredited by its crackdown in the 
Ruhr struggle,” hurting French leverage in international negotiations (p.100). This is 
again the “political jiu-jitsu” (Sharp 1973), “the paradox of repression” (Smithey and 
Kurtz 1999), and the “critical dynamic” (McAdam 1999) of reactions against violent 
repression – but this time the dynamic operated on the international level. In addition, the 
costs of occupation stressed the French economy and mobilized opposition politicians in 
France (Ackerman and Duvall 2000, p.189). Sellen (2010) also neglects to mention that 
the “broad support” for resistance was not just from “the German population,” but also 
entailed financial support including subsidized wages and food supplies for workers on 
strike from the German government (Sharp 1985, p.35; Ackerman and Duvall 2000, 
pp.182-183,193-194). Of course, the costs of subsidizing striking workers also dealt an 
enormous blow to the German government which took to printing money (leading to an 
inflation crisis), rather than taxing industrialists to share the burdens (pp.205-206). Unlike 
Sellen, Sharp (1985) emphasizes that the occupying French forces failed to achieve their 
economic and political goals (p.37).  
 As for the 1920 coup, Bahr (2011) narrates how Germany’s fledgling democratic 
republic was led by social democrats, but the military and the right-wing did not fully 
embrace democratic ideals. For them, “democracy was deeply connected to the stigma of 
defeat in 1918 [WWI]” (p.282). As the Ehrhardt Militia occupied Berlin’s government 
buildings on March 13, 1920, the social democrats fled to Stuttgart “but not without first 
calling for a general strike. The unanimously supported general strike, as well as the 
opposition within parts of the ministerial bureaucracy, led to the collapse of the Putsch 
after four days” (p.282). Likewise, Sellen (2010) recounts of the 1920 military coup that 
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it failed “due to the passive resistance of the administration, which refused to carry out 
Kapp’s orders, and to the general strike immediately called by the trade unions. The 
success of the general strike emboldens the trade unions to begin applying pressure on the 
government. They demand a partial socialization of the economy...” (p.96). 
 How do we explain the readiness of textbooks in Germany to use the words 
“general strike” when it seems to be deliberately and carefully avoided in Chilean and 
Guatemalan textbooks? A “patriotic” factor may be at work in solidifying and 
suppressing memory of the general strikes in each respective case. The targets of 
noncooperation and strikes in the German cases were a military coup and a French 
occupation, not the installed national government as was the case in Guatemala of 1944 
and Chile in 1931, though these were onerous dictatorships.   
 In addition, promoting collective memories of effective general strikes might be 
rightly perceived as a form of class warfare, which is better politely avoided. But the 
relatively large presence of labor unions in Germany might play a role in German 
readiness to recount general strikes, making strikes less taboo in the culture and in fact, 
closer to “conventional action” in the German context (Martin 2008). For example, in 
1986-1987, 43% of nonagricultural workers in West Germany belonged to labor unions, 
compared with 17% in the U.S. (Blanchflower and Freeman 1992). But during the 1923 
Ruhr resistance itself, German political and even union leaders feared that a general strike 
against the French could get out of control, as the “workers’ zeal could go too far” 
(Ackerman and Duvall 2000, p.183). Indeed, eventually 800,000 miners were on strike in 
the Ruhr, but by that time it was not always clear who had become communist 
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sympathizers and who were “engaged in government-sponsored passive resistance” 
(p.202).  
 An often overlooked case, overlooked by our sample of textbooks as well, is the 
nonviolent protest in Berlin of German “Aryan” wives seeking the release of their Jewish 
husbands who had been seized by the Nazis in early 1943, some were immediately 
transported to Auschwitz, others awaited transport. The Gestapo’s threats and insistence 
that the women protesters disperse, were ignored. Essentially, seven days of loud 
demonstrations involving upwards of 600 to 1,000 protesters, and including the chants of 
the wives screaming, “We want our husbands back,” rattled the nerves of the 
Nazileadership (Sharp 2005, p.145). After seven days, both Goebbels and Hitler 
approved the release of all of the intermarried Jews and their half-Jewish children. A 
German official later recalled, “Goebbels released the [the intermarried Jews] in order to 
eliminate the protest” (p.147). The Gestapo released between 1,700 to 2,000 Jews 
imprisoned in Berlin. At the end of the war, intermarried Jews made up “98 percent of the 
surviving German Jewish population that had not been driven into hiding” (p.147). It was 
a clear victory of nonviolent protest. 
 The Nazi occupations of Denmark and Norway are briefly mentioned in the 
textbook by Sellen (2010), but only as a chess-like move of geopolitics: “the occupation 
of Denmark(April 1940)and Norway(April-June 1940)....to ensure theimportant 
wartimeore importsfromneutralSweden,to geta baseagainstEngland andpre-empt 
aBritishoccupation of Norway...” (p.123). Below we will analyze portraits of the 
Norwegian resistance in Norwegian textbooks, but immediately below we consider the 
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Danish case and the significance of German textbook omissions of Denmark’s nonviolent 
resistance. 
 The case of Denmark’s resistance. Denmark declared neutrality during World 
War II (as it had during WWI), but the Germans invaded Denmark in April 1940 and 
began a five year occupation. To critique the omission of the Danish resistance 
movement in German history textbooks may seem like shooting fish in a barrel (i.e., 
aiming for an easy target). After all, it can be argued, given the Nazi legacy, much bigger 
issues must be addressed at length (i.e., German collective memory has much bigger fish 
to fry). However, I contend that the omission of coverage of the Danish resistance and the 
Norwegian resistance, both of which were largely nonviolent and experienced some 
significant successes, fails to acknowledge the Achilles heal of violent occupation and 
violent methods in general – that the “will of the people,” in Jonathan Schell’s (2003) 
words, is “unconquerable.” Few lessons could do more to portray the history of 
occupations accurately and to undermine military adventurism in the future.        
 Initially, the Danes did not resist militarily, and this has been explained in 
pragmatic and principled terms: “they knew a battle against the mighty German war 
machine would be futile. Many observers concluded that the Danes were simply too 
civilized to fight” (Stein 2003, p.50). Danish resistance was primarily marked by 
significant nonviolent initiatives, noncooperation, and acts of sabotage. Almost the entire 
Jewish population, about 6,000 Danish Jews, were hid and clandestinely transferred into 
neutral Sweden, and thousands of Danes followed the example of King Christian X and 
wore the Star of David armbands required of Jews by the Nazis (Stein 2003).  
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 The famous Catholic monk and advocate of nonviolence Thomas Merton (1980) 
writes of Denmark’s resistance:  
It was one of the only nations which offered explicit, formal and successful 
nonviolent resistance to Nazi power...The resistance was successful because it 
was explicit and formal, and because it was practically speaking unanimous. The 
entire Danish nation simply refused to cooperate with the Nazis, and resisted 
every move of the Nazis against the Jews with nonviolent protest of the highest 
and most effective caliber, yet without any need for organization, training, or 
specialized activism: simply by unanimously and effectively expressing in word 
and action the force of their deeply held moral convictions. These moral 
convictions were nothing heroic or sublime. They were merely ordinary. (p.165) 
 
When Hitler ordered the arrest and deportation of Jews in Denmark to concentration 
camps, the Danes “by strikes, by refusals to repair German ships in their shipyards, and 
by demonstrations of protest” (p.166). Ackerman and Duvall (2000) explain how German 
plans to seize Jews in Denmark were completely undermined by a single German 
bureaucrat, Georg Duckwitz, who alerted leaders of Denmark’s Social Democratic Party 
and quickly spread the word through dozens of channels. In a single night, almost all of 
Denmark’s Jews went into hiding with the help of the Danish people. Only 472 Jews 
were captured. In the coming weeks and months, with the help of the Danish, some 7,220 
Jews escaped to Sweden (Ackerman and Duvall 2000). Later, many other German 
bureaucrats in Denmark also refused to cooperate with the final solution.  
 This episode supplies evidence of a crucial and still much debated theory of 
Gandhian/ principled nonviolence – that of the potential “conversion” of opponents 
through the use of nonviolent resistance (see Eddy 2012, forthcoming). Merton (1980) 
recounts that the Danish “open, calm, convinced” nonviolent resistance to Nazi anti-
Jewish policies “shook the morale of the German troops and SS men occupying the 
country and changed their whole outlook on the Jewish question...the German officials in 
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Denmark were changed men...They refused to cooperate in the liquidation of the Jews, 
not of course by open protest, but by delays, evasions, covert refusals and the raising of 
bureaucratic obstacles” (Merton 1980, pp.165-166). This “conversion” of Nazi leaders 
based in Denmark is quite significant, and it suggests a role that nonviolent third-parties 
can play in persuading brutal aggressors, even those planning genocidal violence, to 
reconsider their ways.  
 The Nazi occupation of Denmark and the Danish resistance is a complex tale of 
numerous tit-for-tat exchanges and tipping points. Throughout, the Danish government 
remained quite strong on the issue of protecting Jews, but on other issues they often 
waffled, walking a tightrope of subtle noncooperation with the Nazis and concessions to 
avoid harsh reprisals. In turn, the Germans offered a constant mix of threats, repression 
and concessions, the latter included permitting Denmark to hold parliamentary elections 
in March of 1943. The Danish Nazis won only 3 out of 149 seats (Ackerman and Duvall 
2000, p.218). If included in a German textbook, the results would bring into focus an 
important lesson for German students today – the obvious realization that the German 
occupation clearly took place against the will of Danish citizens.  
 During much of the occupation, Danish administrators “saw themselves as a 
shield for Danes rather than a source of resistance” (Ackerman and Duvall 2000, p.230). 
The resistance came from many sources in civil society: students and youth groups, 
factory workers, shipyard workers, railway workers, the church, an underground press, an 
underground Freedom Council (which the Danish army recognized as the nation’s de 
facto government) and a Command Committee which coordinated resistance (p.225). The 
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King, the Danish police, and the Danish army were also heavily involved in 
noncooperation.  
 Numerous incidents would be textbook-worthy turns in a narrative plot, if only 
textbook authors were interested in telling an engaging story. For instance, when a 
German officer told the Danish King he had been ordered to raise the swastika over the 
castle, the king said, “If this happens, a Danish soldier will go and take it down.” The 
German officer replied, “That Danish soldier will be shot.” The King’s immediate 
response was, “That Danish soldier will be myself.” The Nazis never raised their flag 
over the castle (Ackerman and Duvall 2000, p.229).  
 Incredibly, the outbreak of nonviolent resistance has been partly traced to the 
initiative of a seventeen-year-old schoolboy, Arne Sejr, who lived in a small town in 
Zealand. Upset by the sudden appearance of German soldiers and outraged that the 
Danes’ friendliness with the soldiers, Sejr devised a strategy summarized in his document 
“Ten Commandments for Danes”: 
1. You must not go to work in Germany and Norway. 
2. You shall do a bad job for the Germans. 
3. You shall work slowly for the Germans. 
4. You shall destroy important machines and tools. 
5. You shall destroy everything which may be of benefit to the Germans. 
6. You shall delay all transport. 
7. You shall boycott German and Italian films and papers. 
8. You must not shop at Nazis’ stores. 
9. You shall treat traitors for what they are worth. 
10. You shall protect anyone chased by the Germans. 
 Join the struggle for the freedom of Denmark! 
 (Ackerman and Duvall 2000, p.212) 
 
Sejr typed out 25 copies and delivered them to his town’s most influential citizens. The 
Commandments spread throughout the country and the tactics widely adopted. Ackerman 
and Duvall (2000) claim that the Commandments became “sacred” to the Danes (p.212, 
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p.225). Sejr and his friends sent leaflets to high schools students around the country and 
also put sugar in the gas tanks of German army vehicles. Later as a university student in 
Copenhagen, Sejr joined the underground press (p.216).         
 While the resistance experimented with limited violence (stonethrowing), street 
barricades, and some underground military resistance, the bulk of the campaign was 
nonviolent – including strikes, work stoppages, going home early, nonviolent direct 
action/ sabotage of equipment (e.g., trains delivering war equipment), and other forms of 
noncooperation, demonstrations, singing nationalist songs in large festivals (Ackerman 
and Duvall 2000, p.212), etc. After a very successful “People’s Strike,” the Freedom 
Council “de-emphasized sabotage and military measures in favor of nonviolent action” 
(p.228). The lesson learned was that general strikes did more to undermine the 
occupation than any other weapon, as a Victory Bulletin of the Freedom Council 
observed: “The People’s Strike was decisive – not the barricades or the unrest in the 
streets...” (p.228). From that point on, numerous strikes and nationwide general strikes 
were undertaken. The strikes halted the production of supplies for the German army, and 
many of the general strikes brought the entire nation to a standstill. Germany’s many 
attempts at violent crack-downs only solidified resistance. Ackerman and Duvall (2000) 
draw the explicit lesson: “If the Nazis, the cruelest killing machine in the century’s 
history, could be kept off balance by Danish schoolboys, amateur saboteurs, and 
underground clergymen, what other regime could ever be thought invulnerable to 
nonviolent resistance?” (p.231). The omission of this lesson in German textbooks is 
significant. World War II was not just a series of moving battlefronts and military 
strategy. Rather, resistance sprung up among ordinary people with ordinary weapons. 
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Some of the Danish leaders even understood that mobilizing “the great mass of people” 
for resistance was crucial and that nonviolent strategies would do this best, as one Frode 
Jakobsen argued in a letter at the time, “it is better that 1,000 men have been involved in 
the work [of resistance] than 10” (p.225). Research by Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) 
has recently confirmed that nonviolent movements tend to mobilize the great mass much 
more effectively than violent campaigns. 
 
TEXTBOOKS: THE COSTA RICAN CASE 
 
 The textbook analysis sought to evaluate claims for Costa Rican exceptionalism 
as a culture of peace. Like all of the textbook analyses, we are also pursuing the question 
of why confidence in nonviolent efficacy is not higher in Costa Rica, as reflected in the 
Gallup World Poll question on pragmatic nonviolence. If Costa Rica is exceptional in the 
Latin American context, as a culture of peace, as a middle class society, as a society that 
celebrates equality, social solidarity, the common good, social justice, and public 
institutions, textbook narratives should offer hints of a relatively distinctive cultural 
ethos. The textbooks in Costa Rica are approved by the Ministry of Education (MED) 
and an interview with a MED official revealed that publishers work hard to fulfill MED’s 
textbook content criteria. Ten historical events were selected for analysis (see Appendix 
EE for a concise summary of key findings), each of them conceived as either potential 
indicators of a cultural celebration of nonviolence and peace, or as integral to the 
historical development of Costa Rica’s culture of peace.   
 Surprisingly, none of the textbooks state that Costa Rica was only the 3rd nation in 
world to abolish the death penalty. This would reinforce national pride in Costa Rica as a 
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human rights leader. Textbook portrayals mention but do not celebrate (i.e., endorse the 
normative/ moral claims) or elaborate on the passage of this legislation. They offer no 
explanation for why and how the death penalty was abolished. No advocates of the policy 
are given voice (i.e., no quotations are offered). This is somewhat surprising since the 
capital rotunda in the Legislative Assembly building, perhaps the symbolic center of the 
government, prominently features this legislation. The rotunda has only 7 plaques 
decorating the walls, each one about 8 feet tall commemorating landmark legislation in 
the nation’s history. These plaques recognize the abolition of the death penalty, the 
abolition of the army, the passage of the Social Guarantees (installing worker protections, 
universal health care, and a robust social safety net), and the Constitution of the Second 
Republic of Costa Rica adopted on February 1, 1949 by the Junta led by Jose Figures. On 
the plaque commemorating the abolition of the death penalty is listed Article 45: “Human 
life is inviolable in Costa Rica.” Ricardo Ruiz González (the Director of Public Relations, 
Press, and Protocol at the Legislative Assembly) reports that Tomas Guardia decreed this 
law in 1882 for a couple of reasons. First, as a dictator concerned about coups and his 
own safety, this measure could conceivably save his own life in the imminent future. 
Second, he and his wife were very strong adherents of the Freemason movement which 
endorses strict ethical norms against killing, and Guardia gave his wife this law as a 
birthday present. The influence of his wife on this issue is said to be particularly strong 
(Textbook F, p.306).  
 The role of Freemasonry in this episode has proved difficult to verify. However, 
one source confirms that President Guardia was a Freemason and “member of Caridad 
Lodge No.26 and was ‘Protector of the Order’” (Denslow and Truman 1957, p.157). 
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Other sources confirm that Freemasonry teachings have been interpreted by some 
Freemasons in various periods and nations as endorsing pacifism and similar 
cosmopolitan and humanistic beliefs (e.g., Hacohen 2000, p.47; Piatigorsky 2005, p.175). 
This theory of Guardia’s motivations is highly ironic in a highly Catholic nation like 
Costa Rica. That is, in various times and places, Catholics and other Christians have 
understood Christianity as endorsing a ban on killing. Yet, this trailblazing ethical 
legislation is said to be motivated by Freemasonry not Catholicism. But sociologically, 
this makes sense since subcultural theories have long held that worldviews and beliefs 
can become more salient when linked to organizations that are small, tight-knit, and cut 
against the grain of wider society.    
 The second episode isolated for analysis involved the overthrow of the dictator 
Tinoco (1919), which occurred partly through nonviolent protest and nonviolent direct 
action (i.e., when protesters burned down the state newspaper building). The coverage in 
textbook E is particularly bizarre. In it, the overthrow of Tinoco is very heavily obscured 
in a textbox assessing the negative and positive aspects of Tinoco’s government. In fact, 
there is no hint that Tinoco was ever overthrown. Instead, we are confronted with a 
textbox titled: “Federico Tinoco Granados’ Government (1917-1919)” (p.104). Under 
one column are listed “Negative Aspects,” and under the second “Positive Aspects.” 
These columns are the same length, implying his regime was an equal mix of good and 
bad. Under Negative Aspects we read: “Tinoco’s brother Joaquín was assassinated,” and 
“The opposition burned down the official newspaper La Información.” But the text offers 
no clues that these events helped to overthrow Tinoco, which is in fact what they did. 
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Moreover, in context, we are given no information to help us understand why anyone 
would want to burn down the newspaper building or assassinate the Tinocos. 
 Textbook F offers far better coverage of Tinoco’s overthrow, but it is still quite 
incomplete. The text does not clarify all of the reasons for public discontent with Tinoco 
and his brother, Don Joaquín Tinoco. In fact, the assassination of his brother, recounted 
in the text, makes no sense at all within the text. The reasons for popular discontent 
included the fact that Tinoco and his brother “filled the jails with political prisoners and 
clamped rigid controls on the press” (Biesanz, Biesanz, and Biesanz 1999, p.27). Outrage 
over these restrictions on civil liberties motivated the direct action, setting the pro-Tinoco 
state newspaper building on fire, but textbook readers are not given the information 
necessary to understand the protest action. The text does insert the protests within the mix 
of factors leading to Tinoco’s resignation, but its importance is unclear. By contrast, the 
historians Moliva and Palmer (2007) write, “The decisive mobilization of women 
teachers against the Tinoco dictatorship in June 1919, which accelerated the fall of the 
regime, was proof of the new public roles that women were prepared to assume” (p.93). 
The account by Textbook F is as follows: 
Tinoco exercised a dictatorial government, since he took political and military 
power...The popular sectors, unhappy, participated in demonstrations which were 
repressed with force. Also, the non-recognition of the Tinoco government by the 
United States closed the door of foreign loans. 
Prices of basic goods rose noticeably, while business practically was paralyzed. 
The dictator lost support and the opposition against him got organized. In 1919, 
Carmen Lyra led the fight against the Tinoco dictatorship. She organized educators 
to demonstrate publicly against the government and set the government daily 
newspaper La Información [The Information]on fire. Lyra was followed by the 
police but managed to evade them disguised as a newspaper vendor. 
 
On the 10th of August 1919, the President’s brother and Minister of War, Don 
Joaquín Tinoco, was assassinated. This event, together with the growing 
economical and social instability, the possible military intervention by the United 
552 
States and the pressures, both from the oligarchy as well as the popular sectors, 
forced Federico Tinoco to turn over power... (p.319) 
 
The naming of a protest organizer (Carmen Lyra) and the details of her escape, 
though bare minimum details and hardly a suspenseful narrative drawing readings in, this 
is still more than textbooks typically include. Yet, three notable details are left out here. 
First, as we saw above, Costa Ricans were outraged about the Tinocos’ systematic 
attempts to deny their civil liberties (Biesanz, Biesanz, and Biesanz 1999). Second, high 
school students also participated in the demonstrations and direct action (Biesanz, 
Biesanz, and Biesanz 1999). Third, the turning fortunes of the Tinocos and the growing 
perception of their illegitimacy involved a clear example of popular reaction against 
violent repression, a pattern which nonviolent theorists have called “political jiu-jitsu” 
(Sharp 1973), “the paradox of repression” (Smithey and Kurtz 1999), and the “critical 
dynamic” (McAdam 1999). Biesanz, Biesanz, and Biesanz (1999) recount the event in 
this way: 
Costa Ricans might have tolerated an ineffective government, but they repudiated 
one that restricted liberties they had come to expect. Schoolteachers (mostly 
women) and high school students set fire to the pro-Tinoco newspaper’s plant. 
When the government sent troops against them and fired into the U.S. consulate, 
where some had taken refuge, the public was thoroughly alienated. In August 1918, 
when a coup seemed imminent, the Tinocos fled to Europe. (p.27) 
 
Thus, we see that textbook F does far better than other textbooks, but it still has several 
omissions which obscure the dynamics and significance of the nonviolent protests and 
direct actions contributing to the overthrow of Tinoco.  
On the other hand, textbook F’s coverage of the Tinoco era does include elements 
which point to Costa Rican exceptionalism as a culture of peace. These are twofold. First, 
the decline of military power and influence in politics is praised. Second, a subtle but 
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unmistakable tolerance for the Communist Party as just another political party is 
displayed. The text reads: 
Positive aspects from this period: 
* The army lost power and lost their important role in politics. 
* The electoral system gained power. 
* The political system tends towards continual improvement. The presidential 
 candidates belonged to the intellectual groups in the country. 
* The political parties became better organized, with an ideological foundation, 
 such as the Reformist and the Communist (Worker and Farmer blocs).  
 (Textbook F, p.319)  
 
This tolerance – not to mention the respect for intellectuals – is highly unusual for the 
Americas, and it reflects something about Costa Rican exceptionalism – Communists 
here have not always been demonized. In fact, all of the Costa Rican textbooks examined 
in the present study offer favorable or neutral portraits of Manuel Mora, the Communist 
Party founder and leader. But then, Communists in Costa Rica filled a unique niche 
compared to other nations in the Americas. Space was often (not always) made for them 
within the multi-party political system, key leaders in the Catholic Church hierarchy 
voiced respect for Communist leaders and their social justice aims, the Communists and 
the Church formed a political alliance, and the Communists never turned to violence. 
These factors are integrally and reciprocally linked.  
 As a result, Communists played very important roles in political coalitions 
advancing significant worker protections and social safety nets, as we will see below. 
Textbook B calls Mora one of the three main “protagonists” in its section on the Social 
Guarantees legislation together with President Calderon and Archbishop Sanabria. 
Textbook G notes, “It must be emphasized that in 1940 the Communist Party represented 
10% of the electorate, and it was important due to its capability for mobilization, 
organization and filing complaints” (p.197). Assessing social problems in the 1940s, the 
554 
text argues, “problems existed, it was not a communist invention and solutions were 
needed” (p.197). The contrast with other Latin American countries could not be more 
stark. Consider this quote from Manuel Mora in Textbook B, which makes clear his 
social justice militancy as well as his strong preference for nonviolence: 
We never give ourselves up to imperialism nor to the native oligarchy. If 
necessary, we will fall fighting against these two negative forces for the life of our 
nation. Be we wish we could always fight through legal channels and not find 
ourselves obligated, neither us nor our descendants, to use procedures which do 
not agree with our principles nor with our positive national traditions, nor with the 
best achievements of culture and civilization. (Textbook B, p.101) 
 
However, the 1949 Constitution banned the Communist party, and this dissolved the 
Communist unions as well. Textbook G notes, “this situation pleased the United States” 
(p.202). With the conclusion of the 1948 civil war, the country under Figueres’ leadership 
took a sharp anti-Communist turn. But Costa Rican tolerance and reconciliation emerged 
again in 1975, as the ban on the Communist Party was lifted (p.202), and a handful of 
Communists were again elected and seated in the Legislature. But they have typically 
only held two or three seats. In his later years, Figueres expressed strong approval of 
bringing the Communists back into electoral politics: “I feel that we have to defend even 
the communists’ right to be communist” (Burroughs 1988). In one sense this is typical of 
a long-history of Costa Rican reverence for tolerance and democracy, but on the other 
hand, Figueres’s anti-Communism was a major source of the 1948 Civil War. 
 Textbook coverage of the Social Guarantees legislation is a key area where Costa 
Rican exceptionalism definitively emerges – as a vital social democracy nurtured by a 
small developing nation. This comprehensive social safety net/ Social Security legislation 
is repeatedly celebrated (i.e., the normative/ moral principles behind these policies are 
endorsed) by the textbooks as a human right and fortifier of the common good: “It has as 
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a supreme goal the protection of the wellbeing of the national community” (Textbook G, 
p.195). Elsewhere the text routinely moves rapidly through historical developments as the 
main characters are given no voice (i.e., they are never quoted). Here, the texts slow 
down and include numerous long quotes from Archbishop Sanabria and President 
Calderon who make religious, moral, and rational cases for the Social Guarantees 
legislation. For instance, an extensive quote from Sanabria’s “Pastoral Letter on a Just 
Wage” is shared in which he argues for the just treatment of employees and suggests that 
in “...the Christian community there are not nor can be class privileges...The rich 
convince themselves that wealth has a social function to carry out, missions of justice and 
of charity...” (Textbook G, p.195). This was preceded by the introduction which reports 
that Archbishop Sanabria (head of the Costa Rican Catholic Church” “gave all his moral 
and intellectual support for the social question that was discussed in the 40s” (p.195). An 
extensive quote of President Calderon from a May 1, 1941 Presidential Message, is also 
included:  
To start a politic that tends to favor not only the salaried person but also all other 
citizens whose economic situation deprives them of their supreme right to 
wellbeing, I propose sending one or various projects of legislation which tend to 
establish those social securities… sickness, disability, old age and death, are the 
constant causes of helplessness for many Costa Ricans and if the State does not 
decide to establish a system of true foresight, it will undermine its foundation, 
since no society can be founded upon injustice. (p.195) 
 
The principles behind the legislation are also linked to the advocacy of “many 
noteworthy citizens educated in Europe” (p.195), and especially to Pope Leo XIII, “the 
Worker’s Pope,” and his Encyclical “Rerum Novarum.” In it, the Pope is said to reject 
Communism, but “recommends cooperation between socialism and the Church,” 
“defends regulation and improved salaries,” and “seeking a quick remedy to workers’ 
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poverty” (p.195). Again, the link to modernity and rationality is underlined: “All this 
modern philosophy influenced learned Costa Ricans, among them...Sanabria, 
Archbishop” (p.195). The association between educational enlightenment, modern 
rationality, Christian values, and support for the legislation is repeatedly made.   
 Offering one indicator of Costa Rican exceptionalism, Archbishop Sanabria is 
quoted as saying, “As long as I am leader of the Costa Rican church, she will be at the 
service of the poor and not in service to the rich” (Textbook B, p.101). Moreover, this 
appears in a text that offers the most conservative presentation of the Social Guarantees 
legislation. In other nations in Latin America, church leaders have been assassinated for 
taking such a clear stance. The fact that a textbook would include this quote decades later 
suggests that the culture is still comfortable with such social justice pronouncements. 
And, consider a second indicator: President Calderon is praised for his “eclectic stance” – 
for embracing the “doctrine which seeks to reconcile the best of divergent systems. 
Instead of taking extreme solutions, finely defined, middle ground is adapted,” 
synthesizing “Christian socialism, the old liberalism and the new state interventionism” 
(Textbook G, p.197). The Social Guarantees legislation included Social Security and an 
extension of the Work Code which now “rose to constitutional rank” (p.195): the right to 
work, minimum wage, 8-hour work day, paid vacations, and “insurance for professional 
risks.” On unions, the legislation took a middle path – it “legalized the workers’ 
struggle,” guaranteed the right to strike, but also weakened unions as “the right of 
freedom from union affiliations was established” (p.196). This conservative path on 
unionization continues to the present day, but when one considers how union leaders 
throughout Latin America have often been murdered and severely repressed, the Costa 
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Rican compromise has a definite appeal. Textbook G admits that “In spite of centrist 
efforts, unionism is dispersed and fragmented” (p.285), but in the past it had more 
influence: “The unions and the Communist Party had decisive participation in the 
establishment of the Social Guarantees of 1943. In the following years they were a large 
force in defense of worker’s rights” (p.285).   
 Unlike Textbooks G and D, Textbooks B, E and F give very little voice to 
Calderon, Sanabria, and Mora in the Social Guarantees chapters. That is, there are very 
few quotes from these figures. But Textbooks E and F do celebrate the Social Guarantees 
in textboxes. For instance, Textbook E includes these statements: 
The Social Security Fund is based on the principles of universality, solidarity, 
equity and equality. It is funded by a tripartite regime in which workers, 
employers and the state contribute a percentage of their salary or payroll to ensure 
a dignified and timely attention to the entire population. The economic 
contribution of the parties is based on social justice, because everyone contributes 
according to their salary. Those who earn more contribute more capital, thus it 
ensures the same attention to them and to those who earn the least. Social Security 
became a pillar of social development and favored a better quality of life for the 
nation of Costa Rica. Thanks to it, the country has achieved health indices and life 
expectancy superior to many developed nations. (p.121) 
 
Textbook F repeats the above verbatim, and also adds: 
 
With the Social Guarantees the range of the constitution is elevated to the social 
function of the State, this meant the obligation to legislate for the welfare of the 
nation, protect the family, women, children and the elderly; it also guarantees job 
security, access to decent housing, all levels of education and health. According to 
the Social Guarantees, the state must ensure the fair distribution of wealth and 
provide to Costa Ricans a decent life. (p.336) 
 
 Unlike the other texts which openly and repeatedly praised the Social Guarantees 
legislation, in places Textbook B assumes quite a neutral and even a conservative, cynical 
tone. Rather than praising the laws as a milestone supporting human rights, social justice, 
the poor, and the common good as in Textbook G, Textbook B says that the “Social 
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Guarantees recognize work as a social duty of human beings, through which he can 
acquire, according to his capacities, a dignified life” (p.92). It seems the authors fail to 
recognize that the reforms were grounded in the inalienable dignity of human beings, not 
their utility as workers. The text’s one quote from Calderon in this chapter seems to be 
cherry-picked as it betrays a conservative ruling class tone: “When I was elected 
President...my Christian and human sensitivities obligated me to think on two 
fundamental matters: how to favor the efficiency of the working class, without placing 
disadvantage on the general development of the country...” (p.101). Likewise, rather than 
praising the principles of the Rerum Novarum, Textbook B says it “gave start to the 
Church’s preoccupation with social problems” (p.90). The word “preoccupation” implies 
the Church would be better off sticking to an otherworldly spiritual mission. Cynically, 
Textbook B notes that in seeking to pass the legislation, “The government gave the 
people a series of offers to count on their support like: raising wages, regulating the 
prices of primary goods, guaranteed distribution of shoes to protect children from 
parasites...” (p.93). Thus, the ideological slant of Textbook B suggests there are some 
cracks in the Costa Rican consensus regarding the social safety net and egalitarian values. 
This is to be expected, since elites in the Costa Rican government have advanced neo-
liberal economic policies for many years.   
 Textbook B does make clear that the legislation passed through the alliance of 
Calderon, the Church, and the communists. Manuel Mora is said to have conducted 
“campaigns around the whole country in favor of the Social Guarantees” (p.93). And, we 
are told of a secret meeting between Mora and Archbishop Sanabria in which a grand 
ideological compromise was made “...where both recognized, respected and kept their 
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doctrinal differences, but it is decided to dissolve the communist party and create a new 
group [the Popular Vanguard] that would not attack the Church and that would accept 
Catholic social doctrine as the foundation for solving the socio-economic woes of the 
country...” (p.93).  
 The fourth event analyzed is the Brazos Caídos/ Arms Down Strike. Only one out 
of 5 textbooks (20%) covers the pivotal women’s march and occupation that occurred 
during this strike. Textbook B satisfactorily covers the motives, women leaders (nine of 
them are named by name), and outcome of the strike and pivotal 8,000 women’s march 
and occupation (p.96). The strike and demonstrations sought “electoral guarantees for the 
1948 elections” and were also motivated by “irregularities” committed by the 
government forces. The strike began on July 20, 1947 as businesses, factories, and banks 
shut their doors. The Calderonist government (Teodoro Picado was President, but he was 
widely viewed as a puppet for Calderon) organized counter-repressive measures. Banana 
and wharf workers from the coast came up to the capital and were given a rifle and a red 
blanket by the government, and they roamed the streets looking like “Mariachis.” These 
coastal workers “ransacked striking businesses” (p.96). We then read that negotiations 
between the parties became “laborious” and that nine women planned a march, which 
turned into an overnight occupation: 
In August, a group of women from the opposition, headed by María Teresa 
Obregon de Dengo, Cristina de Esquivel, Rosario de Facio, Emma Gamboa, 
Maria del Rosario Quirós, Marta de Pages, Etilma de Romero, Margarita Baudrit, 
y Clarisa Mora, decided to organize a protest that would end in front of the 
Presidential House, which was taken to conclusion August 2nd, on the Day of the 
Virgin of the Angels. More than eight thousand women paraded, starting from the 
Cathedral, to go solicit electoral guarantees and the end to the strike from 
President Picado. The answer from the President was for them to go pray to the 
Virgin of the Angels for a miracle. So the women decided to spend the night in 
front of the Presidential Home, a night in which a shoot-out unfolded that was 
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viewed as a lack of respect towards the women, some of whom had to throw 
themselves to the ground, others were mocked and insulted by the police. The 
altercation resulted in quick negotiations the next day, thanks to the intervention 
of the National Electoral Tribune of Don Ricardo Castro Beeche of the opposition 
and by the very president of the Republic, Don Teodoro Picado, who was weak of 
character. One cannot govern with mere good intentions, will and a powerful 
character is needed. The strike came to an end, but not the skirmishes between 
those for and against the government. One could feel in the ambience that this 
road was leading irreparably towards a civil war. In the middle of fights, bombs, 
fear and altercations the elections arrived. (p.96)    
 
The slam on Picado’s “weak character” is highly unusual for a state-approved textbook 
by global standards (such texts rarely insult Presidents), but also rare (by global 
standards) is the fairly comprehensive coverage of such a pivotal strike, march, and 
occupation. The climax of the occupation was the shoot-out surrounding the women 
(some of this exchange of gunfire no doubt returned by police or soldiers), and the fact 
that it was said to be “viewed as a lack of respect towards the women.” It did not help 
that police also “mocked and insulted” the women. The text concludes that, “The 
altercation resulted in quick negotiations the next day” (p.96). Hence, we glimpse here 
what appears to be another instance of “the paradox of repression” (Smithey and Kurtz 
1999). Violence and repression of the nonviolent women protesters quickly backfired 
against the government. 
 Like the other texts, Textbook D’s coverage of the “Arms Down Strike” 
completely omits the women’s march and occupation. Textbook D clarifies that the strike 
lasted from July 23 to August 3, and “Basically, it was a management shutdown, a 
closing of commercial and banking establishments...The strike was a massive 
phenomenon that was widely supported. The initial motivation was to protest police 
repression, but it transformed into an opposition that demanded electoral guarantees” 
(p.270). This description of a “massive phenomenon,” “widely supported,” barely hints at 
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the mass nonviolent actions involved beyond the work stoppage. Textbook D concludes 
by saying, “Some authors believe the goal was to overthrow the government, which did 
not happen when negotiations were implemented and opposition to the demanded 
Guarantees developed” (p.270). Textbook E clarifies that one of the key causes of the 
1948 Civil War was: “Lack of knowledge of the agreements from the Arms Down Strike” 
(p.126). 
 It would seem that ademilitarized nation, confident that their national security 
plan is sufficient would want to socialize younger generations into the knowledge that 
their “no standing army” policy has worked in the past, even in the worst case scenario of 
an armed invasion. Given that Costa Rica’s national anthem includes a stanza that 
promises to rally a citizen’s militia in an emergency, it would seem that textbook authors 
would be eager to cite examples when this occurred. The national anthem includes this 
line: “...If an enemy seeking to slander you or/ Harms your name, then we will abandon 
our farms/ And arise with fervor to take up our arms...” Hence, I expected that the 
textbooks would cover the 1948 and 1955 invasions from Nicaragua. Moreover, if the 
texts portray the successful repelling of these invasions by accenting the militarized 
dimensions of Costa Rican resistance, it would seem to buttress pro-violent ideologies 
(e.g., just war ideology) and weaken confidence in the efficacy of nonviolence.   
 But it was found that the invasions and militarized dimensions of resistance were 
scarcely present in the texts. Only 1 out of 5 textbooks covers the 1955 invasion, but this 
text, Textbook E, does not explain how Costa Rica defended itself. We are given only the 
barest of summaries: “In 1955, Anastasio Somoza invaded Costa Rica to overthrow 
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President Figueres and with him the Caribbean Legion” (Textbook E, p.125). Nothing 
more is offered. 
 Longley (1997) recounts the 1955 episode as following a long build-up of 
tensions between Figueres and Somoza. For years, Somoza had sheltered Calderon and 
Calderonista exiles bent on a military invasion. On January 8, Figueres requested OAS 
intervention to prevent an attack on Costa Rica. On Jaunary 11, about 500 rebel troops 
led by a West Point graduate, Teodoro Picado, Jr., and comprised of Costa Rican exiles 
supportive of Calderon crossed into northern Costa Rica, while planes bombed and 
strafed three Costa Rican cities (San José, Cartago, and Liberia). A rebel radio station 
calling itself the “Voice of the Authentic Anti-Communist Revolutionary Army” urged 
Costa Ricans to join the rebellion and expel the “Communist” Figueres and his supporters 
(p.144). A comparison was made between Arbenz in Guatemala (deposed by a CIA and 
Somoza-backed coup) and Figueres. Meanwhile, “the Costa Rican civil guard and a 
hastily organized ‘minuteman’ army moved northward to repulse the invasion” (p.144). 
On short notice, an army of 6,000 volunteers, “including high school youths” was formed 
(Biesanz, Biesanz, and Biesanz 1999, p.32). 
 It was only when the rebels crossed into Costa Rica that the OAS acted, but they 
were swift with U.S. assistance: “Representatives from the United States, Mexico, Brazil, 
Paraguay, and Ecuador immediately boarded USAF (U.S. Air Force) transports to make 
an on-the-spot investigation of the fighting in northern Costa Rica...” (Longley 1997, 
p.145). Anti-aircraft ammunition was delivered from a U.S. base in the Canal Zone. On 
January 16, the OAS approved the sale of four P-51 Mustang fighter aircraft from the 
U.S. to Costa Rica. A day later they were flown down from the U.S. to Costa Rica and 
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U.S. experts taught Costa Ricans how to pilot the aircraft: “...the newly formed Costa 
Rican air force flew sorties against the aggressors. The new aerial presence was 
pivotal...” (p.146). At this point, Somoza rushed his own troops to the border and the 
OAS acted to diffuse tensions: “On 20 January, the [OAS’s] investigative committee 
created a neutral zone three miles on each side of the border and forbade Nicaraguan and 
Costa Rican troops from entering it until 25 January. In that period, the committee 
ordered the insurgents to leave the area or face extermination by the Costa Rican army” 
(p.146). The rebels retreated into Nicaragua and surrendered to Nicaraguan officials.  
 U.S. press coverage was favorably disposed towards Costa Rica thanks partly to 
Costa Rican diplomats and their U.S. State Department allies. The New York Times 
praised the OAS and the U.S. for aiding Figueres. Time magazine lauded the 
inexperienced Costa Rican pilots and the “blue-jean militia armed with their own rifles” 
who beat back a well-trained, well-armed force led by Picado, a West Pointer (p.146). 
Figueres was quoted as insulting Picado, saying, “You can send them to school, but you 
can’t give them brains” (p.147). It is rather amazing that this colorful episode is 
completely omitted from most of the Costa Rican history texts. Perhaps the textbook 
omissions and extremely brief coverage of the 1948 and 1955 invasions is one indicator 
of the cultural ethos of peace in Costa Rica– manifesting here as a disinterestedness in 
military history, or a de-emphasis of its significance.       
 While the rivalry between Figueres and Somoza is also neglected by the 
textbooks, it is a colorful case study that would seem to appeal to textbook authors, given 
the standard textbook trope of emphasizing presidential politics. When Somoza 
challenged Figueres to a duel, Figueres replied, “Grow up” (Longley 1997, p.145). A 
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culture of peace could certainly celebrate that response, and it almost models nonviolent 
conflict resolution for school yard playgrounds. The reality is that Figueres and Somoza 
had formulated multiple plots to overthrow one another. The U.S., which consistently 
backed the Somoza dictatorship, eventually sought to calm tensions between the two. It 
was Vice-President Richard Nixon who brokered a peace agreement between Figueres 
and Somoza as “each leader promised to issue a statement guaranteeing that he would not 
aid any more attempts to overthrow the other” (pp.147-149).      
 In only 2 out of the 5 texts (Textbooks D and G) covering the 1948 invasion is 
there any explanation on how the conflict was resolved. Even here, in the texts which 
offer the most comprehensive account of the 1948 invasion, the lesson that Costa Rica’s 
security plan (and reliance on the Rio Treaty and international organizations like the 
OAS) is sufficient could be made more explicit and explained. Textbook G reads: “In 
December 1948 Calderon invaded Costa Rica from Nicaragua, but he failed due to 
intervention by the OAS, the U.S. and even from Somoza” (Textbook G, p.202). 
Textbook B offers more words about the invasion but even less explanation of its 
resolution. We are told that the Junta was forced do deal with “...some serious political 
events...the invasion from Nicaraguan territory organized by ex-President Calderón 
Guardia in December 1948 joined by a group of his partisans and assistance from the 
Somoza government. The movement failed and relations with Nicaragua worsened” 
(p.98). 
 In Textbook E, Monge’s “Proclamation of Perpetual Neutrality” in 1983 is said to 
guarantee the Costa Rica “could no longer intervene in the internal affairs of another 
State” (p.174). But the motivation for it is only linked to a pragmatic outcome: it helped 
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“international assistance to return to the country, because the international organizations 
were assured that Costa Rica would not support the Sandinistas” (p.174). Other texts take 
a more idealistic view, linking Monge’s Proclamation to extending regional peace 
(Textbook B), extending democratization in the region (Textbook A), or to ideals: 
“respect for the principle of the self-determinationof peoples” (Textbook F, p.135), as 
well as linked to a long history of Costa Rican leaders who “have proclaimed the 
necessity of peaceful coexistence” (Textbook D, p.279). The texts do not fully develop 
the contextual factors shaping the decision. Only textbooks E and F hint at the 
international and economic pressures Monge faced when he made this Declaration. Only 
one of the textbooks (Textbook A) refers to the full name of Monge’s Proclamation: “the 
Declaration of Perpetual, Active, and Unarmed Neutrality.” And none of the texts 
mention Monge’s claim that Costa Rica’s tradition of peace made it a “spiritual power” 
(Biesanz, Biesanz, Biesanz 1999, p.90). The texts might have incorporated an account of 
previous nations that have declared neutrality for limited periods of time, such as 
Denmark and several other European nations during World War I, Sweden during World 
War II, etc. In this sense, the declaration of “Perpetual” Neutrality could be cast a bold 
step on the international stage matching Switzerland’s self-chosen status, and as one 
more example of Costa Rica’s culture of peace worth protecting and celebrating. 
 On the case of Chile’s nonviolent revolution, all four Costa Rican textbooks 
covering the Pinochet era and the overthrow of Pinochet, fail to cover the nonviolent 
protest movement that helped to bring him down. Instead, all four texts emphasize the 
1989 election which unseated Pinochet, and most of the texts also mention the 1988 
referendum which called for the 1989 election. In reality, the nonviolent movement was 
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instrumental in the outcome of the 1988 referendum as well as the 1989 election. The 
closest the texts come to acknowledging a nonviolent mass movement is the following – 
from Textbook C and G: “By 1983, increased unemployment and discontent was 
manifested publicly. The Junta reacted with crushing repression especially against 
students” (C, p.204; G, p.121).  
 This description of repression makes little sense without describing the nonviolent 
resistance the students were engaged in. Overall, a real opportunity is missed to describe 
one of the most significant nonviolent revolutions in Latin American history. It is little 
wonder that many Costa Rican students report little faith in nonviolent efficacy, if they 
lack knowledge of nonviolent revolutions such as the one in Chile. Textbook A is unique 
in that it skips right over the 1931 overthrow of Ibanez, despite covering events in Chile 
in 1929 and the Chilean presidency in 1925 and 1932, and numerous years surrounding 
these dates (p.197). Hence, Textbook A skips over opportunities to cover two separate 
nonviolent revolutions in Chile. Textbook A also discusses Guatemala’s dictator Ubico 
“who governed from 1931 to 1944,” and El Salvador’s dictator Martinez who “governed 
from 1931 until 1944” (p.203). What the text neglects here is the fact that both of these 
dictators were brought down by nonviolent revolutions. Once again, an opportunity is 
missed to discuss popular, mass nonviolent movements and their efficacy in 
overthrowing leaders, even dictators.   
 Textbook G is guilty of the same omission and obfuscation as it mentions the role 
of the U.S.’s support for dictators including “Somoza in Nicaragua, Ubico in Guatemala, 
Fernández Martínez in El Salvador...” on page 198. Then, on the next page the text 
reports: “At an international level, the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union 
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began. In Central America, due to military and civilian uprisings the dictatorships fell, 
except for Somoza in Nicaragua” (p.199; emphasis added). We see that the closest 
Textbook G comes to naming the 1944 nonviolent revolutions throughout Latin America 
is by referring to “military and civilian uprisings.” The vagueness of “civilian uprisings” 
and its pairing with “military” serves to obscure the nonviolent revolutions of 1944.  
 The emphasis on electoral politics (and “conventional action” over against 
nonviolent action) is made explicit in Textbook A, which reports: “Chile is a democratic 
country that has managed to maintain a climate of peaceful coexistence and relative 
prosperity. The instrument of the polls [democracy] has been beating the imposition of 
weapons in dictatorial situations...” (p.198). This is a half-truth, since the omitted 
nonviolent resistance was instrumental in creating a climate free of fear, a climate where 
citizens could exercise their will in the streets as well as the polls. 
 Only one of the textbooks recounts that in1994, Panama and Haiti disbanded their 
armies. Textbook G reads: “Costa Ricathrough itsrulershas hada leading role inthe 
democratization of thearea. Dr. OscarArias Sánchez, who won the Nobel PeacePrize in 
1987, achieved the pacification ofCentralAmericathrough dialogue, as well as the 
eliminationof the military inPanamaandHaiti” (Textbook G, p.124). This omission in the 
other textbooks is surprising, and its significance is only half-developed in Textbook G. 
The demilitarization of Panama makes Costa Rica’s southern border more secure and 
together with Haiti, it shows that Costa Rica’s security model can be exported. Moreover, 
the disbanding of both armies occurred through Oscar Arias’s efforts. Many of the texts 
include subchapters on the Central American region. Textbook F includes a section on 
“Of War and Peace: The Integration of Central America” (p.407), and a section on “The 
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Future of the Central American Region” (pp.408-409). Textbook D has a section on 
Panama’s recent history (p.337). Similarly, Textbook E, includes a subchapter on Central 
American regional problems (pp.197-202) and a “border conflicts” section (p.201). Such 
thematic topics could have easily justified including mention of the fact that Panama 
disbanded its army following the Costa Rican demilitarized model. Oscar Arias, for 
instance, has emphasizedthat the border between Panama and Costa Rica is “the safest in 
the world” because neither nation has an army (Jonson 2000). 
 Regarding coverage of the Iraq War, the textbooks completely neglect to focus on 
important development related to Costa Rica’s national security plan. Completely 
unmentioned is how Costa Rica was pressured into becoming a part of President Bush’s 
“Coalition of the Willing.” In reality, this episode prompted a young law student, Roberto 
Zamora to sue the President of Costa Rica in the nation’s Supreme Court. The outcome of 
the case elevated Costa Rica’s Neutrality Principle to Constitutional status (Eddy and 
Dreiling 2013). In the concluding comment on Iraq, Textbook C seems to naively project 
onto Obama a Costa Rican-like preference for diplomacy: “In 2010, Barack Obama 
announced that at the end of August combat in Iraq will end. Military personnel will be 
exchanged for diplomats to back the Iraqis” (p.139). The only text which even comes 
close to discussing the Coalition of the Willing is Textbook D which writes, “President 
Bush persisted in a plan to attack Iraq on the pretext of liberating this country from the 
dictatorship of Hussein. It was supported by England and Spain, despite the weight of 
worldwide opposition” (p.106). The text mentions Bush’s “pretext,” the failure to find 
evidence of “chemical weapons” after “months of inspection,” and continues in a critical 
tone: “On March 20, 2003 the attack began. The real reason was to control Iraq's oil 
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reserves in this country and have a partner that allows the U.S. to monitor Iran and 
Afghanistan, countries accused of supporting terrorism” (p.106). Hence, it is not for an 
unwillingness to criticize the U.S. that the authors of this text avoid the topic of how the 
Coalition of the Willing impacted Costa Rica’s political scene.  
Textbook Coverage of Abolishing the Army 
 Thus far, analysis of Costa Rican history textbook coverage of milestones and 
important junctures in Costa Rica’s history revealed significant weaknesses and 
omissions in coverage. Overall, the entire set of textbooks perform relatively well on 
most of the selected events, as omissions by one publisher are compensated for by 
another publisher. Of course the problem is students are only assigned one text. On some 
issues such as the Iraq War and the nonviolent overthrow of Pinochet in Chile, all of the 
texts fall short. Coverage of two of Costa Rica’s most significant nonviolent campaigns, 
the overthrow of Tinoco in 1919, and the “Arms Down Strike” in 1947 were only 
covered satisfactorily by one textbook each. Likewise, only one text covers the 1955 
invasion from Nicaragua and only one text covers Oscar Arias’s success in exporting the 
Costa Rican model with the abolition of the Haitian and Panamanian armies in 1994. In 
coverage of all of these historical events, signs of Costa Rican exceptionalism as a culture 
of peace are rare in the textbooks. However, Costa Rican exceptionalism did emerge in 
tolerant coverage of Costa Rica’s Communist party and especially in the celebration of 
the Social Guarantees. In places, the distinctive values of a vital social democracy emerge 
in the texts, including this affirmation in Textbook B: “Besides the right and respect for 
liberty, Costa Ricans have managed to develop other values, upon which the nation has 
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been built: dignity, the common good, solidarity, tolerance, justice, civility, and peace” 
(p.149). 
 Turning to coverage of the abolition of the army, representations of Costa Rica’s 
culture of peace finally emerge with impressive strength and consistency. Five out of six 
textbooks highly praise the abolition of the army for both principled and pragmatic 
reasons. A strong sense of pride emerges in the texts: “God gave us the privilege of being 
born in Costa Rica: a democracy with no armed forces” (Textbook C, p.96). We are told 
that on December 1, 1948 Costa Rica, with Figueres’s declaration “becomes the first state 
in the world without an army. Afterward, the Constitutional Assembly of 1949 
incorporates it into our Constitution” (Textbook D, p.279). And we read a quotation of 
Figueres in 1948: “Ours will be a nation of laws and a land of free men...Today Costa 
Rica is the only country in the world where military armies are constitutionally 
prohibited” (Textbook B, p.110). Figueres is praised because “he could have remained as 
dictator, imitating most Latin American countries” (p.280). Principled rationales include 
the notions that abolishment relates to ideals of peace and democracy including conflict 
resolution through dialogue rather than force. We are told that Costa Rica’s abolition of 
the army and “love for our democracy...had led us to a peaceful coexistence. Conflicts are 
solved with dialogue and negotiation” (p.280). Another text concurs, the act of 
abolishment helps to realize democratic ideals: “The abolition of the army...reinforced the 
use of dialogue and elections to solve conflicts” (Textbook E, p.129). In addition, “It also 
strengthened confidence in national and international institutions and the full enjoyment 
of individual, social and political guarantees” (p.129). This reference to international 
institutions deserves further elaboration, as most of the texts fail to make it clear that 
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without an army, Costa Rica’s security plan has relied heavily on the OAS and the Rio 
Treaty. 
 In the pragmatic realm, the textbooks indirectly imply that abolishing the army 
removed a source of coups (Textbook D, p.272; Textbook G, p.202). More directly, 
Textbook B says the abolition of the army “discarded” the power of a “military caste” in 
government (p.110). In addition, one textbook account argues that abolition and “The 
pacifist idea allowed Figueres to break his agreement with the Caribbean Legion” 
(Textbook B, p.110). This refers to Figueres’ pact with the Caribbean Legion to help 
them overthrow dictators throughout the Central American region. The “pacifist idea” is 
also said to have increased trust in the Junta, and trust that they would turn power over to 
the President-elect Ulate, and “create a favorable space for the next elections” (p.110). 
Even more utilitarian in interpretation is Textbook B’s contention that abolition was “one 
of the wisest measures taken by the Constitutional Assembly of 1949...[because] it served 
to project a pacifist image which allowed the influx of national and foreign funds that 
resolved the large economic problems of the nation” (p.110).   
 But the strongest pragmatic emphasis is the refashioning of budgetary priorities: 
“With this act, Costa Rica allowed a major investment in social development...The 
abolition of the army benefitted the development of education, health and culture...” 
(Textbook E, pp.128-129). Again, we read: “the economic resources of the State 
dedicated to maintaining the military apparatus, would instead be invested to promote 
and develop the education of the country” (Textbook B, p.110). And again, “All countries 
in our region and the world have an army on which millions of dollars are spent. In Costa 
Rica it is spent on education, health, and to improve the quality of life of citizens” 
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(Textbook C, p.96). Textbook F argues, “Thanks to this fact [abolition], the country has 
reached its highest levels of human development, higher than many of the developed 
nations” (p.341). Textbook B joins in the praise, but also strikes a note of critical 
modesty: “[Other] countries spend vast sums on their armies, in Costa Rica the money is 
spent on schools and health clinics. This does not mean we are the best. In recent years, 
many of these institutions are collapsing due to the corruption of public officials that have 
poorly managed public funds” (p.340). Of course, corruption is relative, and Costa Rica 
has recently ranked very high in transparency and lack of corruption.   
 The texts also tell us that Costa Rica has a tradition of peace, marked by President 
Monge’s declaration of Costa Rica as a country of “perpetual neutrality,” the founding of 
the University for Peace in Costa Rica, and Oscar Arias’s 1987 Nobel Peace prize for his 
“intervention in the pacification of Central America” (Textbook D, p.279). Further, Costa 
Ricans are portrayed as participating in a mission of peace to the world: 
Statisticians, politicians, intellectuals and simple Costa Rican citizens, according 
to each person’s resources, with talks at universities, international political forums 
or merely with their way of being or acting, have proclaimed to the world the 
urgent necessity of living in peace. The beginning of this great goal is eliminating 
weaponry and of course the army following the Costa Rican model. (p.279) 
 
Here the text could have given far more specifics regarding Costa Rica’s track record as a 
world leader in peace and human rights initiatives. Textbook F improves slightly upon 
this by listing some highlights of Costa Rica’s leadership at the UN as Costa Rican 
leaders have pushed for an end to South African apartheid, the Agreement Against 
Torture in 1990, a peaceful resolution to the Iraqi conflict in 1995, and the Decade of 
Education and Human Rights in 1995 (p.109).   
573 
 Surprisingly, only one out of six textbooks clarifies that the Rio Treaty has been 
part of Costa Rica’s security plan since 1948. Only Textbook E included the explanation 
that was expected before analysis: “The signing of the Rio Treaty was one of the reasons 
that Costa Rica disbanded its army in 1948, considering the provisions of the Treaty as 
collateral sufficient to ensure national defense” (p.303). However, this only appears in a 
brief caption for a photo. Textbooks B and C critique the Rio Treaty and the OAS, 
arguing they have “not worked” because of U.S. hegemony (Textbook B, pp.192-193 ; 
Textbook C, p.148). Some of the texts also praise the OAS, but they are vague. For 
example, Textbook C refersonly to “positive accomplishments such as its intervention 
with peaceful means in border issues” (p.148). Examples are not given, even though 
Costa Rica has directly benefited from the OAS in this regard.  
 A fuller treatment of the OAS and the Rio Treaty would note that just days after 
disbanding the army on December 1, 1948, Figueres signed the Rio Treaty (the Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance), and just days after this, on December 10 it 
was confirmed that Calderon’s rebel fighters invaded from Nicaragua. Figueres’ response 
was to appeal to the OAS, and to the U.S., the latter to provide assistance in purchasing 
arms (Longley 1997, p.97). On December 12 the OAS met in a special session. On 
December 14, the OAS invoked the Rio Treaty. As a result of OAS intervention, 
including the creation of an investigative committee and later a border monitoring group, 
as well as pressure from the U.S., tensions with the calderonistas and Nicaragua (who 
had supported them) diffused (pp.98-102). A member of the OAS investigating 
committee concluded that thanks to the OAS, “the Rio pact has become a living 
instrument” (p.101). It seems that Costa Rican students, as members of a demilitarized 
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nation, would be interested in the Rio Treaty, its history, and its role as plank in their 
nation’s national security policy. But the textbooks rapidly gloss over these events.  
 The roots of the idea to the abolish the army are not discussed, except that two 
texts refer to the coup attempt by Edgar Corona (Minister of Public Safety) after the Civil 
War, as building support for the abolition of the army (Textbook D, p.272; Textbook G, 
p.202). In addition, some texts note that the army had been a “tiny armed force” since the 
fall of the Tinoco dictatorship so that actually abolishing the army was a “symbolic act” 
(Textbook D, p.272; Textbook G, p.202). The difference here is that this is all Textbook 
G says about abolishment, which serves to diminish its significance.   
 Numerous other events of Costa Rica’s distinctive peace history also merit 
comment, but appear nowhere in the textbooks. These include, but are not limited to the 
following: First, Figueres’s decision as President to invite a Soviet embassy to Costa 
Rica. This bridge-making and peace-making gesture during the Cold War, was ill-
received by the U.S. Second, in 1958, President Echandi, a rival of Figueres, initiated an 
exchange of Costa Rican military equipment for North American farm equipment: “The 
trade of some 2,000 small arms for six tractors was of little academic importance, but it 
demonstrated that Figueres’ abolition of the army was not only accepted but expanded on 
by his political opponents” (Nelson 1983, p.262). Third, Costa Rica’s decision under 
President Arias to normalize relations with Cuba in 2009, another policy frowned upon 
by the U.S., but again a peace-making gesture. Fourth, the decision to allow Calderón to 
return to Costa Rica and to even run for president in 1962. He lost but he was appointed 
as Ambassador to Mexico (1966-1970), a job that took him out of the country (surely a 
source of jokes in Costa Rica), but also demonstrated his re-acceptance. This could easily 
575 
be framed as one indicator of Costa Rica’s tolerance and culture of peace. After going 
into exile, Calderón and his supporters attempted to militarily invade Costa Rica twice, 
once in 1948 and once in 1955. His acceptance back into the nation and his participation 
in electoral politics is worthy of comment.Mauricio Leandro, a UCR professor of 
psychology, has said this was a significant moment of reconciliation and forgiveness for 
“the Costa Rican family” (Eddy and Dreiling 2013).    
 In summary, Costa Rican textbooks reveal some of the same shortcoming 
observed in other nations around the world. Most of the Costa Rican textbooks fail to 
sufficiently cover the “Arms Down” Strike of 1947 and the nonviolent actions 
contributing to Tinoco’s overthrow in 1919. On a regional note, despite the fact that 
many of the sampled texts cover Chile during the Pinochet era, they all fail to depict the 
nonviolent actions (which in fact, helped to remove Pinochet), and focus instead on the 
conventional action of electoral politics. However, Costa Rica’s “culture of peace” very 
clearly emerges in portraits of the Abolition of the Army and the Social Guarantees 
legislation. But, most of the textbooks completely neglect to highlight some of the most 
important features of Costa Rica’s national security plan as a demilitarized nation: the 
Rio Treaty, the 1994 abolition of Panama’s army on its southern border, and the 2003-
2004 lawsuit during the outbreak of the Iraq War which elevated Costa Rica’s principle 
of neutrality to Constitutional status.   
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A CRUCIAL CASE IN U.S. NONVIOLENT HISTORY:  
ROBINSON AND RICKEY 
 This chapter covers the pivotal, invisible nonviolent strategy of Jackie Robinson 
and Branch Rickey in U.S. History Textbooks. I begin on a general level noting that 
narratives, especially narratives addressed to large audiences (e.g., Hollywood films, 
Broadway musicals, and school history textbooks), are likely to employ relatively 
conventional storytelling structures and themes. For instance, the narrators, producers, 
and sponsors of a narrative are likely to cast it within a relatively de-politicized form – or 
at least one that will be perceived as de-politicized by the intended audience. Numerous 
other conventional narrative devices, patterns of communication and social conformity 
may also operate beneath the surface. For example, self-narratives in public arenas are 
often shaped by an etiquette of humility. Hence, in their self-narratives political activists 
seek to avoid appearing egotistical or morally superior, while actively constructing 
themselves as average joes and janes (Schudson 2012).  
 As another example of storytelling conventions, a study of sit-in activist 
narratives during the civil rights movement found that self-narratives of activism were 
marked by a theme of spontaneity (Polletta 1998b). Similarly, Rosa Parks, at least 
initially and under the public media spotlight, emphasized the spontaneous nature of her 
refusal to relinquish her seat on the bus (Schudson 2012).  
 To put it another way, these activists neglected to highlight the training, planning, 
organizational networks and supports which helped to make their activism possible. In 
some cases, this neglect may have been deliberate and strategically chosen, but it may 
also be that it often reflected an almost instinctive/ semi-conscious attempt at frame 
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alignment for mainstream audiences. To emphasize the spontaneity of forms of activism 
serves to de-politicize the action and humanize the actors for mainstream audiences. By 
contrast, if activists, especially activists in polarized political landscapes, were to begin 
their narratives by trumpeting their organizational affiliations, they would quickly be 
dismissed by mainstream audiences as radical “others.” Here, one need only recall how 
Republicans sought to “otherize” Barak Obama during the 2008 and 2012 elections by 
emphasizing that he had been a “community organizer” – a term familiar to activists and 
urbanites, but unfamiliar to suburban and rural white conservatives.               
 When the narratives are historical and preserved in collective memory, an 
additional series of conventions comes into play. For example, collective memories of a 
social movement or event often solidify around one exceptional or representative 
individual, a convention Schwartz (2009) refers to as “oneness.” Hence, the breaking of 
pro baseball’s color line in the 1940s has become the Jackie Robinson story, and Branch 
Rickey – who played such a central role in Robinson’s life is mentioned in only 23% of 
the textbooks which cover this episode. Several scholars have pointed out that school 
textbooks and children’s literature coverage of Rosa Parks reduce her story to a myth that 
both errs from the facts and omits key details (Kohl 1995, Schudson 2012), including 
omissions of other activists who did more for the civil rights movement (Schwartz 2009). 
The Jackie Robinson story seems to follow this paradigm of errors and omissions – 
perhaps the most obvious of which is that he was not the first black to play in the major 
leagues. Loewen (2007) has argued that textbooks omit that fact in order to accommodate 
the narrative trope of relentless American progress. But beyond this detail, other 
significant dynamics are also missing from the Robinson story in the average textbook.  
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 Re-visiting events that are included in nearly all U.S. history textbooks offers a 
good place to start in analyzing how and why significant nonviolent events often become 
outcompeted in the collective memories of nations. Below I will argue that Jackie 
Robinson’s integration of professional baseball is a crucial case, since few incidents in 
U.S. history are more deserving of being categorized in terms of nonviolent action and 
strategy, and since textbooks portrayals almost always fail to use the words 
“nonviolence” or cognate terms in describing it. The absence of any mention of Jesus’s 
ethic “turn the other cheek” is also conspicuous, since it played a pivotal role in 
motivating Jackie Robinson and his boss Branch Rickey, and was a flashpoint in their 
dramatic first meeting. As textbooks frame Robinson’s significance solely in terms of 
breaking the color barrier, they neglect the planning and nonviolent strategy behind this 
process. I suggest these omissions are paradigmatic of the way textbooks frequently 
render nonviolence invisible, even when it played a crucial role in national events. This 
invisibility helps explain why recently, only 54% of Americans affirmed that “peaceful 
means alone will work to improve the situation for oppressed groups” (Gallup World Poll 
2008). Below, I first analyze how textbooks portray Jackie Robinson and his 
accomplishments. Second, I detail the crucial textbook omissions and their larger 
significance.  
U.S. History Textbooks on Jackie Robinson 
 In the present sample, virtually all U.S. history textbooks published in the 1980s 
through 2000s offer a few sentences about Jackie Robinson. Of texts covering Robinson, 
almost 60% include at least one photograph of Robinson as well. While in the 1960s and 
1970s, it was common for textbooks to exclude any mention of Robinson (see Table 
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132), in recent decades,publishers have been more comprehensive in scope – adding 
literally hundreds of pages to the typical U.S. history textbook (Loewen 2007). Still, 
some texts contain no mention of Robinson, such as Appleby et al. (2005) - a text which 
runs to 1,138 pages. Consider the irony, given that historians like David Halberstam have 
contended that Robinson was the single most important American of the decade 
following World War II (Wilson 2010, p.xiv). Many texts limit coverage of Robinson to 
one sentence (e.g., DiBacco, Mason, and Appy 1991; Garcia 2005; Jones et al. 2008; 
Roden et al. 1984) or two sentences (e.g., Davidson and Lytle 1984; Faragher et al. 
2004;Lapsansky-Werner et al. 2008), while others offer a paragraph. Hence, the  
Table 132. Textbook Coverage of Jackie Robinson by Decade (N=37) 
Textbooks Mentioning Robinson (n=22) Textbooks With No Mention of Robinson 
(n=15) 
 Clark 1960 
Bragdon and McCutchen 1961 
Graff and Krout 1961 
Jacobs 1973 
Graff and Bohanna 1978 
 
 
Bidna, Greenberg, and Spitz 1971 
FEP 1971 
Sandler, Rozwenc, and Martin 1971 
Ver Steeg and Hofstadter 1971 
Leinwand 1975 
Brady and Brady 1977 
Pauline 1977 
Todd and Curti 1977 
Bass, Billias, and Lapsansky 1979 
Wood, Gabriel, and Biller 1979 
Garraty 1982 
Davidson an Lytle 1984 
Roden et al 1984 
Jordan et al 1985 
May 1985 
Ritchie et al 1985 
Graff 1986 
Conlin 1985 
 
Davidson and Lytle 1990 
DiBacco et al 1991 
Garraty 1991 
Lowman et al 1996 
Davidson and Stoff 1998 
Norton et al 1998 
Danzer et al 1999 
Giese et al 1999 
 
Faragher et al 2004 
Garcia et al 2005 
Jones et al 2008 
Lapsansky-Werner et al 2008 
Ayers et al 2009 
Appleby et al 2005 
Notes: This is a convenience sample consisting of virtually every text in the UO Knight Library textbook collection and supplemented 
by additional textbooks produced by leading publishers.  
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Robinson story does not appear as a story at all in the average textbook. Instead, it is 
represented through a one or two sentence summary with no narrative arc at all. Most of 
the textbook accounts stick to a simple theme - that Robinson “erased” (Jones et al. 2008, 
p.554) or “broke” the “color barrier” (e.g., Norton et al. 1998, p.826) or “color line,” 
becoming the “first black” player in major league baseball. The manner in which he did 
this is often left unexplored and unexplained, but a few of the sampled textbooks venture 
brief descriptions and explanations. 
 The history textbook I was assigned in my own Texas high school is typical. It 
briefly describes how Robinson broke the “color bar” by playing in the minor leagues in 
1946, and then major league baseball in 1947 with the Brooklyn Dodgers. Incidentally, 
while few of the texts mention Robinson’s first year in the minor leagues, none of them 
mention the fact that he played that year for a Canadian team. That is, ironically, the first 
year of the 3-year experiment took place while his home team was based in Canada – 
safely outside of the racially fraught U.S. Before moving on, the text adds: “Robinson’s 
success on the baseball diamond helped open the door to black athletes in all professional 
sports. The color bar in professional football was broken in 1946, tennis in 1949,  and 
basketball in 1950” (Graff 1986, p.319). In their textbook, Norton et al. (1998) explain 
that Robinson “cracked the color line” but then focus only on Robinson’s baseball skill (a 
common approach of the textbooks), writing that he “electrified Brooklyn Dodger fans 
with his spectacular hitting and base running.” And in a photo caption (below a picture of 
Robinson sliding into third base) they say Robinson had an “aggressive style that won 
him rookie-of-the-year honors” (p.826). With a similar focus on Robinson’s athletic skill, 
Davidson and Stoff’s (1998) textbook summarizes the Robinson story in one line: 
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“Ignoring insults and threats, Robinson won over fans with his daring play” (p.790). 
Faragher et al. (2004) explain that during the late 1940s, several “symbolic firsts” “raised 
black expectations and inspired pride,” and then sum up Robinson in two sentences: “In 
1947, Jackie Robinson broke the color barrier in major league baseball, winning rookie-
of-the-year honors with the Brooklyn Dodgers. Robinson’s courage in the face of racial 
epithets from fans and players paved the way for the black ballplayers who soon followed 
him to the big leagues” (p.547). Here, as in 32% of the textbooks, the shorthand 
explanation for Robinson’s success is tied to his “courage.”  
 In the same way, Lapsansky-Werner et al. (2008) explain: “Robinson braved 
death threats and rough treatment, but throughout his career he won the hearts of millions 
and paved the way for integration of other sports” (p.917). Incidentally, in fact, both 
Rickey and Robinson received death threats, hate mail, and obscene calls (Austin 1997, 
p.104). Again, Robinson’s character is summed up as bravery, and no other clue is given 
as to how he “won the hearts of millions.” Ironically, the preceding paragraph in this text 
discusses the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), whose members were “deeply 
influenced” by Thoreau and Gandhi and “became convinced that African Americans 
could apply direct nonviolent methods to gain civil rights” (Lapsansky-Werner et al. 
2008, p.917). Yet no linkage is made to the Robinson case as an example of nonviolence 
in action. As a result, a key opportunity is lost to explain the reasons for Robinson’s 
success from the vantage point of nonviolent theory. In many ways, the Robinson case 
illustrates hallmarks of Gandhian principled nonviolence which asserts that in any 
conflict, opponents can be “converted” and allies won over through nonviolent action, 
through a willingness to suffer and a refusal to strike back or give in to hate.     
582 
 Similarly, Danzer et al. (1999) dance around the details of the Robinson story 
without using what would arguably be the best descriptor: nonviolence. The authors 
explain the violence opposing players perpetrated against Robinson (i.e., bean balls and 
flagrant cleat spikes), the abuse of fans, and death threats, adding:  
But he endured this abuse with poise and restraint, saying, ‘Plenty of times I 
wanted to haul off when somebody insulted me for the color of my skin. But I had 
to hold to myself. I knew I was kind of an experiment.’ And the experiment was 
successful... (p.639) 
 
While “poise and restraint” are accurate descriptors, they obscure the extent to which 
Robinson and Rickey were specifically motivated and guided by nonviolent ideals and 
strategy. The text by Ayers et al. (2009) recounts: “Millions admired Jackie Robinson for 
his great skill as an athlete. Millions more were inspired by his courage. Robinson bore 
with bravery and dignity the pressure of being an individual so many people wanted to 
see succeed – and so many others expected to see fail” (p.910). Such descriptions of 
Robinson’s actions are accurate, but woefully incomplete.  
 These textbook accounts offer an important clue as to why nonviolence often 
escapes textured description and resonance in collective memory. It is partly because 
nonviolent action overlaps heavily with mundane every day behaviors – i.e., ignoring 
insults and restraining oneself in conflicts – that it risks escaping special notice or 
explanation. For this reason, I contend that principled nonviolence is more likely to 
compete successfully for a share in collective memory – because of its coherence and 
distinctiveness as well as its resonance with moral and religious traditions. This helps to 
explain why Dr. King and Cesar Chavez are often presented in U.S. textbook accounts in 
such as way that their principled nonviolence is highlighted and portrayed with relative 
accuracy. I will argue that principled nonviolence belongs as the central fulcrum in any 
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accurate retelling of the Robinson story. Its absence in the textbook accounts suggests 
that other factors might help explain the narrative depictions of the Robinson story, 
including a conventional tendency to gloss over the role of religion in a secular society, 
and to leave religion out of school history textbooks in particular (Davis 1992). However, 
in depicting the Robinson story, the Christian textbook in this sample (Lowman et al. 
1996) performed no better than the rest of the texts, and made no mention of the Christian 
faith of Rickey or Robinson. Perhaps this is not surprising since most conservative 
Christians in the U.S. have scarcely any notion of the nonviolence of Jesus or its 
implications.          
 Danzer et al.’s (1999) Teacher’s Edition includes a suggested discussion question 
that goes to the heart of the Robinson story, i.e., nonviolent methods and changing racial 
attitudes, but as we have seen, the text just barely provides enough information to 
animate the conversation:  
Jackie Robinson once said, ‘A life is not important except in the impact it has on 
other lives.’ Have students discuss Jackie Robinson’s impact on professional 
sports. Ask them whether they think Robinson’s response to discrimination 
influenced American attitudes toward civil rights. (p.639) 
 
While the final question is a very important one, the leading quotation does not prime 
students to specifically reflect on a nonviolent “response,” but pushes to broader do-
gooder theme.    
 Among the small percentage of textbooks that offer more extensive coverage of 
Robinson, a good example is an Oregon state adopted text which, in four paragraphs, 
details how Robinson was subjected to various forms of prejudice, exclusion, jeering, 
scorn, and physical aggression by other players, teammates, and fans. The text then 
explains:  
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His only offense was that he was black – the first black ballplayer in the major 
leagues. The year was 1947, and Branch Rickey, general manager of the Brooklyn 
Dodgers, had decided to make the first move toward ending segregation in 
baseball. But the first black player would need more than talent – he would need 
the character and restraint to endure the inevitable snubs and insults without 
returning the hostility. Robinson succeeded on all counts.  
 In his first season, Robinson batted .297, led the National League in stolen 
bases, and was voted Rookie of the Year. By 1949, his batting average had soared 
to .342 and it remained over .300 for the next five years. Even more important, he 
won the respect of fans everywhere. By the end of his rookie year, national polls 
rated him the second most popular person in America, close behind singer Bing 
Crosby. 
 Jackie Robinson became a symbol of change for blacks in America...The 
acceptance of Jackie Robinson and other black players who followed smashed the 
color barrier in sports...” (Davidson and Lytle 1990, p.712)     
 
Reading this account while remaining mindful of America’s fascination with violence 
and the purportedly widespread belief in the “myth of redemptive violence” (Wink 1992), 
one is struck by the nonviolent theory which is clearly implicated here. But again, the 
word “nonviolence” never appears. Employing matter-of-fact phrasing, which enjoys the 
benefit of historical hindsight and implies the strategic logic of nonviolence was the 
obvious choice, the textbook does not at all clarify that this nonviolent theory was held by 
Branch Rickey, nor how he came to embrace it and to argue for it. Nor are we told how 
Robinson came to embrace such a nonviolent strategy, where his “character” and 
nonviolent “restraint” came from, or the degree to which nonviolent ideals resonated with 
his own values. We are not told how in the face of violent bigotry, maintaining 
nonviolent discipline was a struggle for Robinson, as nonviolent ideals competed with his 
own – and culturally hegemonic images of masculinity in the U.S.    
 Again, most textbook portraits of Robinson briefly highlight his role in breaking 
the “color bar” in major league baseball, and that is all. When more is said, readers are 
often left to fill in missing details for themselves. For example, Graff and Bohanna’s 
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(1978) text describes Robinson as the first Negro in the major leagues” (p.583) and 
quotes Bob Gibson, an African-American professional baseball player in the 1960s, who 
said of Robinson: “I have a great deal of admiration for him. He had an awful lot of 
courage to do what he did. I’m not sure I would have had as much courage in his place” 
(p.583). The situations which Robinson met with courage are not detailed in the text.  
 A minority of the textbooks (23%) name Branch Rickey, and when he is 
discussed the details are few. Keeping it brief, Garraty’s (1982) text says, “...Robinson 
proved that Branch Rickey of the Brooklyn Dodgers was a shrewd judge of baseball 
talent as well as a believer in equal opportunity” (p.857). A more extensive treatment 
read:  
Rickey, however, believed the time had come for a change and, after much 
searching, chose Robinson to be the pioneer. At first there was resistance to 
Robinson. Unhappy baseball fans shouted insults from the stands, and some threw 
bottles and other objects onto the playing field. Several of Robinson’s teammates 
refused to eat or socialize with him. But his skill and personality soon impressed 
colleagues and public alike. In 1949 the spectacular Robinson was voted the most 
valuable player in the National League. (Jordan, Greenblatt, and Bowes 1985, 
p.685).  
 
Note, it is Robinson’s “skill and personality” which helped him succeed, there is no 
mention of nonviolence, or of how it played a role in Rickey’s choice of Robinson. Table 
133 documents how common this approach to the Robinson story is, to the neglect of the 
specific role of nonviolence. 
 Of all the textbooks analyzed, Jacobs (1973) offers the longest account of the 
Robinson and Rickey story, and does a passable job of highlighting the role of Robinson 
having “enough courage not to fight back” (p.428). But the description of events 
heavilyobscures key details. The 3-year pledge of nonviolence is never clearly named or 
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Table 133. Textbook Coverage of the Jackie Robinson Narrative  
 
Themes in coverage of Jackie Robinson  
% of 
textbooks 
including 
theme (N=22) 
1 photo of Robinson 45% 
2 photos of Robinson 14% 
Photo of Rickey 0% 
Robinson called “1st black” in major leagues(1) 91% 
Mention of Branch Rickey 23% 
Robinson’s “courage” 32% 
Robinson’s “restraint” 23% 
Insults/ abuse/ threats Robinson suffered 36% 
Rickey’s decision to use/ conviction about 
importance of nonviolent strategy 
9% 
The phrase “turn the other cheek” (central to 
the initial Rickey and Robinson meeting and 
strategy of the 3-year pledge of nonviolence) 
0% 
Religious motivations/ religious ideals for 
nonviolence of Rickey and Robinson 
0% 
Mention of Rickey and Robinson’s 3-year 
pledge of nonviolence(2) 
9% 
Role of new anti-discrimination law in New 
York state 
0% 
Role of new baseball commissioner  0% 
Role of NYC mayor’s push to integrate 
baseball 
0% 
Notes: The sample size (N=22) does not include 15 additional analyzed textbooks (mostly published in the 
1960s and 1970s) which made no mention of Jackie Robinson. (1) Robinson was not technically the first 
African-American in the major leagues. (2) two texts (9%) somewhat vaguely discussed the 3-year pledge 
(Giese et al. 1991; Jacobs 1973), but Giese et al. (1991) depict it as a 1-year pledge of nonviolence.  
 
explained, but it is indirectly addressed as the text recounts the end of the 3-year pledge: 
Robinson refused to fight back. He let his bat talk for him...Two seasons later Mr. 
Rickey was sure that Robinson was in the major leagues to stay...Rickey told 
Jackie Robinson that he was on his own. He could fight back. And Jackie did. He 
no longer stayed silent when white players cursed him or tried to kick him. He 
fought back and made them respect him. (p.428) 
 
Note the traditional masculine assumptions here – it was when he began to fight back that 
Robinson “made them respect him.” This completely obscures and contradicts the role of 
nonviolent restraint during the 3-year experiment.       
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 By far the best account is offered by Giese et al. (1999): 
When Rickey and Robinson first met in 1945, Rickey lectured Robinson on what 
to expect in the major leagues. The player would face hostility – from fans, 
opponents, teammates, and the press. Pitchers would try to knock him down with 
pitches, and base runners would try to spike him. Rickey told Robinson he could 
not fight back. ‘Mr. Rickey,’ Robinson asked, ‘do you want a ballplayer who’s 
afraid to fight back?’ Rickey responded, ‘I want a ballplayer with guts enough not 
to fight back!’ Robinson promised he would cause no incident. Through that 
lonely first season, he kept his promise and courageously endured every 
provocation. He played his game, helped the Dodgers win the National League 
pennant, and became Rookie of the Year. (p.564) 
 
The text even includes a review question for students: “Do you think it was important 
that Robinson not react violently to the taunts of his fellow players? Why, or why not?” 
(p.564). The Teacher’s Edition provides “answers” for teachers: “...It was important that 
Robinson not fight back, but endure the hostility...Student answers may differ, but in 
order for the color barrier to be broken for other players, it was very important that no 
violent incidents occur so Robinson could be judged as a baseball player and so no one 
would have excuses for continued exclusion of other African American players” (p.564).  
What Really Happened 
 Why should we attach any importance to categorizing Robinson’s entrance into 
the major leagues as a victory for nonviolent strategy and ideals? I am arguing without 
categorizing an event or action, it cannot be generalized and theorized. As such, the event 
is less fully explained and the operative strategies and principles are less likely to be 
understood, believed in, and applied in other contexts. 
 We move now to the key questions: Why is Jackie Robinson’s entrance into 
major league baseball and his breaking of the color line not remembered in terms of 
nonviolent action? Before addressing that question more fully, let us consider why 
Robinson’s story should be remembered as a victory for nonviolent strategy and ideals. 
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 It should be remembered as nonviolence – (1) as part of Branch Rickey’s plan, 
Rickey asked Robinson to pledge to maintain nonviolent discipline for three years. 
Formalized pledges like this have been a crucial internal organizing tactic for ensuring 
nonviolent discipline and accountability in activist organizations around the world, from 
the Southern Christian Leadership Council (SCLC) in the U.S. civil rights movement to, 
as the author found in his master’s paper fieldwork, the International Solidarity 
Movement in Israel-Palestine  in the 2000’s. 
 It should be remembered as nonviolence – (2) Robinson carried through with his 
pledge under enormous pressure, resisting repeated acts of physical and verbal aggression 
with disciplined nonviolence for three years. Many historians portray crisis moments 
where only Robinson’s pledge held him back from physically lashing out at aggressors, 
but Rickey’s grandson believes this is something of a misperception saying, “Jackie was 
not on a leash. It was Jackie Robinson who kept Jackie Robinson from exploding. He had 
given a pledge he believed in and he stuck by it – that’s all” (Rampersand 1997 cited in 
Lowenfish 2007, p.466). 
 It should be remembered as nonviolence – (3) Rickey’s first meeting with 
Robinson lasted three hours. During this time, he role-played numerous violent and 
insulting scenarios, testing Robinson’s resolve to maintain nonviolent discipline (for 
versions of this exchange see Breslin 2011, pp.66-67; Lowenfish 2007, p.375; Mann 
1957, pp.222-223; Polner 2007, p.153). Such role-playing is a standard training practice 
of nonviolent organizations. It helps prepare nonviolent activists for the aggression they 
might face, helps them rehearse nonviolent responses and imagine what nonviolence 
might look like in a variety of scenarios. 
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 It should be remembered as nonviolence – (4) Dr. King, the key theorist and 
practitioner of nonviolence in America argued that Robinson had enormous significance 
for the U.S. civil rights movement – calling Robinson a “pilgrim walking the lonesome 
byways toward the high road of Freedom. He was a sit-inner before sit-ins, a freedom 
rider before freedom rides” (Zirin 2008, p.118). Dr. King said Robinson was “a legend 
and a symbol in his own time,” who “challenged the dark skies of intolerance and 
frustration” (Dundas 2010). Similarly, Henry (1998) has argued that Robinson helped to 
change “the way blacks thought about themselves...giving them a sense of pride and 
reason to hope for genuine fulfillment in America,” and Robinson did even more for 
white America: “he compelled white Americans to confront the reality of racial prejudice 
and to redefine their values” (p.211). And the conservative political columnist George 
Will has proposed: “the most important black person in American history is Martin 
Luther King – a close second I would argue is Jackie Robinson, who came before Martin 
Luther King and began the consciousness raising of whites and blacks that resulted in 
Martin Luther King’s career” (Burns 2004). Though it had not been fully recognized, 
Robinson’s nonviolence played an absolutely pivotal role in making all of that possible. 
 It should be remembered as nonviolence – (5) Rickey’s own intellectual and even 
spiritual development led him decisively to principled nonviolence, through a network of 
scholars as well as his own commitment to social engagement, intellectual pursuits and 
religious study. (6) Branch Rickey specifically planned and theorized a nonviolent 
strategy, framed in the terms of Christian pacifism’s norm of – in the words of Jesus – to 
“turn the other cheek” and asked Robinson to buy into it. Rickey knew that he and 
Robinson shared a Christian faith in common, and in this sense, Rickey sought and 
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achieved “frame alignment” with the values and religious tradition Robinson already 
embraced.  
 It should be remembered as nonviolence – (7) but the full portrayal of Robinson’s 
entrance into the major leagues must include (to cite again the distinction made by Martin 
(2008)) nonviolent action as well as conventional action through institutional and 
political processes which opened up space for Robinson’s hire by the Dodgers. History 
textbooks have often misrepresented the proper balance of conventional action and 
nonviolent action in key historical episodes like the U.S. civil rights movement. Though 
there has been moderate improvements in some recent textbooks, most U.S. history 
textbooks have long over-emphasized and mis-represented the role and initiative of U.S. 
presidents and legislation in advancing the civil rights movement (i.e., conventional 
action), while neglecting the vital role of mass nonviolent action and civil rights 
movement organizations in forcing the hand of politicians (Loewen 2007, p.220, pp.239-
241). But the Jackie Robinson story as portrayed in U.S. history textbooks ignores the 
role of conventional action in the form of organizational initiatives, public policy shifts, 
and institutional changes.  
 First, a new major league baseball commissioner had recently been elected, A.B. 
Chandler, who unlike his predecessor (Kenesaw Mountain Landis), expressed genuine 
openness to integrating baseball, and even formed a Committee on Baseball Integration 
to explore the issue. Chandler, a former governor and senator from Kentucky, had told 
black reporters, “If a black boy can make it on Okinawa and Guadalcanal, he can make it 
in baseball” (Wilson 2010, p.54). While the use of the word “boy” was relatively 
offensive (and came from a long tradition of Southern racism), the statement signaled a 
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sea change. Second, consciousness-raising media activists had pushed for baseball’s 
integration. For instance, the white communist press, located in New York City, had 
made baseball’s integration a major campaign, correctly seeing baseball in symbolic 
terms as a major cultural institution of the time. But the black press probably played a 
more significant role - the large black newspaper The Pittsburgh Courier conducted a 
survey of major league players and found that three-fourths supported integration (p.49), 
and, Sam Lacy, a black journalist wrote an article in Negro Baseball which listed the best 
black prospects for integrating baseball – practically doing Rickey’s scouting and field 
research for him, Lacy called Robinson “the ideal man to pace the experiment” (p.53). 
Third, public policy shifts in New York state and New York City (the home of the 
Brooklyn Dodgers) structurally pushed Rickey to integrate baseball. In 1943, progressive 
politicians from New York City helped the New York state legislature pass the Ives-
Quinn antidiscrimination law which “opened up businesses, including baseball teams, in 
the state to lawsuits if they did not make some effort to hire qualified blacks” (p.54). In 
this sense, Stout’s (2011) provocative research-based theory that “good laws make good 
people” has some relevance. Moreover, cross-national research on public policy shifts on 
the death penalty suggests that when new abolitionist policies are adopted by elites, mass 
opinion tends to rapidly follow (Stack 2004).  
 And Rickey was subject to still further pushes towards integration. In 1945, New 
York City’s mayor LaGuardia, encouraged integration by forming a Mayor’s “Committee 
on Baseball” (p.55)/ “Committee for Unity” (Lowenfish 2007, p.377). Further, 
LaGuardia’s committee not only produced a report which concluded that “New York 
City’s baseball public would certainly support the integration of Negroes,” but LaGuardia 
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also wanted action before the November election of 1945 – a fact which Daniel Dodson 
(sociologist at NYU and director of LaGuardia’s committee) impressed upon Rickey, 
practically twisting his arm (pp.377-379). In this context, Rickey organized a press 
conference and signed Robinson to the Dodgers organization on October 23, 1945. 
Hence, multiple institutional (i.e., a new state law pushing integration with the stick of 
lawsuits as a threat and the support/ pressure of the mayor), network (i.e., Rickey was 
surrounded by numerous advocates of integration), self-interested (i.e., the pull to win 
baseball games with all the accompanying financial incentives), idealistic (i.e., Rickey 
was intellectually drawn to integration and nonviolence; Robinson was indignant about 
racism - something he found to be very rare among Negro League players - and proud of 
his race, shaping his sense of mission in life), religious (i.e., Rickey and Robinson were 
strong Christians and understood nonviolence as rooted in the message of Jesus), and 
circumstantial factors (i.e., Rickey was convinced that he had found the right man in 
Robinson to lead baseball’s re-integration) combined to push and pull Rickey and 
Robinson to re-integrate baseball. In short, several significant shifts in public policy and 
organizational and political networks pushed Rickey just prior to his landmark decision to 
sign Robinson, but Rickey’s readiness to take this step had been cultivated through long 
reflection and study of nonviolence and racial issues.     
 It should be remembered as nonviolence – (8) Rickey’s principled nonviolent 
orientation extended to a strategic awareness of how reconciliation between the races 
might be fostered or threatened - and how Robinson’s success in baseball could lead to 
charged emotions and potential racial conflict, if not riots. In truth, any observer of Jack 
Johnson’s career would well understand this and black sportswriters had long warned that 
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a “small unruly minority” of black fans often provoke disturbances (Wilson 2010, p.79), 
a factor which parallels the dynamics of a great many mass nonviolent demonstrations. 
But Rickey’s relative prescience was expressed through his networking with, and in 
essence, his nonviolent training and coordination with black leaders. In early 1947, weeks 
before Robinson played his first game in Brooklyn with the Dodgers, Rickey convened a 
meeting of thirty black leaders at a Brooklyn YMCA and engaged them in an extended 
reflection. Connecting this to Rickey’s earlier nonviolent training of Robinson, I believe 
this speech can fairly be called nonviolent training, with key parts of it reflecting on a 
second Weberian thought experiment/ counterfactual. In Rickey’s meeting with 
Robinson, he had asked – what if Robinson fought back? But in this meeting, he asked, 
what if black fans were violent or provoked violence through their attitudes? In essence, 
Rickey asked these leaders to imagine what will happen if black fans gloat and celebrate 
Robinson’s success as a “triumph of race over race” (Lowenfish 2007, pp.416-417). 
Again, his listeners might have here recalled the race riots after the black boxer Jack 
Johnson defeated Jim Jeffries (discussed below). Though many in the audience initially 
took offence (an understandable reaction), Rickey sufficiently convinced the black 
leaders to spur their action. As a proactive measure, the black leaders printed signs 
reading “Don’t Spoil Jackie’s Chances” and “posted them prominently in black churches, 
community centers, schools, stores, taverns, and wherever black people congregated” 
(p.417). Rickey’s goal was to spread consciousness that blacks should avoid antagonizing 
white fans “too quickly,” and Rickey even asked the black leaders in Brooklyn to “help 
organize committees of prominent Negroes in every major league city and spread the 
word” (Polner 2007, p.175). In any case, Rickey’s strategic thinking here approaches the 
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well-theorized Gandhian/ principled nonviolent aim to “convert” the opponent. In 
Gandhi’s view, this can only be done by fostering trust, by overcoming hatred and acting 
on a principle of universal brotherhood/ sisterhood. 
 The meeting and the pledge to “turn the other cheek.” Even many full-length 
biographies of Robinson and of Rickey leave out key details (relevant to the role of 
nonviolent ideals and strategy in baseball’s integration) of the first meeting between these 
two men on August28 of 1945, so it may seem unfair to criticize history textbooks for 
doing the same. But below I will propose the central role of nonviolence can be 
summarized in a few sentences. 
 The role of religion is often left out of accounts of Robinson’s entry into the 
Major Leagues, and it is always left out of school textbook accounts. The history 
textbook (Graff 1986) used in the Christian high school I attended in Texas in the late 
1980s, and a more recent evangelical Christian textbook (Lowman, Thompson, and 
Grussendorf 1996) say not a word about Robinson’s or Rickey’s Christian faith, or the 
important link to Jesus’ nonviolence. History textbook accounts of Robinson never link 
Rickey or Robinson’s motivation to religious ideals. We might expect them to at least 
recite Jesus’s phrase “turn the other cheek,” but that never appears. This is likely partly 
due to the convention of not discussing religion in the public square, or of a conventional 
disdain for pacifism and Christian pacifism (or caricaturized versions of them). In any 
case, very few Christians understand what, in context, Jesus meant by “turn the other 
cheek” (in Matthew 5:38-42 and Luke 6:29-30 of the New Testament). This is not 
terribly surprising since in general, empirical survey studies demonstrate that ignorance 
of the Bible is profound among U.S. Christians (Prothero 2007). It is utterly fitting that in 
595 
an early scene of the film Gandhi (1982), Gandhi instructs a British Anglican priest on a 
correct interpretation of Jesus’ turn the other cheek teaching. Even nonviolent theorists 
have misunderstood Jesus’s “turn the other cheek” episode. Consider Mark Kurlansky 
(2006), author of one of the best popular explorations of nonviolent history in recent 
decades. Kurlansky misinterprets Jesus and as a result, drives an artificial wedge between 
forms of nonviolence, as he writes, “When Jesus Christ said that a victim should turn the 
other cheek, he was preaching pacifism. But when he said that an enemy should be won 
over through the power of love, he was preaching nonviolence” (p.6).   
 It is worth briefly considering the New Testament passages where Jesus discusses 
turning the other cheek. These passages comprise some of the very few Biblical passages 
which have received the highest ranking on a scale of potential historical accuracy by a 
team of contemporary liberal Biblical scholars, known as the Jesus Seminar. That is, most 
of these scholars agreed that “Jesus undoubtedly said this or something very like it” 
(Funk et al. 1993, p.36). The “consensus among Fellows of the Seminar was 
exceptionally high” (p.144). In fact, this teaching ranked, with the beatitudes, in the top 
two, while “love your enemies” ranked third. Hence, these teachings together are 
considered “close to the heart of the teachings of Jesus to the extent that we can recover 
them from the tradition” (p.147).  
 The “turn the other cheek” teaching of Jesus appears in the gospels of Matthew 
(Mt.5) and Luke (Lk.6). There is extremely strong, indirect textual evidence that the 
writers of each gospel were working from the gospel of Mark and a now lost collection 
which scholars call the Q source, or Sayings Gospel Q. The author of Luke altered the 
original trio of “case parodies” in the passage: turn the other cheek, give up your shirt and 
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your cloak (and go naked – since it was a “two-garment society” (p.294)), and “when 
anyone conscripts you for one mile, go an extra mile” (Mt. 5:41). Specifically, Luke 
omitted the third case of going an extra mile – a scenario, it seems, in which a Roman 
soldier asks someone to carry their load for a mile (Funk et al. 1993, p.144). Why was 
this omitted? Because Luke wrote for a Roman audience and he wanted to make 
Christianity palatable to Romans – including the Roman power elites. Luke evidently 
thought this example would offend the Romans (p.145) and omitted it “...because it 
probably referred to military conscription under the Romans, and Luke was particularly 
eager to make the Christian movement look safe and legal to his Roman patron, 
Theophilus” (p.294). Hence, the co-option of the nonviolent Jesus did not begin with the 
emperor Constantine, but it is present even in the gospel of Luke – even in one of the key 
nonviolent passages of the New Testament. Each of the three case parodies urge the 
listeners/ readers to react creatively, boldly, and nonviolently to acts of aggression, and 
thereby to shame the aggressor (pp.144-145).       
 In Matthew’s gospel, Jesus’s admonition to “turn the other cheek” is immediately 
followed by the admonition to “love your enemies” (this verse explicitly rejects the 
conventional mode of “love your neighbor and hate your enemy” (Mt.5:43)). The Jesus 
seminar notes, “The injunction to love your enemies...cuts against the social grain and 
constitutes a paradox: those who love their enemies have no enemies” (Funk et al. 1993, 
p.147). In Matthew, “turn the other cheek” is prefaced by his “thesis statement” - the 
principle of not returning evil for evil (of not extracting an eye for an eye or a tooth for a 
tooth (Mt. 5:38)), of not mirroring evil as in mimetic violence (Wink 1992, p.184). In 
Luke, “love your enemies” is the thesis statement which immediately precedes the “turn 
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the other cheek” teaching (Lk.6:27), and which is immediately followed by the Golden 
Rule: “Do to others as you would have them do to you” (Lk.6:31). On turning the other 
cheek, Wink argues: 
 Christians have, on the whole, simply ignored this teaching. It has seemed 
impractical, masochistic, suicidal...Some who have tried to follow Jesus’ words 
have understood it to mean nonresistance: let the oppressor perpetrate evil 
unopposed. Even scholars have swallowed the eat-humble-pie reading of this text: 
‘It is better to surrender everything and go through life naked than to insist on 
one’s legal rights,’ to cite only one of scores of these commentators from 
Augustine right up to the present. Interpreted thus, the passage has become the 
basis for systematic training in cowardice, as Christians are taught to acquiesce to 
evil. Cowardice is scarcely a term one associates with Jesus. Either he failed to 
make himself clear, or we have misunderstood him. (p.175)  
 
Wink makes a strong case that most have misunderstood Jesus, and he goes on to offer a 
convincing interpretation of what Jesus meant by “turn the other cheek.” In short, it was a 
defiant act of nonviolent resistance which demonstrated a refusal to co-operate with the 
oppressor, a refusal to be shamed, a refusal to accept servility, and a refusal to mirror 
evil, i.e., what René Girard terms “mimetic violence” (Williams 1996). That is, it 
connotes a refusal to imitate the violent methods of the oppressor, but to resist, rebel, and 
revolt by finding a “third way, a way that is neither submission nor assault, neither flight 
nor fight, a way that can secure your human dignity and begin to change the power 
equation” (p.185).    
 Another informed and scholarly interpreter of Jesus’s phrase “turn the other 
cheek,” working in the same radical stream as Wink, was Giovanni Papini, author of The 
Life of Christ. As it happens, it was a book that deeply influenced Branch Rickey. In fact, 
Rickey actually picked up the book and read a lengthy passage from it for Robinson 
during their first meeting. Rickey began by quoting the words of Jesus on turning the 
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other cheek, and then read “with excitement and feeling” Papini’s interpretation of 
Jesus’s words: 
Jesus had not yet arrived at the most stupefying of His revolutionary teaching. ‘Ye 
have heard that it hath been said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth: But I 
say unto you, That ye resist not evil: But whosoever shall smite thee on thy right 
cheek, turn to him the other also...’ For an infinite number of believers this 
principle of not resisting evil had been the unendurable and acceptable scandal of 
Christianity. There are three answers can make to violence: revenge, flight, 
turning the other cheek. The first is the barbarous principle of retaliation....Flight 
is no better than retaliation.... Turning the other cheek means not receiving the 
second blow. It means cutting the chains of the inevitable wrongs at the first link. 
Your adversary is ready for anything but this.... Every man has an obscure respect 
for courage in others, especially if it is moral courage, the rarest and most difficult 
sort of bravery. It makes the very brute understand that this man is more than a 
man...the results of nonresistance, even if they are not always perfect, are 
certainly superior to those of resistance or flight... To answer blows with blows, 
evil deeds with evil deeds, is to meet the attacker on his own ground, to proclaim 
oneself as low as he.... Only he who has conquered himself can conquer his 
enemies. (Papini 1923, pp.104-108 as cited in Polner 2007)  
 
Polner (2007) recounts that here, Rickey put the book down and said to Robinson, “Now, 
can you do it? You will have to promise that for the first three years in baseball you will 
turn your other cheek. I know you are naturally combative. But for three years – three 
years – you will have to do it the only way it can be done. Three years – can you do it?” 
(p.153). 
 Rickey gave Robinson a copy of Papini’s book during their first meeting (Polner 
2007, Wilson 2010), but we must emphasize that Rickey knew that Robinson already 
held a strong Christian faith. Indeed, Rickey had inquired into Robinson’s biography and 
liked everything he heard – Robinson was a “God-fearing, church-going Protestant,” and 
did not drink (Lowenfish 2007, p.374). In fact, both men were members of the Methodist 
denomination (Wilson 2010, p.121). Jackie’s wife Rachel has described Jackie and 
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Rickey as “alike in so many ways,” both were “deeply spiritual with a strong belief in 
God” (Polner 2007, p.183).     
 Rickey had internalized Papini’s interpretation of Jesus’s teaching to “turn the 
other cheek,” but it seems Robinson did not immediately resonate with Rickey’s 
understanding. Such complex arguments are rarely fully grasped after a single exposure. 
Robinson’s initial reaction was, “Mr. Rickey, do you want a ballplayer who’s afraid to 
fight back?” Here, it seems Robinson misunderstands what Rickey (and Papini) means by 
“turn the other cheek.” Rickey countered, “I’m looking for a ballplayer with the guts not 
to fight back!” (Simon 2002, p.81; Giese et al. 1999, p.564). Simon (2002) comments, “It 
was a masterful response; it called on that most competitive of competitors to make 
restraint, not ferocity, the measure of his courage” (p.81). Indeed, Rickey’s framing here 
is masterful, and meets several criteria that Polletta (2008) identifies with great narratives 
– they draw people in with familiar situations (e.g., in this case, a discussion of masculine 
courage/ “guts”), then make surprising shifts which defy expectations while combining 
irony and heroism (p.30). Rickey continued, “Above all, you cannot fight back. That’s 
the only way this experiment will succeed, and others will follow in your footsteps” 
(p.82). Before the end of their meeting, Robinson said he could turn the other cheek but 
not “be an obsequious, cringing fellow” (Polner 2007, pp.151-152). Of course, this is 
what Rickey had in mind all along – a proud, dignified, defiant nonviolence. Adherents 
of nonviolence like Gandhi, King, and a somewhat lesser known example – Emerson, all 
drew very clear contrasts between fear and cowardice as opposed to, in Gandhi’s phrase, 
the “nonviolence of the strong” (Mariani 2009; Wink 2003, p.109n).  
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 In fact, Rickey selected Robinson knowing he was something of a fighter. Rickey 
already knew that during Robinson’s stint in the military, Robinson had refused to move 
to the back of a segregated army bus in Texas (years before Rosa Parks), and that when 
he was charged with conduct unbecoming an army officer, Robinson fought the charge in 
court. The report of this had excited Rickey, who commented, “A man of ideals. A 
battler” (Polner 2007, p.148). Much like Gandhi consistently claimed, Rickey seemed to 
think it easier to take a courageous fighter and nudge them in the direction of nonviolent 
courage, than to begin with a coward. Rickey (1956) later expressed a similar sentiment 
in a speech in Atlanta, and by this point in time, Robinson was widely perceived as 
holding a hot temper and “subject to resentments”:  
It didn't matter to me so much in choosing a man [to be the first black player] that 
he was temperamental, -- righteously subject to resentments. I wanted a man of 
exceptional intelligence, a man who was able to grasp and control the 
responsibilities of himself to his race and could carry that load.  
 
 While Rickey tried to nuance Jesus’s “turn the other cheek” teaching in his 
extended Papini reading for Robinson, Wilson’s (2010) observation still holds true - that 
“The scriptural injunction to turn the other cheek to those who would harm you provided 
a connection between the two” (p.60). In any case, before the end of their historic first 
meeting, Robinson said, “Mr. Rickey, I’ve got two cheeks” (Polner 2007, p.153), and “If 
you want to take this gamble, I promise you there will be no incident” (Wilson 2010, 
p.60).  
 Daniel Okrent has commented that Rickey picked Robinson “...because of who he 
was and what he was…Robinson had a determination, and an ability to – on the one hand 
turn the other cheek, but on the other hand, that as he turned the cheek to let the person 
who was his antagonist know that it would come around again” (Burns 1994). But this 
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description only approaches the meaning Rickey saw in Jesus’s teaching to “turn the 
other cheek,” and in fact, Okrent betrays confusion over the phrase. There is no “come 
around again,” or cycle of violence in turing the other cheek; It is the refusal to enter that 
cycle. It shames the oppressor, and in the language of principled nonviolence, might 
“convert” the oppressor away from their hatred and aggression.   
 Rickey’s road to principled nonviolence. Rickey had undertaken something of an 
intellectual quest, making long lists of books to read, and reading constantly, studying a 
number of sociological and historical books on slavery and race in the Americas as well 
as numerous books on President Lincoln - whose portrait hung on his office wall (Polner 
2007, p.135, p.136, p.150). Granted, the intellectual development of historical actors is a 
theme that is almost never touched on in history textbook accounts, but it is worth 
recognizing that social networks and educational encounters can deeply shape 
worldviews and the choices historical actors make. For a visual representation of the 
network influences on Rickey and Robinson, see Appendix FF (and for documentation of 
network ties see Appendix GG). 
 Rickey was influenced by Giovanni Papini’s book The Life of Christ, and William 
James’s essay “The Moral Equivalent of War.” In fact, Lowenfish (2007) contends this 
was “one of Rickey’s favorite essays” (p.375). Next to Thoreau’s essay on civil 
disobedience, James’s essay, first published in 1910, was the most influential in the early 
American history of nonviolence (Mariani 2009; Lynd and Lynd 1995, p.65). Moreover, 
Papini had been a student of William James at Harvard (Lowenfish 2007, p.375), and it 
seems highly likely that James may have influenced Papini regarding nonviolence, that is, 
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it may be that James’s own interest in pacifism is part of what enabled Papini to perceive 
and emphasize the pacifism of Jesus in his book The Life of Christ.  
 Rickey liked Papini’s book so much, he underlined passages and ordered copies 
for all his children (p.375). Polner (2007) reports that Rickey “marveled at [Papini’s] 
moving characterization of Jesus’ nonviolent nature, a trait he believed necessary for the 
first black player” (p.136). Because Papini’s interpretation of Jesus may be the strongest 
inspiration for Rickey’s nonviolent ideals, it is worth dwelling on momentarily. Papini is 
a clear example of what, over the past century or so, has been variously called liberal, 
radical, or progressive Christianity. For liberal Christians, it has always seemed self-
evident that “Jesus is the man of Peace” (Papini 1923, p.208) and only “literal-minded 
barbarians” (p.207) “determined to misread” (p.208) can find justifications for violence 
in the New Testament, taking verses out of context such as the line by Jesus: “I came not 
to send peace, but a sword” (p.206). Like Tolstoy before him, Papini emphasizes Jesus’ 
Sermon on the Mount including the phrase, “Blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall 
be called the sons of God,” which Papini interprets in standard liberal fashion, but Papini 
also accents his understanding of Jesus’ ethic of defiant resistance (one supported by 
Wink’s (1992) more recent interpretation of the text) in the “turn the other cheek” 
teaching: 
These peacemakers are not the meek of the second beatitude. The meek refrain 
from answering evil with evil; the peacemakers do more, they return good for 
evil, they bring peace where wars are flaring up. When Jesus said He had come to 
bring war and not peace, He meant war to evil...He means, in short, war against 
war. The peacemakers are those who wage war against war, those who placate, 
those who bring about concord. The origin of every war is self-love, love which 
becomes love of riches, pride of possession... hatred for rivals; and the new law 
comes to teach...love for all creatures, even for those who hate us. The 
peacemakers who teach and practice this love cut at the root of all war... (p.95) 
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Above, we saw how Polner (2007) edited the lengthy passage from Papini which Rickey 
read to Robinson in their first meeting. Polner’s editing is likely just conjecture, unless he 
was working from Rickey’s personal underlined copy. All we know is that Ricky read a 
lengthy passage and about where he started and ended. But the significance of the 
passage grows even more, since Rickey presented Robinson with his own copy of the 
book, and Robinson likely meditated on it further. Below, I select additional lines, not 
cited in Polner (2007) above, which also highlight nonviolent ideals and strategy, 
because, again, this book clearly inspired Rickey’s nonviolent praxis, and Robinson 
trusted Rickey in a very close mentor-mentee relationship and friendship. After reciting 
Jesus’ “turn the other cheek” teaching, Papini (1923) wrote: 
There could be no more definite repudiation of the old law of retaliation. The 
greater part of those who call themselves Christians not only have never observed 
this new Commandment, but have never been willing to pretend to approve of it... 
Often the punishment turns on the punisher and the terrible chain of violence from 
one revenge to another stretches out interminably. Wrong is two-edged; it fails 
even if inflicted with the desire of doing good, in nations, or families or 
individuals...the law of retaliation can give a bestial relief to him who is first 
struck, but instead of lessening evil it multiplies it...Flight is no better than 
retaliation. He who hides himself redoubles his enemies’ courage...In spite of its 
apparent absurdity the only way is that commanded by Jesus. If a man gives you a 
blow and you return another blow, he will answer with his fists, you in turn with 
kicks, weapons will be drawn and one of you may lose your life, often for a trivial 
reason...Turning the other cheek means not receiving the second blow. It means 
cutting the chain of the inevitable wrongs at the first link. Your adversary who 
expected resistance or flight is humiliated before you and before himself. He was 
ready for anything but this. He is thrown into confusion, a confusion which is 
almost shame. He has the time to come to himself; your immobility cools his 
anger, gives him time to reflect. He cannot accuse you of fear because you are 
ready to receive the second blow, and you yourself show him the place to 
strike...An injured man who feels no resentment and who does not run away 
shows more strength of soul, more mastery of himself, more true heroism...There 
is no longer an adversary, but a superior who says quietly, ‘Is that not 
enough?...The fact that some one has wronged me cannot force me to act 
wrongly.’ Literally to follow this command of Jesus demands a mastery possessed 
by few, of the blood, of the nerves, and of all the instincts of the baser part of our 
being. It is a bitter and repellent command; but Jesus never said it would be easy 
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to follow him.. without harsh renunciations, without stern and continuous inner 
battles...And yet the results of non-resistance...The example of so extraordinary a 
spiritual mastery, so impossible and unthinkable for common men, the almost 
superhuman fascination of conduct so contrary to usual customs, traditions and 
passions; this example, this spectacle of power, this puzzling miracle...this 
example of a strong, sane man who looks like other men, and yet who acts almost 
like a God...above the motives which move other men – this example if repeated 
more than once...if it is accompanied by proofs of physical courage when physical 
courage is necessary to enjoy and not to harm – this example has an effectiveness 
which we can imagine, soaked though we are in the ideas of revenge and 
reprisals...But whether it pleases us or not, only by accepting this command of 
Christ can we solve the problem of violence. It is the only course which does not 
add evil to evil...these are acts of heroic excellence...so extraordinary that they 
overcome the brutal bully with the irresistible majesty of the divine. Only he who 
has conquered himself can conquer his enemies. Only the saints can charm the 
wolves to mildness. Only he who has transformed his own soul can transform the 
souls of his brothers, and transform the world into a less grievous place for all. 
(pp.104-108)   
  
In these passages we may come to marvel afresh at how difficult Robinson’s task was, 
and the idealism or audacity of Rickey’s vision. But we are set up for that impression by 
Papini’s insistence that humans are “naturally” combative: “Man is a fighting animal...” 
(p.106), and his affirmation of the Christian doctrine that humans are “naturally” sinful: 
“all real moral conquests are repugnant to our nature” (p.107). Of course, this Christian 
version of the old debate over whether humans are naturally aggressive or cooperative 
lingers in the popular imagination. But Papini does not neatly fit on either side of that 
debate, as he models a different strain. Papini does not concede that humans must remain 
slaves to our “natural” predispositions, rather we have a choice, as he writes, “[Jesus] will 
make no concessions to evil and  imperfect nature; He will not find specious reasons to 
justify it as the philosophers do. You cannot serve Jesus and Nature. He [sic] who stands 
with Jesus is against the old animal nature and is working for the higher nature which 
must conquer it” (p.109). Typical of liberal Christianity, the key point of emphasis for 
Papini is his view that overcoming selfish self-love and hatred of others is the main 
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spiritual and ethical task. When we do that we are “already entirely transformed; the rest 
flows from this as a natural consequence. Hatred toward oneself and love for enemies is 
the beginning and end of Christianity” (p.111). 
 Papini adds that to even imagine nonviolence as being this effective is difficult, 
and “we cannot prove it because we have had too few of such examples to be able to cite 
even partial experiments as proofs of our intuition” (p.107). Indeed, Rickey and Robinson 
provided an important “partial experiment,” the results of which suggest nonviolence is 
uniquely effective. This makes it all the more tragic that collective memory has 
overlooked the role of nonviolence in their experiment.   
 Rickey had also conversed several times with Clarence Darrow (Polner 2007, 
Lowenfish 2007) – the famous agnostic and gifted lawyer of the Scopes “monkey trial,” 
which addressed the teaching of evolution in Tennessee’s public schools. Having 
authored two books on nonviolence, Resist Not Evil (1903) and An Eye for an Eye 
(1905), Darrow had earned a reputation as “America’s foremost exponent of nonviolence 
in the years just prior to World War I” (Lynd and Lynd 1995, p.76). Through his personal 
link to Darrow, it is certainly plausible that Rickey would have become aware of 
Darrow’s books and even discussed nonviolence with him. Of course, all of these details 
are completely absent in the brief high school history textbook portrayals of Branch 
Rickey. This is standard practice - virtually none of the figures covered in high school 
history textbooks are depicted as intellectual beings who evolve and wrestle with ideas.    
 Another book Rickey sent to all of his children was Frank Tannenbaum’s Slave 
and Citizen – for Rickey it was an illumination. He wrote a friend that it had “good 
research on the effect of slavery on Western Hemisphere history – on culture – on social 
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relations...” (Polner 2007, p.155). Rickey sought out Tannenbaum (who was in some 
ways very different from the conservative Rickey), a left-wing socialist and professor at 
Columbia University, developed a friendship and engaged him in conversations over the 
Robinson integration experiment – conversations in which Rickey walked away with 
“growing faith in evolutionary and nonviolent racial progress” (Polner 2007, p.155). 
Rickey, well characterized by Lowenfish (2007) as a “cautious conservative progressive,” 
personally urged Tannenbaum to issue an updated edition of his book Slave and Citizen, 
hoping that a wider readership of it would dissuade black militants from employing 
violent methods (p.416). Tannenbaum advocated what has been more recently been 
called inter-group/ inter-racial/ inter-ethnic “contact theory” (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006, 
Erasmus 2010) or the “deprovincialization thesis” (Verkuyten, Thijs, and Bekhuis 2010) 
in which prejudices are said to break down through “Physical proximity, slow cultural 
intertwining...” (Tannenbaum 1946, p.127). To overcome white supremacy, Tannenbaum 
wrote, “It is desirable that nothing should remain static...,” but that the two races continue 
“striving and disagreeing,” “engaged in the painful process of accommodation to each 
other...” (p.114). Clearly, Rickey put this vision into practice as he invited Robinson to 
join the Dodgers. The larger theoretical point here is that this is how ideas emerge and 
gain significance – in and through networks, in and through interpretive communities. 
Rickey’s path to faith in nonviolence and his convictions about how racism might be 
overcome emerged through an entire network of relationships, his rootedness in the 
Christian tradition, and his openness to new ideas – his engagement with scholarly books 
and research. 
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 Tannenbaum (1945) brings the sociological imagination to the history of race in 
the Americas, detailing its social construction, and ripping out the floor under all reified 
notions that racism was natural. He shows how different nations in the Americas had 
different slavery practices and norms, and different attitudes about race – proving that 
U.S. attitudes are not “natural.” Unlike in the Protestant U.S., in Catholic Latin America, 
slaves had been viewed as “moral beings” with souls given by God (Lowenfish 2007, 
p.415). Tannenbaum’s argument on the divergent impacts of Protestantism and 
Catholicism upon slavery has been challenged by recent researchers (Wintz 2004), but in 
any case,Tannenbaum (1945) argues cogently that when individual blacks became 
recognized as great actors, scholars, lawyers, and citizens in their own right, their “moral 
worth” would be acknowledged (p.114); they will acquire a “moral personality”: “the 
‘solution’ of the Negro problem is essentially a matter of establishing the Negro in the 
sight of the white community as a human being equal to its own members” (p.115). This 
well illustrates philosopher Stephen Darwall’s theory that “appraisal respect” leads to 
“recognition respect” (Appiah 2010).  
 Rickey (1956) was fully aware of this, as he said on one occasion, he knew the 
first black player had to “justify himself on the principle of merit,” he did not want to risk 
accusations that he had chosen a black player for “holier than thou” moral reasons. In 
fact, Rickey had planned a handful of schemes to avoid such accusations. The first plan 
involved Robinson’s minor league team playing a series of spring training games against 
the Dodgers. Rickey hoped this would “create a groundswell of support among Dodgers 
players” demanding Robinson’s promotion to the Dodgers (Austin 1997, p.105). The 
second plan involved Rickey’s manager Durocher who would tell reporters that Robinson 
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was needed to help the Dodgers win the pennant, and Rickey would publicly appear to 
reluctantly give in (p.105).   
 This implicates strategic advice frequently heeded by nonviolent adherents: moral 
suasion is not enough, you must appeal to the pragmatic self-interests of opponents and 
would-be allies, just as Saul Alinsky emphasized. Austin (1997) has argued at length that 
in his initial campaign to integrate baseball, Rickey deliberately approached the Dodgers 
board of directors and Dodger players by appealing only to pragmatic concerns – he 
justified signing Robinson in strictly business and economic terms. Similarly, Rickey’s 
initial public relations campaigns as he signed Robinson in late 1945 to the minor leagues 
and in 1947 to the big leagues, were crafted around strictly pragmatic concerns. Austin 
contends the approach amounted to a masterful method of facilitating controversial social 
change in organizations. Although ignored by Austin (1997), this savvy strategic likely 
explains why many observers of Rickey have misperceived him as only shrewd and 
pragmatic. In fact, Rickey’s principled motivations were undoubtedly significant from the 
beginning, but he pursued an initial pragmatic strategy in order to win key allies (Austin 
1997). It was only in early 1948, after Robinson had played a year of minor league ball in 
1946, a year in the big leagues for the Dodgers in 1947 – and proven his skill, that 
Rickey’s rhetoric shifted beyond the economic rationales: “For the first time, Rickey 
began to speak about the desegregation of baseball as an ethical issue embodying 
American ideals of equality and social justice” (Austin 1997, p.106). However, early in 
Robinson’s first year in the big leagues, the Dodgers released “details of the threatening 
letters that Robinson’s and Rickey’s families had been receiving” (p.106). This was one 
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of a series of public relations moves that helped create widespread public support for 
Robinson along principled lines of concern (p.106).       
 Likewise, early on, as when some of the Dodger players threatened to revolt when 
Robinson first joined the team, the manager Durocher appealed to their self-interests 
saying, “He’s going to win pennants for us. He’s going to put money in your pockets and 
money in mine” (Lowenfish 2007, p.419). But within the Dodgers organization, the 
principled motivations of Rickey also began to emerge fleetingly in 1947, but only in 
backstage contexts. In the 1947 spring training camp, when a group of Southern Dodgers 
players organized an anti-Robinson petition, Rickey met with the players, lectured them 
on “Americanism” and offered to trade each of them (Austin 1997, p.105). In any case, 
delivering pragmatic rewards is just what Robinson did – leading the team to many 
World Series, helping them all earn bonus checks that actually doubled most of their 
salaries for the year (Wilson 2010, p.100). But the principled and pragmatic can also be 
integrally related. For instance, the Dodgers, especially among many racial minorities, 
came to be perceived as “America’s team” for the very principled reason of their racial 
integration. This resulted in a surge in their fan base and increased ticket sales for years.      
 The counterfactual. Equally overlooked is the counterfactual (recall that 
counterfactual thought-experiments were a key component of Max Weber’s historical-
sociological method (Zeitlin 2001, pp.252-254)) that Branch Rickey, the General 
Manager of the Brooklyn Dodgers, himself proposed in his first meeting with Robinson. 
Rickey’s counterfactual would have us ask, what would have happened if Robinson had 
fought back in response to the violence and intimidation of racist whites? Rickey argued 
it would set back U.S. race relations by twenty years. As Robinson (1997) recalled, 
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Rickey told him “one wrong move on my part would not only finish the chance for all 
Negroes in baseball, but it would set the cause of the Negro in America back 20 years...I 
had to hold my temper...I had to keep my mouth shut and take it, I couldn’t protest to an 
umpire and I couldn’t get back at players who taunted and insulted me with racial 
remarks” (p.196).  
 Rickey’s counterfactual drew from his context in which numerous sports figures 
had vocalized fears of racial incidents that might be sparked by baseball’s reintegration. 
For example, the great pitcher Satchel Paige had warned that integration would be 
threatened “when one of those colored players, goaded out of his sense by repeated 
insults, takes a bat and busts fellowship in his damned head” (Wilson 2010, p.48). And in 
1942, The Sporting News, the leading sports newspaper of the time, argued against 
baseball’s integration “because of the possibility of unpleasant incidents” (p.53).  
 Building from Weber, Lebow (2000) argues that the most plausible 
counterfactuals arise from the context, are driven by compelling mechanisms, and 
involve “minimal rewrites” of history (p.568). Rickey’s counterfactual fits these criteria, 
and the significance of the thought experiment rests in trying to establish how many years 
a hypothetical incidence of Robinson’s violence might have delayed the integration of 
baseball. Rickey’s assertion that it would be a matter of years seems quite plausible. 
Here, I am only concerned with establishing the notion that Robinson’s nonviolence was 
pivotal in breaking down a regime of structural and symbolic violence. 
 In fact, back in the late 1880s Moses Fleetwood Walker was the first African-
American to play in the major leagues. Virtually every U.S. textbook analyzed in the 
present study failed to mention this. Instead the textbooks state or imply that Robinson 
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was the first black man in the major leagues, a pattern which Loewen (2007) links to the 
pervasive textbook meme of linear cultural progress (p.168). Walker bounced around 
between the minor and major leagues while playing for various teams – at the time the 
American Association had no ban on black players. In 1887, International League owners 
voted to ban blacks, but soon after this, they and the newly organized International 
Association League allowed one black player per team (Rhoden 2006, pp.80-82).  During 
a game in Syracuse, a racist manager from Toronto asked Walker to leave the stadium, 
which led to a heated argument. Rhoden explains, “By this time the cumulative effect of 
turning the other cheek, acting in a way that made whites feel comfortable, began to eat 
away at Walker’s renowned restraint” (p.82).  
 We should take note here of Rhoden’s insight that “turning the other cheek” was 
something Walker routinely did (again, in this, perhaps Robinson is not completely 
unique), and that it could be reduced to “acting in a way that made whites feel 
comfortable.” Rhoden’s use of “turn the other cheek” here may be quite apropos of 
Walker’s own ambivalence about a term he probably had heard in church himself. 
Walker’s father was a minister of the Methodist Episcopal Church in Ohio, and he was 
one of “many black ministers who were challenging the dogma of white churches that 
preached racial passivity as the acceptance of God’s will” (Zang 1995, p.16). Returning 
to the conflagration, Rhoden (2006) writes, “According to one account, Walker was 
surrounded by fans and allegedly brandished a loaded revolver and threatened to put a 
hole in someone in the crowd. He was arrested but released...” ( p.82). Zang (1995) 
corroborates the story, with slightly varying details, citing four different accounts by 
journalists published in two Toronto newspapers and the Sporting Life (pp.48-49). In the 
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face of racial insults Walker had long been “benign” (p.48) and “gentlemanly,” but his 
“good-natured public demeanor was fraying” (p.49). These are the sorts of incidents that 
many proponents and detractors of integration alike, feared before Jackie Robinson came 
along – and Walker’s short history of restraint and  adds salience to Rickey’s counter-
factual. Walker’s last season of pro baseball was 1889. The International Association 
moved to enforce the 1887 ban on black players, a policy followed by all levels of white-
controlled baseball leagues nine years later (p.82). Hence, the integration of baseball was 
delayed for another 60 years.  
 Another counterfactual can be found in Robinson’s own life, during his time as a 
student and multisport athlete at Pasadena Junior College. At the conclusion of a 
basketball game a white player from Long Beach Junior College punched Robinson. 
Robinson responded in kind, knocking the white player flat. What were the 
consequences? As the game had just ended, fans stormed the court and a “riot” nearly 
ensued. But the student body president from Long Beach soon apologized to Robinson 
and his teammates, and Robinson remained a highly respected student athlete at his 
college (Wilson 2010, p.13, p.16). However, this counter-example is readily explained 
away since, in some respects, racial tensions and racial otherization was relatively 
diminished in the California context.  
 Arguably, numerous reasons suggest that the nonviolence of Robinson in the 
major leagues deserves serious reflection. It is only because of Robinson’s nonviolence 
that the U.S. civil rights leader and colleague of Dr. King in the SCLC, Rev. Jessie 
Jackson, could say during the eulogy at Robinson’s funeral:  
Jackie as a figure in history was a rock in the water creating concentric circles and 
ripples of new possibility. He was medicine. He was immunized by God from 
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catching the diseases that he fought. The Lord’s arms of protection enabled him to 
go through dangers seen and unseen. And he had the capacity to wear glory with 
grace. Jackie’s body was a temple of God, an instrument of peace. (Burns 1994, 
V9) 
 
His gravestone presents a quote of his: “A LIFE IS NOT IMPORTANT EXCEPT IN 
THE IMPACT IT HAS ON OTHER LIVES.” While Robinson is widely hailed for 
breaking the color line in major league baseball, the impact of his nonviolence has often 
been overlooked. Yet, Rickey’s counter-factual brings the issue to the fore. Had 
Robinson engaged in violent retaliation, it may well have set racial progress back for 
decades. One of the best assessments comes from Dr. King, who once mused to his 
assistant W. T. Walker, a kind of counterfactual of his own saying, “Jackie Robinson 
made it possible for me in the first place. Without him, I would never have been able to 
do what I did” (Henry 1998, p.211). And shortly before he was assassinated, Dr. King 
told the black player Don Newcombe, “I don’t know what I would have done without you 
guys setting up the minds of people for change. You, Jackie, and Roy [Campanella] will 
never know how easy you made it for me to do my job” (Wilson 2010, p.145). Similarly, 
W. T. Walker argued “Jackie Robinson’s entrance into the big leagues did more for race 
relations than all the work of the so-called forces of Christ combined” (p.159). Of course, 
Robinson as the first, arguably played the most important role. Indeed, Robinson’s 
pioneering nonviolence came more than a decade before the sit-ins and marches of Dr. 
King and the civil rights movement. 
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Robinson and the Perennial Challenges of Nonviolent Action 
 Robinson’s story can also highlight perennial challenges of nonviolent action. 
Many commentators have argued that the violence and stress Robinson endured left a 
weight on his shoulders that endured all his life, and some suggest it probably contributed 
to his early death. The broadcaster Red Barber said,  
I don’t know of anybody besides Robinson who could have done what he did. 
Many of the black players, Reggie Jackson, for example, said later, he’s the only 
one of us who could have done it. Uh, Robinson – Mr. Rickey told him he’d have 
to turn the other cheek, and as Mr. Rickey said, it wasn’t long before he didn’t 
have any other cheek to turn, it just had simply been beat off. I think that – they 
said that Robinson died from diabetes and other things, I think he died from the 
load he carried. (Burns 1994 V9) 
 
The author Gerald Early has implied that Robinson did not quite know how to process his 
anger, and that his anger is shared by all African-Americans in a society shaped by the 
hypocrisies of White supremacy (Burns 1994 V7).  
 In the following passage Robinson reflects on his feelings during a game against 
the Philadelphia Phillies who were particularly vociferous in keeping up a barrage of 
racial epithets directed at Robinson. He admits his deep ambivalence about his nonviolent 
pledge, how he felt it conflicted with masculine norms, even led him to feel like a 
“freak,” and how he fantasized about lashing out in violence: 
for one wild and rage-crazed minute I thought, ‘To hell with Mr. Rickey’s ‘noble 
experiment.’ It’s clear it won’t succeed....What a glorious and cleansing thing it 
would be to let go.’ To hell with the image of the patient black freak I was 
supposed to create. I could throw down my bat, strive over to the Phillies dugout, 
grab one of those white sons of bitches and smash his teeth in with my despised 
black fist. Then I could walk away from it and I’d never become a sports star. But 
my son could tell his son someday what his daddy could have been if he hadn’t 
been too much of a man. (Ward and Burns 1994, p.291) 
 
In another remembrance of the same day, Robinson recalled, “All of a sudden I thought, 
the hell with this. This isn’t me. They’re making me be some crazy pacifist black freak. 
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Hell, no. I’m going back to being myself. Right now....” He would go punch the Phillies 
and “Walk away from this ballpark. Walk away from baseball” (Falkner 1995, p.5). His 
characterization of pacifism as “crazy” and of feeling like a “freak,” reveal how deep his 
ambivalence about nonviolence could be. And this ambivalence seems to go to the heart 
of the American conversation between John Wayne and Gandhi that has been going on 
for many decades. As a “codified hero-system” (West 1999, p.264), our culture and its 
hegemonic images of masculinity set nonviolent adherents up for a clash of ideals which 
requires the deconstruction of masculinity as well as hero images. 
 Robinson’s nonviolent restraint is all the more remarkable when we consider that 
he played so many games under near perfect conditions for a type of violent outburst 
termed a “forward panic.” As described by Collins (2008), it is a situation in which 
confrontational tension builds over time, with a sustained period of waiting and holding 
back, and then a sudden “shift from relatively passive...[to] fully active...[and] the 
tension/ fear comes out in an emotional rush” that is very difficult to control (p.85). In 
fact, in Collins’ descriptions of the forward panic phenomenon, he recounts how the great 
pro baseball player Ty Cobb sometimes flew into “violent rages” after enduring several 
games or innings worth of heckling. Once in May of 1912 in New York, Cobb jumped 
into the stands and pummeled a heckler with “at least a full dozen punches” and then 
continued kicking the man with his spikes (p.91). It turned out the man had no hands due 
to an industrial accident. When fans pointed this out to Cobb, shouting, “He has no 
hands!” Cobb retorted, “I don’t care if he has no legs!” (p.91). Underscoring the element 
of uncontrollable rage/ “blind fury,” Cobb claimed to only recall jumping into the stands, 
while having no memory of actually attacking the man (McCallum 1956, pp.130-131). 
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Thanks partly to white privilege and hegemonic masculinity, such incidents left Cobb’s 
reputation relatively unscathed. For this incident Cobb was initially suspended 
indefinitely by the American League president, Ban Johnson. But all 18 of Cobb’s 
teammates signed a telegram to Johnson in which they refused to play until Cobb was 
reinstated (it was baseball’s first strike, lasting 2 games), as they declared, “He was fully 
justified, as no one could stand such personal abuse from any one” (Cobb and Stump 
1961, p.132). Ultimately, Cobb was suspended for 10 days and fined $50 (p.135).  
 What had the heckler said that was so offensive? Various accounts report that as 
the heckling escalated, teammates urged Cobb to defend himself. While some authors 
politely equivocate and vaguely describe the “inflammatory language” and the 
“particularly vile volley” of the heckler (McCallum 1956, pp.129-130; Collins 2008), it 
seems that when the heckler called Cobb a “half-nigger,” Cobb suddenly flew into a rage 
and jumped into the stands (Alexander 1984, p.105; Holmes 2004, p.58). Cobb 
maintained, “I can get dozens of witnesses to prove that I had every right to attack this 
miserable mug who abused me” (Cobb and Stump 1961, p.134). Alexander (1984) argues 
that “Most working sportswriters tended to side with Cobb...that the slur hurled at him 
would have provoked almost any white man, especially a sensitive southerner” (p.107). 
Cobb was a native of Georgia, and both U.S. Senators and all ten U.S. Congressmen from 
Georgia sent Cobb a telegram of support: “As Georgians we commend your action in 
resisting an uncalled for insult” (p.107). Similarly, the Mayor and Police Commissioner 
of Atlanta argued Cobb had taken the right course of action, upholding “principles” of 
“Southern manhood,” for without fighting “he would have lost the respect of every 
decent man in the country” (p.107). These details offer further insight into the context of 
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racism, hegemonic masculinity, and the Southern “culture of honor” (Pinker 2011, 
p.101)– a context which still heavily shaped the major leagues when Robinson entered 
the stage. Again, these were the norms Robinson was up against, making his nonviolent 
restraint all the more amazing.     
 In any case, Robinson’s pledge to Rickey helped constrain him on that day, and 
again, in St. Louis in August 1947 when a player flagrantly spiked Robinson, opening up 
a gash in his thigh “Robinson’s anger almost overcame him, but when his teammates 
threatened to avenge him, he was the one who talked them out of it” (Ward and Burns 
1994, p.292). He did nothing and constrained himself as he always did during the three 
years of his pledge, though he had told another player immediately after the incident “I’m 
gonna kill somebody. I’m going to knock him into center field...” (Henry 1998, p.210).  
 In my own nonviolent activism and research I have found such anger and 
fantasies of engaging in violent retaliation are a common dynamic that nonviolent 
activists must process and learn to channel. For instance, this was confirmed in 
interviews of high-risk nonviolent activists engaging in nonviolent accompaniment and 
human rights work in Israel-Palestine. Thomas (of the International Solidarity 
Movement) remembered (transcribed interview (Eddy 2006)):  
A key moment when I changed my attitude about violence came after I had been 
in the West Bank for a few weeks and became very frustrated with the actions of 
the Israeli military. I was so upset with everything I had witnessed that I began to 
have violent feelings and fantasies towards the soldiers. I wanted to pick up a rock 
like some of the kids and hit one in the face. It made me hate violence as well as 
gave me a much clearer understanding of its roots. 
 
Channeling such anger into nonviolent modes relies upon communal supports for 
nonviolent discipline.  
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 The frequent mentions of Robinson’s stress by himself and others partly suggests 
that he lacked sufficient support for specifically nonviolent action in his relational 
networks (i.e., friendships, church, etc.), in baseball, and in the Dodger’s organization. 
Nevertheless, Robinson displayed amazing strength and discipline. To overcome 
resentment and to attempt to “love your enemies” takes strength and courage as Gandhi 
and even Nietzsche recognized. Nietzsche wrote, 
To be incapable of taking one’s enemies...seriously for very long – that is the sign 
of strong, full natures in whom there is an excess of the power to form, to mold, to 
recuperate and to forget...Such a man shakes off with a single shrug many vermin 
that eat deep into others; here alone genuine ‘love of one’s enemies’ is possible – 
supposing it to be possible at all on earth. (cited in Schell 2003, p.133)     
 
And so it is that Robinson’s nonviolent triumph also shows us how difficult it is to 
“shrug” off the oppression.  
 Robinson channeled his anger into playing harder on the field. Some have 
observed that he was probably one of the few athletes who played better when angry (Vin 
Scully in Burns 1994). But he also channeled his anger into prophetic outlets of social 
action. Just ten days before he died, Jackie Robinson used his turn at the microphone 
during the 1972 World Series pre-game ceremony to say, “I must admit I’m gonna be 
tremendously more pleased and more proud when I look at that third base coaching line 
one day and see a black face managing in baseball” (Burns 1994 V9).    
Explaining the Omission of Nonviolence and Exploring Competing Accounts 
 So, why is nonviolence neglected in textbook accounts of Robinson? Leaving 
aside for a moment the particularities of the Robinson case, we can say that Robinson 
shares with other recent and significant nonviolent cases a number of handicaps and 
challenges as it competes for a share of collective memory. 
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 First, to deal with Robinson’s nonviolent heroism honestly, one has to unpack the 
violence and bigotry of whites. This turns a feel-good American story of racial progress 
into a narrative with a critical edge, something many textbooks often shy away from.    
 Second, it may be that because baseball is a structured, rule-bound game in which 
violent actions are against the rules, observers then and now have tended to overlook 
Robinson’s nonviolence. On the other hand, physical contact, verbal and physical 
aggression between players on opposing teams as well as referees is fairly routine in 
baseball. Still, much of the aggression against Robinson was verbal, and racial insults on 
the field were difficult for most fans to hear in large stadiums. At times, the racial taunts 
were so loud that the Brooklyn Dodgers radio program turned off their crowd 
microphones (Wilson 2010, p.89), hiding the taunts from the radio audience. Perhaps the 
harassment of Robinson was dimly perceived by white audiences. Is it possible – perhaps 
only fans who devotedly followed his games would notice that he was singled out as the 
target of high spikes when players slid into second base, or the bean ball pitches? He was 
hit nine times his first season (Ward and Burns 1994, p.291), he regularly led the league 
in receiving bean balls (Wilson 2010, p.131), and other players like Ted Williams 
recognized that Robinson got more bean balls thrown at him than any other player (Burns 
1994). But his nonviolent discipline may not have been perceived by the average fan. 
 Third, textbooks tend to ignore strategic considerations for social action, and 
oftentimes neglect religious (Davis 1992), intellectual, or ideological motivations for 
action – and all of these name the sphere within which nonviolence moves and breathes. 
Such conventional forces of simplification have shaped the Robinson story even outside 
of textbook accounts. One often finds simplification of the plot into conventional 
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plotlines of courage, and friendship transcending racial barriers – as in the much retold 
narrative of how the Dodgers’ shortstop Pee Wee Reese befriended Robinson. The result 
is no reflection on the role of nonviolent resistance to bigotry.  
 Fourth, Robinson’s real and perceived inconsistencies regarding nonviolence 
handicapped the clear interpretation and memory of his nonviolent example. The mix of 
principled and pragmatic nonviolence which characterized Robinson’s overall stance on 
and embodiment of nonviolence sent inconsistent messages. To some degree, this 
inconsistency dynamic reflects an unfair, largely subconscious, insistence that 
nonviolence be pure and flawless, when in fact, any real human action and certainly, any 
conflict, tends to be quite a messy affair – infused with contested interpretations from day 
one, as perception is imperfect and filtered by biases, and as interpreters are inspired by 
competing ideologies as well as self-interested motives. 
 Although Robinson exemplified nonviolent action flawlessly for 3 years, both 
Robinson and Rickey later expressed deep ambivalence about nonviolence. As Robinson 
described it, some of this ambivalence was linked to masculine ideals, as we saw above. 
At one point near the end of the three year, Robinson had questioned Rickey about 
continuing his passive responses to insults and aggression. Rickey asked Robinson to 
abide a little longer, but Rickey promised that “the wraps will be off and you can be 
yourself” (Polner 2007, p.184). Here we glimpse the degree to which Robinson held a 
pragmatic nonviolent orientation – it was a temporary strategic means rather than a “way 
of life” as principled nonviolent adherents talk about. Robinson also admitted that given 
all the cruel racism he had encountered, “It is true that I had stored up a lot of hostility...” 
(Robinson 1995, p.79), and again, he explained the series of arguments and disputes he 
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got into in 1949, after the first three years had passed, in the same terms: “I had too much 
stored up inside” (Burns 1994). It is inconceivable that a Gandhi or King would talk 
about going back to be “themselves” after a nonviolent campaign, or “storing up 
hostility.” For principled nonviolent adherents, nonviolence is a way of life believed to 
drive humanity deeper towards truth and love, to self-knowledge, reconciliation with 
others, and liberation – at both personal and social levels. 
 Rickey’s mixed feelings about nonviolence are clearly revealed in his explanation 
of why he approved the end of Robinson’s nonviolent pledge. Rickey knew that 
Robinson was very competitive, believed in “swift retaliation for mistreatment,” and that 
the pressure of always being nonviolent had been “bugging” Robinson (Robinson 1995, 
p.78). Years later, Rickey explained his decision, 
I could see how the tensions had built up in two years and that this young man 
had come through with courage far beyond what I asked, yet, I knew that burning 
inside him was the same pride and determination that burned inside those Negro 
slaves a century earlier. I knew also that while the wisest policy for Robinson 
during those first two years was to turn the other cheek and not fight back, there 
were many in baseball who would not understand his lack of action. They could 
be made to respect only the fighting back, the things that are the signs of courage 
to men who know courage only in its physical sense. So I told Robinson he was 
on his own. Then I sat back happily, knowing that, with the restraints removed, 
Robinson was going to show the National League a thing or two. (pp.78-79) 
 
This is a major footnote in Rickey’s rough theory of nonviolence, and again, the 
limitations of nonviolent action are linked in his mind to masculine ideals, “the signs of 
courage to men...” Rickey perceives that “many in baseball,” i.e., the mass public, did not 
understand Robinson’s nonviolence and perceived it only as “lack of action.” This is a 
big step away from Gandhian nonviolence/ theories of principled nonviolence – which 
assume claim to place trust in humanity and even enemies, such that they can always be 
“converted” through nonviolent action. It also shows that Rickey and Robinson 
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reinforced each other in their ambivalence about nonviolent strategy, and the tensions 
they perceived between nonviolence and hegemonic masculine norms – in their view, 
only “fighting back” would be “respected” by some people.       
 In one of his autobiographies, Robinson (1995) reiterated his deep ambivalence 
about the nonviolent approach he had taken, writing, “Not being able to fight back is a 
form of severe punishment. I was relieved when Mr. Rickey finally called me into his 
office and said, ‘Jackie, you’re on your own now. You can be yourself now’” (p.77). But 
very soon after Rickey released him from his nonviolent pledge, as Robinson began to 
speak out, in his words, to argue and protest against insults and injuries, Robinson 
discovered how strong were the racialized double standards (p.79). He had been a 
“martyred hero,” but quickly became perceived by many whites as a “swellhead, a wise 
guy, an ‘uppity’ nigger” (p.79).  
 But what may be most important here in terms of nonviolent theory, is that 
Robinson’s nonviolence enacted, in a very real sense, a midpoint between what Gandhi 
called the “nonviolence of the strong” and the “nonviolence of the weak.” By the latter, 
Gandhi meant a form of nonviolence taken up by those who have no option of using 
violence, and undertake nonviolence only for pragmatic reasons, or those who are too 
afraid to use violence, and who thus, employ nonviolence out of cowardice. Gandhi 
conflated these two because in both cases, the reasons for undertaking nonviolence are 
pragmatic, not principled. However, the former case involves no fear or “moral 
weakness” and so Horsburgh (1968) rightly objects to lumping these two forms of 
nonviolence together (p.64). Of course, Robinson had no physical limitations preventing 
him from winning many a fist fight (and in this sense, his nonviolence was “the 
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nonviolence of the strong” in Gandhi’s phrase), but his structural location in the racial 
hierarchy meant that if he used violence even once, his opportunity to participate in the 
lucrative white world of major league baseball would be swiftly withdrawn. These 
racialized double standards are the key reason why Robinson (1995) could characterize 
his nonviolent pledge as almost a “severe form of punishment” (p.77). In this sense, 
Robinson’s later courage to “fight back” is not at all incompatible with Gandhian 
nonviolence, at least when it was limited to verbal anger and protest – which was the vast 
majority of the time. The racialized double standards persisting in the U.S., meant that if 
Robinson wished to pursue a baseball career, he needed to be “afraid” of fighting back, at 
least early on during his entry into the league. Moreover, such fear is commonplace in 
rigidly stratified caste systems. Thus, while traveling through the Jim Crow South, 
Robinson realized he had to “keep his cool” in order to protect he and his wife Rachel 
(Wilson 2010). As Rachel recalled: “My man had become the white South’s ‘boy’ in 
order to keep us safe” (p.68)   
 Gandhi detested fear in any form, and this plays into his characterization of 
“nonviolence of the weak.” But the Robinson case illuminates how fear is interlaced in a 
system of white supremacy. In any given fist-fight in the confines of a baseball game, 
Robinson had little reason to fear for his short-term personal safety, but his long-term 
safety was altogether a different issue. He also had reasons to fear for his economic well-
being and career survival, as well as – more profoundly and heroically - his sense of 
responsibility for symbolically representing his race (a burden no one should have to 
care, but in racialized social systems it is commonplace). Thus, Robinson’s nonviolent 
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dilemma was unique, linked to his location in the racial hierarchy and his role as a “trail 
blazer” (Robinson 1997 [1955], p.195).  
 I am contending that the uniqueness of Robinson’s task explodes the distinction 
between pragmatic and principled nonviolence – a distinction that Gandhi often spoke of 
in terms of “nonviolence of the strong” and “nonviolence of the weak.” Robinson was 
keenly aware of the racial double standards, and this is part of why his nonviolence takes 
the form of a mix of pragmatic and principled nonviolence – because after his three year 
nonviolent campaign, he vocally protested the double standards which forced upon him a 
“nonviolence of the weak.” He described his situation after the end of his three year 
campaign, writing,         
I admit that I challenge umpires and tell off opposing players. But I’m no more 
aggressive in this respect than Ty Cobb or [here he lists four other players who 
‘kick up fusses all the time’]...But if I do it, I’m stepping out of line. Many people 
think that a Negro, because he is a Negro, must always be humble, even in the 
heat of sport competition... (Robinson 1997 [1955], p.195) 
 
 Thus, there are both real and perceived contradictions in Rickey and Robinson’s 
nonviolence, and some of the perceived contradictions are unwarranted. Nevertheless, 
such inconsistencies and racially loaded complexities may be a big part of why 
Robinson’s story is not better remembered in terms of nonviolent ideals and strategy. 
Robinson’s reputation for holding a temper is a topic that most biographers mention. 
After his three year pledge expired, Robinson became notoriously known as a feisty 
“hothead” who challenged other players and umpires and let his temper fly (Wilson 2010, 
p.135). Rickey even described Robinson as “instantly violent by natural disposition, 
immediately ready to counterattack...” (Polner 2007, p.153). Wilson (2010) defends 
Robinson by noting that “he never in his 12-year professional career used his fists in any 
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confrontation on the field” (p.135). However, this overlooks a case in which Robinson, 
angered over what he perceived to be Braves’ pitcher Lew Burdette’s racial slurs, threw a 
baseball into the Braves’ dugout, and Robinson admitted to the press, “I aimed it right at 
Burdette’s head. Lucky for him it missed” (NYT 1956). There were other cases where, 
luckily it seems, teammates physically held him back from a possible fist fight (e.g., 
Wilson 2010, p.124). In 1954, after Robinson was thrown out of a game for a comment to 
an umpire, he threw his bat into the stands behind the dugout – where it hit an usher and a 
woman also claimed to have a “nice bump” on her head as a result (McGowen 1954; 
NYT 1954, June 3). Robinson apologized and it was officially ruled an accident (NYT 
1954, June 8), but “fans all around the league took this as one more out-of-control action 
by baseball’s angry man and booed him for the rest of the season. Once a player’s image 
was set, it was hard to escape” (Wilson 2010, p.139).  
 Nevertheless, aside from the single exception of the Burdette case, the “fights” 
Robinson took up were always with words, some yelling yes, but not physical violence. 
Robinson “never in his career resorted to fisticuffs” and he counseled newly arrived black 
players in the major leagues to adopt “Rickey’s dictum, to which he still adhered: we 
don’t fight” (Wilson 2010, p.127). And the significance or Robinson’s choice to fight 
with words is worthy of pause, for to choose words is the essence of nonviolence. As 
Jean-Marie Muller has written, speaking is “characterized by the renunciation of 
violence” (Zizek p.2). We can also define both speaking and the renunciation of violence 
as quintessentially human, as what distinguishes us from animals: “it is actually the 
principles and methods of non-violence...that constitute the humanity of human beings, 
the coherence and relevance of moral standards based both on convictions and a sense of 
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responsibility,’ so that violence is ‘indeed a radical perversion of humanity’” (Muller 
cited in Zizek 2008b, p.2). This argument resonates with the view that 90 to 95% of all 
human activity is nonviolent or “unviolent” (Boulding 1999, p.14) and it presents a 
different nuance than Papini’s reflections which would place nonviolence as a nearly 
impossible though heroic ideal. 
 Internally, both Rickey and Robinson seem to have held a mix of pragmatic and 
principled nonviolent orientations. Rickey was no pacifist, as he volunteered for combat 
duties in World War I. Robinson at least bought into Rickey’s understanding of and 
justification for “turning the other cheek” (at least for three years), but little evidence 
exists of Robinson articulating a principled nonviolent position. Some examples of where 
he approached a principled nonviolent stance are found in his very public support and 
praise of Dr. King’s activities and his objections to Malcolm X on the grounds that 
Malcolm’s philosophy was based on hatred (Smith 1998) – a classic concern of 
principled nonviolence.  
 The relative uniqueness of Robinson’s nonviolent task also deserves 
consideration. Most nonviolent activists enjoy solidarity with other activists undertaking 
similar risks and challenges, but Robinson was alone in a sea of players enjoying and 
taking for granted white privilege. Rickey did provide close mentoring and support, and 
though his teammates eventually become supportive, there were times when all of them 
failed to express solidarity – as when they ate in a restaurant while – at the request of the 
restaurant owner, Robinson and Roy Campanella (an African-American player who 
joined the Dodgers one year after Robinson) ate on the team bus (Polner 2007). When 
Campanella joined the team, they might have enjoyed solidarity, as Rickey had urged 
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Campanella to “follow the passive public approach taken by Robinson,” but Robinson 
had already become somewhat bitter, and viewed Campanella as “just another Uncle 
Tom” who was unwilling to make sacrifices for his race (p.184).          
 Fifth, other complicating factors arise as well. Critics have often projected onto 
the narrative of the idea that Branch Rickey only cared about winning (Burns 1994). 
Rickey’s idealism, intellectual development, and convictions about racial equality and 
nonviolent strategy have largely been neglected or dismissed as irrelevant. This is 
puzzling given numerous indicators of the depth of Rickey’s idealism. For example, 
Rickey was so religiously committed as to refuse to play on Sundays during his own 
short-lived playing career in baseball (Polner 2007, p.46) – a move that cut starkly 
against the grain and was a risky career move for a marginal player (p.49). And while I 
have argued that the role of principled nonviolence as an ideal and a strategy are central 
(though often unnamed or only subconsciously recognized) to Robinson’s heroism and 
success, other competing accounts may be offered.  
 Sixth, it may be that race is all Americans can see in the Robinson story, because 
of the salience of race in the U.S. Anzia and Berry (2011) have written of a “Jackie 
Robinson effect” in which minorities, women, and others subject to discrimination must 
outperform white males in order to obtain jobs and desirable promotions. Those who do 
“make it” often outperform white males in comparable roles, and this is because they 
would have never been selected for those role in the first place if they were not 
exceptional. For our purposes, the argument here is that Robinson would have never been 
selected to play in the major leagues unless he was far better than most white players, and 
better in every way too. The much heralded flaws in the black boxer Jack Johnson’s 
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moral character are a case in point – they became a huge liability for his career (Zirin 
2008, 44-45). Seeking to avoid a public relations challenge like Jack Johnson, Rickey 
was looking for a “clean-living family man whose character was above reproach” 
(Lowenfish 2007, p.357), a squeaky clean man “who lived an exemplary life off the 
field” (Wilson 2010, p.58). Every manager desires a player who is coachable, disciplined, 
mild-mannered/ not likely to get in fights, and in the 1940s at least – somewhat straight-
laced/ morally upright (i.e., able to stay out of the newspapers with bad press). Robinson 
fit the role exceedingly well. Before Robinson, Rickey gave up on another black player 
when he found out he had syphilis (Polner 2007, p.151).  
 From this vantage point, the nonviolence of Robinson diminishes in importance, 
what was key was that he was exceptional in every way – as an athlete and in his 
character. And Robinson knew all of this. He knew he had to consistently perform at a 
high level on the field, and also consistently take the high road and avoid conflict, at least 
until he became accepted by the fans, his teammates and other players in the league (the 
great black baseball player Hank Aaron articulated this insight about Robinson quite well 
(see Anzia and Berry 2011, p.480n). Branch Rickey himself had told Robinson before the 
first season:  
Jackie, we’ve got no army. There’s virtually nobody on our side. No owners, no 
umpires, very few newspapermen. And I’m afraid that many fans will be hostile. 
We’ll be in a tough position. We can win only if we can convince the world that 
I’m doing this because you’re a great ballplayer, a fine gentleman. (Dundas 2010) 
 
And Gerald Early concurs,  
 
...blacks saw that Robinson had to be twice as good, three times as good as a 
white player to even have a chance at the big leagues, that he had to ‘earn’ the 
respect of his white teammates in ways demanded of no white player. And this 
was what integration meant to many blacks. (Ward and Burns 1994, p.417) 
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In a sense, Robinson had no choice but to avoid fights, to be a “fine gentleman” in 
Rickey’s phrase, and as a black man living with white supremacy and its double-
standards (i.e., white privilege) every day. Quite apart from Branch Rickey, Robinson 
knew this both consciously and sub-consciously. Robinson, like all African-Americans 
who grew up under white supremacy, understood the racialized “conservative double-
standard” on violence (Bell 1968), in which violence by whites is acceptable, but never 
by blacks. 
 The threat of being rejected for the slightest mis-step was a powerful constraining 
force. The incident, mentioned above, in which Roy Campanella and Robinson were 
refused service by a restaurant owner demonstrates the point. Robinson was fuming mad 
and Campanella tried to diffuse his anger, saying, “Let’s not have any trouble, Jackie. 
This is the only thing we can do right now, unless we want to go back to them crummy 
Negro leagues” (Polner 2007, p.184). Of course, there were powerful incentives to not 
lash out in violence during his early years in the league. Nevertheless, this account need 
not deny a supportive role for the nonviolent ideals and strategy that Rickey articulated 
and urged upon Robinson, which resonated with Robinson’s own religious faith, and 
which Robinson carried out amazingly well.  
 This version of the Robinson story also allows us to see how common 
nonviolence actually is. And in this sense, Robinson is not alone – as many, many other 
minority sports starts, artists, musicians, and professionals of various kinds also broke or 
partially broke into white institutions through patience, dignity, and moral courage in the 
face of the indignities of white supremacy.  
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 The Robinson story, his rise as a subaltern sports star in a racist society, and his 
challenge to white supremacy/ second-class citizenship well illustrates key dynamics in 
philosopher Stephen Darwall’s distinctions between “appraisal respect” and “recognition 
respect” (cited in Appiah 2010). As a professional athlete, Robinson was given the 
opportunity to display his athletic excellence – earning “appraisal respect” or 
“competitive honor” (p.176, p.13). Such displays of excellence, though they are not 
moral feats, can nonetheless help opponents see the dignity/ humanity of the Other. Many 
similar instances of this dynamic in the sporting world have probably played a crucial 
role in breaking down white supremacist and WASP ideology in the U.S. – including the 
African-American athletes Jessie Owens, Jack Johnson, and Joe Louis as well as Jim 
Thorpe (Native American), Hank Greenberg (Jewish), and Roberto Clemente (Puerto 
Rican), among many others. Perhaps even those who argue that the Russian people’s love 
for the forbidden rock music of the Beatles played a role in bringing down the Soviet 
Union have a point (Woodhead 2009). These sports and musical figures displayed 
excellence, earning a kind of “competitive honor” or “appraisal respect,” which opened 
the door to recognizing their humanity/ human dignity – what can be called “recognition 
respect” (Appiah 2010, p.176, p.13). However, the top dogs will still resist potential – 
even symbolic or psychological changes (i.e., cracks in the regime of symbolic violence) 
brought by the token hero’s emergence. The top dogs are shamed by the token’s feats and 
in shame they lash out, just as honor accrues to the underdogs by virtue of their 
identification with their token hero. After Jack Johnson defeated the white boxer Jim 
Jeffries, over 150 people were killed in race riots, many sparked by white lynch mobs 
attacking blacks (Zirin 2008, p.43). But Jack Johnson’s refusal to condemn black 
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violence during the riots, which Booker T. Washington proded him to do (p.44), begins to 
illustrate how nonviolence can bring people together in a way that violence can not. 
Robinson never caused any race riots.  
 Consider another counterfactual – what if Robinson had spent the rest of his life 
theorizing nonviolence in some of the many newspaper columns (he had a weekly 
column for years), interviews and speeches he gave around the nation. He simply could 
have more fully explained the covenant he made with Branch Rickey, the ideals and 
strategic thinking behind it, explained how and why nonviolence “worked” in response to 
the physical and psychological aggression he encountered during his early years in the 
minor and major leagues. He did not do this. However, Robinson did offer frequent 
praise for Dr. King and in 1960, used his column in the New York Post to defend 
nonviolent activists conducting sit-ins just after President Truman had denounced them 
(Henry 1998, p.210). Moreover, Robinson’s son fought in the Vietnam War, and when 
Dr. King came out against the Vietnam War, Robinson used his weekly newspaper 
column to criticize King’s stance on the war. A lengthy phone conversation with King 
did not change Robinson’s mind (Smith 1998). But eventually, Robinson did move closer 
to King’s view of the Vietnam War, partly as the result of his eldest son’s experiences 
fighting in the war (Wilson 2010). Again, a more consistent nonviolent stance in his later 
years would have likely fostered a much stronger collective memory of Robinson’s 
nonviolence during the pivotal three-year experiment. 
 Important additional contradictions can be named which are indicative of 
Robinson’s own apparent ambivalence about nonviolence. Aside from his enormous 
indirect influence, Robinson did do a great deal for the civil rights movement directly and 
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on the ground, even marching with King on several occasions. But here, Robinson (1995) 
clearly admitted his ambivalence about nonviolence, saying, 
As much as I loved him [King], I never would have made a good soldier in 
Martin’s army. My reflexes aren’t conditioned to accept nonviolence in the face 
of violence-provoking attacks. My immediate instinct under the threat of physical 
attack to me or those I love is instant defense and total retaliation. (p.211) 
 
His claim to be temperamentally ill-suited for King’s nonviolent demonstrations (Smith 
1998) was re-iterated as he talked about the demonstrations in Birmingham: 
I’m not as brave as some of these little 9 and 10 year old kids in the South. I don’t 
like these big teeth that I see on these [police] dogs, and I don’t like to see these 
fierce expressions of the policemen in Birmingham, Alabama, and I don’t like to 
read about pregnant women being poked in the stomach by policemen with their 
nightsticks, and I don’t like to see young Negro kids of 7, 8, 9 years old being 
thrown across the street by the force of a fire hose. But I believe that I must go 
down and say to the people down there, thank you for what you’re doing, not only 
for me and my children, but I believe for America. So I’m going down to do 
whatever I possibly can. (Burns 1994 V8)  
 
When Robinson flew to Birmingham to support the demonstrations of Dr. King and the 
SCLC, Robinson downplayed the courage he was displaying, saying, “I don't like to be 
bitten by dogs, because I am a coward. I don't like to go to jail either, because, as I say, I 
am a coward. But we've got to show Martin Luther King that we are behind him” 
(NAACP ).   
 While every nonviolent movement needs people to take a variety of different 
roles, Robinson’s humility here strikes an ironic note. He claims he was “not as brave” as 
youth in the civil rights movement. Perhaps he is right to defer to the heroic self-suffering 
taken on by civil rights activists on the streets. Perhaps it is true that these activists took 
nonviolence to another level, though observers of Robinson’s early years in professional 
baseball are unanimous in proclaiming his immense courage and bravery (Burns 1994). 
Using his celebrity status effectively, Robinson took up other tasks - raising funds for 
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churches destroyed by arsonists (Smith 1998), speaking to rallies and nightly meetings of 
activists (NYT 1958, September 20), as well as marching in some demonstrations with 
Dr. King (AP 1964, February 18; Herbers 1964).  
 A caveat. I do not mean to imply that the nonviolent strategy via Branch Rickey 
was the only important formative influence on Robinson. Indeed, other relationships and 
insights may be equally important. For instance, we know that the Rev. Karl Downs, 
Robinson’s pastor in Pasadena, California played a significant role. What might Downs 
have taught Robinson? We have some suggestive evidence from an article Downs (1936) 
wrote in The Crisis: “Force, pressure, threats and the like are tests of true courage...Racial 
adjustment must be made through fearless, rational, comprehensive and cooperative 
ventures of both the Negro and white students...” (p.171). And, Downs counsels against 
slave-day myths that argued “‘We must smile in massa’s face and humble ourselves or 
else perish.’ No! Racial respect cannot be accomplished this way!...Courage instead of 
timidity!” (p.187; emphasis in the original) In this advice, we glimpse the historical 
legacies of white supremacy and the potential racial undertones of Robinson’s 
nonviolence, a layer of complications that certainly contributed to the stresses and strains 
of his three-year pledge.    
 An alternative textbook account. Following the example of  Kohl’s (1995) 
insightful analysis of textbook portraits of Rosa Parks, below I offer an alternative 
textbook account, necessarily short, which would begin to do justice to the key 
nonviolent dynamics and their ongoing social significance in the Jackie Robinson story:  
 Jackie Robinson was not the first African-American to play in the major 
leagues of professional baseball. Decades earlier a few black players had briefly 
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played in the major leagues, but an agreement among white team owners 
emerged, effectively banning blacks through conformity to the racist conventions 
of white supremacy. Meanwhile, the Negro Leagues developed, where talented 
black players thrived on teams managed and owned by blacks. Some critics still 
argue that the integration of baseball should have occurred at the team level, 
because in this way, black managers and owners could have been invited into the 
league. Instead, to this day, the management and ownership of teams continues to 
be almost unanimously white (Ward and Burns 1994, p.413).     
 The general manager of the Brooklyn Dodgers, Branch Rickey, had long 
been troubled by racial bigotry, and had deep streaks of idealism and religious 
faith, as well as pragmatism. That is, he wanted his baseball teams to win, and to 
sell lots of tickets to games – attracting fans of all races to the ballpark (on 
Rickey’s pragmatism, see Zirin 2008, p.99; Austin 1997). Constantly reading 
books and making lists of still more historical and sociological books to read, 
Rickey undertook an intellectual search to understand more about the history of 
slavery and racism in the Americas. Rickey also read many books on Lincoln, 
kept a portrait of Abraham Lincoln on his office wall, and as a Methodist lay 
preacher, often read Christian literature. Rickey was taken by one book in 
particular, The Life of Christ by Giovanni Papini, which argued that Jesus taught 
nonviolence, and Jesus’ teaching to “turn the other cheek” proposed a kind of 
brave and proud, defiant nonviolent resistance, which by occupying the moral 
high ground would shame and disarm oppressors. Other influences on Rickey also 
pointed him towards a nonviolent strategy of social change. For example, a 
635 
favorite essay of his was William James’s “The Moral Equivalent of War,” which 
argues for embracing forms of heroic nonviolent action.   
 Rickey began looking for a black baseball player who could play for his 
team and be the first to re-integrate the major leagues in the modern era. Rickey 
was impressed with reports of Robinson’s skills as a baseball player, his religious 
faith and upright morals, as well as his reputation as a fighter with toughness and 
moral courage. He knew that while in the military, Robinson had refused to move 
to the back of a segregated army bus in Texas and then went to court to fight the 
charges of “conduct unbecoming an officer.” When Robinson first met Rickey in 
his Brooklyn office, Rickey asked him if he was tough enough to “turn the other 
cheek,” and though he knew Robinson was a Christian, Rickey explained just 
what he meant by reading from Papini’s book. During their conversation, 
Robinson asked, “Mr. Rickey, do you want a ballplayer who’s afraid to fight 
back?” Rickey countered, “I’m looking for a ballplayer with the guts not to fight 
back!” 
 Rickey then acted out a variety of scenarios where Robinson would likely 
be the target of racist taunts and violence, asking if Robinson could “turn the 
other cheek” in each case. Because Rickey knew Robinson would become the 
target of violent white bigotry, and because he believed that if Robinson lashed 
out in violence it would set back racial progress by decades, Rickey asked 
Robinson to make a three-year pledge of nonviolence. Rickey believed that 
nonviolence was the key to winning over whites and conquering their prejudices, 
and Robinson accepted the challenge.      
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 Although the hatred, violence, and stress Robinson confronted was 
extreme, and persisted for years, Robinson endured with nonviolence and dignity. 
His excellence on the baseball field also helped win over the American public and 
fellow players alike. But by his own account, there were times when Robinson 
almost gave in to the temptation to lash out in violence, and wondered if a “real 
man” would or should. When his three-year pledge was up, Robinson began to 
engage in arguments on the field. But he almost always limited himself to using 
words, and in interviews, he often insightfully pointed to the hypocritical double-
standards many whites judged him by. For years, Robinson also wrote a 
newspaper column which engaged important issues of the day, and was a 
consistent advocate for social issues as he saw them, though in many ways he 
evolved and became more critical of U.S. society and its failure to make more 
significant racial progress.      
 As the U.S. civil rights movement began to gain steam in the American 
South, Robinson lent his support to the nonviolent struggle and often marched 
with Dr. King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. As if to confirm 
Rickey’s and Robinson’s faith in nonviolence during their three-year pledge, 
years later, Dr. King expressed his own view that without Robinson’s heroic steps 
into professional baseball, the civil rights movement would not have been 
possible.  
 
 It is one thing to ask whether the significant details of the Jackie Robinson story 
are accurately and vividly fleshed out in history textbooks. But it is another to argue that 
education must aim to instill humane values (e.g., Adorno’s 1967 essay “Education After 
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Auschwitz” (Adorno 1998)), to promote nonviolence and a culture of peace. If we agree 
that the latter should be our goal, this is all the more reason for the Robinson story of 
nonviolence to assume a prominent place in our school textbooks and in our collective 
memory.  
 
WHY NONVIOLENCE IS NEGLECTED IN HISTORY TEXTBOOKS 
 The present analysis of state-approved history textbooks from around the world 
raises numerous theoretical questions. How do we explain the failure of nonviolence to 
compete in the collective memory? That is, how do we explain the “sin of omission” we 
have documented in history textbooks – their relative neglect of nonviolent campaigns? 
What is it about nonviolent movements which tend to lead to collective forgetting? Is 
violence inevitably more memorable and newsworthy because of deep, almost 
unconscious psychological forces? Is the link between war and the health of the state the 
reason that violence outcompetes nonviolent events? Is memory of nonviolent 
movements perceived as a threat to the health of the state, or to elite power? Is the failure 
of historians to more explicitly theorize historical events in general a big part of the 
problem? Is the failure of social movement leaders to more explicitly name and theorize 
nonviolence part of the problem?   
Conventional Action Versus Nonviolent Action 
The failure to name and categorize major mass nonviolent street actions as 
“nonviolent action” partly stems from a tendency of social movement participants as well 
as historians (and everyone in between) to view mass nonviolent actions as merely 
conventional action. When the action does not become categorized as specifically 
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nonviolent action, it is little wonder that history textbooks do not name the events as 
nonviolence in action. It has been noted that in Latin America, general strikes and mass 
street protests have rarely been perceived as “nonviolent” action (Becker 2003, Parkman 
1990). In some advanced democracies, the “institutionalization of protest” has clearly 
moved many demonstrations and marches into the category of conventional action, as 
protesters acquire permits from city hall and police routinely observe with little 
interference (Meyer and Tarrow 1998).  
 However, the point here is that a great many social movements, nonviolent 
revolutions, leaders, and participants were guided by nonviolent ideology and nonviolent 
strategy, but this has been written out of the textbook accounts of these events. In other 
cases, social movement leaders may have failed to sufficiently articulate nonviolent 
strategy. Yet, as Schock (2003) points out, many leading scholars and strategists of 
nonviolent maintain that “campaigns of nonviolent action are likely to be more effective 
if people understand what the methods are and how they operate (e.g., Ackerman and 
Kruegler 1994; Burrowes 1996; Lakey 1973; McCarthy 1990; and Sharp 1973; 1990)” 
(p.711).  
 Norway ranks relatively low in its national mean score on the Gallup World Poll 
question of “peaceful means alone,” with 48% of respondents affirming peaceful means 
alone “will work” for oppressed groups. Yet, the most historically significant oppressed 
minority/ indigenous group in Norway, the Sami or  Laplanders, won enormous victories 
for greater autonomy and human rights through legislation. For example, the Sami can 
now choose the Sami language as their first language in schools. These legal victories 
were bound up with other Sami protest campaigns which involved an extensive repertoire 
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of nonviolent tactics as documented by the Global Nonviolent Action Database 
(Lawrence 2011). But would the average Norwegian perceive this as “peaceful means”? 
Or, would this fail to be perceived as “peaceful means” or as “nonviolent” because it is 
understood as conventional action? 
 Loewen (2007) argues that many U.S. history textbooks “actually credit the 
government, almost single-handedly” for the progress made by the U.S. civil rights 
movement (p.239). According to Loewen, students reading these texts are likely to 
conclude that the civil rights movement was mostly about Presidents passing civil rights 
legislation, while the mobilization, courage, and sustained nonviolent protests of activists 
is heavily glossed over or even largely omitted. My point is that this emphasis on 
legislation is of course, conventional action, while the significance of mass nonviolent 
actions and diverse forms of creative protest is neglected. Essentially the same pattern 
was found in the Ghanaian text by Gadzepko (2005): At the climax of the independence 
narrative, rather than pointing to the role of mass noncooperation, the textbook 
emphasizes the role of British cooperation. 
Principled Versus Pragmatic Nonviolence 
 The failure to name and categorize nonviolent actions as nonviolent partly stems 
from the tendency of social movement organizations and leaders to embrace pragmatic 
nonviolent ideology rather than principled nonviolence. I would contend that this is likely 
to result in the under-theorization of nonviolence within a movement. Hence, for 
example, Ira Sandperl, the main teacher of nonviolence at the Institute for the Study of 
Nonviolence (founded by the Quaker folk singer Joan Baez), says of anti-Vietnam 
protests in Berkeley in 1964, “Basically we wanted to turn an unviolent movement into a 
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nonviolent one” (Didion 1968, p.52). By unviolent, Sandperl means belief in 
“nonviolence only as a limited tactic” (p.53). Conversely, the distinctive moral rhetoric of 
principled nonviolence clearly distinguishes it from conventional action, and also 
resonates with the moral values of major world religions (Eddy 2012). 
 The best memory outcomes are likely to occur when movement leaders invoke a 
nonviolent “memory template” (Eddy 2012) which aids interpretation (for social 
movement participants, opponents, journalists, and historians) – the Gandhian template is 
an obvious choice here, and many activists around the world have adopted it as they 
frame the strategies and tactics of their own movement for participants, opponents, and 
observers. The failure of Jackie Robinson to explicitly advocate principled nonviolence in 
his discourse, likely played a major role in how most textbooks have neglected to include 
the very clear nonviolent strategy which motivated Branch Rickey and Robinson during 
his first three years in the Major Leagues.   
 The collective forgetting of nonviolence may be fostered by the fact that  
nonviolent action is often a “weapon of the weak” or “nonviolence of the weak” 
(Gandhi’s phrase for pragmatic nonviolence). That is, it is a method chosen because it is 
the only method available: Arms are lacking, or the use of arms would be suicidal. In 
such cases, nonviolent strategy may not even be consciously chosen, and so it is little 
wonder that it tends not to be theorized, recognized, or celebrated. For instance, in the 
case of the resisting Norwegian teachers, one of them has recalled, “Nowhere through all 
these discussions did the idea of nonviolent resistance come in. Instead of an idea, it 
developed as a way to work – a way to do something” (Sharp 2005, p.136).  
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 Walter Wink (1987) found not just ambivalence or unformed opinions about 
nonviolence, but a lack of awareness among South African anti-apartheid activists that 
what they were doing could be properly classified as “nonviolent” action. They lacked 
theorization of nonviolent methods, language to articulate nonviolent strategy, and 
awareness of nonviolence as a distinct category, and this among activists who were 
successfully using a great variety of nonviolent methods. Similarly, in their massive 
bibliography of scholarship on nonviolent movements around the world, McCarthy and 
Sharp (1997) argue, “most of the human experiences identified here as ‘nonviolent 
action’ were never thought of in those terms by the people who undertook them” 
(p.xxxvi). I contend this outcome is much more common when social movement leaders 
and organizations embrace pragmatic nonviolence rather than principled nonviolence. 
 Moreover, seminal theorists of nonviolence like Sharp (1996, p.237) and George 
Lakey (1973, p.57) have argued that pragmatic nonviolence has been a much more 
significant factor than principled nonviolence in social movement history.   
Violent Events Tend to Receive Narrative Privilege 
 Nonviolence is at risk for being viewed as a non-event, while violence fills the 
news and the history books. One version of this factor proposes that peace has “very 
limited” “aesthetic appeal” (Mariani 2009, p.102). In the humorist Garrison Keilor’s 
version of this, which he frequently reiterates in his radio narratives (broadcast on 
National Public Radio) about his native snowbound Minnesota, he argues that you simply 
cannot tell stories about sunshine and happiness. Thus, suffering and tragedy enjoys a 
kind of narrative privilege. Likewise, Juhnke and Hunter (2004) propose that historians, 
teachers, and students “welcome the focus and drama that wars offer to the classroom,” 
642 
and this is more generally related to the notion that “violence often has a galvanizing or 
cathartic effect” (p.43).  
 Recent research shows that the rankings of U.S. presidents and their relative 
“greatness” by professional historians positively correlates with the number of U.S. war 
casualties during their presidency, even after controlling for 7 predictors: economic 
growth, years in office, years at war while in office, whether the president was 
assassinated (likely to boost heroic status), whether the president was a war hero, the 
president’s intelligence, and presence or absence of presidential scandals (Henderson and 
Gochenour 2012). Hence, it seems more war deaths produces “greater” presidents in the 
minds of historians.    
 The failure to categorize and name instances of nonviolent action as 
“nonviolence” is bound up with wider cultural forces which neglect the significance of 
nonviolent strategy. Nonviolent theorists have documented case studies of nonviolent 
resistance in a great many nations around the world. But scholars looking for nonviolent 
cases and outsiders in general bring a different lens to a culture and its history. Hence, 
they may project onto a nonviolent movement or event more significance than locals 
attach to it. I asked a professor from Norway about his recollections of Norwegian 
resistance to the Nazis. He mentioned the short-lived violent resistance as well as forms 
of resistance like working very slow. When I explained Gene Sharp’s (2005) celebration 
of the nonviolent resistance of Norwegian teachers, the professor confessed, “I never 
thought of teachers as leaders of resistance. I did not hear about that.” Such stories of 
nonviolent resistance are at risk for being lost from collective memory because of a 
general failure to recognize the significance and successes of nonviolent strategy. 
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Psychological and Epistemic Arguments - We Remember What Hurts 
 Another explanation can be found in the theory that there is a deep, epistemic 
connection between memory and suffering, pain, and trauma. Dostoyevsky (2003) wrote, 
“Suffering is the sole origin of consciousness” (p.262). Nietzsche (1967 [1887]) asked: 
“How can one create a memory for the human animal? How can one impress something 
upon this partly obtuse, partly flighty mind, attuned only to the passing moment, in such a 
way that it will stay there?” (p.60) Adopting an anthropological lens, Nietzsche’s answer 
was that the “whole prehistory of man” relied on an assumed principle of 
“mnemotechnics”: “If something is to stay in the memory it must be burned in: only that 
which never ceases to hurt stays in the memory” (p.61). This, writes Nietzsche, “is a 
main clause of the oldest (unhappily also the most enduring) psychology on earth” (p.61). 
Nietzsche continues, 
Man could never do without blood, torture, and sacrifices when he felt the need to 
create a memory for himself; the most dreadful sacrifices and pledges (sacrifices 
of the first-born among them), the most repulsive mutilations (castration, for 
example), the cruelest rites of all the religious cults (and all religions are at the 
deepest level systems of cruelties) – all this has its origin in the instinct that 
realized that pain is the most powerful aid to mnemonics. (p.61)  
 
Mary Daly (1978), the Catholic feminist theologian turned radical feminist philosopher, 
concurred as she argued that patriarchal religion and ritual engages in memory-creating 
through “mind/ spirit rape” (p.110). The argument is clear, if we were to engineer 
collective memories, a key principle of design is – to remember, to reproduce memory, 
make it hurt.   
 Anthropological analyses of rites of passage as well as patriarchal religion offer 
support for this notion. Mircea Eliade’s study of manhood initiation rituals concluded that 
in dozens of cultures all over the world, the rite involves older men giving the boy a 
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painful wound, one meant to “reverberate out from a rich center of meaning” (Bly 1990, 
p.28). Robert Bly, a leader in the mytho-poetic men’s movement that emerged in the 
1980’s, interpreted a host of world myths as he wrote, “A wound allows the soul or spirit 
to enter” (p.209). Likewise, Joseph Campbell contended that the most common means of 
gaining wisdom is we “suffer and gain wisdom gradually” (Dossey 1999, p.129).The 
theory that pain and memory are more deeply interlinked than other experiences may 
provide us one beginning point for explaining the comparative resonance achieved by 
violence and war in collective memory.  
 Hence, in an extension and application of this theory we could argue that 
nonviolent history tends to hurt and bleed less, and so if Nietzsche’s theory is correct, 
nonviolent action is virtually designed for forgetting. Our preoccupation with blood, pain 
and suffering is not just the province of history, religion, and the news (“if it bleeds, it 
leads”), but clearly extends into the preoccupations of professional psychology: “Journals 
in the field have published forty-five thousand articles in the last thirty years on 
depression, but only four hundred on joy” (Ehrenreich 2007, p.13).  
 A growing body of psychological research suggests that it is powerful emotions 
which make memories stick. Both positive and negative emotions can cement memory, 
but painful memories are especially likely to “haunt” consciousness, as we become 
preoccupied with accounting for and explaining traumatic events (Lemonick 2007). 
Similarly, some psychological research shows that negative events and behaviors tend to 
be remembered better (Skowronski and Carlston 1987), and to provoke more elaborate 
attributions (Hastie 1984, Schwarz and Clore 1983).  
645 
 It is easy to see how the suffering of soldiers on the battlefield is designed for 
memory-creating, especially since the “moral status” of soldiers is routinely viewed as 
unassailable. Their “sacrifice,” and noble duty on behalf of the nation is sacred. In fact, in 
the U.S. during the post-Vietnam era, the “support the troops” mantra is emblematic of an 
emergent “warrior ethics” in which war is routine, virtuous, unquestioned, and apolitical 
(Lucas and McCarthy 2005). That is, the reasons for conducting a particular war rapidly 
vanish in importance, all that matters is supporting the troops. While others in U.S. 
society suffer, such as the poor, their moral status is routinely questioned (i.e., as in the 
assertion that the poor are lazy) – a rhetorical means of obfuscating the structural 
violence that perpetuates their suffering. Guarding the memories of soldiers and their 
wars becomes a key sacred function of all of the state-sponsored mechanisms in space 
and time, notably, holidays and monuments, but also textbooks. All help to reproduce the 
civil religion.        
The Problem is History Textbooks in General – They Need to Theorize 
 Nelson and Olin (1979) argue that, for history to become useful, historians need 
to become more consciously theoretical. Textbooks largely ignore theoretical and 
explanatory concerns (e.g., how or why nonviolent action/ military strategies can 
succeed). As a result, in history textbooks, it is “just one damn thing after another” 
(Loewen 2007, p.278), with little space given to developing context or explanations. This 
is why Loewen argues that history textbooks need to become more sociological, with 
explicit theoretical reflections on causal forces in history (p.342).  
 Comprehensive accounts of nonviolent action require some coverage of the 
sources of nonviolent ideals, as well as theories about why nonviolence works. But 
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secondary school history textbooks largely ignore the origins and development of ideas, 
ideals, ideologies, and values, as well as religious ideas. As we have seen, the nonviolent 
religious ideal embodied in Jesus’s phrase “turn the other cheek,” an ideal which plays a 
crucial role in the Jackie Robinson story, is completely ignored in textbook portraits.  
The Problem is History Textbooks in General – No One Learns Within the Narratives  
 There is little to no “learning” documented inside the narrative arc of secondary 
school history textbooks, in general, or in biographical portraits contained within 
textbooks, in particular. For example, consider that most of the main leaders of the Black 
Panther Party Social eventually renounced violent methods, but this never appears in U.S. 
history textbooks. Actors enter the stage of history, play their role as politicians or 
activists, soldiers or generals, and exit never to be heard from again. Remorse about their 
violent actions or changes of heart almost never appear. Here again, the space and form 
constraints involved in telling history as the story of a nation, severely limits the human 
depth and accuracy of the effects violent events have on individual lives – on people who 
think, feel, mourn, believe, regret, hope, or have nightmares for the rest of their lives. 
This pattern overlaps with the pervasive failure of many textbooks to give “voice” (i.e., to 
quote social actors in their own words) to the historical figures covered.  
 Can textbook retellings of the Vietnam War be complete without noting Defense 
Secretary Robert McNamara’s conclusion “well before leaving the Pentagon that the war 
was futile” and his public revelation late in life that the war was “wrong, terribly wrong” 
(Wiener 2009). Textbooks recount the “domino theory” as a motivation for the war, but 
they do not share McNamara’s admission late in life that in applying the domino frame to 
Vietnam, it was: “a basic misunderstanding or misevaluation of the threat to our security 
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represented by the North Vietnamese…I am certain we exaggerated the threat.” And, 
McNamara’s misgivings extended to his participation in World War II, in which he 
played a supportive planning role in American firebombing of Japanese cities, a 
campaign which killed 900,000 Japanese civilians. McNamara recounts that his superior, 
General Curtis E. LeMay argued that if the U.S. lost the war, they would be prosecuted as 
war criminals for their role in the firebombing. In retrospect McNamara concurred – they 
were “behaving as war criminals,” and he confessed the only reason such American 
actions were not categorized as “immoral” was because the U.S. won the war (Wiener 
2009).    
 Textbooks praise General Douglas MacArthur as a “brilliant soldier” (e.g., Roden 
et al. 1984, p.603), but we never hear his words upon the death of Gandhi in January 
1948: “The process of mass application of force to resolve contentious issues is 
fundamentally not only wrong, but contains within itself the germs of self-
destruction….If civilization is to survive, men cannot fail eventually to adopt Gandhi’s 
belief….” (Green 1978, p.vii). There is additional evidence that MacArthur appreciated 
nonviolent tactics, as he recognized the general strike as “so deadly a social weapon” it 
had to be banned in post-war Japan during the U.S. occupation which he oversaw (A.A.P. 
1947, Feb. 1).  
The Problem: Textbook Production Processes Result in Deeply Conservative Textbooks 
 The contested political process and corporate (i.e., private publishing house) 
interests which produce textbooks result in conservative/ patriotic texts which avoid 
controversy. Loewen (2007) has demonstrated this pervasive pattern in U.S. history 
textbooks, and Leahey (2010) has shown how the process results in textbooks which 
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“whitewash” the Vietnam War.It is worth noting that one of the few textbooks in the 
present sample to portray a nonviolent revolution relatively accurately, the El Salvador 
textbook, is a pdf distributed via the internet straight from the Ministry of Education, 
rather than through a publishing house. Perhaps eliminating the corporate publishing 
house “middle man” in this way can create space for more controversial historical events 
in national curriculums. 
 In most nations, the aim of textbook actors to avoid controversy has resulted in 
the avoidance of recent history, some of which may still carry fresh wounds. An 
interesting case in point concerns the Czech Republic, which recently celebrated the 20th 
anniversary of the Velvet Revolution (1989), a movement scholars claim as one of the 
most significant nonviolent revolutions since 1945 (Dudouet 2008,Stephan and 
Chenowith 2008). However, a young activist marked the occasion by writing a manifesto 
which argued that “many of his peers had no idea what was being celebrated…because 
recent history was glossed over in Czech history books” (Bilefsky 2009, p.A16).   
 In 1777, when Norway was still part of the Danish Kingdom, a Norwegian history 
textbook was published entitled Great and Pleasant Deeds performed by Danes, 
Norwegians and Holstenians (Lorentzen 1990). The title well names the tone of national 
history textbooks down to the present, with a patriotic emphasis on “great deeds” and an 
apolitical, or conservative emphasis on “pleasant deeds.”  
 In the U.S., when a federally funded project, “National Standards for United 
States History” released its report in 1994, conservatives pounced on it for its 
multiculturalism, as well as for what they perceived as its overemphasis on the dark side 
and struggles of U.S. history, while departing from “a traditional approach to history that 
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emphasizes facts, dates, and events” (Leahey 2010, p.14). An op-ed by Lynne V. Cheney 
in the Wall Street Journal assessed the National Standards arguing that more emphasis 
should be given to Paul Revere, George Washington, Robert E. Lee, Ulysses S. Grant, 
Thomas Edison, the Wright brothers, and J.P. Morgan; And, less emphasis should be 
given to McCarthyism, the KKK, the American Federation of Labor, the National 
Organization of Women, and Harriet Tubman (Cheney 1994). Cheney expresses panic 
that “The National Standards... concentrates on ‘multiple perspectives’ and on how the 
American Revolution did or did not serve the ‘interests’ of different groups” (p.A22). 
This is not the “tone of affirmation” that Cheney thinks appropriate (p.A22). On the heals 
of a Republican takeover of Congress in the midterm elections of 1994, the U.S. Senate 
voted 99-1 to censure the National Standards and withdraw federal funding (Leahey 
2010). Textbook publishers and politicians should not take all of the blame however. 
Studies show that over 90% of teacher avoid controversial issues in the classroom 
(Loewen 2007, p.327).  
 Nonviolent struggles often reach deeper into the heart of social contradictions 
embedded in the status quo. Thus, adequate coverage of nonviolent movements will 
require delving into numerous critiques of society and power structures. Such negative 
tones are often avoided in textbooks. It has long been assumed that a key reason for rosy-
colored views of national life is that textbook publishers and educators understand the 
function of textbooks as one of inculcating patriotism.  
 Frederic Jameson has argued that narrative always has a function: “it is a specific 
mechanism through which the collective consciousness represses historical 
contradictions” (Sarup 1993, p.179). Following this psychoanalytic metaphor, historical 
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narratives include the repression of “the political unconscious” (Jameson 1981). Building 
on Jameson, it can be said that historical texts utilize ideological frames, or what he terms 
“strategies of containment” (Sarup 1993, p.180). The interpreter’s task becomes finding 
patterns which represent strategies of containment, by identifying “gaps or absences as 
specific signs of the way the text denies or represses history” (p.180). I argue that 
analysis of state-sponsored textbook narratives reveals that nonviolent action is such a 
gap and absence.  
Nonviolent Action Threatens the Status Quo 
 A case can also be made that the omission of nonviolent action is straightforward: 
history texts reflect the hegemonic ideology of the ruling class and nonviolent action 
threatens the status quo. Wink (2003) argues that power elites simply do not want the 
mass public to know that nonviolent noncooperation and nonviolent resistance works 
(pp.53-54). Historical precedents are dangerous, remembering them and celebrating them 
even more dangerous. What is at stake here is recognition of a tool, a strategy and set of 
tactics, already existing in the toolbox of those who would mobilize for greater social 
justice. In a novel by Milan Kundera (1981), a character argues that the struggle against 
power “is the struggle of memory against forgetting” (p.3). 
 What we observe – and do not observe in history textbooks is akin to the well-
known practice of state-owned radio stations in the Soviet bloc who played classical 
music during coups and uprisings, rather than report any news. Likewise, during the 
recent mass street protests in Turkey, “CNN Turk, the network’s Turkish-language 
affiliate, was running a cooking show” (Cook and Koplow 2013, p.G4). For those who 
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would resist, but lack information or historical memory, textbooks serve to reproduce a 
knowledge crisis.  
The Problem is Widespread Misperceptions of the Concept of “Nonviolence” 
 Wink (2003) argues that nonviolence has not been championed by mainstream 
society because the term itself is negative, and the concept is subject to confusion and 
easy dismissals (p.3). The problem is linked to predecessor terms for nonviolence, 
“passive resistance” and “pacifism,” both of which imply passivity and have long 
resulted in confusion. Gandhi contended that the name “soul force” (the English 
translation of the Hindi word satyagraha) was the remedy for these problems, but as we 
saw in the Google Ngram analysis, this term for nonviolence has not caught on.   
 The easy dismissals and critiques of nonviolence are closely bound up with a long 
legacy of the co-optation of nonviolent religious values expressed in the sacred texts of 
the world religions, and the legitimation of “just war” doctrines by religious elites. In 
probably every major religious tradition, we can trace this pattern to interactions between 
theological traditions and the agendas of religious elites who in many empires and 
countries have either come from the power elite classes, sought alliances with the elites, 
or found other reasons for rationalizing and legitimating warfare, violence, and 
nationalism. Again, this factor overlaps with #7 above and the Marxist insight that “The 
ruling ideas of each age have always been the ideas of its ruling class” (Marx and Engels 
1848, p.30), and education is captive to “the influence of the ruling class” (p.28). 
Double Standards on Nonviolence 
 In every generation (and sometimes more often than this) nonviolence is widely 
viewed as discredited. This occurs whenever a nonviolent movement fails to achieve its 
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goals in a timely manner. This occurred throughout the U.S. civil rights movement, and 
recently as the nonviolent movements of the “Arab Spring” failed to achieve swift 
victories after those in Tunisia and Egypt. Wink (2003) links this double standard to the 
ideological hegemony of the ruling class, and citing evidence from Wolpin (1981), he 
refutes the double standard: 
If a single case can be shown where nonviolence doesn’t work, nonviolence as a 
whole can then be discredited. No such rigorous standard is applied to violence, 
however, which regularly fails to achieve its goals. Close to two-thirds of all 
governments that assume power by means of coups d’état are ousted by the same 
means; only 1 in 20 post-coup governments give way to a civil government (p.54) 
  
Inconsistencies Among Nonviolent Leaders As Well As Double Standards  
on Nonviolent Leaders  
 One reason for the underemphasis of nonviolence in textbooks might be linked to 
the lack of consistencies among prominent nonviolent adherents in their opposition to 
violence. Here we confront an unfair double-standard, as adherents of violence, generals, 
soldiers and so forth, act nonviolently most of the time, but those actions are not 
understood as undermining the legitimacy of violence.  
 I have argued that the mixed messages about the sufficiency of nonviolence 
articulated by figures such as Nkrumah and Jackie Robinson may have played some role 
in de-centering nonviolence from the pivotal narratives of their public lives. It is worth 
noting that Gandhi’s real and perceived inconsistencies and contradictions on 
nonviolence/ violence have dogged the Gandhian memory template and the application of 
the Gandhian repertoire around the world down to today, supplying ample ammunition 
for his skeptics and detractors (Eddy 2012). Thus, social movement leaders like Nelson 
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Mandela have cited Gandhi’s words or example as they attempt to justify turning away 
from nonviolent to violent methods (Eddy 2012). 
 Consider Emerson, who laid out an almost fully fledged nonviolent philosophy in 
his 1838 essay “War,” but when the Civil War arrived he was a strong supporter of the 
Union Army (Mariani 2009, p.118n). William Lloyd Garrison, a leading proponent of 
abolitionism, nonviolence and passive resistance, decided to support Lincoln and the 
Union Army when the Civil War broke out. Clarence Darrow, the leading advocate of 
nonviolence in the U.S. before World War I (Lynd and Lynd 1995), became a vocal 
supporter of U.S. entry into WWI, though he later regretted it (Darrow 1932, pp.210-
217). Reinhold Niebuhr, a leading American pacifist and Christian theologian endorsed 
U.S. entry into WWII. Niebuhr’s rethinking of violence and war resulted in a form of 
“Christian realism” which has reportedly influenced President Obama’s worldview. 
Bayard Rustin, a pivotal nonviolent organizer of the U.S. civil right movement and life-
long pacifist Quaker, attracted attention for his refusal to condemn the Vietnam War out 
of strategic concerns and political compromises in his agenda to advance race relations in 
the U.S.  
 However, once again, we observe here a double standard – nonviolent leaders are 
perhaps unfairly held to a higher standard of consistency. When soldiers come home and 
do not kick the dog or do not hit their family members, we do not take notice. When 
General MacArthur praises Gandhi (above), or when a politician who has advocated war 
engages in diplomatic talk with the enemy (which occurs at the end of most conflicts), it 
is not taken as an argument against violent means of conflict resolution. The double 
standards in our perceptions of consistency and inconsistency are revealed in that it is 
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only when nonviolent adherents stray from strict nonviolence, that nonviolent ideology is 
understood as de-legitimized. The same lesson is not drawn when violent adherents 
refuse to be violent for moral or practical reasons. 
 As another example of a lack of consistency in nonviolent leaders and 
organizations, key players in the U.S. civil rights consciously shifted from principled 
nonviolence to pragmatic nonviolence and violent ideologies. Between 1964 and 1966, 
SNCC, one of the leading U.S. civil rights movement organizations, shifted “from a 
nonviolent, interracial, participatory democracy to a violent, black separatist, hierarchical 
organization” (Robnett 2002, p.266). SNCC leaders made a moral and pragmatic case 
against nonviolence, arguing that “Defending your home is dignity” and “a man has a 
right to defend himself” while employing anecdotes such as the following: when the Klan 
were shot at by black men in North Carolina, the Klan did not return (p.274). Similarly, 
CORE came to espouse self-defense including the “right of demonstrators to defend 
themselves when attacked” (Bell 1968, p.63). But SNCC and CORE’s strategic moves 
away from nonviolence was a key factor in their loss of allies, funds, and organizational 
decline (McAdam 1999, p.210). 
Group/ Party Politics Plays a Role in Shaping Memories  
 A case can also be made that group/ party politics plays a role in shaping 
memories of nonviolent movements, as well as tarnishing the memory of some 
nonviolent leaders for partisans. left-right ideological loyalties and the ongoing messiness 
and contentiousness of politics all play a role in how nonviolent movements and leaders, 
especially political leaders, are remembered, and who reveres them in collective memory. 
The Ministries of Education in most nations keep very tight control over curriculum and 
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textbook content. As power shifts to new political parties, new bureaucrats are appointed, 
and sometimes ideological slants and textbook omissions are glaring, as we saw in the 
case of Chile. 
 In addition, the longer a nonviolent leader is in the public spotlight, the more 
likely their image will be tarnished through the vicissitudes of political struggle. The 
untimely deaths of Dr. King and Gandhi may have done more to preserve the legacy of 
nonviolence than we know, though it is certainly possible they may have moved in 
directions of greater consistency in nonviolence. This was true of King in his last year. 
He was killed one year to the day after giving his famous anti-Vietnam War speech, his 
first significant public opposition to the war. Similarly, one wonders if the vaulted status 
of Rosa Parks is partly due to the fact that she went on to live most of her life relatively 
out of the public eye, which served to avoid tarnishing her legacy for the controversy 
avoiding textbooks. 
 Robinson’s long and very public affiliation with the Republican party surely 
alienated many Democrats, as did his prominent spotlight as a weekly newspaper 
columnist, a venue where he often weighed in on political issues. In addition, Black 
radicals like Malcolm X had very public feuds with Robinson. Amiri Baraka has also 
written of Robinson in very harsh terms as a “race traitor” for leaving his team in the 
Negro Leagues and contributing to the destruction of the Negro Leagues, which had been 
a key source of black economic independence and pride. Baraka wrote,  
I don’t want to get political and talk bad about ‘integration.’ Like what a straight-
out trick it was. To rip off what you had in the name of what you ain’t never 
gonna get. So the destruction of the Negro National League...to what must we 
attribute that? We’re going to the big leagues. Is that what the cry was on those 
Afric’ shores when the European capitalists and African feudal lords got together 
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and palmed our future. ‘We’re going to the big leagues!’ (Ward and Burns 1994, 
p.413) 
 
 Robinson’s affiliation with the NAACP led to conflict as he came to see them as 
not progressive enough, and his refutation of the NAACP in 1967 likely alienated 
moderates (Wilson 2010, pp.155-156, p.174). Rickey was also a Republican and some 
say he entertained anti-Communist hysteria when it suited his agenda (Ward and Burns 
1994, p.354; Lowenfish 2007, p.468). Robinson’s Congressional testimony on July 17, 
1947 was perceived by many leftists as submitting to the worst of anti-Communist 
hysteria and as an attack on Paul Robeson. However, Robinson’s actual statement 
included strong critiques of Jim Crowism and white supremacy. In any case, this attack 
on Robeson alienated many radicals, leftists, and progressives - many of whom were civil 
rights movement allies and would very likely have become “memory entrepreneurs” for 
his nonviolent heroism. Later, Robinson denounced Dr. King’s antiwar stance on 
Vietnam. While Robinson adhered to conservative politics, it can still be argued that U.S. 
power elites co-opted Robinson, enlisting him to help fight the hegemon’s wars and 
ideological battles during the Cold War.  
 During his reign, Nkrumah’s socialist policies were a major source of internal 
CPP party conflict and wider domestic opposition (Gadzepko 2005, p.230). Indeed, 
Nkrumah had been charged in conspiratorial terms as a Communist since his UGCC days 
in 1948, soon after returning to Ghana (Assensoh 1989, p.168, pp.210-211; Gocking 
2005, pp.91-92). He openly embraced socialist policies, articulated Marxist-Leninist 
ideology, and in 1957 publicly identified himself as a Marxist Socialist (Assensoh 1989, 
p.135). In this it seems he was deeply influenced by Paul Robeson’s Council on African 
Affairs, which Nkrumah participated in during his time living in the U.S. (pp.206-207). 
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In Ghana, Nkrumah’s legacy in collective memory has been partly tied to the fortunes of 
his party, the CPP, which was banned after his rule ended, and resurged in the late 1990s 
even as Nkrumahist political factions petitioned and won the right to reclaim the CPP 
label (Gocking 2005, p.241, p.249). But it remains true that the CPP almost disappeared 
due to Nkrumah’s overthrow, and his overthrow – which obviously tarnished his own 
historical legacy, was partly linked to Cold War era interventions by the U.S. 
 In Costa Rica, collective memories of Oscar Arias have been serious tarnished by 
his unpopular advocacy of neoliberal policies in his second term as President. My Costa 
Rican survey revealed that students who self-identify with Oscar Arias’s political party, 
the National Liberation Party, listed him as a national hero 20% of the time compared to 
Costa Rican students who identified with another political party, who listed Arias as a 
hero only 9.1% of the time. Similarly, recent experimental research shows that college 
students self-identifying as either Democrats or Republicans perceive politicians guilty of 
inconsistent behavior as hypocrites 40% of the time if the politician belongs to the 
opposing party, but only 16% of the time if the politician belongs to their own party 
(NPR 2012, March 5). It seems, our social allegiances, our identification with a “tribe” 
deeply shapes our perceptions of virtue and vice in public figures. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 This project endeavored to further our knowledge of “cultures of peace” and 
global patterns in the reproduction of nonviolent attitudes and collective memories of 
nonviolence. While new cross-national data sets (especially the GPI and Gallup World 
Poll) helped to facilitate this investigation, their weaknesses and limitations have been 
documented above. Importantly, it was shown that the replication of a Pew Global 
Attitudes survey question with a 4-point Likert scale explains much more variance in the 
violent/ nonviolent attitude indexes than the dichotomous Gallup World Poll questions, 
which raises questions about the Gallup method of using dichotomous questions. 
Moreover, it suggests that the Pew item serves as a better “keystone” indicator of violent/ 
nonviolent ideology. In addition, the shortcomings of the GPI emerged as we observed 
that the leading arms dealing nations and the U.S. with its “empire of bases” were not 
significantly penalized by the GPI scoring system.  
 One lesson of this analysis is that forcing diverse indicators into a single index 
can obscure more than it reveals. After all, over the years, the internal and external 
indexes of peace utilized by the GPI only obtain correlations as high as .4, and sometimes 
as low as .28 (see Table 125). While the GPI has not released national scores on their 
internal and external indices, the WPI offers the advantage of reporting three sub-indexes. 
On the WPI’s 2009 Military sub-index, Costa Rica ranked very high (among the top 5 
nations), but Costa Rica ranks lower on the other sub-indexes gauging levels of political 
and social peace.  
659 
 Correlations and graphs of the subjective attitudinal poll data with the peace 
indexes (which utilize objective indicators) demonstrate that few nations rank highly in 
both the objective and subjective indicators. Germany and Japan are two nations that 
perform very well in a great many objective and attitudinal indicators of peace. This 
stimulates questions about whether experiences of utter defeat in war are tragically the 
most convincing and lasting way for nations to “learn” the ways of peace. However, both 
nations were also forced by the U.S. and the international community to adopt 
demilitarized structures and policies, possibly suggesting a significant role for “policy 
cues” and “elite cues” in reproducing peaceful attitudes. But neither Japan nor Germany 
perform well in some of the attitudinal indicators of peace, especially on the nonviolent 
efficacy item of the Gallup World Poll.  
 Analysis of the Gallup World Poll revealed that in only a few nations did national 
means meet high thresholds on the two “principled nonviolent” indicators including the 
just war ideology indicator (“military attacks on civilians are never justified”) and the 
opposition to terrorism indicator, as well as the pragmatic nonviolence indicator 
(“peaceful means alone will work”). That is, we observed in the Gallup data that the 
accumulation of “peace capital” is quite specific, with a frequent disconnect between 
forms of principled and pragmatic nonviolence.  
 While the study employed numerous standard statistical tools, these tools 
themselves are limited, and concepts like peace and democracy as well as historical 
experiences often become grossly over-simplified when operationalized in dichotomous 
variables or even 10-point scales. Nevertheless, mindful of the manifold weaknesses of 
positivistic approaches, sociology pursues generalization in the hope that something new 
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can be learned about typical patterns, while pushing theoretical explanations forward. 
Cross-national data presents significant challenges, especially as we attempt to generalize 
across societies at different levels of development. Future regression analyses would do 
well to better specify types of wars (e.g., imperial, civil war, co-operative, etc.) and their 
effects in reinforcing violent/ nonviolent attitudes.  
 The emerging intellectual consensus is that on average, human civilization has 
become significantly more peaceful in the transition from pre-state societies to state 
societies (Goldstein 2011, Pinker 2011), though this conclusion specifies “more peaceful” 
in terms of proportional levels of violence. That is, the absolute numbers killed by war 
and murders became much higher in the 20th Century (though it has tapered steeply 
downward since the end of WWII), but the percentages killed were far lower than in 
previous centuries. The extreme rise in population growth helps to account for this. Thus, 
humanity remains in a relatively precarious position, as modern nations possess powerful 
death-dealing technologies and reproduce pro-violent ideological adherents who can be 
mobilized for war. But the spectacles of war and political violence can also deceive us, as 
detailed above, since evidence shows that more people around the world are murdered 
and far more people are killed by structural violence (e.g., lack of clean water). Partly for 
these reasons, the reproduction of nonviolent ideology has been the focus of this project, 
since nonviolent movements are needed to agitate for peace-as-social-justice, not only 
peace-as-the-absence-of-war (Kimball 1984). The thinking here is that adherence to 
nonviolent ideology may be thought of as a kind of pre-mobilized readiness to practice or 
support nonviolent action or other peaceful means, rather than violent means of pursuing 
justice or conflict resolution.  
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 In contrast to Pinker’s (2011) optimism about increasing levels of peace bound up 
with forces of modernity, the present study strikes a cautionary note. Correlational and 
regression analyses revealed that education, industrialization, wealth (GDP per capita), 
globalization, and democracy are associated with some surprising effects on nonviolent 
attitudes.   
 First, on average, education and several other forces of modernity do not cultivate 
confidence in pragmatic nonviolence, in fact, the opposite is the case. Indicators of 
icreasing levels of educational attainment and investment are correlated with declining 
confidence in nonviolent efficacy. But educational indicators are correlated with 
increases in peaceful attitudes on the state terrorism item. However, in the regression 
models, controlling for other factors, education is not a significant predictor of peaceful 
attitudes on the pragmatic nonviolent item or the state terrorism item.  
 In correlations, the following nation characteristics were associated with the most 
peaceful attitudes on the pragmatic nonviolence indicator: “primitive” historically 
predominant religious traditions, nations in the Sub-Saharan Africa, agrarian nations with 
a low GDP per capita, nations on the periphery of the world-system, and “partly free” 
nations with hybrid (not fully democratic) regimes. Likewise, in the regression models, as 
GDP per capita increases, confidence in nonviolence decreases.  
 Second, structural indicators of peace do not necessarily foster peaceful attitudes. 
We even saw that increasing freedoms, political rights, and civil liberties tend to be 
correlated with less peaceful attitudes on the pragmatic nonviolence item.  
 Third, it seems modern democracies are effective in socializing their citizens into 
“callous cruelty,” double-standards on violence such that state violence is perceived as 
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legitimate (Elias 1997), as well as “moral disengagement” (Bandura 1990) from state 
military actions. In the regression models, controlling for other factors, increasing levels 
of democracy is significantly associated with less peaceful attitudes on the issue of 
military attacks on civilians.  
 Overall, forces of modernity were far more robustly correlated with the rejection 
of terrorism than with the rejection of state terrorism. This supports the frequent claim of 
Noam Chomsky that in the U.S. and other modern nations, Just War ideology has long 
been reduced to the tribalalistic view that violence is good if “we” use it, but when any 
other people use violence it is always “terrorism” and illegitimate. Principled stands 
against state terrorism are highest in the Middle East and North Africa – a region often 
under attack by their own governments, suggesting it is not the case that modernity 
reproduces robust ethical objections to violence (even those clearly violating international 
law), but rather experiences of state violence allowed respondents to take the perspective 
of hypothetical civilian victims. There is no significant correlation with indicators of 
Globalization and attitudes towards state terrorism. Though the sample size on this 
indicator was somewhat small, this raises doubts about Pinker’s (2011) broad theorizing 
that cognitive and relational forms of cosmopolitanism, and openness to global markets 
(i.e., “gentle commerce”) might cultivate peaceful attitudes. On the other hand, in the 
regression models, controlling for other variables, GDP per capita was associated with 
more peaceful attitudes on the state terrorism item, but in some models only weakly, and 
not always at the .05 level of significance. In some tension with the findings on 
democracy, this seems to suggest that on average, in wealthy democracies, citizens are 
slightly more likely to reject state terrorism as legitimate. 
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 Fourth, history and collective memory matters: experiences of war and successful 
nonviolent campaigns can both lead to stronger nonviolent attitudes, at least in the short-
term. Nations with recent nonviolent campaign successes do seem to “learn” that 
nonviolence “will work,” but this memory diminishes over time (i.e., collective memory 
is short-lived). Thus, in the regression analysis, one of the strongest predictors of belief in 
pragmatic nonviolence was the “years since last nonviolent success” variable. Fifth, 
forms of principled (i.e., at the low threshold of Just War orientations) and pragmatic 
nonviolence are often distinct: nations that “learn” nonviolence will work do not “learn” 
that killing civilians is wrong (and vice versa). 
 While scholars have puzzled over the meaningfulness of public opinions, the 
present study contributes to this debate by documenting for the first time survey 
respondent ideological adherence to the spectrum of violent/ nonviolent ideologies 
theorized by Megoran (2008): militarism, political realism, just war, and nonviolence. It 
was revealed that Costa Ricans were significantly more peaceful than UO respondents on 
48 out of 52 items. The potential for a “yea-saying” bias and “extreme response” bias 
among Hispanic respondents is tested. But rather than viewing this merely as a source of 
error, substantive cultural interpretations are offered. Regression analyses revealed that 
nationality was the single biggest predicter of nonviolent attitudes, with Costa Ricans 
significantly more peaceful. And, among other findings, Costa Ricans were significantly 
more likely to agree with pro-nonviolent quotations of Dr. King. 
 Factor analyses of each nation’s data sets were independently used to construct 
indexes. Delimited indexes were constructed for the purposes of cross-national 
comparison. The results of exploratory factor analyses show that the Costa Rican sample 
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has almost 7 times more adherents of nonviolent ideology, and 3 times fewer adherents of 
militarism than the UO sample. About 32% of respondents in both nations were just war 
adherents. Only about 28% of respondents in each sample were “unspecified” in terms of 
violent/ nonviolent ideology. Thus, the majority did answer the core battery of 33 
questions with coherence.  
 On the other hand, there are reasons to doubt the stability of many respondent’s 
attitudes. Analysis of the U.S. survey identified a robust “elite cues” effect in a quasi-
experimental section involving quotations by elite moral and political leaders. As 
evidence for the “elite cues” theory of opinion formation, it was found that in one 
subgroup, over 80% of respondents changed their minds (in response to an elite cue on 
the illegitimacy of targeting civilians in military attacks) in an experimental test 
embedded in the survey. 
 Joining the list of typical personality and demographic correlates of violent 
ideological leanings is the sports fan variable. This study found significant associations 
between violent ideological leanings and baseball fandom as well as the UO football fan 
variable, offering some support for Stempel’s (2006) provocative findings as well as 
Chomsky’s theories of a spectator sport-tribalism link. I suspect UO football fandom is a 
proxy indicator for integration into mainstream American culture in general, including 
generalized forms of American militarism. Meanwhile, those who are not UO football 
fans are more likely to embrace countercultural currents which are critical of mainstream 
culture including militarism. In support of these interpretations, the “conformity” value is 
associated with less peaceful scores on the militarism index (see Table 63).  
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 It seems Costa Rica’s structural and historical traditions of demilitarization play a 
decisive role in shaping nonviolent attitudes. Psychocultural explanations of violent/ 
nonviolent attitudes can also be linked to the finding that Costa Ricans value 
“universalism” more centrally (operationalized in terms of equality, multicultural 
tolerance, and ecological concern (see Appendix M)), while UO students value “power” 
more centrally (see Table 62). This may reflect the “emotional climate” of the two 
nations including predispositions for peace. 
 The survey revealed that a robust consensus (92%) of Costa Rican students said 
Costa Rica should not reintroduce a military force. Unlike Germany and Japan, Costa 
Rica’s demilitarization process was entirely led by domestic military and political 
leaders. For over 65 years, Costa Rica has demonstrated that through reliance on 
international law, international organizations, and diplomacy, small nations can meet 
their security needs, even in a hostile region, even without a military. It is interesting to 
note that Costa Rica’s “no standing army” policy embodies Thomas Jefferson’s vision for 
the U.S., and it has allowed Costa Rica to prioritize education, health care, and a robust 
social safety net. Textbook analyses revealed significant pride and robust principled and 
pragmatic justifications for the policy of demilitarization.   
 Costa Rica was one of the nations meeting high thresholds in all three attitudinal 
indicators, ranking in the top 3 in the world. When analyzing the replication of the Pew 
Global Attitudes Survey item, “It is sometimes necessary to use military force to maintain 
order in the world,” we see that Costa Ricans university students would rank very highly 
in the world, but we cannot be certain whether they are more or less peaceful on this item 
than the general Costa Rican population (see discussion of Figure 23 above).   
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 Some of Costa Rica’s imperfections in reproducing peace culture were 
documented, such as the lack of knowledge of nonviolent revolutions, and the lower 
confidence of university students in pragmatic nonviolence, as compared with the rest of 
the population. It was shown that Costa Rican textbooks fail to document cases of 
successful nonviolent campaigns in Costa Rican and Latin American history, as well as 
some key foundations of Costa Rica’s national security plan (e.g., the Rio Treaty).  
 Analysis of the open-ended survey questionsconducted in both nations, revealed a 
serious scarcity of nonviolent capital, i.e., a lack of historical knowledge of nonviolent 
events. Over 72% of Costa Ricans and 83% of UO respondents could not name a 
successful/ somewhat successful nonviolent revolution. Yet, many of these respondents 
claimed that nonviolent methods alone “will work” (the nonviolent efficacy question). In 
addition, respondents who reported knowledge of nonviolent revolutions did not differ 
from the rest of the sample on the nonviolent efficacy question. These are just two pieces 
of evidence documented in the present study which supports Althusser’s (1971) notion 
that “ideology has no history” (p.160). 
 Results from an additional follow-up survey of UO students in 2012 (N=34) 
suggested that respondents may have been confused by the term “nonviolent revolution” 
in the original survey, or simply less knowledgeable about nonviolent revolutions than 
nonviolent campaigns/ movements. This second survey occurred after the “Arab Spring,” 
which received widespread media coverage in the U.S. Given how recent the Arab Spring 
was, the absence of Tunisia in student lists and the extremely low reporting of Egypt 
(5.9%) is very surprising. It suggests students do not follow the news, or for some reason, 
did not perceive these as successful/ somewhat successful nonviolent revolutions.  An 
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additional follow-up survey of UO students in early 2013 (N=61) revealed that 5% 
named Egypt and 0% listed Tunisia as cases of successful/ somewhat successful 
nonviolent revolution, but 15% named Egypt and 3% listed Tunisia as cases of 
successful/ somewhat successful violent revolution. In this survey, while 77% could not 
name nations with successful/ somewhat successful nonviolent revolutions, only 26% 
could not name nations with successful/ somewhat successful violent revolutions. 
However, scholars are now pointing out that many revolutions perceived as violent 
actually had crucially important nonviolent stages that did most of the heavy lifting, such 
as overthrowing corrupt regimes (Kurlansky 2006, Schell 2003). Again, all of this 
suggests that respondents lack sufficient intellectual capital/ antiwar knowledge to hold 
informed opinions about the prospects for effective nonviolent movements. 
 The textbook analysis supports the inference that collective memory of significant 
nonviolent campaigns is often spotty to non-existent, though some textbooks recounted 
the nonviolent campaigns relatively well (e.g., El Salvador). Several theoretical 
explanations were put forth to account for the omissions of nonviolent action from 
textbook content. The U.S. survey also suggests that collective memory processes have 
failed to reproduce antiwar knowledge for the Vietnam War among university students 
today, supporting the results of a recent nationally representative Gallup Poll (Dugan 
2013), as well as Althusser’s (1971) notion that “ideology has no history” (p.160). Gallup 
Poll data also documents how retrospective memories of U.S. Presidents is usually more 
positive than the ratings of contemporary Presidents. That is, as collective memory 
processes engage, “history is usually kinder to ex-Presidents” (Jones 2013). It seems the 
same is true of wars – as old wars are remembered more fondly by new generations than 
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by those who lived through them. This remains a significant puzzle for collective 
memory studies, but we can be sure this interacts with the hegemony of violent 
ideologies. 
 For decades the Gallup organization has documented the “most admired” 
Americans in yearly poll data, but the present study determines whether the 
characteristics of admired heroes might be associated with violent/ nonviolent ideology. 
In the Costa Rican sample, t-tests on the dummy variable “soldier hero” (i.e., respondents 
who listed a soldier as an admired national hero) revealed that there was no significant 
difference in attitudes between this group and the rest of the sample, on the Nonviolence 
Index or the Militarism Index, not even at the modest .1 level. Thus, at least in the case of 
Costa Rica, embracing soldiers as national historical heroes is not associated with violent 
ideological leanings or pro-military attitudes.   
 In the UO data, cross-tabulations revealed that almost 2/3rds of those listing King 
and Parks as heroes did affirm, earlier in the survey, that nonviolence “will work,” while 
over 1/3 answered that nonviolence “will NOT work.” Thus, it seems that about 1/3 of 
respondents listed King and Parks as heroes while disavowing or failing to recognize the 
strategic efficacy of nonviolence. Among other possible interpretations, this contradiction 
suggests a degree of respondent ignorance about their biographies (e.g., failure to “learn” 
from King’s biography/ praxis that nonviolence can work) or the modern “fragmentation” 
of consciousness (Habermas 1987) as contradictory ideals and beliefs are held within the 
self. In the UO data, when respondents who listed King and/ or Parks as heroes was used 
to create a dummy variable and this variable was entered into a regression equation, it 
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was significant (at the .05 level), and positively associated with peaceful scores on the 
Nonviolence Index. 
 Nevertheless, in the two forms of the elite quotes section of the survey, I found 
suggestive evidence that some U.S. respondents reacted against King’s harsh criticism of 
U.S. militarism, as King’s critique, as if provoking a patriotic backlash, tilted some 
respondents towards higher levels of agreement with Obama’s pro-violent quotes. 
Additional evidence from two questions, including one on whether the U.S. military’s use 
of unmanned drones is “brave” and a second on the role of the U.S. military in the world, 
suggests that roughly 15-20% of UO respondents were unwilling to mount virtually any 
critique of the U.S. military. This offers evidence of a brand of patriotism which Marty 
(1958) likened to “Americanized state Shinto” (p.21). 
 No nation is a utopian Shangri-La, as every nation faces historical struggles and 
challenges in the pursuit of peace and justice. The global distribution of violent and 
nonviolent ideologies are likely to interact with structural and geopolitical factors and 
play a role in how nations pursue their interests and ideals in the community of nations. 
But if we are to find ways to increasingly transcend the “tragedy of culture” (the failure 
to learn and assimilate), to acknowledge the unity of means and ends, and to affirm our 
common humanity, we would do well to tell the history of triumphant nonviolent social 
action around the world, and to seal it in collective memory. As Thomas Merton (1967), a 
Trappist monk and leading advocate of nonviolence in the 1960s said, “...nonviolent 
action must establish itself in the minds and memories of modern [people] not only as 
conceivable and possible, but as a desirable alternative to what [they] now consider the 
only realistic possibility: namely political technique backed by force” (p.20). 
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APPENDIX A 
 
U.S. SURVEY 
 
Notes: Sources of borrowed/ modified survey questions appear in brackets [ ]. This survey was 
conducted in an Introduction to Sociology class at the University of Oregon in the Fall of 2010. 
The surveys were completed online through the Qualtrics survey program. There were four 
versions of the survey: for males and females (in order to replicate the Schwartz Values Survey 
questions which use gender-specific pronouns), and with two forms randomly assigned (in one 
nonviolent quotes appear first, in the other pro-violent quotes appear first). The survey version 
reproduced here is for females, with pro-violent quotes appearing first in the elite quotes section.  
 
Survey of Attitudes Toward Conflict and Conflict Resolution Methods 
 
I1 (Instruction #1) This survey takes about 30 to 35 minutes to complete.  You will receive extra 
credit in your SOC 204 class for completing the survey. This survey is confidential.  Your name 
will never appear in any data report or publication of this survey.  Since your name (and email 
address) will be automatically separated from the data, the researcher and your professor will 
never know how you answered the questions. The purpose of this survey is to improve our 
understanding of opinions relating to personal and social conflicts, violence and nonviolence, war 
and peace, political and military actions. Your participation is voluntary, and you should feel free 
to decline to participate. If you agree to participate - please continue reading: 
 
I2 By answering the survey questions below, you acknowledge that you are providing your 
consent to participate. I, hereby certify that I am AT LEAST 18 YEARS OLD and that I agree to 
participate in this survey conducted by Matthew Eddy, a graduate student in Sociology at the 
University of Oregon. I understand that my participation is voluntary; that I do not have to answer 
any of the questions, and that I am free to withdraw from participation in this survey at any time.  
I understand that I can skip any question or questions that I feel uncomfortable with.I understand 
that choosing to participate or withdraw from participation will in no way impact my relationship 
with this university, any professor, or the researcher. 
 
I3 If you do NOT know your answer to a question, you may SKIP IT and leave it unanswered.  
Please check the circle that matches your opinion for each question below. 
 
 
[Notes: 1) The parenthetical notes of explanation in Q4 and Q6 did not appear in the original 
Gallup World Poll questions. Pre-testing revealed that these clarifications were necessary for 
some students. As Gallup World Poll questions were conducted one on one between 
interviewers and respondents, it is likely that such minor explanations sometimes occurred in 
those surveys informally. 2) Many questions below are replications or modifications of survey 
questions that have been previously tested and validated in cross-national or U.S. surveys. 
Where applicable, the sources are noted after the question below. These source references did 
not appear in the original surveys. See Appendix D below for the sources of the 34 items of 
Q9.] 
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Q4 Some people think that for the military to target and kill civilians is sometimes justified, while 
others think that kind of violence is never justified.  Which is your opinion? (Civilians = unarmed 
men, women, and children who are NOT participating in a violent conflict) 
Never justified (1); Sometimes justified (2)  [Source: Gallup World Poll 2008] 
 
Q5 Some people think for an individual person or a small group of persons to target and kill 
civilians is sometimes justified while others think that kind of violence is never justified. Which 
is your opinion? 
Never justified (1); Sometimes justified (2)   [Source: Gallup World Poll 2008] 
 
Q6 Some people believe that groups that are oppressed and are suffering from injustice can 
improve their situation by peaceful means alone (nonviolent methods).  Others do NOT believe 
that peaceful means alone will work to improve the situation for oppressed groups.  Which do 
you believe, peaceful means alone will work, or peaceful means alone will NOT work? 
Will work (1); Will NOT work (2)  [Source: Gallup World Poll 2008] 
 
I7 Below are conflicts in which two adult male strangers might engage in a fist fight.  Tell me 
whether you would approve of the use of punching in each situation.  
Q7_1 Would you approve of a man punching an adult male stranger who was drunk and bumped 
into the man and his wife on the street? Yes (1); No (2) 
Q7_2 Would you approve of a man punching an adult male stranger who had hit the man's child 
after the child accidentally damaged the stranger's car? Yes (1); No (2) 
Q7_3 Would you approve of a man punching an adult male stranger who had broken into the 
man's house? Yes (1); No (2) 
Q7_4 Would you approve of a policeman punching an adult male citizen who said vulgar and 
obscene things to the policeman? Yes (1); No (2) 
[Source of the Q7 questions: General Social Survey 2008, Q235 & Q236] 
 
I8 Below, several actions are described. Tell me whether you think the action can always be 
justified, never be justified, or something in between. Check the number that matches your 
opinion:  
Never 
Justifiable 
(1) 
(2) (3) Rarely 
Justifiable 
(4) 
(5) (6) Sometimes 
Justifiable 
(7) 
(8) (9) Always 
Justifiable 
(10) 
Q8_1 For a man to beat his wife [Source: World Values Survey 2005] 
Q8_2 Political assassinations [Source: World Values Survey 1990; European Values Survey 
1999, 1990, 1981] 
Q8_3 The use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information 
[Source: Pew Survey of U.S. in October 2005] 
Q8_4 For the police to beat a crowd of nonviolent protesters who refuse to leave the streets 
Q8_5 Killing in self-defense [Source: World Values Survey 1990 & earlier EVS] 
 
Q9 Do you strongly agree (1), agree (2), disagree (3), or strongly disagree (4) with the following 
statements about punishment, violence, nonviolence, militaries and war? 
Q9_1 A person has the right to kill to defend his/ her family. 
Q9_2 A person has the right to kill to defend his/ her property. 
Q9_3 There are situations in which a woman is justified in slapping her husband in the face. 
Q9_4 There are situations in which a man is justified in slapping his wife in the face. 
Q9_5 Corporal punishment (spanking) is necessary to bring up children properly. 
Q9_6 Military discipline develops good character in youth. 
Q9_7 War brings out the best qualities in men. 
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Q9_8 Many of our nation's greatest heroes are soldiers. 
Q9_9 When people suffer under a dictator, a violent revolution is necessary and justified. 
Q9_10 Using violence to pursue political goals is NEVER justified. 
Q9_11 War breeds disrespect for human life. 
Q9_12 It is better to forgive your enemies and work for peace with justice than to be a good 
soldier. 
Q9_13 It is better to disobey orders and think for yourself than to be a good soldier. 
Q9_14 Military discipline injures self-respect and individuality. 
Q9_15 There is nothing wrong with nations seizing territory or natural resources through war 
because nations should protect their own economic security and interests. 
Q9_16 When the goal is liberation from tyranny or oppression, war can be necessary and 
justified. 
Q9_17 Because freedom and justice may be more important than peace, war may be necessary 
and although regrettable, it is the lesser of two evils. 
Q9_18 Diplomacy (negotiations between leaders) often fails and war between nations becomes 
necessary. 
Q9_19 The Biblical command against killing does NOT apply to warfare. 
Q9_20 There is NO conceivable justification for war. 
Q9_21 The evils of war are greater than any possible benefits. 
Q9_22 It is the moral duty of the individual to refuse to participate in any way in any war, no 
matter what the cause. 
Q9_23 We should honor the heroes of nonviolence more than those who used violence. 
Q9_24 In nations on the verge of civil war, nonviolent movements are likely to be more 
successful in increasing long-term peace and justice than using violence. 
Q9_25 If armed conflict between individuals and cities can be outlawed, it is possible to outlaw 
armed conflict between nations - perhaps through the United Nations and the International Court 
of Justice. 
Q9_26 Diplomacy (negotiations between leaders) and nonviolent methods can always work to 
solve international disputes. 
Q9_27 If the goal is peace, peaceful methods must be used because we can NOT separate the 
means (methods) from the ends (goals). 
Q9_28 Nonviolent methods can work to overthrow dictators. 
Q9_29 We should object to wars when nations try to seize territory or natural resources. 
Q9_30 We should support disarmament efforts (efforts to reduce the number of weapons 
manufactured and held by militaries and armed groups around the world). 
Q9_31 The death penalty should be used for a person convicted of murder. 
Q9_32 It is necessary to fight terrorism by military means (methods).  
Q9_33 It is sometimes necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world. 
Q9_34 Now, please answer the last question (Q9_33) the way you think most people in your 
nation would answer it. 
[see Appendix D below for the sources of the 34 items of Q9] 
 
Q10 People vary in their opinion of how the U.S. military impacts the rest of the world. In your 
opinion, does the U.S. military act as the world’s heroic policeman, or as the armed forces of a 
self-interested empire, or something in between? The U.S. military acts as… 
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(1) the 
world’s 
heroic 
policeman 
who helps 
keep the 
peace, and 
furthers 
freedom and 
democracy. 
(2) (3) (4) 
Something 
in between 
(5) (6) (7) the 
armed forces 
of a self-
interested 
empire that 
dominates 
and exploits 
the world, 
and mostly 
serves 
wealthy and 
powerful 
interests in 
the U.S. 
 
Q11 People vary in their opinions about U.S. involvement in recent wars. In your opinion, were 
the following wars just and worthy causes deserving of U.S. military involvement? 
  Yes, a just war 
(1)  
Somewhat just 
(2) 
No, NOT a just 
war (3) 
Q11_1 Vietnam War 
(1955 – 1975) 
□ □ □ 
Q11_2 Iraq War (2003 to 
present) 
□ □ □ 
Q11_3 Afghanistan War 
(2001 to present) 
□ □ □ 
 
Q12 The U.S. military has used a variety of strategies to attack enemies in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
including bombing campaigns conducted by predator drones (un-manned aircraft) and dropping 
bombs from airplanes flying at 40,000 feet (beyond the reach of enemies in Iraq and Afghanistan 
who lack anti-aircraft technology). Rate your level of agreement or disagreement with the 
following statements: 
 Strongly 
Agree (1) 
Agree (2) Disagree (3) Strongly 
Disagree (4) 
Q12_1 Dropping bombs from 
airplanes flying at 40,000 
feet is a smart strategy. 
□ □ □ □ 
Q12_2 Dropping bombs from 
airplanes flying at 40,000 
feet is morally justified. 
□ □ □ □ 
Q12_3 Dropping bombs from 
airplanes flying at 40,000 
feet is brave. 
□ □ □ □ 
Q12_4 Using predator drones to 
drop bombs is a smart 
strategy. 
□ □ □ □ 
Q12_5 Using predator drones to 
drop bombs is morally 
justified. 
□ □ □ □ 
Q12_6 Using predator drones to 
drop bombs is brave. 
□ □ □ □ 
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Q13 Below, different opinions about violence and war are expressed by various leaders. Please 
check your level of agreement or disagreement with each statement. [Answers: strongly agree (1), 
agree (2), disagree (3), or strongly disagree (4)]   
 
[Form A appears below with pro-violent elite quotes first] 
Q13_1 “There will be times when nations, acting individually or in concert, will find the use of 
[military] force not only necessary but morally justified.” – President Barack Obama in his 2009 
Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech 
Q13_2 “The nonviolence practiced by men like Gandhi and King may not have been practical or 
possible in every circumstance.” – President Barack Obama in his 2009 Nobel Peace Prize 
acceptance speech  
Q13_3 “The USA has helped underwrite [support] global security for more than six decades with 
the blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms. The service and sacrifice of our men and 
women in uniform has promoted peace and prosperity from Germany to Korea, and enabled 
democracy to take hold in places like the Balkans. We have borne this burden not because we 
seek to impose our will. We have done so out of enlightened self-interest – because we seek a 
better future for our children and grandchildren, and we believe that their lives will be better if 
others’ children and grandchildren can live in freedom and prosperity. So yes, the instruments of 
war do have a role to play in preserving the peace.” – President Obama in his 2009 Nobel Peace 
Prize acceptance speech   
Q13_4 “Violence is not the monopoly of the exploiters and as such the exploited can use it too 
and, moreover, ought to use it when the moment arrives.” – Che Guevera (1963) 
Q13_5 “Our soldiers must have a relentless hatred of the enemy; a people without hatred cannot 
vanquish a brutal enemy.” – Che Guevera (1967) 
Q13_6 “Targeting innocent civilians for murder is always and everywhere wrong.” – President 
George W. Bush (2002) 
Q13_7 “I hate war as only a soldier who has lived it can, only as one who has seen its brutality, 
its futility, its stupidity…There is not glory in battle worth the blood it costs…When people speak 
to you about a preventive war, you tell them to go fight it. After my experience, I have come to 
hate war…War settles nothing.” – Dwight Eisenhower, U.S. Army General and 34th President of 
US (from 1953-1961) 
Q13_8 “People who dismiss the concepts of dialogue, diplomacy, and negotiation as a waste of 
time are the biggest challenge to people who work for peace…I do believe that the U.S. tends to 
resort to military force too quickly.” – Oscar Arias Sanchez, Costa Rican President (2005) and 
Nobel Peace Prize winner 
Q13_9 “When war, as in these days in Iraq, threatens the fate of humanity, it is ever more urgent 
to proclaim that only peace is the road to follow to construct a more just and united society. 
Violence and arms can never resolve the problems of man.” – Pope John Paul II (2003) 
Q13_10 “It is my conviction that killing under the cloak of war is nothing but an act of murder.” 
– Albert Einstein 
Q13_11 “Violence is impractical because it is a descending spiral ending in destruction for all. 
The old law of an eye for an eye leaves everybody blind…Violence is immoral because it thrives 
on hatred rather than love. It destroys community and makes brotherhood impossible. Violence 
ends by defaulting itself. It creates bitterness in the survivors and brutality in the destroyers.” – 
Martin Luther King, Jr. (1958) 
Q13_12 “Violence never brings permanent peace. It solves no social problem: it merely creates 
new and more complicated ones.” – Martin Luther King, Jr. in his 1964 Nobel Peace Prize 
acceptance speech 
Q13_13 “[The USA] is the greatest purveyor of violence in the world today.” – Martin Luther 
King, Jr. 1967 [“purveyor” means supplier, distributer] 
675 
 
Q14 [Form B – with nonviolent elite quotes first] 
 
Coding Table. Order of questions in Form A and Form B 
Order of 
quotes in 
Form A 
Quote Order of 
quotes in 
Form B 
Q13_1 Obama: military force morally justified Q14_12 
Q13_2 Obama: nonviolence of Gandhi and King not practical Q14_11 
Q13_3 Obama: the USA underwrites global security Q14_13 
Q13_4 Che: violence monopoly Q14_9 
Q13_5 Che: hatred Q14_10 
Q13_6 Bush: Targeting innocent civilians is wrong Q14_4 
Q13_7 Eisenhower: I hate war Q14_2 
Q13_8 Oscar Arias: diplomacy/ U.S. resorts to military force too 
quickly 
Q14_6 
Q13_9 Pope John Paul II: violence can never resolve problems Q14_7 
Q13_10 Einstein: war is murder Q14_5 
Q13_11 King: violence is a descending spiral Q14_3 
Q13_12 King: violence never brings permanent peace  Q14_1 
Q13_13 King: USA greatest purveyor of violence Q14_8 
 
 
Q15 What is your gender? Male (1); Female (2) 
 
I16 Here I briefly describe some people. Please read each description and think about how much 
each person is or is not like you. Check the answer that shows how much the person in the 
description is like you.  
 
Q17 How much like you is this person? 
[Answers: Very much like me (1), Like me (2), Somewhat like me (3), A little like me (4), Not 
like me (5), Not like me at all (6)] 
Q17_1 Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to her. She likes to do things in her 
own original way. 
Q17_2 It is important to her to be rich. She wants to have a lot of money and expensive things. 
Q17_3 She thinks it is important that every person in the world be treated equally. She believes 
everyone should have equal opportunities in life. 
Q17_4 It’s important to her to show her abilities. She wants people to admire what she does. 
Q17_5 It is important to her to live in secure surroundings. She avoids anything that might 
endanger her safety. 
Q17_6 She likes surprises and is always looking for new things to do. She thinks it is important to 
do lots of different things in life. 
Q17_7 She believes that people should do what they’re told. She thinks people should follow 
rules at all times, even when no-one is watching. 
Q17_8 It is important to her to listen to people who are different from her. Even when she 
disagrees with them, she still wants to understand them. 
Q17_9 It is important to her to be humble and modest. She tries not to draw attention to herself. 
Q17_10 Having a good time is important to her. She likes to “treat” herself. 
Q17_11 It is important to her to make her own decisions about what she does. She likes to be free 
and not depend on others. 
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Q17_12 It’s very important to her to help the people around her. She wants to care for their well-
being. 
Q17_ 13 Being very successful is important to her. She hopes people will recognize her 
achievements. 
Q17_ 14 It is important to her that the government ensure her safety against all threats. She wants 
the government to be strong so it can defend its citizens. 
Q17_ 15 She looks for adventures and likes to take risks. She wants to have an exciting life. 
Q17_ 16 It is important to her always to behave properly. She wants to avoid doing anything 
people would say is wrong. 
Q17_17 It is important to her to get respect from others. She wants people to do what she says. 
Q17_18 It is important to her to be loyal to her friends. She wants to devote herself to people 
close to her. 
Q17_19 She strongly believes that people should care for nature. Looking after the environment 
is important to her. 
Q17_20 Tradition is important to her. She tries to follow the customs handed down by her 
religion or her family. 
Q17_21 She seeks every chance she can to have fun. It is important to her to do things that give 
her pleasure. 
[Source: Q17 & Q19 are replications of the Schwartz Value Survey incorporated in the World 
Values Survey] 
 
I18 Instructions (as above for Schwartz Values Survey) 
Q19 Schwartz Values Survey – for male respondents (as above, except with male pronouns) 
 
I20 Please consider some different forms of political action that people can take, and check 
whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it, or would never 
(under any circumstances) do it. Please check the answers that match your choices.    
Q21 This is a form of political action that I (have done, might do, would never do): 
Q21_1 Signing a petition 
Q21_2 Joining in boycotts (refusing to buy products from unjust corporations or nations) 
Q21_3 Attending legal and lawful demonstrations 
Q21_4 Joining strikes at a workplace 
Q21_5 Occupying buildings or factories, or barricading streets 
Q21_6 Damaging things like breaking windows, removing road signs, etc. 
Q21_7 Use personal violence like fighting with other demonstrators or the police 
Q21_8 Attending an anti-war demonstration 
Q21_9 Attending a school related demonstration 
[Source: I20 and the items in Q21 are adapted from the World Values Survey] 
 
I22 Below are statements of opinion on a variety of social issues. You will probably find that you 
feel positively towards some statements and negatively towards others, to varying extents. Please 
check the term that matches your feeling (negative, neutral, or positive) about each statement. 
Q23 How do you feel about each statement?  
[Answers: very negative (1), negative (2), slightly negative (3), neutral (4), slightly positive (5), 
positive (6), very positive (7)] 
Q23_1 Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups. 
Q23_2 It’s OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others. 
Q23_3 To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups. 
Q23_4 Inferior groups should stay in their place. 
Q23_5 Group equality should be our ideal. 
Q23_6 We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups. 
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Q23_7 Increased social equality. 
Q23_8 We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally. 
[Source: Social Dominance Orientation – 8-item scale as developed and tested by Pratto et al. 
(1994)] 
 
Q24 How many years old are you? Age:  
(1) 18-29; (2) 30-39; (3) 40-49; (4) 50-59; (5) 60-69; (6) 70-79; (7) 80 or over 
 
Q25 People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, 
or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the: 
(1) Upper class; (2) Upper middle class; (3) Lower middle class; (4) Working class; (5) Lower 
class 
 
Q26 What kind of place or places did you live during most of your years in junior high/ middle 
school and high school? 
(1) big city; (2) suburbs; (3) small city; (4) rural area; (5) a mix; (6) other 
 
Q27 Have you ever been in the military? 
(1) Yes; (2) No 
 
Q28 Have either of your parents ever been in the military? 
(1) Yes; (2) No 
 
Q29 In political matters, people talk of the “left” (liberal) and the “right” (conservative). How 
would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking? 
(1) Far left (very liberal); (2) Left (liberal); (3) Moderate; (4) Right (conservative); (5) Far right 
(very conservative) 
 
Q30 How interested would you say you are in politics? 
(1) Very interested; (2) Somewhat interested; (3) Not very interested; (4) Not at all interested 
 
Q31 Are you of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin? [Source: U.S. Census 2010] 
(1) No, not of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin 
(2) Yes, Mexican, Mexican American, Chicano 
(3) Yes, Puerto Rican 
(4) Yes, Cuban 
(5) Yes, another Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin (for example, Argentinian, Colombian, 
Dominican, Nicaraguan, Salvadoran, Spaniard, and so on) 
 
Q32 What is your race? (Check one or more boxes) [Source: U.S. Census 2010] 
(1) White 
(2) Black, African American, or Negro 
(3) American Indian or Alaska Native 
(4) Native Hawaiian 
(5) Other Pacific Islander (for example, Fijian, Tongan, and so on) 
(6) Asian Indian 
(7) Chinese 
(8) Filipino 
(9) Japanese 
(10) Korean 
(11) Vietnamese 
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(12) Other Asia (for example, Hmong, Laotian, Thai, Pakistani, Cambodian, and so on) 
(13) Some other race 
 
Q33 How proud are you to be an American? 
(1) Very proud; (2) Quite proud; (3) Not very proud; (4) Not at all proud; (5) I am not American 
 
Q34 Have you ever been punched or beaten by another person? (1) No; (2) Yes [Source: General 
Social Survey 2008, Q233] 
 
Q35 Did this happen to you as a child or as an adult? (1) Child; (2) Adult; (3) Both [Source: 
General Social Survey 2008, Q233A] 
 
Q36 How many times would you guess this has happened to you? 
(1) Once; (2) 2 or 3 times; (3) 4 or more times; (4) Not sure [Source: General Social Survey 
2008, Q233B] 
 
I37 Below are 5 questions that test your knowledge of history. You may find that you do NOT 
know the answers to some or most of them. Please type in your responses if you know the 
answers, or if you think you know part of the answer. If you do not know, please check “Don’t 
know.” 
 
Q38 Can you name the nation that most of the September 11th airplane hijackers were citizens of? 
(1) Yes, the nation was: 
(2) Don’t know 
 
Q39 Can you name from 1 to 4 of the biggest (and most powerful) allies of the United States 
during World War II? 
(1) Yes, the biggest allies of the U.S. during World War II were: 
(2) Don’t know 
 
Q40 Gandhi was a leader of nonviolent protest movements that achieved some degree of success 
in two different nations (on two different continents). Can you name these two nations that he 
personally lived in and led nonviolent protest movements in? 
(1) Yes, the two nations were: 
(2) Don’t know 
 
Q41 Can you name nations that have had successful, or somewhat successful, nonviolent 
revolutions in the 20th and 21st centuries (from 1900 through to this year in 2010)? (Please name 
as many as you can remember.) 
(1) Yes, these nations include: 
(2) Don’t know 
 
Q42 Can you please list about 2 to 5 heroes of U.S. history that you admire and respect the most? 
(1) Yes, they include: 
(2) Don’t know 
 
Q43 Which political party do you tend to vote for? 
(1) Republican 
(2) Democrat 
(3) Green Party 
(4) Libertarian Party 
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(5) Constitution Party 
(6) Other (you can type your party in below if you wish:) 
(7) I do not vote 
(8) None 
 
Q44 How patriotic are you? Would you say extremely patriotic, very patriotic, somewhat 
patriotic, or not especially patriotic? 
(1) extremely patriotic; (2) very patriotic; (3) somewhat patriotic; (4) not especially patriotic 
 
Q45 People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the rest of the world. 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement about how you see yourself? 
Q45_1 I see myself as a world citizen. [Answers: (1) Strongly Agree; (2) Agree; (3) Disagree; (4) 
Strongly Disagree] 
 
Q46 Which major have you chosen, or if not yet sure, which major are you thinking of choosing? 
(1) sociology 
(2) psychology 
(3) pre-med 
(4) pre-law 
(5) business 
(6) engineering 
(7) physics 
(8) computer science 
(9) education 
(10) journalism 
(11) performing arts or fine arts 
(12) Other humanities or social sciences (English, ancient and modern languages, history, 
religion, political science, anthropology, economics, etc.) 
(13) Other life sciences, natural sciences, or earth sciences (chemistry, biology, math, geology, 
etc.) 
(14) Other 
 
I47 People have different experiences with sports in American culture. I would like to ask you a 
few questions about your experiences with sports.  
Q48 Did you play sports while you were in high school? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
 
Q49 Please click every sport you played in high school – whether for a school team or as a club 
sport: 
Q49_1 football 
Q49_2 volleyball 
Q49_3 basketball 
Q49_4 baseball 
Q49_5 softball 
Q49_6 soccer 
Q49_7 running/ track and field 
Q49_8 lacrosse 
Q49_9 ice hockey 
Q49_10 tennis 
Q49_11 golf 
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Q49_12 cheerleading 
Q49_13 dance team 
Q49_14 water polo 
Q49_15 swim team 
Q49_16 crew/ rowing 
Q49_17 wrestling 
Q49_18 boxing 
Q49_19 martial arts 
Q49_20 rugby 
Q49_21 rock climbing 
Q49_22 cross-country skiing 
Q49_23 alpine skiing or snowboarding 
Q49_24 ultimate frisbee 
Q49_25 cycling 
Q49_26 Other 
 
Q50 When the UO football team wins, how do you feel? 
(1) great/ excited/ very happy 
(2) happy 
(3) somewhat happy 
(4) mostly indifferent 
(5) I do NOT care at all if they win or lose 
 
Q51 Can you select the correct last names for the current UO quarterback, star running back, and 
field goal kicker (IN THAT ORDER)? [Qualtrics starting coding answers at 3] 
(3) Polk, Price, Folk 
(4) Price, Polk, Folk 
(5) James, Thomas, Beard 
(6) Thomas, James Beard 
(7) Brehaut, Franklin, Forbath 
(8) Luck, Taylor, Jones 
(9) Taylor, Luck, Whitaker 
(10) Masoli, Jones, Kahut 
 
Q52 Below, I list several different kinds of sports and sporting events. Please tell me – how often 
do you watch each sport on television or the internet? [Answers: Often (1); Sometimes (2); 
Rarely (3); Never (4)] 
Q52_1 Major League Baseball 
Q52_2 NFL Football 
Q52_3 College Football 
Q52_11 NBA Basketball 
Q52_12 College Basketball 
Q52_13 NASCAR Auto Racing 
Q52_14 Tennis 
Q52_15 Golf 
Q52_16 Soccer 
Q52_17 Indy (Indianapolis 500-Style) Auto Racing 
Q52_18 Figure Skating 
Q52_19 the Olympics 
Q52_20 Extreme Sports like Skateboarding 
Q52_21 Boxing 
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I53 Finally, below are a few questions about your religious beliefs. 
Q54 Do you belong to a religious tradition? 
(1) Yes; (2) No 
 
Q55 In case you do belong to a religious tradition, answer which one. 
(1) None 
(2) Atheist/ Agnostic 
(3) I am spiritual, not religious 
(4) Catholic 
(5) African-American Protestant 
(6) Conservative Protestant (for example: Evangelical, Baptist, Southern Baptist, Missouri Synod 
Lutheran, Presbyterian Church in America, Nondenominational, Independent, Bible Church, 
Bible Believing, Charismatic, Full Gospel, Pentecostal, Assembly of God, Four Square, Vineyard 
Fellowship, Holiness, Presbyterian/ Reformed, Church of Christ, Church of God, Nazarene, 
Calvary Chapel, Fundamentalist, other Baptist, other Lutheran, Free Methodist, other Methodist, 
Missionary Church, other evangelical or fundamentalist) 
(7) Mainline Protestant (for example: Presbyterian (PCUSA), United Methodist, Lutheran 
(ELCA), United Church of Christ (UCC), Disciples of Christ, Congregationalists, Episcopalian, 
or other liberal Protestant)  
(8) Quaker or Friends, Mennonite, or Brethren 
(9) Unitarian Universalist 
(10) Christian Science 
(11) Mormon 
(12) Seventh Day Adventist 
(13) Jehovah’s Witness 
(14) Jewish 
(15) Buddhist 
(16) Hindu 
(17) Muslim 
(18) Native American 
(19) Pagan or Wiccan 
(20) Other religion (type in below): 
 
Q55_TEXT Other religion (type in below) 
 
Q56 Apart from weddings, funerals, and christenings, about how often do you attend religious 
services these days? 
(1) More than once a week 
(2) Once a week 
(4) Once a month 
(5) Only on special holy days 
(3) Once a year 
(7) Less often 
(6) Never or Practically never 
[Source: World Values Survey; Note: Qualtrics coded answer values out of order] 
 
Q57 Here are four statements about the Bible, and I’d like you to tell me which is closest to your 
own view. 
(1) The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word 
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(2) The Bible is the inspired word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally, word 
for word 
(3) The Bible is an ancient book of fables, legends, history, and moral precepts recorded by men 
 
Q58 Do you consider yourself to be a Christian? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No [branch in computer program; those answering “No” are sent to Q61] 
 
Q59 When it comes to your religious identity, would you say you are a Pentecostal, 
fundamentalist, evangelical, mainline, or liberal Protestant, or do none of these describe you? 
(1) Pentecostal 
(2) fundamentalist 
(3) evangelical 
(4) mainline Protestant 
(5) liberal Protestant 
(6) Catholic 
(7) other Christian 
(8) none of these 
 
Q60 Do you consider yourself a “born-again” Christian? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
(3) Don’t know 
 
Q61 If you would like to share any comments about the survey, please type them here: 
(1) Yes, I’d like to say: 
(2) I do not wish to type any comments 
 
I62 If you have any questions about the survey you may contact Matthew Eddy 
(meddy@uoregon.edu), the advisor, Professor Michael Dreiling (dreiling@uoregon.edu), or The 
Office of Human Subjects at the University of Oregon (human_subjects@orc.uoregon.edu). 
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APPENDIX B 
 
COSTA RICA SURVEY 
 
Form B (pro-nonviolent quotes appear first). Survey is translated into English (actual survey was 
conducted in Spanish; see Appendix C below for Spanish version) 
 
Opinion Survey 
 
This survey has been put together by Matthew Eddy, a graduate student in Sociology at the 
University of Oregon (USA).  The survey should take about 30 minutes to complete. 
 
This opinion survey is confidential.  If you choose to participate, your name will never appear in 
any report or publication of this survey.  Please do NOT put your name on it.   
 
The purpose of this survey is to collect opinions relating to personal and social conflicts, 
violence and nonviolence, war and peace, political and military actions.  Most of the 
questions in this survey have been asked to people around the world, as researchers seek to 
understand how people think and feel about these issues. 
 
Your participation is voluntary, you should feel free to decline to participate.  There is no 
immediate personal benefit for participation.  However, your participation will help researchers 
better understand public opinions about conflict and conflict resolution.   
 
 
 
 
 
If you agree to participate – please continue reading:  
 
I, hereby consent to participate in this study directed by Matthew Eddy, a graduate student in 
Sociology at the University of Oregon (USA).   
 
By answering the survey questions below, I acknowledge that I am providing my consent to 
participate. I certify that I am at least 18 years old and that I agree to participate in this research 
project. 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary; that I do not have to answer any of the questions, 
and that I am free to withdraw from participation in this survey at any time.  I understand that I 
can skip any question or questions that I feel uncomfortable with.  
 
I also understand that choosing to participate or withdraw from participation will in no way 
impact my relationship with this university, any professor, or the researcher. 
 
If I have any questions about this research project, I may contact Matthew Eddy at (541) 579-
1591, or via e-mail: meddy@uoregon.edu.  I may also contact the advisor, Professor Michael 
Dreiling via e-mail: dreiling@uoregon.edu. I may also contact The Office for Protection of 
Human Subjects at the University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon (USA) 97403, (541) 346-2510, or 
via e-mail: human_subjects@orc.uoregon.edu, if I have questions regarding my rights as a 
research subject. 
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[code: CR_M_NV]  [Note: Costa Rica (“CR”) Survey for Males (“M”) (for gender-specific 
Schwartz Values section), Form B (with nonviolent (“NV”) quotes appearing first)] 
 
Directions:  Please do NOT put your name on this survey.   
If you do NOT know your answer to a question, you may skip it and leave it unanswered.   
Please circle the answer that matches your opinion for each question below. 
 
[Q4 in data set] 1. Some people think that for the military to target and kill civilians is sometimes 
justified, while others think that kind of violence is never justified. Which is your opinion? 
(Civilians = unarmed men, women, and children who are not participating in a violent conflict) 
Never justified  Sometimes justified 
 1   2 
2. Some people think for an individual person or a small group of persons to target and kill 
civilians is sometimes justified while others think that kind of violence is never justified. Which 
is your opinion? 
Never justified  Sometimes justified 
 1   2 
3. Some people believe that groups that are oppressed and are suffering from injustice can 
improve their situation by peaceful means alone (nonviolent methods).  Others do NOT believe 
that peaceful means alone will work to improve the situation for such oppressed groups.  Which 
do you believe, peaceful means alone will work, or peaceful means alone will NOT work? 
Will work   Will NOT work 
       1             2 
 
4. Below are conflicts in which two adult male strangers might engage in a fist fight.  Tell us 
whether you would approve of the use of punching in each situation.  
a. Would you approve of a man punching an adult male stranger who was drunk and bumped into 
the man and his wife on the street? □ Yes □ No 
 
b. Would you approve of a man punching an adult male stranger who had hit the man’s child after 
the child accidentally damaged the stranger’s car? □ Yes  □ No 
 
c. Would you approve of a man punching an adult male stranger who had broken into the man’s 
house? 
 □ Yes  □ No  
 
d. Would you approve of a policeman punching an adult male citizen who said vulgar and 
obscene things to the policeman? □ Yes □ No 
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5. Below, several actions are described.  Tell us whether you think the action can always be 
justified, never be justified, or something in between.  Please circle the number that matches 
your opinion:         
 Never                  Rarely               Sometimes         Always                                                                                                                            
Justifiable         Justifiable           Justifiable         Justifiable                                         
a. For a man to beat his wife 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
b. Political assassinations 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
c. The use of torture against 
suspected terrorists in order to 
gain important information 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
d. For the police to beat a crowd 
of nonviolent protesters who 
refuse to leave the streets 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
e. Killing in self-defense 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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6. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements 
(circle your answer) about punishment, violence, nonviolence, militaries and war:  
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Dis-
agree 
Strongly 
disagree 
a. A person has the right to kill to defend 
his/ her family.  
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
b. A person has the right to kill to defend 
his/ her property. 
1 2 3 4 
c. There are situations in which a woman is 
justified in slapping her husband in the face. 
1 2 3 4 
d. There are situations in which a man is 
justified in slapping his wife in the face. 
1 2 3 4 
e. Corporal punishment (spanking) is 
necessary to bring up children properly. 
1 2 3 4 
f. Military discipline develops good 
character in youth.  
1 2 3 4 
g. War brings out the best qualities in men.  1 2 3 4 
h. Many of our nation’s greatest heroes are 
soldiers. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
i. When people suffer under a dictator, a 
violent revolution is necessary and justified. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
j. Using violence to pursue political goals is 
NEVER justified.  
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
k. War breeds disrespect for human life. 1 2 3 4 
l. It is better to forgive your enemies and 
work for peace with justice than to be a good 
soldier. 
1 2 3 4 
m. It is better to disobey orders and think 
for yourself than to be a good soldier. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
n. Military discipline injures self-respect and 
individuality. 
1 2 3 4 
o. There is nothing wrong with nations 
seizing territory or natural resources 
through war because nations should protect 
their own economic security and interests. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
p. When the goal is liberation from tyranny 
or oppression, war can be necessary and 
justified. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
q. Because freedom and justice may be more 
important than peace, war may be necessary 
and although regrettable, it is the lesser of 
two evils. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
r. Diplomacy (negotiations between leaders) 
often fails and war between nations becomes 
necessary.  
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
s. The Biblical command against killing does 
NOT apply to warfare. 
 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
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Strongly 
agree 
Agree Dis-
agree 
Strongly 
disagree 
t. There is NO conceivable justification for 
war. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
u. The evils of war are greater than any 
possible benefits. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
v. It is the moral duty of the individual to 
refuse to participate in any way in any war, 
no matter what the cause. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
w. We should honor the heroes of 
nonviolence more than those who used 
violence. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
x. In nations on the verge of civil war, 
nonviolent movements are likely to be more 
successful in increasing long-term peace and 
justice than using violence. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
y. If armed conflict between individuals and 
cities can be outlawed, it is possible to 
outlaw armed conflict between nations – 
perhaps through the United Nations and the 
International Court of Justice.  
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
z. Diplomacy (negotiations between leaders) 
and nonviolent methods can always work to 
solve international disputes. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
aa. If the goal is peace, peaceful methods 
must be used because we can NOT separate 
the means (methods) from the ends (goals). 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
bb. Nonviolent methods can work to 
overthrow dictators. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
 
4 
cc. We should object to wars when nations 
try to seize territory or natural resources. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
dd. We should support disarmament efforts 
(efforts to reduce the number of weapons 
manufactured and held by militaries and 
armed groups around the world). 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
ee. The death penalty should be used for a 
person convicted of murder. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
ff. It is necessary to fight terrorism by 
military means (methods). 
 
1 2 3 4 
gg. It is sometimes necessary to use military 
force to maintain order in the world. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
hh. Now, please answer the last question (gg) 
the way you think most people in your 
nation would answer it. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
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11. Below, different opinions about violence and war are expressed by various leaders.  
Please circle your level of agreement or disagreement with each statement. [Form B] 
 
 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
1. "When war, as in these days in Iraq, threatens the 
fate of humanity, it is ever more urgent to proclaim 
that only peace is the road to follow to construct a 
more just and united society. Violence and arms can 
never resolve the problems of man." - Pope John Paul 
II (2003)  
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
2. “Any human order to kill must be subordinate to 
the law of God which says, ‘Thou shalt not kill.’ No 
soldier is obliged to obey an order contrary to the law 
of God.” – Archbishop Oscar Romero (El Salvador, 
1980)  
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
3. “People who dismiss the concepts of dialogue, 
diplomacy, and negotiation as a waste of time are the 
biggest challenge to people who work for peace… I 
do believe that the U.S. tends to resort to military 
force too quickly.” - Oscar Arias Sánchez, Costa 
Rican President (2005)  
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
4. “With popular, non-violent mobilization, always 
committed to non-violence, that's when lots of good 
ideas and proposals begin to emerge from below (the 
people).” – Subcomandante Marcos of the Zapatistas 
(Chiapas, Mexico, 2006) 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
5. “We consider it unethical to approve of any 
measures to secure the victory of a revolution. We do 
NOT believe that the end (goal) justifies the means 
(method).” – Subcomandante Marcos (Chiapas 2001) 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
6. “The first task for any new politics is to recognize 
that there are differences between us all and that in 
light of this, we [should] aspire to a politics of 
tolerance and inclusion.” - Subcomandante Marcos 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
7. "It is a cowardly thought, that of killing others. 
Whom do you suppose to free by 
assassination?...Those who will rise to power by 
murder will certainly not make the nation happy." – 
Gandhi (1922) 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
8. "Violence never brings permanent peace. It solves 
no social problem: it merely creates new and more 
complicated ones." – Martin Luther King, Jr. (U.S.) in 
his 1964 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
9. “The non-violence practiced by men like Gandhi 
and King may not have been practical or possible in 
every circumstance.” - U.S. President Barack Obama 
in his 2009 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
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10. “There will be times when nations…will find the 
use of [military] force not only necessary but morally 
justified.”    - U.S. President Barack Obama in his 
2009 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech  
Strongly 
agree 
1 
Agree 
 
2 
Disagree 
 
3 
Strongly 
disagree 
4 
11. “Violence is not the monopoly of the exploiters 
and as such the exploited can use it too and, 
moreover, ought to use it when the moment arrives.” 
– Che Guevera (1963)  
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
12. “Our soldiers must have a relentless hatred of the 
enemy; a people without hatred cannot vanquish a 
brutal enemy.” – Che Geuvera (1967)  
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
13. “War [that involves] the violent destruction of an 
oppressive and inhuman regime, is more than justified 
if its aim is the creation of a society where men live in 
peace with each other.” - Father Ernesto Cardenal 
(Nicaragua, 1981) 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
 
Note: The order of questions in Q12/ Form A (pro-violent quotes appear first) differed as 
detailed in the table below. 
Coding Table. Order of questions in Form A (pro-violent quotes appear first) and Form B 
(nonviolent quotes appear first), with top row appearing first and bottom row appearing last. 
Order of 
quotes in 
Form A 
Quote Order of 
quotes in 
Form B 
Q12_1 Che: violence monopoly Q11_11 
Q12_2 Che: hatred Q11_12 
Q12_3 Obama: There will be times when military force morally 
justified 
Q11_10 
Q12_4 Obama: nonviolence of Gandhi and King not practical Q11_9 
Q12_5 Father Ernesto Cardenal: justified war Q11_13 
Q12_6 King: violence never brings permanent peace Q11_8 
Q12_7 Gandhi: killing is cowardly Q11_7 
Q12_8 Oscar Arias: diplomacy Q11_3 
Q12_9 Papa Juan Pablo II: violence can never resolve problems Q11_1 
Q12_10 Romero: Thou shalt not kill Q11_2 
Q12_11 Marcos: non-violent mobilization Q11_4 
Q12_12 Marcos: end does not justify the means Q11_5 
Q12_13 Marcos: tolerance and inclusion Q11_6 
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8. Here we briefly describe some people. Please read each description and think about how 
much each person is or is not like you. Circle the answer that shows much the person in the 
description is like you. 
HOW MUCH LIKE YOU IS THIS 
PERSON? 
Very 
much 
like 
me 
Like 
me 
Some-
what 
like 
me 
A little 
like 
me 
Not 
like 
me 
Not 
like 
me at 
all 
a. Thinking up new ideas and being 
creative is important to him. He likes to do 
things in his own original way. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
b. It is important to him to be rich. He 
wants to have a lot of money and 
expensive things.  
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
c. He thinks it is important that every 
person in the world be treated equally. He 
believes everyone should have equal 
opportunities in life. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
d. It’s important to him to show his 
abilities. He wants people to admire what 
he does. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
e. It is important to him to live in secure 
surroundings. He avoids anything that 
might endanger his safety.  
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
f. He likes surprises and is always looking 
for new things to do. He thinks it is 
important to do lots of different things in 
life.  
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
g. He believes that people should do what 
they’re told. He thinks people should 
follow rules at all times, even when no-one 
is watching. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
h. It is important to him to listen to people 
who are different from him. Even when he 
disagrees with them, he still wants to 
understand them. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
i. It is important to him to be humble and 
modest. He tries not to draw attention to 
himself. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
j. Having a good time is important to him. 
He likes to “treat” himself. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
k. It is important to him to make his own 
decisions about what he does. He likes to 
be free and not depend on others. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
l. It’s very important to him to help the 
people around him. He wants to care for 
their well-being. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
m. Being very successful is important to 
him. He hopes people will recognize his 
achievements.  
 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
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HOW MUCH LIKE YOU IS THIS 
PERSON? 
Very 
much 
like 
me 
Like 
me 
Some
what 
like 
me 
A 
little 
like 
me 
Not 
like 
me 
Not 
like 
me at 
all 
n. It is important to him that the 
government ensure his safety against 
all threats. He wants the state to be 
strong so it can defend its citizens. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
o. He looks for adventures and likes to 
take risks. He wants to have an 
exciting life. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
6 
p. It is important to him always to 
behave properly. He wants to avoid 
doing anything people would say is 
wrong. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
q. It is important to him to get respect 
from others. He wants people to do 
what he says. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
r. It is important to him to be loyal to 
his friends. He wants to devote himself 
to people close to him. 
1 2 3 
 
4 5 6 
s. He strongly believes that people 
should care for nature. Looking after 
the environment is important to him. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
t. Tradition is important to him. He 
tries to follow the customs handed 
down by his religion or his family. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
u. He seeks every chance he can to 
have fun. It is important to him to do 
things that give him pleasure. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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9. Please consider some different forms of political action that people can take, and check 
whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it, or would 
never (under any circumstances) do it.  Please put a check √ in the boxes of your choices. 
          Have done      Might do   Would  
          never do 
 
a. Signing a petition     □  □  □ 
 
b. Joining in boycotts     □  □  □ 
 
c. Attending lawful demonstrations    □  □  □ 
 
d. Joining unofficial strikes    □  □  □ 
 
e. Occupying buildings or factories, or barricading □  □  □ 
     streets 
f. Damaging things like breaking windows,  □  □  □ 
    removing road signs, etc. 
 
g. Use personal violence like fighting with other  □  □  □ 
    demonstrators or the police 
 
h. An anti-war demonstration    □  □  □ 
 
i. A school related demonstration   □  □  □ 
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10. Below are statements of opinion on a variety of social issues. You will probably find that 
you feel positively towards some statements and negatively towards others, to varying 
extents. Please circle the term that matches your feeling (negative, neutral, or positive) 
about each statement. 
 
 very 
negative 
negative slightly 
negative 
neutral slightly 
positive 
positive very 
positive 
a. Some groups 
of people are 
simply inferior 
to other 
groups. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
b. It’s OK if 
some groups 
have more of a 
chance in life 
than others. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
c. To get ahead 
in life, it is 
sometimes 
necessary to 
step on other 
groups. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
d. Inferior 
groups should 
stay in their 
place. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e. Group 
equality should 
be our ideal. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
f. We should do 
what we can to 
equalize 
conditions for 
different 
groups. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
g. Increased 
social equality. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
h. We would 
have fewer 
problems if we 
treated people 
more equally. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
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To conclude, please answer the following questions about you.  Place a check √ by your 
answer. 
 
11. Sex:  □ Male □ Female 
12. How old are you? Age:  
□ 18-29  
□ 30-39  
□ 40-49  
□ 50-59  
□ 60-69 
□ 70-79 
□ 80 or over 
 
13. People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle 
class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the: 
□ Upper class 
□ Upper middle class 
□ Lower middle class 
□ Working class 
□ Lower class 
□ Don´t know 
 
14. Have you ever been in the military?:  □ Yes □ No 
 
15. In political matters, people talk of the “left” (liberal) and the “right” (conservative). 
How 
would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking? 
□ Far left (very liberal) 
□ Left (liberal) 
□ Moderate 
□ Right (conservative) 
□ Far right (very conservative) 
□ Don’t know 
 
16. How interested would you say you are in politics? 
□ Very interested 
□ Somewhat interested 
□ Not very interested 
□ Not at all interested 
 
17. Do you belong to a religious denomination?  
□ Yes  □ No 
 
18. In case you do belong to a religious denomination, answer which one.  
□ Catholic 
□ Evangelical 
□ Other:______________ 
□ None
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19. Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend 
religious services these days? 
□ More than once a week 
□ Once a week 
□ Once a month 
□ Only on special holy days/Christmas/Easter days 
□ Other specific holy days 
□ Once a year 
□ Less often 
□ Never practically never 
 
20. How proud are you to be Costa Rican? 
□ Very proud 
□ Quite proud 
□ Not very proud 
□ Not at all proud 
 
21. Translator mistake, the question read: Have you been beaten or hit, or have you hit 
someone at some time in your life? [Translator mistake – the question was supposed to read: 
Have you ever been punched or beaten by another person?] 
□ No            GO TO QUESTION 22 
□ Yes 
 
IF YES: 
A. Did this happen to you as a child or as an adult? 
□ Child 
□ Adult 
□ Both 
 
B. How many times would you guess this has happened to you? 
□ Once 
□ Two or three times 
□ Four or more times 
□ Not sure 
 
22. Below are 5 questions that test your knowledge of history. You may find that you do not 
know the answers to some or most of them. Please write in your responses if you know the 
answers, or if you think you know part of the answer. If you do not know please check 
“Don’t know.”  
a. Can you name some nations that supported the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq (in 2003) by 
sending soldiers from their own military forces?  
□ Yes, some of the nations 
were:__________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________  
□ Don’t know  
b. Che Guevera was part of armed revolutionary groups in several nations, can you name 
some or all of them?  
□ Yes, the nations 
were:__________________________________________________________________________  
□ Don’t know  
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c. Gandhi was a leader of nonviolent protest movements that achieved some degree of 
success in two different nations (on two different continents). Can you name these two 
nations that he personally lived in and led nonviolent protest movements in?  
□ Yes, the nations were:________________________________________________________  
□ Don’t know  
 
d. Can you explain what Gandhi’s concept of satyagraha means?  
□ Yes, it means:______________________________________________________________ 
□ Don’t know  
 
e. Can you name nations that have had successful, or somewhat successful, nonviolent 
revolutions in the 20th and 21st centuries (from 1900 through to this year in 2010)? (Please 
name as many as you can remember.)  
□ Yes, these nations include:_____________________________________________________  
____________________________________________________________________________ 
□ Don’t know  
 
23. Which political party do you tend to vote for?_________________________________ 
 
24. Can you please list about 2 to 5 heroes of your nation’s history that you admire and 
respect the most?_________________________  
 
25. Do you think Costa Rica should bring back a national military force? 
□ Yes 
□ No  
□ Maybe 
□ Don’t know 
 
26. What is your race/ ethnicity?  
□ Mestizo  
□ White  
□ Black/ Afro-Caribbean  
□ Amerindian  
□ Chinese  
□ Other:___________________  
 
27. What nation were your parents born in Costa Rica?  □ Yes   □ No  
If no, where were they born? ________________________________ 
 
28.  If you have any comments about the survey, please write them here: 
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APPENDIX C 
 
COSTA RICA SURVEY IN SPANISH 
 
Encuesta de opinión  
 
Esta encuesta ha sido elaborada por Matthew Eddy, un estudiante graduado en sociología de la 
Universidad de Oregon (Estados Unidos).  Se requieren unos 30 minutos para completar esta 
encuesta.  
 
 Esta encuesta de opinión es confidencial.  Si elige participar, su nombre nunca aparecerá en 
cualquier informe o publicación de este estudio.  Por favor no coloque su nombre en ella.    
 
 El propósito de esta encuesta es recopilar opiniones relacionadas a las personas y conflictos 
sociales, la violencia y la no violencia, la guerra y la paz, acciones políticas y militares.  La 
mayoría de las preguntas en esta encuesta se les hecho a personas en todo el mundo, ya que los 
investigadores buscan entender cómo la gente piensa y siente acerca de estos problemas.   
 
Su participación es voluntaria, usted debe sentirse libre de negarse a participar.  No hay ningún 
beneficio personal inmediato por la participación.  Sin embargo, su participación ayudará a los 
investigadores comprender mejor las opiniones públicas sobre el conflicto y resolución de 
conflictos.        
 
Si acepta participar – por favor, continúe leyendo: 
 
Por la presente doy mi consentimiento de  participar en este estudio dirigido por Matthew Eddy, 
un estudiante graduado en sociología de la Universidad de Oregon (Estados Unidos).  
 
Al responder a las siguientes preguntas del cuestionario, reconozco que estoy dando mi 
consentimiento para participar. Yo certifico que tengo por lo menos 18 años de edad y que estoy 
de acuerdo en participar en este proyecto de investigación.  
 
 Entiendo que mi participación es voluntaria; que no tengo que responder a cualquier pregunta, y 
que soy libre de retirarme de la participación en esta encuesta en cualquier momento.  Entiendo 
que yo puedo omitir cualquier pregunta o preguntas con las que me sienta incómodo.  
 
También entiendo que elegir participar o que retirarme mi participación en esta encuesta no 
impactará de ninguna forma mi relación con esta Universidad, cualquier profesor o el 
investigador.   
 
Si yo tengo cualquier pregunta acerca de este proyecto de investigación, yo puedo contactar a 
Matthew Eddy por el número de teléfono siguiente (541) 579-1591, o a través de su correo 
electrónico: meddy@uoregon.edu.  También puedo contactar al consejero, el profesor Michael 
Dreiling a través de su correo electrónico: dreiling@uoregon.edu. También puedo contactar a la 
Oficina para la protección de sujetos humanos en la Universidad de Oregon, Eugene, Oregon 
(Estados Unidos) 97403, por el número de teléfono (541) 346-2510, o a través del correo 
electrónico: human_subjects@orc.uoregon.edu, si tengo preguntas sobre mis derechos como un 
sujeto de investigación.     
 
[code: CR_M_NV]  [Note: Costa Rica (“CR”) Survey for Males (“M”) (for gender-specific 
Schwartz Values section), Form B (with nonviolent (“NV”) quotes appearing first)] 
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Instrucciones: Por favor NO coloque su nombre en esta encuesta.   Si NO sabe su respuesta 
a una de las  preguntas, puede pasar a la próxima pregunta y dejarla sin contestar.   Por 
favor, haga un círculo en la respuesta que coincida con su opinión para cada pregunta a 
continuación.   
1. Algunas personas piensan que a veces se justifica que los militares busquen sus objetivos 
civiles y los maten, mientras que otros piensan que ese tipo de violencia nunca está 
justificada. ¿Cuál es su opinión? 
(Civiles: Hombres, mujeres o niños desarmados que no participan en ningún conflicto 
violento) 
 Nunca se justifica                     A veces se justifica.  
 1    2 
 
2. Algunas personas piensan que para una persona individual (civil) o un pequeño grupo de 
personas busquen sus objetivos civiles y los maten, es algo justificado, mientras que otros 
piensan que ese tipo de violencia nunca está justificada. ¿Cuál es su opinión?  
 Nunca se justifica                     A veces se justifica.  
 1    2 
 
      3.  Algunas personas creen que los grupos que son oprimidos y están sufriendo injusticias pueden 
mejorar su      situación por medios solamente pacíficos (métodos de resistencia no violentos).  
Otros NO creen que solamente los medios pacíficos funcionarán para mejorar la situación de 
esos grupos oprimidos.  ¿Qué cree usted, que únicamente los medios pacíficos funcionarán o 
que los medios pacíficos por sí solos no funcionarán?  
             Funcionarán                  No funcionarán 
  1    2 
 
4. A continuación hay conflictos en los que dos hombres adultos que no se conocen podrían 
participar en una pelea a puñetazos.  Díganos si aprobaría el uso de puñetazos en 
cada una de las siguientes situaciones.  
a. ¿Aprobaría usted que un hombre de puñetazos a otro hombre extraño adulto quien estaba 
borracho y choca con el hombre y su esposa en la calle?  
               □ Sí                               □ No  
b. ¿Aprobaría usted que un hombre de puñetazos a otro hombre extraño adulto que había 
golpeado al hijo del hombre después de que el niño había dañado accidentalmente el 
carro del extraño?  
               □ Sí                                □ No 
 c. ¿Aprobaría usted que un hombre de puñetazos a otro hombre extraño adulto que se había 
metido en casa del hombre?   
               □ Sí                                □ No 
d. ¿Aprobaría usted que un policía de puñetazos a un ciudadano (hombre) adulto quien le dijo 
cosas vulgares y obscenas al policía?  
    □ Sí                                □ No 
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5. A continuación, se describen varias acciones.  Díganos si usted piensa que la acción 
siempre se puede   justificar, nunca se puede justificar, o algo entre las dos.  Por favor, 
circule el número que coincida con su opinión:         
   
a. Que un hombre le de golpes a 
su esposa 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
b. Asesinatos políticos 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
c. El uso de la tortura con los 
sospechosos de terrorismo para 
obtener información importante 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
d. Que la policía golpee a un 
grupo de personas que protestan 
pacíficamente y se rehúsan a 
dejar las calles 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
e. Matar en defensa propia 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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6. Está usted totalmente de acuerdo, de acuerdo, en desacuerdo o totalmente en desacuerdo 
con las siguientes frases (circule su respuesta) acerca del castigo, la violencia, la no 
violencia, ejércitos y la guerra:  
  Totalmente 
de acuerdo  
De 
acuerdo  
En 
desacuerdo  
Totalmente 
en 
desacuerdo  
a. Una persona tiene el derecho de matar para 
defender a su familia.  
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
b. Una persona tiene el derecho de matar para 
defender su propiedad.  
1 2 3 4 
c. Hay situaciones en las se le justifica a una 
mujer que le dé una cachetada (golpe con la 
mano abierta) a su marido en la cara.  
1 2 3 4 
d. Existen situaciones en las que se le justifica a 
un hombre que le dé una cachetada (golpe con 
la mano abierta) a su esposa en la cara.  
1 2 3 4 
e. Castigos corporales (le dé golpes) si es 
necesario para criar a los niños correctamente.  
1 2 3 4 
f. La disciplina militar desarrolla un buen 
carácter en los jóvenes. 
1 2 3 4 
g. La guerra saca las mejores cualidades de los 
hombres.  
1 2 3 4 
h. Muchos de los más grandes héroes de 
nuestra nación son militares.                                                                                                     
  
1
  
2
  
3 
  
4 
i. Cuando la gente sufre bajo un dictador, la 
revolución violenta es necesaria y justificada.  
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
j. El uso de la violencia para conseguir 
objetivos políticos NUNCA se justifica.  
 
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
k. La guerra genera una falta de respeto por la 
vida humana.  
1 2 3 4 
l. Es mejor perdonar a tus enemigos y trabajar 
por la paz con justicia que ser un buen soldado.  
1 2 3 4 
m. Es mejor desobedecer las órdenes y pensar 
por sí mismo, que ser un buen soldado.  
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
n. La disciplina militar lastima el autoestima y 
la individualidad.  
1 2 3 4 
o. No hay nada malo con apoderarse de 
territorio o de los recursos naturales a través de 
la guerra debido a que las Naciones deben 
proteger sus propios intereses y su seguridad 
económica.  
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
p. Cuando la meta es la libertad de la tiranía o 
la opresión, la guerra puede ser necesaria y 
justificada. 
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
q. Porque la libertad y la justicia pueden ser 
más importantes que la paz, la guerra puede 
ser necesaria y aunque lamentable, es el menor 
de dos males. 
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
r. La diplomacia (negociaciones entre líderes) a 
menudo falla y la guerra entre las Naciones se 
convierte en necesaria.  
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
s. El mandamiento bíblico contra el asesinato 
no se aplican a la guerra. 
 
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
 
701 
 
 
  
 
Totalmente 
de acuerdo  
De 
acuerdo  
En 
desacuerdo 
Totalmente 
en 
desacuerdo  
t. NO existe justificación concebible para la 
guerra.  
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
u. Los males de la guerra son mayores que los 
posibles beneficios.  
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
v. Es un deber moral de la persona negarse a 
participar de alguna manera en cualquier 
guerra, no importa qué la causa.  
  
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
w. Nosotros debemos honrar a los héroes de la 
no violencia más que aquellos que utilizan la 
violencia.  
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
x. En las Naciones al borde de la guerra civil, 
los movimientos pacíficos tienden a tener más 
éxito en el aumento de la paz a largo plazo y la 
justicia que el uso de la violencia.  
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
y.  Si los conflictos armados entre los individuos 
y las ciudades pueden ser evitados, es posible 
evitar el conflicto armado entre las Naciones – 
quizás a través de las Naciones Unidas y la 
Corte Internacional de justicia.  
  
  
1 
  
  
2 
  
  
3 
  
  
4 
z. La diplomacia (negociaciones entre líderes) y 
los métodos no violentas siempre pueden 
trabajar para resolver las controversias 
internacionales.  
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
aa. Si la meta es la paz, se deben utilizar 
métodos pacíficos, porque NO podemos separar 
el significado de (métodos) de las (metas).  
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
bb. Los métodos de resistencia no violentos 
pueden funcionar para derrocar a los 
dictadores.  
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
  
4 
cc. Nos deberíamos oponernos a las guerras, 
cuándo las naciones intentan aprovechar el 
territorio o los recursos naturales.   
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
dd. Nosotros debemos apoyar los esfuerzos de 
desarme (esfuerzos para reducir la fabricación 
de armas y obtenidas por los ejércitos y grupos 
armados alrededor del mundo).  
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
ee. Debe utilizarse la pena de muerte para una 
persona declarada culpable de asesinato.  
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
ff. Es necesario combatir contra el terrorismo 
con medios militares (métodos).  
1 2 3 4 
gg. Algunas veces es necesario utilizar la fuerza 
militar para mantener el orden en el mundo.  
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
hh. Ahora, por favor responda la última 
pregunta (gg) de la forma en que piensa que la 
mayoría de la gente en su nación respondería.  
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
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7. A continuación, diferentes opiniones sobre la violencia y la guerra son expresadas por 
varios líderes. Por favor, circule el número según su nivel de estar de acuerdo o en 
desacuerdo con cada frase.  
  Totalmente 
de acuerdo  
De 
acuerdo  
En 
desacuerdo  
Totalmente 
en 
desacuerdo  
a. “Cuando la guerra, como en estos días en 
Irak, amenaza el destino de la humanidad, es 
cada vez más urgente proclamar que sólo la 
paz es el camino a seguir para construir una 
sociedad más justa y solidaria. La violencia y 
las armas no pueden nunca resolver los 
problemas del hombre”- Papa Juan Pablo II 
(2003)  
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
b. “Cualquier orden para matar a un humano 
debe ser subordinada a la Ley de Dios que 
dice, ‘No mataras.’ Ningún soldado está 
obligado a obedecer una orden contraria a la 
Ley de Dios.”– Arzobispo Oscar Romero (El 
Salvador, 1980) 
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
c. “Las personas que piensan que los conceptos 
de diálogo, diplomacia y  negociación son 
como un desperdicio de tiempo son el mayor 
desafío para las personas que trabajan por la 
paz… Yo creo que los Estados Unidos tiende a 
recurrir a la fuerza militar demasiado rápido."- 
Oscar Arias Sánchez, Ex presidente de Costa 
Rica (2005) 
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
d. “Con la movilización popular no violenta, 
siempre comprometida con la no violencia, que 
es cuando muchas buenas ideas y propuestas 
comienzan a surgir desde abajo (del pueblo).” 
– Subcomandante Marcos de los Zapatistas 
(Chiapas, México, 2006)  
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
e. “Nos parece poco ético aprobar las medidas 
para asegurar la victoria de una revolución. 
Nosotros  NO creemos que el fin (la meta) 
justifica los medios (los método).” – 
Subcomandante Marcos (Chiapas 2001)  
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
f.  “La primera tarea de cualquier nueva 
política es reconocer que existen diferencias 
entre nosotros todos y que la luz de esto, 
[debería] aspirar a una política de la tolerancia 
e inclusión." - Subcomandante Marcos  
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
g. “Es un pensamiento cobarde, el de matar a 
otros. ¿A los que se supone que usted liberará 
por asesinato?... Quienes crecen en el poder 
por asesinato, desde luego, no hará a la nación 
feliz.”  – Gandhi (1922)  
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
h. “La violencia nunca trae paz permanente. 
No soluciona ningún problema social: 
simplemente crea nuevos y más complicados. 
"-Martin Luther King, Jr. (Estados Unidos) en 
su discurso de aceptación del Premio Nobel de 
la paz de 1964  
  
  
1 
  
  
2 
  
  
3 
  
  
4 
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i. “La no violencia practicada por hombres 
como Gandhi y Martin Luther King, pueden no 
haber sido prácticas o posible en cada 
circunstancia.” – Barack Obama, Presidente de 
Estados Unidos en su discurso de aceptación 
del Premio Nobel de la paz de 2009    
Totalmente 
de acuerdo 
  
1 
De 
acuerdo 
  
2 
En 
desacuerdo 
  
3 
Totalmente 
en 
desacuerdo  
4 
j. “Habrán momentos cuando las naciones… 
encontrarán el uso de la fuerza [militar] no 
solamente necesaria pero moralmente 
justificada." - Barack Obama, Presidente de 
Estados Unidos en su discurso de aceptación 
del Premio Nobel de la paz de 2009 
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
 k. “La violencia no es el monopolio de los 
explotadores y como tal los explotados pueden 
utilizarla y, por otra parte, deberían utilizarla 
cuando llegue el momento." – Che Guevara 
(1963) 
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
l. “Nuestros soldados deben tener un odio 
implacable al enemigo; un pueblo sin odio no 
puede derrotar un enemigo brutal.” –  Che 
Guevara (1967)  
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
m. “La guerra [que involucra] la destrucción 
violenta de un régimen opresivo e inhumano, 
está más que justificada si su objetivo es la 
creación de una sociedad donde los hombres 
viven en paz entre sí."-Padre Ernesto Cardenal 
(Nicaragua, 1981) 
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
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8. A continuación se presenta una breve descripción de algunos tipos de personas. Por favor lea cada 
descripción y piense en cuánto cada una de estos tipos de personas es o no es igual que usted. Circule 
la respuesta que muestra qué tanto la persona en la descripción es igual que usted.  
¿QUÉ TANTO ES COMO 
USTED ES ESTA PERSONA?  
Se parece 
mucho a 
mí  
Se 
parece a 
mí  
Se 
parece 
algo a 
mí 
Se parece 
un poco a 
mí 
No se 
parece a 
mí 
No se 
parece 
nada a mí 
a. Tener nuevas ideas y ser 
creativo son importante para 
él. Le gusta hacer las cosas a su 
manera.  
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
  
5 
  
6 
b. Es importante para él ser 
rico. Él quiere tener mucho 
dinero y cosas caras.  
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
  
5 
  
6 
c. Piensa que es importante que 
todo el mundo sea tratado de la 
misma manera. Él cree que 
todos deben tener igual 
oportunidades en la vida.  
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
  
5 
  
6 
d. Para él es importante 
mostrar sus habilidades. Él 
quiere que gente admire lo que 
él hace.  
 
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
  
5 
  
6 
e. Para él es importante vivir en 
un entorno seguro. Él evita 
cualquier cosa que pueda poner 
en peligro su seguridad.  
  
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
  
5 
  
6 
f. Le gustan las sorpresas y está 
siempre buscando hacer nuevas 
cosas. Piensa que es importante 
hacer muchas cosas diferentes 
en la vida.  
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
  
5 
  
6 
g. Él cree que las personas 
deberían hacer lo que se les 
manda. Cree que debería 
obedecerlas normas siempre 
aunque nadie les vea. 
 
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
  
5 
  
6 
 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
h. Para él es importante 
escuchar a las personas que son 
diferentes a él. Aunque no esté 
de acuerdo con ellos, él aún 
quiere entenderlos. 
  
 
 
1  
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
 
6 
 i. Para él es importante ser 
humilde y modesto. No intenta 
llamar la atención. 
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
  
5 
  
6 
 j. Para él es importante 
divertirse. Le gusta "darse" 
caprichos. 
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
  
5 
  
6 
 k. Para él es importante tomar 
sus propias decisiones sobre lo 
qué hace. Le gusta ser libre y 
no depender de los demás. 
  
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
  
5 
  
6 
 l. Para él es muy importante 
ayudar a la gente a su 
alrededor. Él quiere cuidar del 
bienestar de otros. 
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
  
5 
  
6 
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 ¿QUÉ TANTO ES COMO 
USTED ES ESTA PERSONA? 
 Se parece 
mucho a 
mí 
 Se 
parece a 
mí 
Se 
parece 
algo a 
mí 
Se parece 
un poco a 
mí 
No se 
parece a 
mí 
No se 
parece 
nada a 
mí 
m. Para él es importante tener 
éxito. Él espera que la gente 
reconozca sus logros.  
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
  
5 
  
6 
 
n. Para él es importante que el 
Gobierno garantice su 
seguridad contra todo tipo de 
amenazas. Él quiere que el 
estado sea fuerte, para que 
pueda defender a sus 
ciudadanos.  
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
  
5 
  
6 
o. Él busca aventuras y le gusta 
tomar riesgos. Él quiere tener 
una vida emocionante.  
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
  
5 
  
6 
p. Para él es importante 
siempre comportarse. Él quiere 
evitar hacer cualquier cosa que 
la gente diría que es un error.  
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
  
5 
  
6 
q. Para él es importante 
hacerse respetar de los demás. 
Él quiere que las personas 
hagan lo que él dice.  
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
  
5 
  
6 
r. Para él es importante ser fiel 
a sus amigos. Él quiere 
dedicarse a personas cercanas a 
él.  
1 2 3 
  
4 5 6 
s. Él cree firmemente que las 
personas deben cuidar de la 
naturaleza. Cuidar el medio 
ambiente es importante para él.  
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
  
4 
  
5 
  
6 
t. Para él las tradiciones son 
importantes. Él intenta seguir 
las costumbres dictadas por su 
religión o su familia.  
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
  
5 
  
6 
u. Busca cualquier ocasión 
para divertirse. Es importante 
para él hacer cosas que le den 
placer.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
  
9. Por favor considere algunas formas diferentes de acción política que las personas pueden tomar y quiero que 
me diga si realmente ha hecho cualquiera de estas cosas, si podría hacerlo, o nunca lo haría (bajo ninguna 
circunstancia). Por favor ponga una marca de verificación √ en los cuadros de su elección.  
                                                                        Lo ha hecho     Podría hacerlo      Nunca lo haría  
 a. Firmar una petición                                                   □                        □                              □  
b. Solidarizarse con boicots                                           □                         □                              □    
c. Participar en manifestaciones legales                        □                        □                               □  
d Solidarizarse con huelgas no oficiales                        □                        □                               □  
e. Ocupación  de edificios, fábricas o barricadas  
    en la calle.                                                                   □                        □                               □ 
 f.  Dañar cosas como romper ventanas,                         □                         □                              □ 
    tumbando la señalización vial, etc..  
 g. Utilizar violencia personal al enfrentar                      □                        □                              □ 
    a otros manifestantes o a la policía  
h. Manifestación contra la guerra                                   □                         □                              □ 
 i. Una manifestación relacionada con una escuela        □                         □                               □  
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10. A continuación se presentan las frases de opinión sobre una variedad de asuntos 
sociales. Probablemente encontrará que usted se siente positivamente hacia algunas frases y 
negativamente hacia otras, en diversos grados. Por favor, circule el número en la frase que 
coincida con su sentimiento (negativo, neutral o positivo) acerca de cada frase.  
  
  Muy 
negativo  
Nega-
tivo  
Ligera-
mente 
negativo  
Neutral  Ligera-
mente 
positivo  
Positivo  Muy 
positivo  
a. Algunos grupos 
de personas son 
simplemente 
inferiores a otros 
grupos.  
  
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
  
5 
  
6 
  
7 
b. Está bien si 
algunos grupos 
tienen más de una 
oportunidad en la 
vida que otros.  
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
  
5 
  
6 
  
7 
c. Para salir 
adelante en la 
vida, a veces es 
necesario pasar 
por encima de 
otros grupos.  
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
  
5 
  
6 
  
7 
d. Los grupos 
inferiores deben 
permanecer en su 
lugar.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e. El grupo de 
igualdad debe ser 
nuestro ideal.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
f. Debemos hacer 
todo lo posible 
para igualar las 
condiciones para 
los diferentes 
grupos.  
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
  
5 
  
6 
  
7 
g. Mayor igualdad 
social.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
h. Tendríamos 
menos problemas 
si tratáramos a 
personas con más 
igualdad.  
  
  
1 
  
2 
  
3 
  
4 
  
5 
  
6 
  
7 
  
 Para concluir, por favor, conteste las siguientes preguntas acerca de usted. Coloque un 
marca √ de verificación para su respuesta.  
 
11. Sexo: □ Masculino □ Femenino  
 
12. Edad: ¿Cuántos años tiene?  
            □ 18-29   □ 30-39   □ 40-49    □ 50-59  
            □ 60-69   □ 70-79   □ 80 o más  
 
 
707 
 
13. Las personas a veces se describen a sí mismas como pertenecientes a la clase 
trabajadora, la clase media, la clase alta o clase de baja. Se describiría usted mismo como 
pertenecientes a la:  
                     □ Clase alta 
                     □ Clase media alta 
                     □ Clase media baja  
                     □ Clase trabajadora  
                     □ Clase baja  
                     □ No sabe  
14. ¿Ha estado alguna vez en el ejército?:           □ Sí                 □ No  
15. En los asuntos políticos, la gente habla de la "izquierda" (liberal) y la "derecha" 
(conservador). ¿Cómo colocaría sus opiniones sobre esta escala, en términos generales?  
                      □ Extrema izquierda (muy liberal)  
                      □ Izquierda (liberal)  
                      □ Moderado  
                      □ Derecha (conservador)  
                      □ Extrema derecha (muy conservador)  
                      □ No sabe  
16. ¿Qué tan interesado diría que está usted en la política?  
                      □ Muy interesado  
                      □ Algo interesado  
                      □ No muy interesado  
                      □ Para nada  interesados  
17. ¿Pertenece a un grupo religioso?  
                   □ Sí          □ No  
18. En el caso de que usted pertenezca a un grupo religioso, responda a cuál de ellos.  
                     □ Católico  
                     □ Evangélico  
                     □ Otro: ______________  
                     □ Ninguno  
 19. Además de bodas, funerales y bautizos, ¿con qué frecuencia asiste a los servicios 
religiosos estos días?  
                     □ Más de una vez por semana  
                     □ Una vez a la semana  
                     □ Una vez al mes  
                     □ Sólo en los días de festividades, Navidad y Pascua  
                     □ Otros días específicos de festividades 
                     □ Una vez al año  
                     □ Menos frecuente  
                     □ Nunca o Nunca prácticamente  
 
20. ¿Qué tan orgullosos se siente de ser [nacionalidad]?  
                     □ Muy orgulloso  
                     □ Algo orgulloso  
                     □ No muy orgulloso  
                     □ Para nada orgulloso  
  
21.a. ¿Ha sido golpeado o ha golpeado a otra persona alguna vez en su vida?  
                     □ No        → VAYA a la  pregunta 22  
                  □  Sí        ↓ 
                                   Si sí: 
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b. ¿Esto le sucedió a usted cuando era niño o adulto?  
                     □  Niño  
                     □  Adultos  
                     □  Ambos  
c. ¿Cuántas veces le ha sucedido esto a usted?  
                      □  Una vez  
                      □  Dos o tres veces  
                      □  Cuatro o más veces  
                      □  No estoy seguro  
22. A continuación tenemos 5 preguntas que evaluaran su conocimiento en historia. Tal vez 
se dé cuenta de que no sabe las respuestas  para algunas o todas estas preguntas. Por favor 
escriba si sabe la respuesta, o si usted piensa que sabe parte de la respuesta. Y si no sabe la 
respuesta por favor coloque una marca en “No sé la respuesta.” 
 
a. ¿Puede nombrar algunas naciones que apoyaron a los Estados Unidos en la invasión de 
Irak (en el 2003)  al mandar soldados de sus fuerzas militares?  
□ Sí, Algunas de las naciones fueron: 
_____________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________ 
□ No sé la respuesta. 
b. ¿El Che Guevara fue parte de unos grupos  armados revolucionarios en algunas 
naciones, puede nombrar alguno de estos grupos o todos ellos? 
□ Sí, Algunas de los grupos fueron: 
________________________________________________________ 
□ No sé la respuesta. 
c. Gandhi fue un líder de movimientos de resistencia no violentos que alcanzaron algunos 
grandes logros en dos naciones diferentes (en dos continentes diferentes). ¿Puede nombrar 
estas dos naciones en las que él personalmente vivió y lidero los movimientos de resistencia 
no violentos? 
□ Sí las naciones fueron: _____________________________________________________ 
□ No sé la respuesta. 
d. ¿Puede explicar qué significa el concepto satiagraja de Gandhi? 
□ Sí, sé que significa: 
__________________________________________________________________ 
□ No sé la respuesta. 
e. ¿Puede usted nombrar las naciones que han tenido movimientos revolucionarios pacíficos 
o de resistencia no violentos exitosos o algo exitosos en el siglo 20 y el siglo 21 (desde 1900 
hasta este año 2010)? (Por favor nombre tantos como pueda recordar.) 
□ Sí, estas naciones incluyen:_____________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
□ No sé la respuesta. 
23. ¿A favor de cuál partido político tiende a votar usted?: 
_____________________________  
24. ¿Puede nombrar de 2 a 5 héroes de la historia de su nación, a los que usted más admire  
y  respete?__________________________________________________________________ 
25. ¿Crees usted que Costa Rica debe tener nuevamente una fuerza militar nacional?  
                     □   Sí  
                     □   No  
                     □   Tal vez 
                     □   No sé  
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26. ¿Cuál es su raza o etnicidad? 
  □ Mestizo  
  □ Blanco/caucásico   
  □ Negro/Afro-Caribeño  
  □ Indígenas  especifique ____________________ 
  □ Chino  
  □ ¿Otra raza o etnicidad?:___________________  
   
27. ¿Nació usted o alguno de sus padres fuera de Costa Rica?        □ Sí     □ No  
 
    ¿Si sí, en dónde?  ____________________________________________ 
                                                                 
28. Si le gustaría escribir cualquier comentario sobre la encuesta, por favor hágalo aquí:  
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APPENDIX D  
 
VARIABLE CODING OF CORE VIOLENT/ NONVIOLENT  
INDICATORS AND QUESTION SOURCES 
 
Table 1. Core Questions: Categorizing Items by Violent/ Nonviolent Indicators 
 
Item (question) 
and category and/ 
or variable 
indicator 
Question - Below are questions in which 
“Disagree” (3) or “Strongly Disagree” (4) are 
the peaceful answers (these questions are 
positively worded for violent orientations) 
 
Costa Rica 
survey & 
UO survey 
variable 
name for 
this item 
Source of 
question 
(Author= 
question 
written by 
author) 
(a) self-defense 
(family)  
a. A person has the right to kill to defend his/ 
her family. 
Q9_1 McAlister et 
al. 1999, 2001 
(b) self-defense 
(property) 
b. A person has the right to kill to defend his/ 
her property. 
Q9_2 McAlister et 
al. 1999, 2001 
(c) domestic 
violence (F on M) 
c. There are situations in which a woman is 
justified in slapping her husband in the face. 
Q9_3 McAlister et 
al. 1999 
(d) domestic 
violence (M on F) 
d. There are situations in which a man is 
justified in slapping his wife in the face. 
Q9_4 McAlister et 
al. 1999 
(e) corporal 
punishment 
e. Corporal punishment (spanking) is necessary 
to bring up children properly. 
Q9_5 McAlister et 
al. 1999 
(f) militarism f. Military discipline develops good character 
in youth. 
Q9_6 my re-write of 
#1 in Droba 
1931 
(g) militarism g. War brings out the best qualities in men. Q9_7 from #1 in 
Gundlach in 
Stagner 1942 
(h) militarism h. Many of our nation's greatest heroes are 
soldiers. 
Q9_8 my re-write of 
#11 in 
Gundlach in 
Stagner 1942 
(i) just war i. When people suffer under a dictator, a 
violent revolution is necessary and justified. 
 
Q9_9 Author 
(o) realpolitiks o. There is nothing wrong with nations seizing 
territory or natural resources through war 
because nations should protect their own 
economic security and interests. 
Q9_15 Author 
(p) just war p. When the goal is liberation from tyranny or 
oppression, war can be necessary and justified. 
Q9_16 my re-wording 
of #41 from 
Droba 1931 
(q) just war q. Because freedom and justice may be more 
important than peace, war may be necessary 
and although regrettable, it is the lesser of two 
evils. 
 
Q9_17 my re-wording 
of #13 from 
Droba 1931 
(r) realpolitiks r. Diplomacy (negotiations between leaders) 
often fails and war between nations becomes 
necessary. 
 
Q9_18 Author 
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(s) Judeo-Christian 
sanction 
s. The Biblical command against killing does 
NOT apply to warfare. 
Q9_19 from #10 in 
Gundlach in 
Stagner 1942 
(ee) death penalty 
(myth of redemptive 
violence) 
ee. The death penalty should be used for a 
person convicted of murder. 
 
 
Q9_31 Slight revision 
of U.S. Gallup 
poll 
(ff) realpolitiks ff. It is necessary to fight terrorism by military 
means (methods). 
Q9_32 World Values 
Survey (asked 
only in 
Algeria) 
(gg) realpolitiks 
 
gg. It is sometimes necessary to use military 
force to maintain order in the world. 
[This question comes from the 2007 Pew 
Global Attitudes Survey, with a slight 
modification of the words used in the 4-point 
Likert scale (i.e., Pew used “completely agree, 
mostly agree, mostly disagree, or completely 
disagree”).] 
Q9_33 Q22g in Pew 
Global 
Attitudes 
Project survey 
2007 
OMIT ITEM BELOW from  some analyses – social desirability bias control [no alpha test on]: 
(hh) view of 
culture’s embrace of 
realpolitiks [no 
alpha test on] 
hh. Now, please answer the last question (gg) 
the way you think most people in your nation 
would answer it. 
Q9_34 Author 
Below are questions in which “Strongly Agree” (1) or “Agree” (2) are the peaceful answers (these 
questions are positively worded for agreement by nonviolent orientations). [QUESTIONS BELOW 
ARE REVERSE CODED, so that peaceful answers score and graph as “3”&“4”]  
(j) Principled 
nonviolence 
(adherents of 
militarism, 
realpolitiks, just 
war, and pragmatic 
nv will disagree) 
j. Using violence to pursue political goals is 
NEVER justified. 
Q9_10 slight revision 
of World 
Values Survey 
1995 
(k) Principled 
nonviolence/ against 
militarism 
k. War breeds disrespect for human life. Q9_11 from #26 in 
Gundlach in 
Stagner 1942 
(l) Principled 
nonviolence/ against 
militarism  
l. It is better to forgive your enemies and work 
for peace with justice than to be a good soldier. 
Q9_12 my revision of 
#4 in Hasan 
and Khan 
1988 
(m) Against 
militarism 
m. It is better to disobey orders and think for 
yourself than to be a good soldier. 
Q9_13 Author 
 
(n) Against 
militarism 
n. Military discipline injures self-respect and 
individuality. 
Q9_14 from #4 in 
Droba 1931 
(t) Principled 
nonviolence/ against 
just war 
t. There is NO conceivable justification for 
war. 
Q9_20 from #35 in 
Droba 1931 
(u) Principled 
nonviolence/ against 
just war 
u. The evils of war are greater than any 
possible benefits. 
Q9_21 from #24 in 
Gundlach in 
Stagner 1942 
(v) Principled 
nonviolence/ against 
just war 
v. It is the moral duty of the individual to 
refuse to participate in any way in any war, no 
matter what the cause. 
 
Q9_22 from #8 in 
Droba 1931 
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(w) Principled 
nonviolence/ against 
militarism 
 
w. We should honor the heroes of nonviolence 
more than those who used violence. 
Q9_23 my revision of 
question in 
Elliot 1980  
(x) Nonviolence x. In nations on the verge of civil war, 
nonviolent movements are likely to be more 
successful in increasing long-term peace and 
justice than using violence. 
 
Q9_24 Author 
(y) Principled 
nonviolence/ against 
realpolitiks 
y. If armed conflict between individuals and 
cities can be outlawed, it is possible to outlaw 
armed conflict between nations - perhaps 
through the United Nations and the 
International Court of Justice. 
 
Q9_25 my revision of 
#32 in Droba 
1931 
(z) Principled 
nonviolence/ against 
realpolitiks 
z. Diplomacy (negotiations between leaders) 
and nonviolent methods can always work to 
solve international disputes. 
Q9_26 Author 
(aa) Principled 
nonviolence 
aa. If the goal is peace, peaceful methods must 
be used because we can NOT separate the 
means (methods) from the ends (goals). 
Q9_27 Author 
(bb) Pragmatic 
nonviolence (key 
indicator 
distinguishing 
pragmatic nv from 
violent orientations) 
bb. Nonviolent methods can work to overthrow 
dictators. 
Q9_28 Author 
(cc) Against 
realpolitiks 
cc. We should object to wars when nations try 
to seize territory or natural resources. 
Q9_29 Author 
(dd) Against 
realpolitiks 
dd. We should support disarmament efforts 
(efforts to reduce the number of weapons 
manufactured and held by militaries and armed 
groups around the world). 
Q9_30 Author 
From questions earlier in survey: 
 
Just war Military targeting of civilians (question was 
dichotomous & neutrally worded) 
Q4 Gallup World 
Poll 
Just revolution (Just 
war)  
Targeting of civilians in terrorism (question 
was dichotomous & neutrally worded) 
Q5 Gallup World 
Poll 
Pragmatic 
nonviolence 
Do peaceful means alone work? (question was 
dichotomous & neutrally worded) 
Q6 Gallup World 
Poll 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
713 
 
APPENDIX E  
 
FACTOR ANALYSIS METHDOLOGY 
  
Costa Rica data – Principal Axis Exploratory Factor Analysis: Items Loading on Factors 
Notes: 3 factors were extracted; .3 was utilized as a cut off on item loadings; R = Reverse coded; 
Respondent answer choices on all items: 1=Strongly Agree; 2=Agree; 3=Disagree; 4=Strongly 
Disagree; With reverse coding, peaceful answers become coded “3” and “4” on all items. Below 
are the items loading on each factor and utilized in constructing indexes based on each factor. 
 
Table 1. Factor 1: Nonviolence 
Item category Item Question # 
(R = Reverse 
coded) 
1. Principled nonviolence: political 
violence never justified 
j. Using violence to pursue political goals is NEVER 
justified. 
Q9_10  R 
2. Principled nonviolence/ against 
militarism: war breeds disrespect for 
humanity 
k. War breeds disrespect for human life. Q9_11  R 
3. Principled nonviolence/ against 
militarism: better to forgive and work 
for peace than to be a soldier 
l. It is better to forgive your enemies and work for 
peace with justice than to be a good soldier. 
Q9_12  R 
4. Principled nonviolence/ against just 
war: no justification for war 
t. There is NO conceivable justification for war. Q9_20  R 
5. Principled nonviolence/ against just 
war: evils of war outweigh benefits 
u. The evils of war are greater than any possible 
benefits. 
Q9_21  R 
6. Principled nonviolence/ against just 
war: moral duty to refuse to participate 
in any war 
v. It is the moral duty of the individual to refuse to 
participate in any way in any war, no matter what 
the cause. 
Q9_22  R 
7. Principled nonviolence/ against 
militarism: we should honor 
nonviolent heroes more than violent 
w. We should honor the heroes of nonviolence more 
than those who used violence. 
Q9_23  R 
8. Nonviolence: nonviolent 
movements more successful 
x. In nations on the verge of civil war, nonviolent 
movements are likely to be more successful in 
increasing long-term peace and justice than using 
violence. 
Q9_24  R 
9. Principled nonviolence/ against 
realpolitiks: armed conflict could be 
outlawed 
y. If armed conflict between individuals and cities 
can be outlawed, it is possible to outlaw armed 
conflict between nations - perhaps through the 
United Nations and the International Court of 
Justice. 
Q9_25  R 
10. Principled nonviolence/ against 
realpolitiks: diplomacy and 
nonviolence can always work 
z. Diplomacy (negotiations between leaders) and 
nonviolent methods can always work to solve 
international disputes. 
Q9_26  R 
11. Principled nonviolence: if goal is 
peace, must be unity of means and 
ends 
aa. If the goal is peace, peaceful methods must be 
used because we can NOT separate the means 
(methods) from the ends (goals). 
Q9_27  R 
12. Pragmatic nonviolence: 
nonviolence can overthrow dictators 
bb. Nonviolent methods can work to overthrow 
dictators. 
Q9_28  R 
13. Against realpolitiks: support 
disarmament 
dd. We should support disarmament efforts (efforts 
to reduce the number of weapons manufactured and 
held by militaries and armed groups around the 
world). 
Q9_30  R 
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Table 2. Factor 2: Militarism 
1. Militarism: military discipline 
develops character 
f. Military discipline develops good character in youth. Q9_6 
2. Militarism: war develops best 
qualities in men 
g. War brings out the best qualities in men. Q9_7 
3. Militarism: many of our 
greatest heroes are soldiers 
h. Many of our nation's greatest heroes are soldiers. Q9_8 
4. Against militarism: better to 
disobey/ think for self than to be 
a good soldier 
m. It is better to disobey orders and think for yourself than 
to be a good soldier. 
Q9_13  R 
5. Against militarism n. Military discipline injures self-respect and individuality. Q9_14  R 
6. Realpolitiks: military methods 
needed to fight terrorism 
ff. It is necessary to fight terrorism by military means 
(methods). 
Q9_32   
7. Realpolitiks: military force 
need to maintain order in world 
 
gg. It is sometimes necessary to use military force to 
maintain order in the world. 
Q9_33 
 
Table 3. Factor 3: Just War 
1. Self-defense: right to kill to 
defend family 
a. A person has the right to kill to defend his/ her family. Q9_1 
2. Self-defense: right to kill to 
defend property 
b. A person has the right to kill to defend his/ her property. Q9_2 
3. Just war: against dictator i. When people suffer under a dictator, a violent revolution 
is necessary and justified. 
Q9_9 
4. Just war: of liberation p. When the goal is liberation from tyranny or oppression, 
war can be necessary and justified. 
Q9_16 
5. Just war: lesser of two evils q. Because freedom and justice may be more important 
than peace, war may be necessary and although regrettable, 
it is the lesser of two evils. 
Q9_17 
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Table 4. Factor loadings of individual items on the 5 factors: Costa Rica data (country-specific analysis) 
 
 
 
Notes: Factor 1 = Nonviolence; Factor 2 = Militarism; Factor 3 = Just War 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                               
           Q9_33    -0.0253    0.5309    0.2561        0.5676  
           Q9_32    -0.1595    0.4503    0.2906        0.6742  
           Q9_31    -0.1374    0.2395    0.2573        0.8562  
           Q9_30     0.5438    0.0991   -0.0356        0.6570  
           Q9_29     0.1720    0.1862    0.0924        0.8803  
           Q9_28     0.3651    0.1976   -0.0050        0.7663  
           Q9_27     0.5761    0.0831    0.0247        0.6115  
           Q9_26     0.6175   -0.2018    0.0562        0.6770  
           Q9_25     0.6185   -0.2135    0.0488        0.6793  
           Q9_24     0.4455    0.0360   -0.0029        0.7869  
           Q9_23     0.5325    0.0769   -0.0237        0.6809  
           Q9_22     0.5081    0.0286    0.1598        0.6657  
           Q9_21     0.4478    0.1428    0.0820        0.6930  
           Q9_20     0.4506    0.1710    0.1773        0.6140  
           Q9_19     0.1613   -0.0144    0.1561        0.9426  
           Q9_18     0.1890    0.1633    0.2733        0.7822  
           Q9_17     0.2569    0.0073    0.5624        0.5529  
           Q9_16     0.1685    0.0191    0.5634        0.6037  
           Q9_15     0.2317    0.1875    0.0959        0.8419  
           Q9_14     0.2370    0.4217   -0.2832        0.7134  
           Q9_13     0.0104    0.4189   -0.3281        0.8141  
           Q9_12     0.5908    0.0746   -0.0425        0.6180  
           Q9_11     0.4256    0.1517   -0.1030        0.7587  
           Q9_10     0.3269   -0.0091   -0.0609        0.8999  
            Q9_9     0.1419   -0.0901    0.4232        0.8064  
            Q9_8     0.0530    0.5416    0.0408        0.6603  
            Q9_7     0.1665    0.5944   -0.0637        0.5608  
            Q9_6     0.0119    0.6485    0.0693        0.5349  
            Q9_5    -0.0922    0.2369    0.1448        0.9141  
            Q9_4     0.0101    0.0921    0.2272        0.9228  
            Q9_3    -0.1494    0.2120    0.2834        0.8540  
            Q9_2    -0.1018    0.0938    0.6180        0.5914  
            Q9_1    -0.0300   -0.0461    0.6296        0.6283  
                                                               
        Variable    Factor1   Factor2   Factor3     Uniqueness 
                                                               
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
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UO data – Principal Axis Exploratory Factory Analysis: Items Loading on Factors 
Notes: 5 factors were extracted; .3 was utilized as a cut off on item loadings; R = Reverse coded; 
Respondent answer choices on all items: 1=Strongly Agree; 2=Agree; 3=Disagree; 4=Strongly Disagree; 
With reverse coding, peaceful answers become coded “3” and “4” on all items. Below are the items loading 
on each factor and utilized in constructing indexes based on each factor. 
 
Table 5. Factor 1: Militarism 
Item category Item Question # (R 
= Reverse 
coded) 
1. Militarism: military discipline 
develops character 
(f) “Military discipline develops good character in 
youth.” 
Q9_6 
 
2. Militarism: war develops best 
qualities in men 
(g) “War brings out the best qualities in men.” Q9_7 
3. Principled nonviolence/ against 
militarism: war breeds disrespect for 
humanity 
(k) “War breeds disrespect for human life.” Q9_11 R 
4. Principled nonviolence/ against 
militarism: better to forgive and 
work for peace than to be a soldier 
(l) “It is better to forgive your enemies and work for 
peace with justice than to be a good soldier.” 
Q9_12 R 
5. Against militarism: better to 
disobey/ think for self than to be a 
good soldier 
(m) “It is better to disobey orders and think for yourself 
than to be a good soldier.” 
Q9_13 R 
6. Against militarism: military 
discipline injures self-respect 
(n) “Military discipline injures self-respect and 
individuality.” 
Q9_14 R 
Table 6. Factor 2: Nonviolence 
Item category Item Question # (R 
= Reverse 
coded) 
1. Principled nonviolence/ against 
militarism: we should honor 
nonviolent heroes more than violent 
(w) “We should honor the heroes of nonviolence more 
than those who used violence.”  
Q9_23 R 
2. Nonviolence: nonviolent 
movements more successful 
(x) “In nations on the verge of civil war, nonviolent 
movements are likely to be more successful in 
increasing long-term peace and justice...”  
Q9_24 R 
3. Principled nonviolence/ against 
realpolitiks: armed conflict could be 
outlawed 
(y) “…it is possible to outlaw armed conflict between 
nations – perhaps through the UN and the International 
Court of Justice.” 
Q9_25 R 
4. Principled nonviolence/ against 
realpolitiks: diplomacy and 
nonviolence can always work 
(z) “Diplomacy…and nonviolent methods can always 
work to solve international disputes.”  
 
Q9_26 R 
5. Principled nonviolence: if goal is 
peace, must be unity of means and 
ends 
(aa) “If the goal is peace, peaceful methods must be 
used because we can NOT separate the means 
(methods) from the ends (goals).”  
Q9_27 R 
6. Pragmatic nonviolence: 
nonviolence can overthrow dictators 
(bb) “Nonviolent methods can work to overthrow 
dictators.”  
Q9_28 R 
 
Table 7. Factor 3: Interpersonal Violence 
Item category Item Question # 
1. Self-defense: right to kill to 
defend family 
(a) “A person has the right to kill to defend his/ her 
family.” 
Q9_1 
2. Self-defense: right to kill to 
defend property 
(b) “A person has the right to kill to defend his/ her 
property.” 
Q9_2 
3. Domestic violence: wife slapping 
husband can be justified 
(c) “There are situations in which a woman is justified 
in slapping her husband in the face.” 
Q9_3 
4. Domestic violence: husband 
slapping wife can be justified 
(d) “There are situations in which a man is justified in 
slapping his wife in the face.” 
Q9_4 
5. Corporal punishment: spanking 
children is necessary 
(e) “Corporal punishment (spanking) is necessary to 
bring up children properly.” 
Q9_5 
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Note: Two items loading on this factor were conceptually distinct, hence, in order to “clean” the index these items were 
omitted in the construction of an “interpersonal violence” index: Q9_9 (i) Just war: “When people suffer under a 
dictator, a violent revolution is necessary and justified.” (in the previous pcf factor analysis, this item loaded on the just 
war factor but it was cross-loading and not above .5, the cut-off which was utilized in the pcf factor analysis); Q9_15 
(o) Realpolitiks: “There is nothing wrong with nations seizing territory or natural resources through war because 
nations should protect their own economic security and interests.” 
 
Table 8. Factor 4: “Just War” (and “Just Revolution”) 
 
Item category Item Question # 
(R = Reverse 
coded) 
1. Just war: of liberation (p) “When the goal is liberation from tyranny and 
oppression, war can be necessary and justified.” 
Q9_16 
2. Just war: lesser of two evils (q) “Because freedom and justice may be more 
important than peace, war may be necessary and 
although regrettable, it is the lesser of two evils.” 
Q9_17 
3. Principled nonviolence/ against 
just war: no justification for war 
(t) “There is NO conceivable justification for war.” Q9_20 R 
4. Principled nonviolence/ against 
just war: evils of war outweigh 
benefits 
(u) “The evils of war are greater than any possible 
benefits.” 
Q9_21 R 
5. Principled nonviolence/ against 
just war: moral duty to refuse to 
participate in any war 
(v) “It is the moral duty of the individual to refuse to 
participate in any way in any war, no matter what the 
cause.” 
Q9_22 R 
 
 
 
Table 9. Factor 5: Realpolitiks   
 
Item category Item Question # 
1. Militarism: hero-system (h) “Many of our nation’s greatest heroes are soldiers.” Q9_8 
2. Realpolitiks: diplomacy often 
fails and war becomes necessary 
(r) “Diplomacy often fails and war between nations 
becomes necessary.” 
Q9_18 
3. Death penalty: justified for 
murder 
(ee) “The death penalty should be used for a person 
convicted of murder.” 
Q9_31 
4. Realpolitiks: military methods 
needed to fight terrorism 
(ff) “It is necessary to fight terrorism by military means 
(methods).” 
Q9_32 
5. Realpolitiks: military force need 
to maintain order in world 
(gg) “It is sometimes necessary to use military force to 
maintain order in the world.” 
Q9_33 
 
Note: Although the death penalty item is conceptually distinct, especially since it deals with a different level and arena 
for violence, it was retained because it was conceived as falling within a general instrumental attitude towards violence, 
and an instance of embracing the “myth of redemptive violence” (Wink 1992) somewhat like realpolitiks does. 
However, technically, in the realpolitiks orientation, war is outside the sphere of ethical reflection. Including the death 
penalty item also raised the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient above the acceptable cut-off level of .6 to .6172. Admittedly, 
the items loading on this factor do not capture the distinctive hard-edge of national interest in the Realpolitiks position 
such as was operationalized in the item: “o. There is nothing wrong with nations seizing territory or natural resources 
through war because nations should protect their own economic security and interests.” However, item “o” loaded on 
Factor 3, “Interpersonal Violence” (see Note above) – suggesting that attitudes justifying self-defense, domestic 
violence, and corporal punishment tend to overlap with attitudes affirming national self-interest in the realpolitiks 
position. Had the items been arranged in a different order, these items may have been more likely to correlate. Clearly, 
the order of items matters, and makes our empirical task difficult. By looking at the question numbers in the far right-
hand column above, we can observe potential cases of auto-correlation (i.e., items correlating partly because of their 
proximity to one another) among the items loading on each of the 5 factors. However, many of the items were grouped 
by ideological orientation in the survey’s format (see Appendix D), and this was deemed justified in order to make the 
survey-taking experience less taxing and confusing, especially since the subject matter is relatively complex.    
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Table 10. Factor loadings of individual items on the 5 factors: UO data (country-specific analysis) 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Factor 1 = Militarism; Factor 2 = Nonviolence; 3= Interpersonal Violence; 4 = Just War; 5 = 
Realpolitiks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                   
           Q9_33     0.1080    0.1268    0.1002    0.2412    0.3532        0.6317  
           Q9_32     0.0810   -0.0698    0.1315    0.2102    0.5273        0.5763  
           Q9_31    -0.0467    0.2447    0.2831   -0.0857    0.3051        0.7342  
           Q9_30     0.2810    0.2621    0.0756   -0.1521    0.0733        0.7523  
           Q9_29     0.1489    0.2515   -0.0608   -0.0521    0.0735        0.8762  
           Q9_28    -0.0713    0.5102    0.1793    0.0677   -0.1230        0.6985  
           Q9_27     0.1364    0.4505    0.1107    0.1268   -0.0027        0.6175  
           Q9_26    -0.0835    0.5506   -0.0543    0.1262    0.0312        0.6782  
           Q9_25     0.1250    0.4460    0.0101    0.1739   -0.0766        0.6676  
           Q9_24     0.0397    0.5404    0.0307   -0.1827    0.0437        0.6976  
           Q9_23     0.1835    0.3855   -0.1293    0.0248    0.2554        0.6287  
           Q9_22     0.0507    0.2907   -0.1797    0.3998    0.0272        0.6853  
           Q9_21     0.3305    0.1670   -0.0404    0.4114   -0.0539        0.5910  
           Q9_20     0.1095    0.1014   -0.0321    0.6529    0.0527        0.4695  
           Q9_19     0.2413   -0.0372    0.2423    0.0713    0.1468        0.7773  
           Q9_18     0.0410   -0.0201    0.2519   -0.0329    0.4017        0.7429  
           Q9_17     0.1433   -0.0908    0.0785    0.5550    0.1459        0.5859  
           Q9_16    -0.1116   -0.0798    0.1984    0.5727    0.1292        0.5896  
           Q9_15     0.2981    0.0138    0.3567   -0.1713    0.1670        0.6537  
           Q9_14     0.4844   -0.0012   -0.0863    0.1176   -0.0348        0.7700  
           Q9_13     0.4517    0.0258   -0.1530    0.0110    0.0945        0.7772  
           Q9_12     0.5274    0.1227   -0.0369    0.0685    0.0507        0.6169  
           Q9_11     0.6233   -0.0043   -0.0688    0.1335   -0.0174        0.6045  
           Q9_10     0.0176    0.1262    0.2806    0.1858   -0.2721        0.7906  
            Q9_9    -0.1821    0.1568    0.4568    0.2672   -0.0107        0.6545  
            Q9_8     0.0938    0.0267    0.0555    0.0960    0.4207        0.7371  
            Q9_7     0.3139    0.0465    0.2893   -0.0471    0.0408        0.7286  
            Q9_6     0.3766   -0.1016    0.2366    0.0281    0.1278        0.7136  
            Q9_5     0.1627    0.1675    0.4302   -0.1117   -0.1364        0.7042  
            Q9_4     0.1437   -0.0337    0.3036   -0.0834   -0.3784        0.7769  
            Q9_3     0.2062   -0.2437    0.4151    0.0930   -0.0888        0.7311  
            Q9_2     0.0047    0.0354    0.6227   -0.0038    0.0963        0.5753  
            Q9_1    -0.2507   -0.0178    0.6067    0.1421    0.2040        0.5845  
                                                                                   
        Variable    Factor1   Factor2   Factor3   Factor4   Factor5     Uniqueness 
                                                                                   
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
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APPENDIX F 
 
INTERITEM CORRELATIONS AND RELIABILITIES 
 
Tables of Costa Rican Attitude Indexes: Interitem Correlations and Reliabilities 
Table 1. Factor 1: Nonviolence Index 
Items Correlations 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
1. Principled nonviolence: 
political violence never 
justified 
            
2. Principled nonviolence/ 
against militarism: war 
breeds disrespect for 
humanity 
.32            
3. Principled nonviolence/ 
against militarism: better 
to forgive and work for 
peace than to be a soldier 
.20 .32           
4. Principled nonviolence/ 
against just war: no 
justification for war 
.25 .24 .30          
5. Principled nonviolence/ 
against just war: evils of 
war outweigh benefits 
.19 .22 .35 .46         
6. Principled nonviolence/ 
against just war: moral 
duty to refuse to participate 
in any war 
.11 .15 .28 .41 .36        
7. Principled nonviolence/ 
against militarism: we 
should honor nonviolent 
heroes more than violent 
.21 .19 .37 .22 .29 .32       
8. Nonviolence: nonviolent 
movements more 
successful 
.19 .09 .24 .27 .25 .28 .29      
9. Principled nonviolence/ 
against realpolitiks: armed 
conflict could be outlawed 
.15 .19 .26 .28 .28 .18 .28 .18     
10. Principled 
nonviolence/ against 
realpolitiks: diplomacy and 
nonviolence can always 
work 
.15 .14 .32 .21 .26 .21 .26 .27 .38    
11. Principled 
nonviolence: if goal is 
peace, must be unity of 
means and ends 
.20 .16 .32 .34 .30 .30 .33 .32 .32 .37   
12. Pragmatic nonviolence: 
nonviolence can overthrow 
dictators 
.02 .07 .27 .21 .16 .16 .33 .24 .30 .33 .42  
13. Against realpolitiks: 
support disarmament 
.20 .23 .30 .24 .30 .34 .31 .33 .32 .22 .34 .23 
 Reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) = .81 
Table 2. Factor 2: Militarism Index 
Items Correlations 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1. Militarism: military discipline 
develops character 
      
2. Militarism: war develops best 
qualities in men 
.46      
3. Militarism: many of our greatest 
heroes are soldiers 
.40 .45     
4. Against militarism: better to 
disobey/ think for self than to be a 
.16 .20 .15    
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good soldier 
5. Against militarism 
 
.43 .22 .19 .34   
6. Realpolitiks: military methods 
needed to fight terrorism 
.40 .19 .22 .14 .17  
7. Realpolitiks: military force need 
to maintain order in world 
 
.45 .31 .30 .08 .21 .54 
 Reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) = .72 
Table 3. Factor 3: Just War Index 
Items Correlations 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1. Self-defense: right to kill to 
defend family 
    
2. Self-defense: right to kill to 
defend property 
.55    
3. Just war: against dictator .26 .25   
4. Just war: of liberation .32 .25 .26  
5. Just war: lesser of two evils .34 .25 .30 .54 
 Reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) = .71 
Tables of UO Attitude Indexes: Interitem Correlations and Reliabilities 
Table 4. Factor 1: Militarism Index 
Items Correlations 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1. Militarism: military discipline 
develops character 
     
2. Militarism: war develops best 
qualities in men 
.36     
3. Principled nonviolence/ against 
militarism: war breeds disrespect for 
humanity 
.19 .27    
4. Principled nonviolence/ against 
militarism: better to forgive and 
work for peace than to be a soldier 
.26 .19 .39   
5. Against militarism: better to 
disobey/ think for self than to be a 
good soldier 
.19 .14 .24 .37  
6. Against militarism: military 
discipline injures self-respect 
.21 .04 .34 .19 .25 
 Reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) = .65 
 
Table 5. Factor 2: Nonviolence Index 
Items Correlations 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1. Principled nonviolence/ against 
militarism: we should honor 
nonviolent heroes more than violent 
     
2. Nonviolence: nonviolent 
movements more successful 
.33     
3. Principled nonviolence/ against 
realpolitiks: armed conflict could be 
outlawed 
.28 .24    
4. Principled nonviolence/ against 
realpolitiks: diplomacy and 
nonviolence can always work 
.25 .25 .26   
5. Principled nonviolence: if goal is .26 .28 .37 .29  
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peace, must be unity of means and 
ends 
6. Pragmatic nonviolence: 
nonviolence can overthrow dictators 
.25 .25 .34 .19 .26 
 Reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) = .69 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Factor 3: Interpersonal Violence Index 
Items Correlations 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1. Self-defense: right to kill to 
defend family 
    
2. Self-defense: right to kill to 
defend property 
.47    
3. Domestic violence: wife slapping 
husband can be justified 
.30 .28   
4. Domestic violence: husband 
slapping wife can be justified 
.07 .15 .28  
5. Corporal punishment: spanking 
children is necessary 
.21 .24 .21 .20 
 Reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) = .62 
 
Table 7. Factor 4: “Just War” (and “Just Revolution”) Index 
 
Items Correlations 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1. Just war: of liberation     
2. Just war: lesser of two evils .44    
3. Principled nonviolence/ against 
just war: no justification for war 
.41 .44   
4. Principled nonviolence/ against 
just war: evils of war outweigh 
benefits 
.23 .36 .51  
5. Principled nonviolence/ against 
just war: moral duty to refuse to 
participate in any war 
.24 .29 .38 .25 
 Reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) = .73 
 
Table 8. Factor 5: Realpolitiks Index   
 
Items Correlations 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1. Militarism: our soldiers are greatest 
heroes 
    
2. Realpolitiks: diplomacy often fails 
and war becomes necessary 
.22    
3. death penalty: should be used for 
murder 
.17 .19   
4. Realpolitiks: military methods 
needed to fight terrorism 
.26 .29 .36  
5. Realpolitiks: military force need to 
maintain order in world 
.28 .24 .23 .37 
 Reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) = .62 
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APPENDIX G 
 
NOTE ON OMISSIONS FROM SAMPLES 
 
 Fifteen respondents of the UO survey were deleted from the sample on the basis 
of their answer “I am not American” on Question 33 (“How proud are you to be an 
American?”). Many of these 15 respondents also indicated “I don’t vote” on Q43 
(“Which political party do you tend to vote for?”), perhaps supporting the inference that 
they are not U.S. citizens. Although the survey could have included a question which 
asked if respondents are U.S. citizens, it was thought that some students may be illegal 
residents and nervous about answering the question honestly. The omission of these 15 
respondents was guided by the need to target U.S. citizens in accordance with the overall 
purpose of the survey – to measure how American identities and socialization in U.S. 
culture affects attitudes. Q33 is an imperfect but justifiable proxy measure which 
attempted to weed out citizens of other nations. In hindsight, a better method of 
identifying non-U.S. citizens could have been devised. 
 Similarly, a handful of respondents in the Costa Rican survey were omitted 
because on the question, “How proud are you to be Costa Rican?” respondents indicated 
they were citizens of other nations (i.e., foreign exchange students), not citizens of Costa 
Rica.  
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APPENDIX H 
 
SECOND-ORDER FACTOR ANALYSES 
 
 In each data set, second-order/ higher-order factor analyses were conducted on the 
original correlation matrix, i.e., the primary or first-order factors (Gorsuch 1983). This was 
deemed appropriate because of the relatively strong correlations among many of the first-order 
factors in the original correlation matrix, suggesting that some generalization (and perhaps further 
data organization and reduction to a single factor) is possible. Higher-order factors “reduce 
accuracy for an increase in the breadth of generalization” (p.240). There is nothing inherently 
preferable or more important in higher-order factors, as both first and second-order factors aid in 
understanding the data (Cattell 1966c, Gorsuch 1983). Interpretations of second-order factors are 
post-hoc and subject to error as they are “based upon the interpretations of the first-order factors 
that are, in turn, based upon the interpretations of the variables” (Gorsuch 1983, p.245).     
 
Table 1. UO data: Correlation Matrix of First-Order Factors 
 f1 militarism f2 nonviolence f3 interpersonal 
violence 
f4 just war f5 realpolitiks 
f1 militarism 1.0000     
f2 nonviolence 0.5884 1.0000    
f3 interpersonal 
violence 
0.4535 0.2601 1.0000   
f4 just war 0.2780 0.4065 0.3349 1.0000  
f5 realpolitiks 0.4590 0.3398 0.2322 0.2671 1.0000 
    
Table 2. UO data: Second-Order Factor of First-Order Factors 
First-Order Factors Second-Order Factor 
(1 factor extracted) 
f1 militarism .811 
f2 nonviolence .690 
f5 realpolitiks .525 
f3 interpersonal 
violence 
.505 
f4 just war .490 
  Note: Extraction method: principal axis factoring 
 
Table 3. Costa Rica data: Correlation Matrix of First-Order Factors 
 f1 nonviolence f2 militarism f3 just war 
f1nonviolence 1.0000   
f2 militarism 0.5219 1.0000  
f3 just war 0.2619 0.4540 1.0000 
 
Table 4. Costa Rica data: Second-Order Factor of First-Order Factors 
First-Order Factors Second-Order Factor 
(convergence on 1 
factor) 
f2 militarism .939 
f1 nonviolence .554 
f3 just war .481 
Note: Extraction method: principal axis factoring 
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APPENDIX I 
 
CODING IDEOLOGICAL ADHERENTS 
 
Costa Rica data 
Because three factors emerged in the exploratory factor analysis of the Costa Rican data, three 
ideological adherent categories were coded based on these three factors (which were used to 
construct indexes): militarism, just war, and nonviolence. Because of reverse coding, answers of 
“1” and “2” represent pro-violent answers on all of the items. Likewise, because of reverse 
coding, pro-nonviolent answers on all of the indexes consist of “3” and “4” (2.5 is the mid-point) 
– with “4” representing the strongest level of agreement with the nonviolent attitude, or the 
strongest level of disagreement with the violent attitude depending on the phrasing of the item. 
Thus, a respondent who averages a “4” on the nonviolence index, the just war index, and the 
militarism index is a respondent who consistenly gave the strongest pro-nonviolent answers on 
each of those collections of items. The Stata programming appears below: 
 
gen nv_adherents = 0 
replace nv_adherents = 1 if  nonviolence >=3 & militarism >=3 & justwar >=3 
 
gen mil_adherents = 0 
replace mil_adherents = 1 if militarism <= 2.5 
 
gen justwar_adherents = 0 
replace justwar_adherents = 1 if justwar <= 2.5 & mil_adherents != 1 & Q4==1 
 
I coded mil_adherents and justwar_adherents this way because anyone who agreed with the 
militarism items would be likely to also agree with the just war items, but since militarism is a 
more hard-core position (insofar as attitudes towards violence are concerned), militarism 
adherents were coded first and classified separately from the just war adherents. 
 
UO data 
Five factors (which were used to construct indexes) emerged through the exploratory factor 
analysis of the Costa Rican data. However, the “interpersonal violence” factor engages a different 
level of violence than the political level which is the primary focus of this analysis. Hence, four 
ideological adherent categories were coded: militarism, realpolitiks, just war, and nonviolence. 
The Stata programming appears below: 
 
gen nv_adherents = 0 
replace nv_adherents = 1 if  nonviolence >= 3 & militarism >=3 & justwar >=3 & realpolitiks >=3 
 
gen mil_adherents =0 
replace mil_adherents = 1 if militarism <= 2.5 
 
gen realpol_adherents =0 
replace realpol_adherents = 1 if realpolitiks<= 2.5 & mil_adherents != 1 & Q9_15 < 3 
 
gen justwar_adherents =0 
replace justwar_adherents = 1 if justwar <= 2.5 & mil_adherents != 1 & realpol_adherents != 1 & Q4==1 
 
I coded mil_adherents, realpol_adherents, and justwar_adherents this way because anyone who 
agreed with the militarism items would be likely to also agree with the just war items, but since 
militarism is a more hard-core position, I separated those people out from the realpolitiks and just 
war positions. Likewise, realpolitiks adherents would be likely to also agree with the just war 
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items, but since realpolitiks is a more hard-core position, I separated those people out from the 
just war position. In other words, I followed Megoran (2008) in theorizing militarism as the more 
extreme/ hard-core position, followed by realpolitiks as the 2nd most hard-core position (insofar as 
attitudes towards violence are concerned), and finally, just war was conceived as a middle 
position.  
 
Two departures from the factor analysis results were made for strong theoretical reasons. First, it 
was decided that pro-violent responses (codes of “1” or “2”) on the Q9_15 item represent the 
heart of the realpolitiks ideology. Hence, it had to be included even though this item did not load 
with the factor identified as “realpolitiks.” Adding “& Q9_15 <3” to the end of the 
realpol_adherents code above (as opposed to an earlier code which ommitted this stipulation 
only) resulted in a large shift downward in the number of respondents identified as realpolitiks 
adherents: from 142 adherents to 35 adherents. Of course, this also resulted in a much larger 
number of just war adherents. However, the just war adherent code initially ommitted the 
stipulation “& Q4==1.” This resulted in 150 respondents being coded as just war adherents.  
 
Secondly, it was decided, again for solid theoretical reasons, that a crucial indicator of the just 
war position involves affirming constraints against targeting and killing civilians. Hence, “& 
Q4==1” was added to the end of the code. This stipulation resulted in a shift downward from 150 
to 127 respondents identified as just war adherents. This means that an additional 23 respondents 
would have been coded as just war adherents if they had agreed that targeting and killing civilians 
is “never justified.” Because they did not provide that answer, these 23 respondents were sorted 
into the pool of ideologically undifferentiated respondents. Likewise, for the same reason (i.e., “& 
Q4==1” was added to the original code formula for “justwar_adherents”) 13 respondents in the 
Costa Rican sample were sorted from the just war position into the pool of ideologically 
undifferentiated respondents.  
 
Note that in both the UO and Costa Rica data sets Q4 was not included in the factor analyses (and 
hence, Q4 did not load on the just war factor). Only the Q9 questions were included in the factor 
analysis. All of the Q9 questions involved a 4-point Likert scale, whereas the Q4 question was 
dichotomous (sometimes justified/ never justified). Hence, again, this addition was made to the 
code for purely theoretical reasons (i.e., any definition of the just war position should include this 
constraint), rather than empirical reasons (i.e., as would be the case if the Q4 item loaded on the 
just war factor).       
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APPENDIX J 
 
PEACE INDICATORS FROM SMALLER CROSS-NATIONAL POLLS 
 
Table 1. Rank orders of subjectively peaceful nations, percent who “strongly agree” or “agree” 
(rank #1 is most peaceful). 
 
“War is 
neccessary to 
settle 
differences 
between 
countries”  
“Gov. should 
negotiate with 
groups using 
violence”  
Gun scale – 
gun makes 
home/ person 
safer  
Killing 
Others  is 
justifiable 
scale 
“Democracy is 
the best political 
system”  
“In some 
occasions, 
dictatorship is 
good”  
1) 3.8 Spain 1) 84 El 
Salvador 
1) 15.3 Brazil 
(Rio) 
1) 23.35 
Spain 
1) 87.5 Costa 
Rica 
1) 5.3 El 
Salvador 
2) 4.4 Costa 
Rica 
2) 78.7 Brazil 
(Rio) 
2) 15.7 Spain 2) 37.75 
Costa Rica 
2) 85.9 USA 
(Texas) 
2) 6.5 Costa 
Rica 
3) 6.8 El 
Salvador 
3) 78.4 
Venezuela 
3) 16.25 El 
Salvador 
3) 39.55 
USA 
(Texas) 
3) 83.3 Spain 3) 7.9 Spain 
4) 7.3 Chile 4) 71.9 Costa 
Rica 
4) 18.3 Brazil 
(Salvador) 
4) 40.9 El 
Salvador 
4) 73.3 El 
Salvador 
4) 8.1 USA 
(Texas) 
5) 9.1 Colombia 5) 70.8 Brazil 
(Salvador) 
5) 21.9 
Colombia 
5) 44 Brazil 
(Rio) 
5) 67.6 Brazil 
(Salvador) 
5) 9.3 Brazil 
(Salvador) 
6) 9.6 Brazil 
(Rio) 
6) 59.2 Chile 6) 22.85 Chile 6) 46.03 
(Chile) 
6) 62.7 
Venezuela 
6) 11.8 Chile 
7) 11.2 Brazil 
(Salvador)  
6) 59.2 Spain 7) 24.25 
Venezuela 
7) 47.85 
Brazil 
(Salvador) 
7) 62.3 Brazil 
(Rio) 
7) 19.1 Brazil 
(Rio) 
8) 12.5 
Venezuela 
7) 58.7 
Colombia 
8) 26.65 Costa 
Rica 
8) 53.58 
Venezuela 
8) 61.3 Chile 8) 23.3 
Venezuela 
9) 23.7 USA 
(Texas) 
8) 55.8 USA 
(Texas)  
9) 28.05 USA 
(Texas) 
   
 
Note: The samples were only drawn from cities: Madrid (Spain), San Jose (Costa Rica), San Salvador (El 
Salvador), Santiago (Chile), Cali (Colombia), Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), Salvador de Bahia (Brazil), Caracas 
(Venezuela), Austin and Houston, Texas (USA). The “Gun” scale included 2-items: 1) Gun in home makes 
home safer; 2) Carrying a gun makes a person safer. The nation-level Cronbach’s alpha (reliability 
coefficients) for the Gun scale ranged from .65 to .86. The “Killing Others” scale included 4-items: 1) 
Right to kill to defend family; 2) Right to kill to defend property; 3) OK to kill a person who threatens the 
community; 4) OK to kill rapist of a child. The nation-level alphas for this scale ranged from .64 to .72 
(Orpinas 1999). Data source: McAlister, Orpinas, and Velez (1999), Orpinas (1999). 
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Table 2. Rank orders of subjectively peaceful nations, percent who “strongly agree” or “agree” 
(rank #1 is most peaceful). 
 
“Justification of family violence” items 
“Corporal punishment is necessary 
for children” 
“Sometimes is justified: men 
slap wife” 
“Sometimes is justified: women 
slap husband” 
1) 5.1 Chile 1) 3.4 Costa Rica 1) 5.4 Spain 
2) 6.3 Spain 2) 4.9 El Salvador 2) 5.7 Brazil (Salvador) 
3) 8.5 Venezuela 3) 4.9 Spain 3) 6.5 El Salvador 
4) 10.2 Brazil (Rio) 4) 5.0 Brazil (Rio) 4) 7.3 Costa Rica 
5) 15.2 El Salvador 5) 5.6 Brazil (Salvador) 5) 8 Brazil (Rio) 
6) 15.8 Costa Rica 6) 6.9 Chile 6) 9.7 Chile 
7) 25.3 Brazil (Salvador) 7) 8.3 Venezuela 7) 14.5 Venezuela 
8) 33.5 Colombia 8) 11.0 Colombia 8) 28.8 USA (Texas) 
9) 36.4 USA (Texas) [item not included in USA 
survey] 
[item not included in Colombia 
survey] 
 
Note: The samples were only drawn from cities: Madrid (Spain), San Jose (Costa Rica), San Salvador (El 
Salvador), Santiago (Chile), Cali (Colombia), Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), Salvador de Bahia (Brazil), Caracas 
(Venezuela), Austin and Houston, Texas (USA). The researchers (McAlister et al 1999, Orpinas 1999) 
grouped these 3 items together thematically, but did not combine into a scale or report alpha tests of 
internal consistency. Data source: McAlister, Orpinas, and Velez (1999), Oripinas (1999). 
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APPENDIX K 
 
SURVEY OF NONVIOLENT CAPITAL/ HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE 
 
 [conducted Winter Term, 2013, UO Sociology course] 
 
Instructions: The questions below are taken from opinion surveys that have been conducted in 
many nations around the world.  Please answer each question in order, and do not go back and 
change any answers. Please circle your answer. All answers will be kept confidential. 
 
1. Some people think that for the military to target and kill civilians is sometimes justified, while 
others think that kind of violence is never justified.  Which is your opinion? (Civilians = unarmed 
men, women, and children who are NOT participating in a violent conflict) 
Never justified (1) Sometimes justified (2) 
 
2. Some people think for an individual person or a small group of persons to target and kill 
civilians is sometimes justified while others think that kind of violence is never justified. Which 
is your opinion? 
Never justified (1) Sometimes justified (2) 
 
3. Some people believe that groups that are oppressed and are suffering from injustice can 
improve their situation by peaceful means alone (nonviolent methods).  Others do NOT believe 
that peaceful means alone will work to improve the situation for oppressed groups.  Which do 
you believe, peaceful means alone will work, or peaceful means alone will NOT work? 
Will work (1)   Will NOT work (2) 
 
Instructions: Many of the questions below are very difficult for the average citizen and you are 
not expected to be able to answer all of them. Please circle your answer, and write-in as you 
are able. All answers will be kept confidential. Thank you very much for your help in 
conducting this research! 
 
4. Can you name some oppressed groups who were suffering from injustice and who improved 
their situation by peaceful means alone (nonviolent methods)? (Please name as many as you can 
remember.) 
(1) Yes, these groups include:_______________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
(2) Don’t know 
 
5. Can you name nations that have had successful, or somewhat successful, nonviolent 
revolutions in the 20th and 21st centuries (from 1900 through 2012)? (Please name as many as you 
can remember.) 
(1) Yes, these nations include:_______________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
(2) Don’t know 
 
6. Can you name nations that have had successful, or somewhat successful, violent revolutions in 
world history? (Please name as many as you can remember.) 
(1) Yes, these nations include:___________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
(2) Don’t know 
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7. Can you name specific wars when violent methods have “worked” in resolving conflicts in 
world history? (Please name as many as you can remember.) 
(1) Yes, these nations include:___________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
(2) Don’t know 
 
8. Can you name cases where diplomacy (negotiation between leaders) “worked” in resolving 
conflicts in world history? (Please name as many as you can remember.) 
(1) Yes, these cases include:_____________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
(2) Don’t know 
 
9. Can you name an international treaty (or several treaties) that you think ensures a more 
peaceful world? (Please name as many as you can remember.) 
(1) Yes, these treaties include:____________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
(2) Don’t know 
 
10. Can you name an international organization (or several organizations) that you think ensures a 
relatively more peaceful world? (Please name as many as you can remember.) 
(1) Yes, these include:__________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
(2) No 
 
11. Again, some people think that for the military to target and kill civilians is sometimes 
justified, while others think that kind of violence is never justified. Can you name a case where 
targeting and killing civilians was justified? 
(1) Yes, a case was:___________________________________________________ 
(2) No, I can’t think of a specific case 
(3) I don’t think that can be justified 
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APPENDIX L 
 
GALLUP WORLD POLL METHODOLOGY ON “DON’T KNOW”/  
“DEPENDS” ANSWERS 
 
 The Gallup World Poll methodology report explains: “Most items have a simple 
dichotomous (“yes or no”) response set to minimize contamination of data because of 
cultural differences in response styles and to facilitate cross-cultural comparisons” (GWP 
2009, p.3). But a methodological complication arises concerning the dichotomous 
phrasing of the questions, versus the actual number of answer options. All three of the 
violent/ nonviolent questions are phrased as dichotomous choices, and it seems additional 
answer responses were not initially read out as answer options. Nevertheless, as 
respondents answered items in the Gallup World Poll, it seems they were told or came to 
understand that on some items they had the option of answering “depends,” “don’t 
know,” or “refused to answer.” Of course, according to international standards, the latter 
is a required option in human subjects protocols. Moreover, if a respondent had trouble 
making up their minds, it seems likely that survey givers might have offered additional 
answer options which the survey designers were willing to accept and code.  
 On the military attacks on civilians item, the only exceptions to this pattern seems 
to be in Tunisia, where no respondents were listed as answering “depends,” and in 6 
nations (DRC (Kinshasa), Yemen, Ivory Coast, Burundi, Mozambique, and Liberia) 
where 0% of respodents were listed as answering “don’t know/ refused to answer.” It is 
possible that in some of these cases, rounding eliminated evidence of the less than ½ of 
1% of respondents who answered “don’t know”/ “refused to answer,” but given the 
proprietary nature of the data (only topline data is available) it is impossible to know at 
the present time. In any case, in several nations, the percentage of respondents answering 
“depends” is much higher than in the rest of the cross-national sample – suggesting 
perhaps that respondents in those nations were made more aware that “depends” was 
always an answer option, or even that it was cued as an answer option on these particular 
items.  
 On the peaceful means alone “will work”/ “will not work” item, “depends” was 
not accepted or coded as an answer option, but “don’t know”/ “refused to answer” were 
options that were coded. However, in Ivory Coast, Malawi, and Uganda 0% were coded 
as responding “don’t know”/ “refused.” Conversely, in Ukraine close to 25% of 
respondents were coded as “don’t know”/ “refused.”  
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APPENDIX M 
 
SCHWARTZ VALUES INDICES 
 
Values Items in Index 
Conformity 7. She believes that people should do what they’re told. She thinks people 
should follow rules at all times, even when no-one is watching. 
16. It is important to her always to behave properly. She wants to avoid doing 
anything people would say is wrong. 
Tradition 9. It is important to her to be humble and modest. She tries not to draw 
attention to herself. 
20. Tradition is important to her. She tries to follow the customs handed down 
by her religion or her family. 
Benevolence 12. It’s very important to her to help the people around her. She wants to care 
for their well-being. 
18. It is important to her to be loyal to her friends. She wants to devote herself 
to people close to her. 
Universalism 3. She thinks it is important that every person in the world be treated equally. 
She believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life. 
8. It is important to her to listen to people who are different from her. Even 
when she disagrees with them, she still wants to understand them. 
19. She strongly believes that people should care for nature. Looking after the 
environment is important to her. 
Self-Direction 1. Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to her. She likes to 
do things in her own original way. 
11. It is important to her to make her own decisions about what she does. She 
likes to be free and not depend on others. 
Stimulation 6. She likes surprises and is always looking for new things to do. She thinks it 
is important to do lots of different things in life. 
15. She looks for adventures and likes to take risks. She wants to have an 
exciting life. 
Hedonism 10. Having a good time is important to her. She likes to “treat” herself. 
21. She seeks every chance she can to have fun. It is important to her to do 
things that give her pleasure. 
Achievement 4. It’s important to her to show her abilities. She wants people to admire what 
she does. 
13. Being very successful is important to her. She hopes people will recognize 
her achievements. 
Power 2. It is important to her to be rich. She wants to have a lot of money and 
expensive things. 
17. It is important to her to get respect from others. She wants people to do 
what she says. 
Security 5. It is important to her to live in secure surroundings. She avoids anything 
that might endanger her safety. 
14. It is important to her that the government ensure her safety against all 
threats. She wants the government to be strong so it can defend its citizens. 
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APPENDIX N 
EXPLANATION OF DUMMY CODES 
Table 1. Dummy variables in UO data 
 
1. male (versus female) (Q15) 
2. white (versus non-white) (Q32) 
3. Hispanic (Q31) 
4. black (Q32) 
5. upper classes (Q25, those claiming membership in “upper middle class” or “upper class”) 
6. rural (Q26, location of residence during junior high/ middle school and high school) 
7. Republican party (versus non-Republicans) (Q43) 
8. Democratic party (versus non-Democrats)  (Q43) 
9. Politically interested (Q30, those answering 1 or 2 were coded as “politically interested”) 
10. Knowledgeable of nonviolent revolutions (Q41, those answering by naming 1, 2, 3 or more correct historical nonviolent 
revolutions were coded “1,” everyone else was coded “0”) 
11. religious (Q54: Do you belong to a religious tradition?) 
12. Christian (Q58: Do you consider yourself to be a Christian) 
13. Catholic (Q55) 
14. evangelical (Q59) 
15. attenders (Q56, those who attend religious services once a month or more) 
16. born again (Q60; indicator of conservative/ evangelical Christianity) 
17. Biblical literalist (Q57; indicator of conservative Christianity) 
18. moderates and conservatives (versus liberals; Q29, self-identified ideology) 
19. military parents (Q28: Have either of your parents ever been in the military?) 
20. athletes (Q48: Did you play sports while you were in high school?) 
21. sports fan (respondents who answered “1” (“great/ excited/ very happy”) on Q50: When the UO football team wins, how do you 
feel?) 
22. Majors 1-10 
 
Table 2. Dummy codes in Costa Rica data 
 
1. male (versus female) (Q13) 
2. white (versus non-white) (Q43) 
3. Mestizo (versus white; see Note1 below) (Q43) 
4. upper classes (Q23, those claiming membership in “upper middle class” or “upper class”) 
5. PLN party (versus non-PLN; see Note 2 below) (Q40) 
6. PAC party (versus non-PAC) (Q40) 
7. liberal (versus non-liberals) (Q25; see Note 3) 
8. politically interested (Q26, those answering 1 or 2 were coded as “politically interested”) 
9. Knowledgeable of nonviolent revolutions (Q41, those answering by naming 1, 2, 3 or more correct historical nonviolent revolutions 
were coded “1,” everyone else was coded “0”) 
10. religious (Q27: Do you belong to a religious denomination?) 
11. Catholic (Q28) 
12. evangelical (Q28) 
13. attenders (Q29, those who attend religious services once a month or more) 
14.  UCR student (Q48) 
15. U Latina student (Q48) 
16. U Hispanoamericana student (Q48) 
17. Majors 1-9 
 
Note 1: Because most repondents listed their race/ ethnicity as either white or Mestizo, and there were so few racial minorities, the 
Mestizo dummy code’s comparison group is only whites. That is, racial minorities like blacks and Chinese were coded as missing data 
in the Mestizo dummy variable only.  
Note 2: A high % of respondents claimed no party affiliation. This was expected, since political parties have often lacked saliance for 
voters in Costa Rica (Biesanz, Biesanz, and Biesanz 1999, p.71). To accomodate this context, the dummy code for PLN included those 
who left this question blank (i.e., “missing data”) in the code of “0” (zero), the non-PLN code. Those who claimed identification with 
PLN were coded “1.” The same procedure was followed for the PAC code. 
Note 3: Because the majority of respondents answered Q25 by claiming themselves as “moderates,” and relatively few claimed 
themselves as “conservatives,” the best dummy code seemed to be “liberals.”      
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APPENDIX O 
  
GLOBAL PEACE INDEX 2009, 2011, 2012 INDICATORS 
 
Indicator (Changes in GPI indicators are noted by year) Weight 
(1 to 5) 
[weights adjusted 
in 2012] 
INTERNAL PEACE 60% 
EXTERNAL PEACE 40% 
1. Perceptions of criminality in society 4 [3] 
2. Number of internal security officers and police per 100,000 
people 
3 
3. Number of homicides per 100,000 people 4 
4. Number of jailed population per 100,000 people 3 
5. Ease of access to weapons of minor destruction 3 
6. Level of organized conflict (internal) 5 
7. Likelihood of violent demonstrations 3 
8. Level of violent crime 4 
9. Political instability 4 
10. Respect for human rights (2009)/ Level of disrespect for human 
rights (Political Terror Scale) (2011, 2012) 
4 
11. Volume of transfers of major conventional weapons, as 
recipient (imports) per 100,000 people 
2 
12. Potential for terrorist acts (2009, 2011)/ Terrorist Acts (2012) 1 [2] 
13. Number of deaths from organized conflict (internal) 5 
14. Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP 2 
15. Number of armed services personnel per 100,000 people 2 
16. Funding for UN peacekeeping missions 2 
17. Aggregate number of heavy weapons per 100,000 people 3 
18. Volume of transfers of major conventional weapons as supplier 
(exports) per 100,000 people 
3 
 
19. Military capability/sophistication 2 
20. Number of displaced people as a percentage of the population 4 
21. Relations with neighbouring countries 5 
22. Number of external and internal conflicts fought: 2002-07 (GPI 
2009)/ 2003-08 (GPI 2011)/ 2004-09 (GPI 2012) 
5 
23. Estimated number of deaths from organized conflict (external) 5 
 
Notes: In the GPI’s from previous years, “Level of distrust in other citizens” was used instead of indicator 
#1 above. Also, “UN Deployments 2007-08 (percentage of total forces)” was used in the GPI 2008 instead 
of indicator #16 above. Arguably, the new indicator is biased as it privileges wealthy nations (on the other 
hand, the old indicator may have been biased as it privileged the handful of poor nations who have 
traditionally supplied a disproportionate number of UN peacekeepers partly because the poverty in these 
nations prompts men to serve as mercenaries). Unfortunately, the GPI 2009 also dropped an indicator of 
militarism used in the GPI 2008: “Non-UN Deployments 2007-08 (percentage of total forces).” Dropping 
this indicator privileges the U.S. by ignoring the large numbers of U.S. troops deployed abroad. 
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APPENDIX P 
 
TESTING CORRELATES OF NONVIOLENT ATTITUDES 
 
Table 1. Concepts and Measures (for Testing Correlates of Nonviolent Attitudes in Gallup World Poll data) 
 
Variable (n=sample 
size) 
[Variable Name] Definitions, Coding, and Sources 
Gallup World Poll 
(3 questions)  
Source: Gallup World Poll internet data. Surveys were conducted primarily in 
2008 and 2009, but in some nations they were conducted in 2007. For a full list 
of survey dates for the data used in the present study, see Appendix R. This data 
set is proprietary, with the 2005 to 2010 data set available for $285,000. As the 
present study was concluding, the 2005-2006 data set became available to 
academics for $5,000. However, topline data has been free to the public on the 
Gallup World Poll web page. One limitation is that some of the web-posted data 
comes from earlier waves (see Appendix R).  
Nonviolence Will 
Work (n=136) 
[nv_willwork_2_15_2010] % of citizens in nation affirming peaceful means 
alone “will work”; Source: Gallup World Poll internet data (2008-2009), 
retrieved 2/15/2010. 
State Terrorism: 
military attacks on 
civilians (n=131) 
[percent_mil_neverjust_2_26_2010] % of citizens in nation affirming military 
attacks on civilians “never justified”; Source: Gallup World Poll internet data 
(2008-2009), retrieved 2/26/2010 . 
Terrorism: 
individual attacks on 
civilians (n=130) 
[indneverjust_2_16_2010] % of citizens in nation affirming individual attacks on 
civilians “never justified”; Source: Gallup World Poll internet data (2008-2009), 
retrieved 2/16/2010. 
Global Peace Index 
2009 score (n=120) 
[gpi2009] Most peaceful score: 1.202; Least peaceful score: 3.341; Source: 
Institute for Economics and Peace 
Transformed GPI 
2009 score (n=120) 
[transgpi2009] Tansformed GPI score was calculated by 4 – x (where x = each 
nation’s GPI2009 score). Most peaceful score: 2.798; Least peaceful score: .659  
Global Peace Index 
2012 score (n=128) 
[gpi2012] Most peaceful score: 1.113; Least peaceful score: 3.392; Source: 
Institute for Economics and Peace 
Transformed GPI 
2012 score (n=128) 
[transgpi2012] Tansformed GPI score was calculated by 4 – x (where x = each 
nation’s GPI2012 score). Most peaceful score: 2.887; Least peaceful score: .608 
World Peace Index 
2009 score (n=122) 
[WPI2009] Most peaceful score: 93.5; Least peaceful score: 34.7; Source: World 
Peace Forum 
World Peace Index 
2012 score (n=122) 
[WPI2012] Most peaceful score: 91.5; Least peaceful score: 37.8; Source: World 
Peace Forum 
World Peace Index 
decade (2001-2010) 
average score 
(n=122) 
[WPIdecade_avg] Note: This average was calculated because the scores of 
several nations were relatively volatile in one or more years during the decade.  
 
Political Peace 
Index (WPI 2012) 
(n=122) 
[POL2012] Sub-index of the WPI; Most peaceful score: 98.8; Least peaceful 
score: 12.9; Source: World Peace Forum 
Military-Diplomatic 
Peace Index (WPI 
2012) (n=122) 
[MIL2012] Sub-index of the WPI; Most peaceful score: 90.2; Least peaceful 
score: 27.7 for Syria (South Sudan (not in current sample) is even lower at 21.7); 
Source: World Peace Forum 
Socio-Economic 
Peace Index (WPI 
2012) (n=122) 
[SOC2012] Sub-index of the WPI; Most peaceful score: 92.1; Least peaceful 
score: 19.5; Source: World Peace Forum 
Positive Peace Index 
(GPI 2012) (n=99) 
[PPI2012] Positive Peace Index 2012; Most peaceful score: 1.17; Least peaceful 
score: 4.016; Source: Global Peace Index 2012 report; Institute for Economics 
and Peace 
 
735 
 
Transformed 
Positive Peace Index 
(GPI 2012) (n=99) 
[transPPI2012] Transformed Positive Peace Index; calculated by 5 – x (where x = 
each nation’s Positive Peace Index 2012 score); Most peaceful score: 3.83; Least 
peaceful score: .984  
Type of Society 
(n=134) 
[typesociety] “Postindustrial Societies” (coded “1”) were defined, following 
Norris and Inglehart (2004), as the 21 most affluent states, ranking with a Human 
Development Index (HDI) score over .898 (Source: the 1998 HDI in the UNDP 
Human Development Report for 2000).  
“Industrial Societies” (coded “2”) were defined as the nations with a moderate 
HDI (ranging from .740 to .886). 
“Agrarian societies” (coded “3”) were defined as the nations with lower levels of 
development as indicated by a low HDI (below .740). 
Because the Palestinian Territories (coded “2”) and Liberia (coded “3”) were not 
included in the Human Development Report, they were coded based on GDP per 
capita PPP (measured in “current international $”) and GDP per capita (measured 
in “constant 2000 US$”), in 1998 World Bank data.  
[Although the Gallup World Poll data was retrieved in early 2010 (and data was 
largely collected in 2009 and 2008), the 1998 date of this socio-economic data 
was deemed appropriate since cultural change is likely to have significant time 
lags.]  
Type of society 
reverse-coded 
(n=134) 
[reversetypesociety] The “typesociety” variable above, reverse coded (4 – 
typesociety). 1=Agrarian; 2=Industrial; 3=Post-industrial 
Type of Economy 
(n=133) 
[type_econ] Types: 1=Low GDP per capita; 2= Medium; 3= High GDP per 
capita; Source: Norris (2009) data from World Bank 2007 (3-category level of 
GDP per capita in PPP (purchasing power parity) 2006) 
Region (n=136) [region_code] 1=Western Europe, Canada & U.S.; 2= Eastern Europe & Central 
Asia; 3= Middle East & North Africa; 4= South & East Asia & Oceana; 5= Latin 
America; 6= Sub-Saharan Africa 
Civilizations 
(n=130) 
[Nine_civilizations] 
(1) Western Christianity 
(2) Muslim 
(3) Orthodox (Russian and Greek) 
(4) Latin American 
(5) Sinic/Confucian 
(6) Japanese 
(7) Hindu 
(8) Buddhist 
(9) Sub-Saharan Africa 
Source: These codes build on Norris and Inglehart (2004, pp.138-141), who draw 
from Huntington’s (1996) theorizing on distinct civilizations. Notes: Based on 
Huntington’s coded map (pp.26-27) and additional research, the following 
nations were deemed as unique or too diverse and historically complex to code as 
belonging to any one civilization: Guyana, Haiti, Israel, Kosovo, the Philippines, 
and Trinidad and Tobago. In any case, we must take seriously critiques of 
Huntington, such as one articulated by Chalmers Johnson (2001): “Talking about 
the ‘clash of civilizations’ is a way of evading responsibility for the ‘blowback’ 
that US imperial projects have generated” (p.14).   
Historically 
Predominant Major 
Religions (n=135) 
[typereligion] Protestant (1), Catholic (2), Orthodox Christian (3), Buddhist/ 
Eastern (4), Muslim (5), Hindu (6), Jewish (7), Other (indigenous beliefs, 
animism) (8). Sources: States classified by the historically predominant 
(plurality) religion, derived from the Encyclopedia Britannica Book of the Year 
2001 by Alesina et al. (2003) and Norris and Inglehart (2004, pp.46-47). Notes: 
For states not included in Norris and Inglehart’s (2004) data set, the coding is 
based on the major religion (adhered to by the largest population) according to 
the CIA. The World Factbook, 2012. (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence 
Agency).  Retrieved November 10, 2012. 
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https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2122.html#af  
The CIA vaguely coded the following countries as predominantly “Christian”: 
Botswana, Cameroon, Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Malawi, and Zambia. 
Thus, Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson (2001, Vol.2, pp.623-648) was consulted to 
produce more specific codes: all of these African nations were reported to be 
predominantly Protestant (including Protestants, Pentecostal-Charimatics, and 
Evangelicals), except for the Republic of Congo which is predominantly Roman 
Catholic. All of these are standard reference sources widely used in the literature 
(Norris and Inglehart 2004, p.44). 
Secularization 
(n=66) 
[Secularization] 1= Most people religious; 2 = Moderate; 3 = Most people 
secular; Source: Norris and Inglehart, World Values Survey data, coded in Norris 
(2009). 
World-system 
position (n=115) 
[worldsystempos] 1= Periphery; 2= Semiperiphery; 3= Core; Source: Clark and 
Beckfield (2009) 
Democracy/ Regime 
Type #1 (n=134) 
[regimetype] 1= Authoritarian regimes; 2= Hybrid regimes; 3= Flawed 
democracies; 4=Full democracies; Source: Democracy Index 2010 by Economist 
Intelligence Unit 
Democracy measure 
#2 (n=134) 
[DemIndex2010score] Democracy Index 2010 Overall Score; 10 = Highly 
functioning; 0= Poorly functioning; Source: Democracy Index 2010 by 
Economist Intelligence Unit 
Democracy measure 
#3 (n=134) 
[PolCulture2010] Political Culture Index; 10 = Highly functioning; 0= Poorly 
functioning; Source: Democracy Index 2010 by Economist Intelligence Unit 
Democracy measure 
#4 (n=134) 
[CivLib2010] Civil Liberties Index; 10 = High degree of civil liberties; 0= 
Nonexistent civil liberties; Source: Democracy Index 2010 by Economist 
Intelligence Unit 
Democracy/ Regime 
Type #5 (n=132) 
[FreedomHouse2008] 1= Not free; 2= Partly free; 3= Free; Source: Norris and 
Inglehart (2009) data from Freedom House 2008 
Democracy/ Regime 
Type #6 (n=136) 
[FreedomHouse2012] 1= Not free; 2= Partly free; 3= Free; The ratings reflect 
global events from January 2, 2011, through December 31, 2011; Source: 
Freedom in the World 2012, Freedom House 
Democracy measure 
#7 (n=136) 
[PolRights2012] Political Rights Index; codes 1-7 (1 represents the most free and 
7 the least free rating); Source: Freedom in the World 2012, Freedom House 
Transformed 
Political Rights 
Index (n=136) 
[transPolRights2012] calculated by 8 – x (where x = each nation’s Political 
Rights Index 2012 score) 
Democracy measure 
#8 (n=136) 
[CivLib2012] Civil Liberties Index; codes 1-7 (1 represents the most free and 7 
the least free rating); Source: Freedom in the World 2012, Freedom House 
Transformed Civil 
Liberties Index 
(n=136) 
[transCivLib2012] calculated by 8 – x (where x = each nation’s Civil Liberties 
Index 2012 score) 
Democracy measure 
#9 (n=136) 
[Elect_Democracy] Dummy variable – rated/ not rated as an “electoral 
democracy” by Freedom House; Codes: 1=Yes, an electoral democracy; 0=No; 
Source: Freedom in the World 2012, Freedom House 
Education measure 
#1 (n=126) 
[Literacy_rate_adult]  Source: World Bank data 2009; Note: If data was lacking 
for the year 2009, World Bank data was used, if available, for the years 2005 – 
2010. World Bank data on literacy is obtained from UNESCO, which estimates 
that all developed countries have a literacy rate of more than 95%  
(http://data.worldbank.org/about/faq/specific-data-series; Retrieved November 
14, 2012). Moreover, since several middle-income nations (e.g., Armenia, 
Belarus, Estonia, and Ukraine) with data reported over 99% literacy, developed 
countries missing data were coded as 99%. The figures for Azerbaijan and Sudan 
came from the 2010 UN Human Development Report. 
Education measure 
#2 (n=132) 
[Mean_yrs_school] Mean years of schooling; Source: UN Human Development 
Report 2010 
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Education measure 
#3 (n=126) 
[primary_enrol_ratio_net] Primary school enrollment ratio, net (% of primary 
school-age population), Data refer to the most recent year available during the 
period 2001-2009; Source: UN Human Development Report 2010 
Education measure 
#4 (n=109) 
[secondary_enrol_ratio_net] Secondary school enrollment ratio, net (% of 
secondary school-age population), Data refer to the most recent year available 
during the period 2001-2009; Source: UN Human Development Report 2010 
Education measure 
#5 (n=122) 
[enroll_tertiary_percentgross] School enrollment, tertiary (% gross); The total 
enrollment in tertiary education (ISCED 5 and 6), regardless of age, expressed as 
a percentage of the total population of the five-year age group following on from 
secondary school leaving. Note: If data was lacking for 2009, data refer to the 
closest year available between the years 2004-2011. In the cases of Egypt and 
Laos, data was available for 2008 and 2010, so this was averaged to produce an 
estimated 2009 figure. Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, in World Bank 
World Development Indicators  
Education measure 
#6 (n=112) 
[pop_with_secondary_ed] Population with at least secondary education (% ages 
25 and older), 2010; Source: UN Human Development Report 2010 
Education measure 
#7 (n=124) 
[educ_percent_govt_spent] Public spending on education, total (% of government 
expenditure); 2009 data; where data lacking in 2009, data comes from closest 
year available between 2000-2010; in a few cases, data was present for 2008 and 
2010, so this was averaged to produce an estimated 2009 figure; Source: 
UNESCO Institute for Statistics, in World Bank World Development Indicators 
Education measure 
#8 (n=127) 
[educ_spent_percent_GDP] Current education spending as a % of GDP; 2009 
data; where data lacking in 2009, data comes from closest year available between 
2000-2010; in a few cases, data was present for 2008 and 2010, so this was 
averaged to produce an estimated 2009 figure; Source: UNESCO Institute for 
Statistics, in World Bank World Development Indicators 
Education measure 
#9 (n=101) 
[pupil_teacher_ratio] Pupil-teacher ratio (number of pupils per teacher); Data 
refer to the most recent year available between 2005-08; The pupil-teacher ratio 
data from Chad (176.2) and Central African Republic (100.2) were ommitted 
because they are such clear outliers – more than double the ratios of virtually all 
of the other nations. Source: UN Human Development Report 2010 
Education measure 
#10 (n=126) 
[males_w_secondary_ed] Male population with at least secondary education (% 
ages 25 and older); Source: UN Human Development Report 2011 
Cosmopolitanism 
measure #1 (n=78) 
[cbindex] Cosmopolitanism Index; This index is constructed by adding the 
standardized (i.e., each component is equally weighted) Media Freedom Index, 
the Globalization Index (see below), and per capita GDP; Source: Norris and 
Inglehart (2009) 
Cosmopolitanism 
measure #2 (n=78) 
[GlobIndex2005] Globalization Index; The KOF Index of Globalization, 1970-
2005 (for methods see http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/); The 100-point index is 
constructed from two dozen variables measuring three dimensions: 1) social 
globalization (the spread of personal contact, information flows, and cultural 
proximity); 2) economic globalization (the long-distance flow of goods, 
investment capital, and commercial services, as well as restrictions through 
import berriers, taxes, and tariffs); and 3) political globalization (measured by 
integration with international intergovernmental organizations, the number of 
embassies based in a country, and national engagement in UN peace missions); 
Source: Norris and Inglehart (2009, p.312) 
Urbanization 
measure #1 (n=135) 
[percent_urban_pop] Urban population (% of total population); Source: World 
Bank data 2009; Note: World Bank data was lacking for Taiwan, so the data on 
Taiwan comes from the Population Reference Bureau (2010).  
Urbanization 
measure #2 (n=133) 
[per_urban_cia2010] Urban population (% of total population); Source: CIA 
World Factbook 2010 
Urbanization 
measure #3 (n=134) 
[Urban_population] Total number of urban residents; Source: World Bank data 
2009 
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Urbanization 
measure #4 (n=134) 
[Ruralpopulation_percent_of_total] Rural population (% of total population); 
Source: World Bank data 2009 
Urbanization 
measure #5 (n=135) 
[Population_density] Population density (people per sq. km of land area); Source: 
World Bank data 2009  
Measure of female 
empowerment #1 
(n=123) 
[GenderInequalIndex_UN2011] Gender Inequality Index; Sweden ranks #1 with 
an index score of .049; Chad ranks last, #145, with an index score of .735; 
Source: UN Human Development Report 2011 
Measure of female 
empowerment #2 
(n=128) 
[percent_parliaments_female] Proportion of seats held by women in national 
parliaments (%); Source: World Bank data 2009 
Measure of female 
empowerment #3 
(n=134) 
[adol_fertility] Adolescent fertility rate (births per 1,000 women ages 15-19); 
Source: World Bank data 2009 
Measure of female 
empowerment #4 
(n=135) 
[Birth_rate_perthousand] Birth rate, crude (per 1,000 people); Source: World 
Bank data 2009 
Measure of female 
empowerment #5 
(n=135) 
[fertility_rate] Fertility rate, total (births per woman); Source: World Bank data 
2009 
Measure of female 
empowerment #6 
(n=134) 
[Ratio_female_to_male_labor_parti] Ratio of female to male labor participation 
rate (%); Source: World Bank data 2009 
Measure of female 
empowerment #7 
(n=134) 
[Labor_participation_fem_over15] Labor participation rate, female (% of female 
participation ages 15+); Source: World Bank data 2009 
Measure of female 
empowerment #8 
(n=54) 
[percent_females_in_total_nonagri] Share of women employed in the 
nonagricultural sector (% of total nonagricultural employment); Source: World 
Bank data 2009  
Measure of female 
empowerment #9 
(n=70) 
[Literacy_rate_adult_female] Literacy rate, youth female (% of females ages 15 
and above); Source: World Bank data 2009 
Measure of female 
empowerment #10 
(n=70) 
[Literacy_rate_youth_females15_24] Literacy rate, youth female (% of females 
ages 15-24); Source: World Bank data 2009 
Measure of female 
empowerment #11 
(n=70) 
 
[Ratio_youngliterate_fem_to_males] Ratio of young literate females to males (% 
ages 15-24); Source: World Bank data 2009 
Measure of female 
empowerment #12 
(n=111) 
[Ratio_female_to_male_primary_enr] Ratio female to male primary enrollment 
(%); Ratio of female to male primary enrollment is the percentage of girls to boys 
enrolled at primary level in public and private schools; Source: World Bank data 
2009 
Measure of female 
empowerment #13 
(n=81) 
 
[Totalenroll_primary_female_perce] Total enrollment, primary school, female 
(% net); Source: World Bank data 2009 
Measure of female 
empowerment #14 
(n=91) 
[Primary_completion_rate_female] Primary completion rate, female (% of 
relevant age group); Primary completion rate. Female is the total number of new 
female entrants in the last grade of primary education, regardless of age, 
expressed as percentage of the total female population of the theoretical entrance 
age to the last grade of primary. This indicator is also known as "gross intake rate 
to the last grade of primary." The ratio can exceed 100% due to over-aged and 
under-aged children who enter primary school late/early and/or repeat grades;  
Source: World Bank data 2009 
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Measure of female 
empowerment #15 
(n=42) 
[Progression_to_secondary_female_ ] Progression to secondary school, female 
(%); Transition from primary (ISCED 1) to secondary (ISCED 2), general 
programmes (%). Female is the number of new female entrants to the first grade 
of secondary education (general programmes only) in a given year, expressed as 
a percentage of the number of female pupils enrolled in the final grade of primary 
education in the previous year; Source: World Bank data 2009  
Measure of female 
empowerment #16 
(n=97) 
[Ratio_female_to_male_secondary_e] Ratio of female to male secondary 
enrollment (%); Ratio of female to male secondary enrollment is the percentage 
of girls to boys enrolled at secondary level in public and private schools; Source: 
World Bank data 2009 
Measure of female 
empowerment #17 
(n=101) 
[Secondary_ed_percent_female] Secondary education, pupils (% female); 
Source: World Bank data 2009 
Measure of female 
empowerment #18 
(n=95) 
[enroll_secondary_female_percentg] School enrollment, secondary, female (% 
gross); Gross enrollment ratio. Secondary. All programmes. Total is the total 
enrollment in secondary education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage 
of the population of official secondary education age. GER can exceed 100% due 
to the inclusion of over-aged and under-aged students because of early or late 
school entrance and grade repetition. Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics,  
World Bank data 2009 
Measure of female 
empowerment #19 
(n=66) 
[enroll_secondary_female_percentn] School enrollment, secondary, female (% 
net); Net enrollment rate. Secondary. All programmes. Total is the ratio of 
children of the official secondary school age who are enrolled in secondary 
school to the population of the official secondary school age. Source:  
UNESCO Institute for Statistics, World Bank data 2009 
Measure of female 
empowerment #20 
(n=125) 
[females_w_second_ed] Female population with at least secondary education (% 
ages 25 and older); Source: UN Human Development Report 2011 
Measure of female 
empowerment #21 
(n=97) 
[Ratio_girls_to_boys_primary_n_se] Ratio of girls to boys in primary and 
secondary education (%); Source: World Bank data 2009 
Measure of female 
empowerment #22 
(n=88) 
[Ratio_fem_to_male_tertiary_enrol] Ratio of female to male tertiary enrollment 
(%); Source: World Bank data 2009 
Measure of female 
empowerment #23 
(n=88) 
[enroll_tertiaryfemale_percentgro] School enrollment, tertiary, female (% gross); 
Source: World Bank data 2009 
Structural measure 
of militarism #1 
(n=131) 
[percent_labor_soldiers] Armed forces personnel (% of total labor force); Source: 
World Bank data 2009 
Structural measure 
of militarism #2 
(n=131) 
[total_soldiers] Armed forces personnel, total; Source: World Bank data 2009 
Structural measure 
of militarism #3 
(n=105) 
[Military_expenditure_percent_gov] Military expenditure (% of central 
government expenditure); 2009 data; Where data lacking in 2009, data comes 
from closest year available between 2000-2010; In a few cases, data was present 
for 2008 and 2010, so this was averaged to produce an estimated 2009 figure; 
Source: SIPRI Yearbook in World Bank data 
 
Structural measure 
of militarism #4 
(n=128) 
[Military_expenditure_percentGDP] Percent of GDP devoted to military 
spending; 2009 data; Where data lacking in 2009, data comes from closest year 
available between 2000-2010; In a few cases, data was present for 2008 and 
2010, so this was averaged to produce an estimated 2009 figure; Source: SIPRI 
Yearbook in World Bank data  
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Structural measure 
of militarism #5 
(n=132) 
[perGDP_mil_spend_CIA2010] Percent of GDP devoted to military spending in 
2010;  Source: CIA World Factbook 
 
Structural measure 
of militarism #6 
(n=128) 
[Military_expenditure_currentLCU] Military expenditure (current local currency 
units (LCU)); 2009 data; Where data lacking in 2009, data comes from most 
recent year available between 2000-2008; Source: SIPRI Yearbook in World 
Bank data 
Structural measure 
of militarism #7 
(n=133) 
[percapita_mil_spending] Per capita military expenditure (US$); Note that the 
following nations had a value of 0 on this measure because they are 
demilitarized: Costa Rica, Panama, Haiti, Iceland, and Hong Kong; However, 
Costa Rica is described as having a per capita expenditure of US $43 for 
“paramilitary (police) forces” (Time 2012, p.249); Panama is described as having 
a per capita expenditure of US $66 for  “paramilitary” forces (p.391); Haiti is 
listed as including only police and UN peacekeepers (p.298); Iceland is described 
as having “no military” but “coast guard (paramilitary) personnel” with a per 
capita expenditure of US$109 (p.303); Hong Kong residents are “exempted from 
military service” and no per capita expenditure is listed (p.301); Source: Time 
2012/ Encyclopaedia Britannica 
Structural factors: 
size of population 
(n=135) 
[WB_Population_total] Population, total; Source: World Bank data 2009 
 
Structural factors: 
population in 
millions (n= 135) 
[pop_in_millions_CIA2011] Population, total (in millions); Source: CIA World 
Factbook 2011 
Structural factors: 
youth bulge proxy 
(n=134) 
[proxyyouth_bulge] Population ages 0-14 (% of total population); This data from 
1994 (i.e., data has a 15 year lag) was used as a proxy indicator for youth bulges 
at the time of the Gallup World Poll data (collected around 2009); Source: World 
Bank data 1994 
Structural factors: 
youth bulge (n=134) 
[youth_bulge] Population ages 15-29 (% of total population); data comes from 
2005 to 2009; Source: Encyclopaedia Britannica (Time 2012) 
GDP per capita 
(n=130) 
[GDPpercapitaPPPconstant2005inter] GDP per capita in PPP (purchasing power 
parity) in constant 2005 international dollars; Source: World Bank data 2009; 
Note: An “international dollar would buy in the cited country a comparable 
amount of goods and services a US dollar would buy in the United States” 
(World Bank website, retrieved November 2012). 
http://data.worldbank.org/about/faq/specific-data-series 
Log of GDP per 
capita PPP (n=130) 
[lnGDPpercapita] 
GNI per capita 
(n=129) 
[GNIpercapitaPPPcurrentinternat] GNI per capita in PPP in current international 
dollars; Source: World Bank data 2009; Note: GNI (gross national income) was 
formerly referred to as GNP (gross national product)  
State Reach (n=113) [statereach] State reach is measured by an index including road density, 
telephone density, and the percentage of the population living in urban areas 
(2006 data); Source: Holtermann (2012) 
History of major 
nonviolent 
campaigns by nation 
(1900 – 2009) 
(n=136) 
 
[Rnv_success_in_last100yrs] A major nonviolent campaign “success” since 1900 
(coded “1” if present; “0” if absent); Source: Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) and 
online Global Nonviolent Action Database (GNAD), retrieved February 2013   
 
Dummy: Limited 
nonviolent success 
since 1900 (1900 – 
2009) (n=136) 
[Rlimitednvsuccess_in_last100yrs] Nations coded as experiencing major 
nonviolent campaigns with “limited success” since 1900 (coded “1” if present; 
“0” if absent);  Source: Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) and online Global 
Nonviolent Action Database (GNAD), retrieved February 2013 
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Dummy: Two or 
more nonviolence 
successes since 
1900 (1900 – 2009) 
(n=136) 
[Rtwo_or_more_nvsuccesses] Two or more major nonviolent campaigns 
achieving “success” since 1900 years (coded “1” if present; “0” if absent); 
Source: Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) and online Global Nonviolent Action 
Database (GNAD), retrieved February 2013 
Year last successful 
nonviolent 
campaign ended 
(1900 – 2009) 
(n=136) 
[Ryr_last_successfulnv_movt_ended] Year last successful nonviolent campaign 
ended (1900 – 2009). Those with no successful nonviolent campaigns were 
initially coded as 1900. In a second set of tests, these nations were coded as 
missing data. 
Years since 
successful 
nonviolent 
campaign 
(n=136) 
[Ryrs_since_lastnvsuccess] This variable is based on the above variable, as the 
following subtraction was conducted: 2009 – (Ryr_last_successfulnv_movt 
_ended).   
Nonviolent history 
(n=136) 
[Rnv_movt_history] 
1 = nations with 2 or more nonviolent successes 
2= nations with 1 nonviolent “success” only 
3= nations with nonviolent movements achieving “limited success” only (nations                    
experiencing major successful nonviolent campaigns were excluded) 
4= no major nonviolent movements achieving even “limited success” 
Source: Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) and online Global Nonviolent Action 
Database (GNAD), retrieved February 2013 
Dummy: Nonviolent 
success since 1988 
(n=136) 
[Rnvsuccess_since1988] (coded “1” if present; “0” if absent); Source: Stephan 
and Chenoweth (2008) and online Global Nonviolent Action Database (GNAD), 
retrieved February 2013 
Dummy: Nonviolent 
success since 1998 
(n=136) 
[Rnvsuccess_since1998] (coded “1” if present; “0” if absent); Source: Stephan 
and Chenoweth (2008) and online Global Nonviolent Action Database (GNAD), 
retrieved February 2013 
Number of years at 
war since 1945 (to 
2009) (n=136) 
[war_years] Number of years at war (cumulative and non-consecutive) since 
1945 (to 2009). Statistics are rough estimates based on the simple rounding off of 
each conflict start date and end date by yearly increments, based on start and end 
date statistics which are described by year only in the Marshall (2012) dataset. 
Hence, any conflict starting and ending in the same year is coded as one year at 
war. But if a conflict started in 1945 (any month) and ended in 1946 (any month), 
the subtraction procedure would also give us an estimate of one year at war (i.e., 
1946 (end date) – 1945 (start date) = 1 year), even though it is obviously possible 
the time period was closer to two years, depending on the months involved. 
Hence, the data is fuzzy in the sense that for each war event we are either 
rounding up or rounding down by a few months with each coding. Nevertheless, 
this coding procedure was considered defensable, and saved a great deal of time 
(more accurate codes would be possible for teams of researchers using the 
Correlates of War dataset).  
           
There is another imprecision in the data in that some nations like India have had 
multiple conflicts going on at once, and in order to save time, the coding method 
simply added each conflict together cumulatively. Hence, if a nation had two 
simulataneous conflicts between 1945 and 1955, this would count as 20 years at 
war. Thus, nations like the Philippines are penalized/ overcounted as a result of 
waging two conflicts at once. Likewise for India, the total number of years at war 
during this period (1945 to 2009), if each war duration is added together, is 129 
years. Since 64 is the number of years between 1945 and 2009, any nation with 
more than 64 total years at war was coded as “64.” Again, this coding procedure 
was considered defensable, since it gives us one indicator of a nation’s ability or 
inability to avoid or resolve conflicts over time, measured in years.  
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Again, there is an obvious imprecision in start date and end date information for 
each war/ conflict since it does not include the month. Since Gallup World poll 
data was collected in most nations between 2008 and 2009, and data from a few 
nations was collected in 2007, conflicts that began after the polling date (see 
Appendix T) in each respective nation were not included in the count of years at 
war. 
 
For simplicity and comparability, 2009 was taken to be the end date of the 
“number of years at war” variable data point. Again, if a war started in 2007, 
2008, 2009 or after, and this war start came after the Gallup World Poll survey 
date in that country, it was not counted. In no cases did this result in a nation at 
war in 2007-2009 being counted as a nation at peace for additional years because, 
coincidentally, all of the nations at war in 2007-2009 (past the date of the Gallup 
World poll survey in each respective country) were involved in long-standing 
conflicts, many of which extended into 2011 and beyond. Moreover, virtually all 
of the nations that began new wars in 2007-2009, began very small wars and 
were already experiencing other prolonged wars. Similarly, no nations were 
treated as if they had engaged in 1 or 2 extra years of war that they did not 
ultimately engage in. For example, the Central African Republic survey was 
conducted in 2007. This nation has had a war from 2005 to 2011+, but (for 
simplicity and comparability) the war end date was coded at 2009. This means 
that in a few cases like Central African Republic and Chad, the Gallup opinion 
survey was treated as if conducted in 2009, after 1 or 2 additional years of war. 
But in all cases, these wars were ongoing and in most cases longstanding over 
many years or decades. Thus, the distorting effects of coding irregularities would 
seem to be, on average, very small. For our purposes, a distortion would be 
present if for some reason, those additional years of war somehow generated a 
strong shift in public opinions. For a macro, cross-national analysis, such data 
problems were considered very minor. Source: Marshall (2012) 
Total number of 
years at peace since 
1945 (to 2009) 
(n=136) 
[peace_years ] Total number of years at peace (non-consecutive) since 1945 (to 
2009). This statistic is based on the variable above, calculated through 
subtraction as follows: 64 - (number of years at war since 1945) = peace years; 
[64 is the number of years between 1945 and 2009]. Source: Marshall (2012) 
Year last war ended 
(1945 to 2009) 
(n=136) 
[year_last_war_ended] The year in which the nation’s last war ended, if fought, 
during the period 1945 to 2009. Those with ongoing wars were coded 2009. 
Those with no wars were coded as 1945. Source: Marshall (2012) 
Number of 
consecutive years of 
peace since last war 
ended (1945 to 
2009) (n=136) 
[years_since_war] Number of consecutive years of peace since last war ended 
(1945 to 2009). This variable is based on the above variable, calculated through 
subtraction as follows: 2009 - (Year last war ended) = years since war. Source: 
Marshall (2012) 
Dummy: 
Historically peaceful 
nations (n=136) 
[historically_peaceful] Nations with no wars between 1945 and 2009 were coded 
as “1.” Other nations coded as “0.”; Source: Marshall (2012) 
Dummy: War prone 
nations (n=136) 
[war_prone] Nations with more than 40 years of war (using the “war_years” 
variable above) between 1945 and 2009 were coded as “1.” Other nations coded 
as “0.”; Source: Marshall (2012) 
Casualty counts 
(1945 to 2009) 
(n=136) 
[casualties] Overall, for simplicity and comparability, 2009 was taken to be the 
end date of the casualty count data. If a war started in 2009 or after, it was not 
included in the casualty count data. Because the Marshall (2012) data includes 
casualty counts through 2011, and these counts were adopted in the present 
study, there is some imprecision in the data (i.e., people killed in 2009-2011 were 
counted as if they had already been killed before the opinion poll in 2009 for 
example). But it was not considered problematic since all of the casualty counts 
extending into 2011 were part of long-standing, multi-year conflicts that began 
long before 2009. Hence, the effect of casualty counts on attitudes would likely 
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have already had the chance to form and solidify, though turning points in 
conflicts and attitudes are always possible.  
Another source of imprecision in the data is seen in the casualty counts for 
international conflicts. In most cases, Marshall (2012) lists casualties only for one 
nation (itemized by nation), but for some minor international conflicts he lists 
total killed (including casualties to the enemy or enemy population). For 
example, in both the U.S. and Panama casualty counts, he lists 1,000 deaths 
under the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama. Less than 50 U.S. soldiers were killed 
in the invasion, but an estimated 1,000 to 4,000 Panamanians were killed. 
Source: Marshall (2012) 
Human 
Development Index 
(HDI) 2010 (n=131) 
[HDI2010] The HDI is an index of the potential human development that could 
be achieved if there was no inequality in a society; Source: UN Human 
Development Report 2010 
Inequality-adjusted 
HDI (IHDI) 2010 
(n=116) 
[InequalHDI2010] The inequality-adjusted human development index; The IHDI 
is the actual level of development, taking into account inequality; Under perfect 
equality, the HDI and IHDI would be equal; Source: UN Human Development 
Report 2010 
Overall loss (%) in 
potential due to 
inequality (n=116) 
[lossHDI2010] The “Loss (%),” the difference between the HDI and the 
Inequality-adjusted HDI expressed as a percentage, indicates the loss in potential 
human development due to inequality. Source: UN Human Development Report 
2010 
Income inequality 
2000-2010 (n=121) 
[Gini2000_2010] Income Gini coefficient 2000 – 2010; The range is from 16.8 to 
74.3, with the higher number representing more inequality; Japan, Norway, and 
Sweden are all at about 25, while the U.S. has a score of 40.8 ;Source: UN 
Human Development Report 2010 
Average Annual 
Temperature (F) 
(n=134) 
[avg_temp] Average Annual Temperature (in Farenheit) for the nation; Source: 
www.weatherbase.com 
Average Annual 
High Temperature 
(F) (n=133) 
[avg_hightemp] Average Annual High Temperature (in Farenheit) for the nation; 
Source: www.weatherbase.com 
Mountainous terrain 
(n=124) 
[mount] The proportion of a nation’s terrain which is mountainous. This measure 
takes into account not only altitude but also plateaus and rugged uplands. Source: 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004)  
Natural log of 
mountainous terrain 
(n=124) 
[lnmount2] In natural log transformations, Stata transforms 0 to missing data, 1 
to 0, and numbers between 0 to 1 into negative numbers. In the “mount” variable, 
since some nations were originally coded with a 0, some were coded with 1, and 
some were coded with values between 1 and 0, and in order to avoid missing data 
and negative numbers, the “mount2” variable was created in this way: mount2 = 
1 + mount; Then, a natural log transformation of the mount2 variable was 
conducted.   
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
(n=133) 
[ethnic_fract] Ethnic fractionalization is a measure of ethnic heterogeneity within 
the nation; 0= “complete homogeneity”; 1= “complete heterogeneity” (Alesina et 
al. 2003, p.166); Source: Alesina et al. (2003) 
Language 
Fractionalization 
(n=131) 
[lang_fract] Language fractionalization is a measure of linguistic heterogeneity 
within the nation; 0= “complete homogeneity”; 1= “complete heterogeneity” 
(Alesina et al. 2003, p.166); Source: Alesina et al. (2003) 
Religion 
Fractionalization 
(n=134) 
[rel_fract] Religion fractionalization is a measure of religious heterogeneity 
within the nation; 0= “complete homogeneity”; 1= “complete heterogeneity” 
(Alesina et al. 2003, p.166); Source: Alesina et al. (2003) 
Ethnic dominance: 
share of the 
population in the 
largest ethnic group 
(n=136) 
[plural] Percent of population in largest group. Source: Fearon and Laitin (2003); 
The variables “plural” and “second” were coded together. In cases where data 
was missing for one of the variables, the TIME Almanac (2013) was utilized to 
furnish data on both variables. The CIA World Factbook 2013 provided data on 
Palestine (West Bank; Gaza Strip data not available). 
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Ethnic polarization: 
share of the 
population in the 
second largest 
ethnic group 
(n=136) 
[second] Source: Fearon and Laitin (2003); The variables “plural” and “second” 
were coded together. In cases where data was missing for one of the variables, 
the TIME (2013) Almanac was utilized to furnish data on both variables. The 
CIA World Factbook 2013 provided data on Palestine (West Bank; Gaza Strip 
data not available). 
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APPENDIX Q 
 
CORRELATIONS OF PEACE INDEXES WITH GALLUP WORLD POLL (2010) ITEMS 
 
 % military 
attacks on 
civilians 
never 
justified 
% terrorism 
never 
justified 
% non- 
violence 
will work 
Trans 
GPI 
2009 
Trans 
GPI 
2012 
WPI 
2009 
WPI 
2012 
WPI dec-ade 
avg 
Trans 
PPI 
2012 
POL 
2012 
MIL 
2012 
% military 
attacks on 
civilians never 
justified 
1.0           
% terrorism never 
justified 
.8315**** 1.0          
% nonviolence 
will work 
.0026 -.121 1.0         
TransGPI2009 .1911* .2604** -.2272* 1.0        
TransGPI2012 .1686 .2643** -.2544** .9537**** 1.0       
WPI2009 .1582 .2541** -.2429** .8035**** .8091**** 1.0      
WPI 2012 .1762 .2773** -.2644** .8122**** .8460**** .9389**** 1.0     
WPI decade 
 avg 
.1938* .3047*** -.2317* .8123**** .8176**** .9710**** .9537**** 1.0    
TransPPI2012 .1145 .3368*** -.2941** .7432**** .7580**** .8132**** .8560**** .8684**** 1.0   
POL 2012 .0968 .1918* -.2055* .7490**** .7961**** .8742**** .8953**** .8856**** .7313**** 1.0  
MIL 2012 .1413 .0043 -.0185 .5115**** .5303**** .5389**** .5737**** .5202**** .2586* .4231**** 1.0 
SOC 2012 .1699 .3611**** -.3239*** .5379**** .5204**** .6381**** .7226**** .6707**** .7518**** .4751**** .0378 
 
Notes: Tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001; Sources: Gallup World Poll; Global Peace Index; World Peace 
Index 
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APPENDIX R 
 
DATE OF SURVEYS FOR GALLUP WORLD POLL DATA 
 
Afghanistan Oct_2009 
Algeria Sep_2009 
Angola Sep_2008 
Argentina Aug_2009 
Armenia  Jul_2009 
Australia Jun_2008 
Austria Apr_2008 
Azerbaijan Aug_2009 
Bahrain May_2009 
Bangladesh May_2009 
Belarus Jul_2009 
Belgium Jun_2008 
Belize Oct_2007 
Benin Aug_2008 
Bolivia Aug_2009 
Botswana Jul_2008 
Brazil Sep_2009 
Burkina Faso Apr_2008 
Burundi Aug_2009 
Cambodia Jun_2009 
Cameroon Apr_2009 
Canada Sep_2008 
Cen African Repub
 Nov_2007 
Chad Nov_2008 
Chile Sep_2009 
Colombia Aug_2009 
Comoros Mar_2009 
Dem Repub Congo
 Jun_2007 
Repub Congo Sep_2008 
Costa Rica Aug_2009 
Cote dIvoire Apr_2009 
Cyprus May_2009 
Czech Repub Jun_2007 
Denmark Apr_2008 
Djibouti Sep_2008 
Dominican Repub
 Nov_2008 
Ecuador Sep_2009 
Egypt Aug_2009 
El Salvador Jul_2009 
Estonia Jul_2009 
Ethiopia May_2008 
Finland Apr_2008 
France Jun_2008 
Georgia May_2009 
Germany Jan_2009 
Ghana Jul_2009 
Greece Oct_2009 
Guatemala Jul_2009 
Guinea Dec_2007 
Guyana Oct_2007 
Haiti Dec_2008 
Honduras Jul_2009 
Hong Kong Nov_2008 
Hungary Jun_2009 
Iceland Dec_2008 
India Jul_2008 
Indonesia May_2009 
Iran May_2008 
Iraq Aug_2009 
Ireland Apr_2008 
Israel Oct_2008 
Italy Jun_2008 
Japan Aug_2009 
Jordan Oct_2009 
Kazakhstan Aug_2009 
Kenya Apr_2009 
South Korea Sep_2008 
Kosovo Oct_2008 
Kuwait Aug_2009 
Kyrgyzstan Jul_2009 
Laos Aug_2008 
Latvia Aug_2009 
Lebanon Aug_2009 
Liberia May_2008 
Lithuania Aug_2009 
Luxembourg Jan_2009 
Madagascar Aug_2008 
Malawi Sep_2009 
Malaysia Jul_2009 
Mali Jun_2008 
Malta Jan_2009 
Mauritania Sep_2009 
Mexico Aug_2009 
Moldova Jul_2009 
Mongolia Oct_2008 
Morocco Jul_2009 
Mozambique Jun_2008 
Namibia Sep_2007 
Nepal Jul_2009 
Netherlands Jun_2008 
New Zealand Jun_2008 
Nicaragua Jul_2009 
Niger  Jun_2009 
Nigeria Aug_2009 
Norway Jun_2008 
Pakistan May_2009 
Palestinian Ter Aug_2009 
Panama Aug_2009 
Paraguay Aug_2009 
Peru Aug_2009 
Philippines Jun_2009 
Poland Jan_2009 
Portugal Oct_2008 
Qatar Mar_2009 
Romania Apr_2009 
Russia Jun_2009 
Rwanda Aug_2009 
Saudi Arabia Aug_2009 
Senegal Jun_2009 
Sierra Leone Jun_2008 
Singapore Jun_2009 
Slovenia May_2009 
South Africa Apr_2009 
Spain Apr_2008 
Sri Lanka Jun_2009 
Sudan Aug_2009 
Sweden  Apr_2008 
Syria Sep_2009 
Taiwan Oct_2008 
Tajikistan Aug_2009 
Tanzania Jul_2008 
Thailand Sep_2008 
Togo Aug_2008 
Trin and Tobago Oct_2008 
Tunisia Aug_2009 
Turkey Jul_2008 
Uganda Jun_2009 
Ukraine May_2009 
UK  Jun_2008 
USA Aug_2008 
Uruguay Aug_2009 
Venezuela Aug_2009 
Vietnam May_2009 
Yemen Sep_2009 
Zambia Jun_2008 
Zimbabwe Jul_2009 
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APPENDIX S 
OLS UNSTANDARDIZED COEFFICIENTS FOR REGRESSION OF NONVIOLENT EFFICACY ITEM 
(GALLUP WORLD POLL) ON INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Log GDP per capita -4.585*** 
(.916) 
-5.916*** 
(1.103) 
-6.943*** 
(1.485) 
-7.760*** 
(1.563) 
-7.226** 
(1.488) 
-6.711** 
(1.509) 
-7.087*** 
(1.508) 
-5.798*** 
(1.014) 
-7.260*** 
(1.458) 
Population total -1.61 
(9.68) 
-1.51 
(1.03) 
-1.21 
(1.00) 
-1.18 
(9.99) 
-1.23 
(9.97) 
-1.06 
(9.95) 
-1.14 
(9.86) 
-1.92* 
(9.27) 
-1.32 
(9.89) 
Years since war .005 
(.048) 
-.050 
(.080) 
-.060 
(.077) 
-.064 
(.078) 
-.073 
(.077) 
-.146 
(.089) 
-.153† 
(.088) 
 -.161† 
(.087) 
(Revised) Years since last 
nonviolent success 
-.081*** 
(.023) 
-.076*** 
(.023) 
-.064** 
(.023) 
-.067** 
(.023) 
-.068** 
(.023) 
-.061** 
(.023) 
-.065** 
(.023) 
-.079*** 
(.023) 
-.062** 
(.023) 
Historically peaceful 
(dummy) 
 1.867 
 (4.189) 
3.963 
(4.090) 
4.522 
(4.109) 
4.966 
(4.118) 
5.073 
(4.088) 
5.537 
(4.056) 
 5.671 
(4.031) 
War prone (dummy)  2.384 
(5.004) 
1.140 
(4.864) 
1.688 
(4.857) 
.538 
(4.851) 
7.346 
(6.323) 
7.60 
(6.263) 
 7.187 
(6.232) 
Casualties  -5.86* 
(2.74) 
-5.08† 
(2.66) 
-5.39* 
(2.68) 
-4.75† 
(2.66) 
-3.89 
(2.69) 
-4.66† 
(2.70) 
 -4.16 
(2.71) 
DemIndex2010score  .936 
(.696) 
.706 
(.678) 
.599 
(.688) 
.864 
(.682) 
.890 
(.677) 
.656 
(.683) 
  
Population density   -.004** 
(.001) 
-.004*** 
(.001) 
-.004** 
(.001) 
-.004** 
(.001) 
-.004*** 
(.001) 
 -.004*** 
(.001) 
Percent urban population   .117 
(.073) 
.128† 
(.073) 
.113 
(.073) 
.087 
(.074) 
.105 
(.074) 
 .106 
(.073) 
Ethnic fractionalization    -6.875 
(4.731) 
     
Religious fractionalization     -6.741 
(4.368) 
-6.542 
(4.337) 
-5.992 
(4.306) 
 -6.092 
(4.252) 
Peace years      .213† 
(.128) 
.202 
(.127) 
 .195 
(.126) 
second (share of pop in 
2nd largest ethnic group) 
      -17.749† 
(9.794) 
 -17.122† 
(9.682) 
CivLib2010        1.046† 
(.532) 
.849 
(.547) 
N 130 129 129 128 129 129 129 129 129 
Adj R² .2633 .2931 .3444 .3517 .3520 .3616 .3739 .2943 .3818 
High VIF (Mean VIF) 1.39  
(1.20) 
4.03 
(2.13) 
4.04 
(2.32) 
4.32 
(2.31) 
4.09 
(2.24) 
5.42 
(2.71) 
5.43 
(2.62) 
1.69 
(1.35) 
5.43 
(2.59) 
 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; † = p≤ .10; * = p ≤ .05; ** = p ≤ .01; *** = p ≤ .001 (two-tailed tests); The dependent variable is the national means for the nonviolent 
efficacy item (Gallup World Poll 2010): % “will work; The “revised” nonviolent history data comes from Stephan and Chenoweth (2008), the online Global Nonviolent Action Database 
(GNAD), and a few additional cases. 
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APPENDIX T 
 
CROSS-NATIONAL GENDER GAPS IN NONVIOLENT ATTITUDES 
 
Figure 1. Gender gaps at nation-level on “military attacks on civilians never justified” 
item (Gallup World Poll 2008-2009) 
 
 
 
Note: Percentage difference by sex (nation-level data) 
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Figure 2. Gender gaps: Nations where female mean more peaceful than male mean by 5% 
or greater on “military attacks on civilians never justified” item (Gallup World Poll 2008-
2009) 
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Figure 3. Gender gaps: Nations where male mean more peaceful than female mean by 4% 
or greater on “military attacks on civilians never justified” item (Gallup World Poll 2008-
2009) 
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Figure 4. Gender gaps at the nation-level on “peaceful means alone will work” item 
(Gallup World Poll 2008-2009) 
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Figure 5. Gender gaps: Nations where female mean more peaceful than male mean by 5% 
or greater on “peaceful means alone will work” item (Gallup World Poll 2008-2009) 
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Figure 6. Gender gaps: Nations where male mean more peaceful than female mean by 4% 
or greater on  “peaceful means alone will work” item (Gallup World Poll 2008-2009) 
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APPENDIX U 
 
GLOBAL PEACE INDEX 2008 – NATION SCORES AND  RANKS 
 
Rank/ Country/ Score 
1 Iceland 1.176 
2 Denmark 1.333 
3 Norway 1.343 
4 New Zealand 1.350 
5 Japan 1.358 
6 Ireland 1.410 
7 Portugal 1.412 
8 Finland 1.432 
9 Luxembourg 1.446 
10 Austria 1.449 
11 Canada 1.451 
12 Switzerland 1.465 
13 Sweden 1.468 
14 Germany 1.475 
15 Belgium 1.485 
16 Slovenia 1.491 
17 Czech Republic 1.501 
18 Hungary 1.576 
19 Chile 1.576 
20 Slovakia 1.576 
21 Uruguay 1.606 
22 Netherlands 1.607 
23 Hong Kong 1.608 
24 Romania 1.611 
25 Oman 1.612 
26 Bhutan 1.616 
27 Australia 1.652 
28 Italy 1.653 
29 Singapore 1.673 
30 Spain 1.683 
31 Poland 1.687 
32 South Korea 1.691 
33 Qatar 1.694 
34 Costa Rica 1.701 
35 Estonia 1.702 
36 France 1.707 
37 Vietnam 1.720 
37 Malaysia 1.721 
39 Latvia 1.723 
40 Ghana 1.723 
41 Lithuania 1.723 
42 UA Emirates 1.745 
43 Madagascar 1.770 
44 Taiwan 1.779 
45 Kuwait 1.786 
46 Botswana 1.792 
47 Tunisia 1.797 
48 Panama 1.797 
49 United Kingdom 1.801 
50 Mozambique 1.803 
51 Laos 1.810 
52 Cyprus 1.847 
53 Zambia 1.856 
54 Greece 1.867 
55 Gabon 1.878 
56 Argentina 1.895 
57 Bulgaria 1.903 
58 Tanzania 1.919 
59 Nicaragua 1.919 
60 Croatia 1.926 
61 Libya 1.927 
62 Cuba 1.954 
63 Morocco 1.954 
64 Equatorial Guinea 1.964 
65 Jordan 1.969 
66 Bosnia & Herz. 1.974 
67 China 1.981 
68 Indonesia 1.983 
69 Egypt 1.987 
70 Paraguay 1.997 
71 Senegal 2.011 
72 Kazakhstan 2.018 
73 Malawi 2.024 
74 Bahrain 2.025 
75 Syria 2.027 
76 Rwanda 2.030 
77 Namibia 2.042 
78 Bolivia 2.043 
79 Albania 2.044 
80 Peru 2.046 
81 Burkina Faso 2.062 
82 Dom. Repub. 2.069 
83 Moldova 2.091 
84 Ukraine 2.096 
85 Serbia 2.110 
86 Bangladesh 2.118 
87 Macedonia 2.119 
88 Mongolia 2.155 
89 El Salvador 2.163 
90 Brazil 2.168 
91 Cambodia 2.179 
92 Cameroon 2.182 
93 Mexico 2.191 
94 Belarus 2.194 
95 Papua New Guinea 2.224 
96 Jamaica 2.226 
97 USA 2.227 
98 Trinidad & Tobago 2.230 
99 Mali 2.238 
100 Ecuador 2.274 
101 Azerbaijan 2.287 
102 Turkmenistan 2.302 
103 Guatemala 2.328 
104 Honduras 2.335 
105 Iran 2.341 
106 Yemen 2.352 
107 India 2.355 
108 Saudi Arabia 2.357 
109 Haiti 2.362 
110 Angola 2.364 
111 Uzbekistan 2.377 
112 Algeria 2.378 
113 Philippines 2.385 
114 Uganda 2.391 
115 Turkey 2.403 
116 South Africa 2.412 
117 Congo (Brazz.) 2.417 
118 Thailand 2.424 
119 Kenya 2.429 
120 Mauritania 2.435 
121 Ethiopia 2.439 
122 Cote d’ Ivoire 2.451 
123 Venezuela 2.505 
124 Zimbabwe 2.513 
125 Sri Lanka 2.584 
126 Myanmar 2.590 
127 Pakistan 2.694 
128 DRC 2.707 
129 Nigeria 2.724 
130 Colombia 2.757 
131 Russia 2.777 
132 Lebanon 2.840 
133 North Korea 2.850 
134 Cen. African Rep. 2.857 
135 Chad 3.007 
136 Israel 3.052 
137 Afghanistan 3.126 
138 Sudan 3.189 
139 Somalia 3.293 
140 Iraq 3.514 
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APPENDIX V 
 
PARALLELS BETWEEN INDICATORS IN GPI 2012 AND WPI 2012 
 
GPI 2012 Indicators WPI 2012 Indicators WPI 2012 Sub-Index Indicators 
  Political Military- 
diplomatic 
Socio- 
economic 
1. Perceptions of criminality in society     
2. Number of internal security officers and 
police per 100,000 people 
    
3. Number of homicides per 100,000 people     
4. Number of jailed population per 100,000 
people 
    
5. Ease of access to weapons of minor 
destruction 
    
6. Level of organized conflict (internal) X (WPI measures much longer 
historical trajectories) 
X   
7. Likelihood of violent demonstrations X (WPI measures coups or riots 
in previous year) 
X   
8. Level of violent crime     
9. Political instability X X   
10. Level of disrespect for human rights 
(Political Terror Scale) 
X (WPI also measures external 
respect for human rights: treaties 
signed) 
X X  
11. Volume of transfers of major conventional 
weapons, as recipient (imports) per 100,000 
people 
    
12. Terrorist acts X X   
13. Number of deaths from organized conflict 
(internal) 
X (WPI measures much longer 
historical trajectories) 
X   
14. Military expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP 
X  X  
15. Number of armed services personnel per 
100,000 people 
X  X  
16. Funding for UN peacekeeping missions     
17. Aggregate number of heavy weapons per 
100,000 people 
    
18. Volume of transfers of major conventional 
weapons as supplier 
(exports) per 100,000 people 
    
19. Military capability/sophistication     
20. Number of displaced people as a 
percentage of the population 
    
21. Relations with neighbouring countries X  X  
22. Number of external and internal conflicts 
fought: 2003-08 
X (WPI measures much longer 
historical trajectories) 
X X  
23. Estimated number of deaths from 
organized conflict (external) 
X (WPI measures much longer 
historical trajectories) 
 X  
 
Notes: X=close or rough parallel present. The most up-to-date indexes for both the WPI and GPI were 
selected for comparison. In the WPI 2012, the list of indicators was slightly refined, as some previously 
used indicators deemed insighificant were deleted. The WPI’s Socio-economic sub-index involves 
indicators that are much closer to “positive peace” than the GPI attempts to measure. However, in 2012, the 
GPI also released a separate Positive Peace Index for the first time. 
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APPENDIX W 
 
WPI 2012 INDICATORS 
 
WPI 2012 Sub-Index Indicators 
Political Military-diplomatic Socio-economic 
Frequency of civil wars in 1945-
1979 (0=None; 1=Once; 2=Twice 
or more) 
Frequency of Wars in 1945-1979 
(0=None; 1=Once; 2=Twice or 
More) 
Ecological and Social Safety in 
2011 (Occurrence of major 
accidents, incidents, disasters) 
(0=None; 1=Once; 2=Twice or 
more) 
Size of casualties from civil wars 
in 1945-1979 (0=Less than 
1/10,000 per population; 1= 
1/10,000 or more) 
Size of casualties from wars in 
1945-1979 (0=None or less than 
1/10,000 per population; 1= 
1/10,000 or more) 
Unemployment Rate 
(0=Minimum – 1=Maximim) 
Frequency of civil wars in 1980 
and afterward (0=None; 1=Once; 
2=Twice or more) 
Site of Wars in 1945-1979 (0=No 
War or in Foreign Territory; 
1=Domestic Territory or Same 
Continent) 
Inflation Rate (0=Minimum – 
1=Maximim) 
Size of casualties from civil wars 
in 1980 and afterward (0=Less 
than 1/10,000 per population; 1= 
1/10,000 or more) 
Victory or Defeat from Wars in 
1945-1979 (0=No War or 
Victory; 1=Defeat) 
Multidimensional Poverty Index 
(0=Minimum – 1=Maximim) 
[UNDP Human Development 
Report 2010-2011] 
Political Conflicts such as Coup 
d’état or Riots since 1945 
(0=None since 1945; 1=Occurred 
from 1945-1979; 2=Occurred 
from 1980 and afterward) 
Frequency of Wars in 1980 and 
afterward (0=None; 1=Once; 
2=Twice or More) 
Income Inequality: GINI Index 
(0=Minimum – 1=Maximim) 
[UNDP Human Development 
Report 2011] 
Democratization: Political Rights 
Protection (0=very bad – 6=very 
good) [Freedom House data] 
Size of casualties from wars in 
1980 and after (0=None or less 
than 1/10,000 per population; 1= 
1/10,000 or more) 
Gender Inequality: Gender 
Inequality Index (0=Minimum – 
1=Maximim) [UNDP Human 
Development Report 2010-2011] 
Democratization: Freedom of 
citizens (0=very bad – 6=very 
good) [Freedom House data] 
Site of Wars in 1980 and 
afterward (0=No War or in 
Foreign Territory; 1=Domestic 
Territory or Same Continent) 
Human Development Index 
reflecting Income, Education and 
Health (0=Minimum – 
1=Maximim) [UNDP Human 
Development Report 2011] 
UNDP Human Rights Index 
(0=very bad – 4=very good) 
Victory or Defeat from Wars in 
1980 and after (0=No War or 
Victory; 1=Defeat) 
 
Ratified International 
Conventions (0=None – 9=All 
Nine) 
Experience of Colonial Rule 
(0=No; 1=Yes) 
 
Political Transparency (0=very 
bad – 10=very good, very 
transparent) [Transparency 
International, Corruption 
Perception Index 2011] 
Year of the Formation of 
Independent State (0=Before 20th 
century; 1=1900-1949; 2= 1950 
and afterward) 
 
Civil Wars in 2011 (0=None; 
1=Once; 2=Twice or More) 
Nation’s Power (0=Superpower; 
1=International Power; 
2=Regional Power; 3=Others) 
 
Political Conflicts such as Coup 
d’état or Riots in 2011 (0=None; 
1=Once; 2=Twice or More) 
Number of Neighboring States 
(0=None; 1=One; 2=Two or 
More) 
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Political Settlements or Policies 
to Resolve Domestic Conflicts in 
2011 (0=None; 1=Reached) 
Relations with Neighboring 
Powers: Number of Neighboring 
States with Equal or Superior 
Status (0=None; 1=One; 2=Two 
or More) 
 
 Number of Natioons in Enduring 
Rivalry (0=None; 1=One or 
More) 
 
 Potential Territorial Dispute 
(0=None; 1=One or More) 
 
 Ratio of Military Expenditure 
over GDP (0=Minimum value – 
1=Maximum value) 
 
 Military Force per Population 
(0=Minimum value – 
1=Maximum value) 
 
 International Treaties against 
Weapons of Mass Destruction 
and its Experiments (0=None; 
0.5=Signature, Non-ratification; 
1=One Convention; 2=Two 
Conventions; 3=All) 
 
 All-out Wars in 2011: Occurrence 
and Location (0=None; 
1=Occurred in non-neighboring 
states; 2=Occurred in neighboring 
states) 
 
 Use of Force Other than Wars, or 
Acts of Violence in 2011 
(0=None; 1=Once; 2=Twice or 
more, and/ or strong conflicts) 
 
 Peace Enhancing Events 
(Treaties, Arms Reduction, etc.) 
in 2011 (0=None; 1=Made) 
 
 
Notes: While many of the indicators above incorporate important historical factors lacking from the GPI, 
some of the coding schemes are relatively crude. To take one example, for the indicator “Victory or Defeat 
from Wars in 1980 and after,” nations that experienced no war are conflated with those that experienced 
victory as both receive a code of “0.” Yet, a victory in a war can have enormous consequences, including 
cultivating beligerant attitudes in the population. To take another example, the size of casualties are 
reduced to only two categories. For information on how the variables are standardized and the indexes 
calculated, see the WPI 2012 report available online.   
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APPENDIX X 
 
OLYMPIC COUNTRY ABBREVIATIONS 
 
The 205 “countries” recognized by the International Olympic Committee as National Olympic Committees 
and their three-letter abbreviations. Kosovo lacks an official abbreviation, but was assigned “KVO” for this 
study. An asterisk (*) denotes a territory and not an independent country (Retrieved 2/14/2012 from 
http://geography.about.com/od/countryinformation/a/olympiccodes.htm) 
Afghanistan - AFG 
Albania - ALB 
Algeria - ALG 
American Samoa* - ASA 
Andorra - AND 
Angola - ANG 
Antigua and Barbuda - ANT 
Argentina - ARG 
Armenia - ARM 
Aruba* - ARU 
Australia - AUS 
Austria - AUT 
Azerbaijan - AZE 
The Bahamas - BAH 
Bahrain - BRN 
Bangladesh - BAN 
Barbados - BAR 
Belarus - BLR 
Belgium - BEL 
Belize - BIZ 
Bermuda* - BER 
Benin - BEN 
Bhutan - BHU 
Bolivia - BOL 
Bosnia and Herzegovina - 
BIH 
Botswana - BOT 
Brazil - BRA 
British Virgin Islands* - IVB 
Brunei - BRU 
Bulgaria - BUL 
Burkina Faso - BUR 
Burundi - BDI 
Cambodia - CAM 
Cameroon - CMR 
Canada - CAN 
Cape Verde - CPV 
Cayman Islands* - CAY 
Central African Republic - 
CAF 
Chad - CHA 
Chile - CHI 
China - CHN 
Colombia - COL 
Comoros - COM 
Congo, Republic of the - 
CGO 
Congo, Democratic Republic 
of the - COD 
Cook Islands* - COK 
Costa Rica - CRC 
Cote d'Ivoire - CIV 
Croatia - CRO 
Cuba - CUB 
Cyprus - CYP 
Czech Republic - CZE 
Denmark - DEN 
Djibouti - DJI 
Dominica - DMA 
Dominican Republic - DOM 
East Timor (Timor-Leste) - 
TLS 
Ecuador - ECU 
Egypt - EGY 
El Salvador - ESA 
Equatorial Guinea - GEQ 
Eritrea - ERI 
Estonia - EST 
Ethiopia - ETH 
Fiji - FIJ 
Finland - FIN 
France - FRA 
Gabon - GAB 
The Gambia - GAM 
Georgia - GEO 
Germany - GER 
Ghana - GHA 
Greece - GRE 
Grenada - GRN 
Guam* - GUM 
Guatemala - GUA 
Guinea - GUI 
Guinea-Bissau - GBS 
Guyana - GUY 
Haiti - HAI 
Honduras - HON 
Hong Kong* - HKG 
Hungary - HUN 
Iceland - ISL 
India - IND 
Indonesia - INA 
Iran - IRI 
Iraq - IRQ 
Ireland - IRL 
Israel - ISR 
Italy - ITA 
Jamaica - JAM 
Japan - JPN 
Jordan - JOR 
Kazakhstan - KAZ 
Kenya - KEN 
Kiribati - KIR 
Korea, North (PDR of Korea) 
- PRK 
Korea, South - KOR 
Kuwait - KUW 
Kyrgyzstan - KGZ 
Laos - LAO 
Latvia - LAT 
Lebanon - LIB 
Lesotho - LES 
Liberia - LBR 
Libya - LBA 
Liechtenstein - LIE 
Lithuania - LTU 
Luxembourg - LUX 
Macedonia - MKD 
(Officially: Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia) 
Madagascar - MAD 
Malawi - MAW 
Malaysia - MAS 
Maldives - MDV 
Mali - MLI 
Malta - MLT 
Marshall Islands - MHL 
Mauritania - MTN 
Mauritius - MRI 
Mexico - MEX 
Federated States of 
Micronesia - FSM 
Moldova - MDA 
Monaco - MON 
Mongolia - MGL 
Montenegro - MNE 
Morocco - MAR 
Mozambique - MOZ 
Myanmar (Burma) - MYA 
Namibia - NAM 
Nauru - NRU 
Nepal - NEP 
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Netherlands - NED 
Netherlands Antilles* - AHO 
New Zealand - NZL 
Nicaragua - NCA 
Niger - NIG 
Nigeria - NGR 
Norway - NOR 
Oman - OMA 
Pakistan - PAK 
Palau - PLW 
Palestine* - PLE 
Panama - PAN 
Papua New Guinea - PNG 
Paraguay - PAR 
Peru - PER 
Philippines - PHI 
Poland - POL 
Portugal - POR 
Puerto Rico* - PUR 
Qatar - QAT 
Romania - ROU 
Russian Federation - RUS 
Rwanda - RWA 
Saint Kitts and Nevis - SKN 
Saint Lucia - LCA 
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines - VIN 
Samoa - SAM 
San Marino - SMR 
Sao Tome and Principe - STP 
Saudi Arabia - KSA 
Senegal - SEN 
Serbia - SRB 
Seychelles - SEY 
Sierra Leone - SLE 
Singapore - SIN 
Slovakia - SVK 
Slovenia - SLO 
Solomon Islands - SOL 
Somalia - SOM 
South Africa - RSA 
Spain - ESP 
Sri Lanka - SRI 
Sudan - SUD 
Suriname - SUR 
Swaziland - SWZ 
Sweden - SWE 
Switzerland - SUI 
Syria - SYR 
Taiwan (Chinese Taipei) - 
TPE 
Tajikistan - TJK 
Tanzania - TAN 
Thailand - THA 
Togo - TOG 
Tonga - TGA 
Trinidad and Tobago - TRI 
Tunisia - TUN 
Turkey - TUR 
Turkmenistan - TKM 
Tuvalu - TUV 
Uganda - UGA 
Ukraine - UKR 
United Arab Emirates - UAE 
United Kingdom (Great 
Britain) - GBR 
United States - USA 
Uruguay - URU 
Uzbekistan - UZB 
Vanuatu - VAN 
Venezuela - VEN 
Vietnam - VIE 
Virgin Islands* - ISV 
Yemen - YEM 
Zambia - ZAM 
Zimbabwe – ZIM 
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APPENDIX Y 
 
NONVIOLENT INDEX 
 
NV Index Rank/ Mean/ Nation indneverjust nvworks milneverjust 
1) 84.3333 Tunisia 92 68 93 
2) 82 Finland 94 68 84 
    82 Spain 93 62 91 
3) 80.6667 Georgia   81 82 79 
4) 80.3333 Liberia   80 84 77 
5) 79.3333 Mauritania 84 69 85 
6) 78.6667 Uruguay 83 72 81 
7) 76.6667 Greece 82 80 68 
8) 76 Paraguay 86 59 83 
9) 75.6667 Hungary   86 62 79 
10) 75.3333 Argentina  83 65 78 
11) 75 Iraq 90 45 90 
     75 Egypt 86 53 86 
12) 74.6667 Kazakhstan 77 76 71 
      74.6667 Costa Rica 76 73 75 
13) 73.3333 Nicaragua 76 71 73 
14) 73 Ghana 74 73 72 
15) 72.6667 Madagascar 67 85 66 
16) 72.3333 Philippines   71 79 67 
      72.3333 Japan 94 33 90 
17) 72 Kenya 81 63 72 
      72 Burundi 79 65 72 
18) 71.6667 Chile   80 61 74 
      71.6667 Mali   82 66 67 
19) 71 Ireland 79 65 69 
20) 70.6667 Sweden   79 59 74 
      70.6667 Sierra Leone 70 76 66 
21) 70.3333 Australia 88 55 68 
       70.3333 Estonia 80 53 78 
       70.3333 Zimbabwe 85 46 80 
22) 70 Latvia 80 57 73 
23) 69.6667 Indonesia 81 51 77 
      69.6667 Lebanon 95 57 57 
24) 69.3333 Austria 82 48 78 
      69.3333 Burkina Faso 78 54 76 
      69.3333 Ecuador 74 60 74 
      69.3333 Morocco 74 62 72 
25) 69 Armenia 72 72 63 
      69 Canada 82 61 64 
26) 68.3333 Germany   84 48 73 
      68.3333 Colombia 78 64 63 
27) 68 Pakistan 66 73 65 
28) 67.3333 Repub of Korea 85 45 72 
     67.3333 Saudi Arabia 72 44 86 
     67.3333 Russian Fed 70 63 69 
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29) 67 El Salvador 71 59 71 
      67 Norway 84 48 69 
30) 66.3333 Niger 70 70 59 
      66.3333 Palestine  76 42 81 
      66.3333 Peru 76 52 71 
31) 65.3333 Netherlands 88 47 61 
      65.3333 Algeria 79 42 75 
      65.3333 Italy 78 54 64 
      65.3333 Ukraine   68 61 67 
      65.3333 Nigeria 71 62 63 
32) 65 Romania 75 50 70 
33) 64.6667 Namibia 68 56 70 
34) 64.3333 Turkey 64 61 68 
35) 64 Chad 66 60 66 
36) 63.6667 Bolivia 68 54 69 
      63.6667 Benin 59 76 56 
37) 63.3333 Brazil 71 55 64 
      63.3333 Belarus 69 56 65 
38) 63 Mexico 68 56 65 
      63 Dem Rep Congo (Kins.) 67 58 64 
      63 Laos 87 20 82 
39) 62.6667 South Africa   67 61 60 
40) 62.3333 Senegal 66 64 57 
      62.3333 Denmark 81 47 59 
      62.3333 Malaysia 74 38 75 
41) 61 Zambia 64 57 62 
42) 60.6667 New Zealand 75 49 58 
43) 59.3333 Panama 64 54 60 
      59.3333 Uganda 59 53 66 
      59.3333 Azerbaijan 58 58 62 
      59.3333 USA   76 54 48 
44) 58.6667 Dominican Republic 61 60 55 
45) 58.3333 Guatemala 59 60 56 
      58.3333 Iran 70 38 67 
46) 58 Belize 65 45 64 
      58 Repub of Moldova 60 65 49 
47) 57.6667 France 74 37 62 
48) 57 Mongolia 61 58 52 
      57 Cameroon 55 60 56 
49) 56.6667 Lithuania 66 42 62 
50) 56 Kyrgyzstan   44 77 47 
      56 UK 71 52 45 
      56 Sri Lanka 82 39 47 
51) 55 Poland   68 37 60 
52) 54.6667 Belgium 63 46 55 
53) 53.3333 Botswana 58 57 45 
54) 52.3333 Honduras 53 50 54 
55) 50 Israel 73 33 44 
56) 48.3333 Central African 
Repub 32 76 37 
57) 46 Djibouti 31 58 49 
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58) 45.3333 Czech Republic   62 25 49 
59) 44 Thailand   65 28 39 
60) 43.6667 Vietnam 63 8 60 
61) 42.3333 India   48 40 39 
62) 41 Singapore 53 24 46 
63) 38.6667 Guyana 41 46 29 
64) 37.3333 Bangladesh 28 73 11 
65) 36 Cambodia 24 54 30 
66) 34.6667 Nepal  8 84 12 
 
NOTE: indivneverjust = % citizens affirming individual attacks on civilians “never justified”; nvworks = % 
citizens affirming peaceful means alone “will work”; milneverjust = % citizens affirming military attacks 
on civilians “never justified”; nvmean = mean % of citizens affirming nonviolent attitudes [This is the 
average of the three Gallup World Poll 2008 questions, referred to here as the “Nonviolent Index”]; Note 
that during the course of this study, the Gallup World Poll released their own “Violence Index” based on 
the same data. Data source: Gallup World Poll 2008 
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SEARCHING FOR PEACEFUL NATIONS WITH THE NONVIOLENT INDEX 
Figure 1. WPI 2012 and Nonviolent Index (Gallup World Poll 2010) 
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Figure 2. GPI 2012 and Nonviolent Index (Gallup World Poll 2010) 
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Figure 3. GPI 2009 and Nonviolent Index (Gallup World Poll 2010) 
 
Figure 4. MIL2009 and Nonviolent Index (Gallup World Poll 2010) 
 
AFG
ALG
ANG
ARG
AUS
AUT
AZE
BAN
BLR
BEL
BOL
BOT
BRA
BUR
BDI
CMR
CAN
CAF
CHA
CHI
COL
COD
CGO
CRC
CIV
CYP
CZE
DEN
DOM
ECU
EGY
ESA
EST
ETH
FIN
FRA
GEO
GER
GHA GRE
GUA
GUY
HAI
HON
HUN
ISL
IND
INA
IRI
IRQ
IRL
ISR
ITA
JPN
JOR
KAZ
KEN
KOR
KUWLAO
LAT
LIB
LTU
LUX
MAD
MAW
MAS
MLI
MTN
MEX
MDA
MGL
MAR
MOZ
NAM
NEP
NED
NZL
NCA
NGR
NOR
PAK
PAN
PAR
PER
PHI
POL
POR
QAT
ROU
RUS
KSA
SEN
SIN
SLO
RSA
ESP
SRI
SWE
TPE
TAN
THA
TRI
TUN
TUR
UGA
UKR
GBR
USA
URU
VEN
VIE
YEM
ZAM
ZIM
.5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
3
tra
ns
gp
i2
00
9
20 40 60 80 100
Nonviolent_Index
ALG
ANG
ARG
ARM
AUS
AUT
AZE
BAN
BLR
BEL
BOL
BOT
BRA
BUR
BDI
CMR
CANCAF
CHA
CHI
COL
COD
CRCCZE DEN
DOM
ECU
EGY
ESA
EST
ETH
FIN
FRA
GEO
GER
GHA
GRE
GUA
HON
HUN
ISL
IND
INA
IRI
IRQ
IRL
ISR
ITA JPN
JOR
KAZKEN
KOR
KUW
KGZ
LAO
LAT
LIB
LTU
LUX
MAD
MAW
MAS MLI
MLT
MTN
MEX
M A
MGL
MAR
MOZ
NAM
NEP
NED
NZL
NCANIG
NGR
NOR
PAK
PAN
PA
PER
PHI
POL
POR
QAT
ROU
RUS
KSASEN
SLE
SIN
SLO
SA
ESP
SRI
SWE
TPE
TJK
TAN
THA
TOG
TRI
TUN
TUR
UGA
UKRGBR USA
URU
VEN
VIE
YEM
ZAM
ZIM
20
40
60
80
10
0
M
IL
20
09
20 40 60 80 100
Nonviolent_Index
766 
 
Figure 5. MIL2012 and Nonviolent Index (Gallup World Poll 2010) 
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Figure 6. WPI2009 and Nonviolent Index (Gallup World Poll 2010) 
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Figure 7. WPI Decade Average and Nonviolent Index (Gallup World Poll 2010) 
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Figure 8. POL2012 and Nonviolent Index (Gallup World Poll 2010) 
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APPENDIX Z 
 
GRAPHING INDICATORS OF PEACEFUL NATIONS 
 
Figure 1. Graphing Mean Attitudes Towards Terrorism and Military Force 
 
Note: For the Pew item: “% Disagree” = Respondents who answered “Disagree” + Respondents who 
answered “Strongly Disagree”; If Costa Rican student results from the present survey sample could be 
graphed above, they would rank slightly more peaceful than Argentina (ARG) on both indicators as 41% of 
Costa Rican students Disagreed that “Military force is sometimes necessary” (replication of the Pew 
question); 90% of Costa Rican students affirmed that “individual attacks on civilians are never justified” 
(Gallup question). This would make Costa Rica one of the top 5 most peaceful nations above, if the 
indicators were weighted equally. However, we established in Chapter 5 that Costa Rican University 
students’ mean score was +14% more peaceful than the general population of Costa Rica on the “individual 
attacks” item.  
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Figure 2. Graphing GPI Scores By Mean Attitudes Towards Military Force  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIB 
JPN 
ESP 
EGY 
KOR 
GER 
ARG 
CAN 
MLI INA KEN 
CHI 
SWE ITA USA 
PER FRA 
MAS 
GHA MAR 
ISR 
GBR 
BRA 
NGR RUS 
BOL 
POL 
MEX 
UKR 
RSA 
SEN 
PAK 
TUR 
CZE 
UGA IND 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
%
 C
iti
ze
ns
 D
is
ag
re
e:
 M
ili
ta
ry
 F
or
ce
 S
om
et
im
es
 
N
ec
es
sa
ry
 (P
ew
 G
lo
ba
l A
tti
tu
de
s 
20
07
) 
GPI 2008 Nation score (0=least peaceful, 3=most peaceful) 
772 
 
Figure 3. Graphing GPI Scores By Mean Attitudes on State Terrorism 
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Figure 4. Graphing GPI Scores By Mean Attitudes on State Terrorism 
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Figure 5. GPI Scores By Mean Attitudes on Pragmatic Nonviolence 
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APPENDIX AA 
 
UNSTANDARDIZED COEFFICIENTS FOR OLS REGRESSION OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ON 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES (OBJECTIVE/ SUBJECTIVE PEACE INDICATORS) 
 
Variable Cluster Bomb Signatory States Landmine Treaty States Parties CNTBT States Parties ICC States Parties 
B 
(t) 
 
Adj. R² B 
(t) 
 
Adj. R² B 
(t) 
 
Adj. R² B 
(t) 
 
Adj. R² 
milneverjust 6.34* 
(1.99)  
.0306 5.18 
(1.38) 
.0095 4.54 
(.96) 
-.0008 1.63 
(.49) 
-.0082 
nvworks 4.21 
(1.43) 
.0111 7.19* 
(2.12) 
.0359 6.59 
(1.54) 
.0143 6.51* 
(2.19) 
.0389 
GPI 2008 .14 
(1.52) 
.0136 .24* 
(2.24) 
.0410 .58*** 
(4.68) 
.1816 .36*** 
(3.95) 
.1344 
population in 
millions 
-53.50 
(-1.97) 
.0297 -77.42* 
(-2.46) 
.0512 -24.55 
(-0.61) 
-.0068 -57.47* 
(-2.06) 
.0336 
% urban 1.86 
(0.40) 
-.0090 2.49 
(0.46) 
-.0084 11.00 
(1.65) 
.0180 5.20 
(1.10) 
.0023 
 
Notes: N=95; Unstandardized regression coefficient; Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001; ICC = International Criminal Court; 
CNTBT = Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; The GPI score for each nation was transformed (GPI score X (-1) + 4) so that the most peaceful countries in the GPI have the highest 
scores (with 3 the most peaceful score and 0 the least peaceful score possible); In each case, the treaty (binary or “dummy” variable) was used as the independent variable. Independent 
variables were entered in one at a time (rather than in multiple regressions); “nvworks” = % of respondents affirming that peaceful means alone will work for oppressed groups; 
“milneverjust” = % of respondents affirming that military attacks on civilians are never justified; “States Parties” = states that have completed ratification or accession. In the case of the 
Cluster Bomb Treaty (which opened for signature in December of 2008) there are 108 signatory states, but only 69 states parties (nations that have ratified the treaty). It was decided to use 
signatory states in the Cluster Bomb regression because the treaty has entered into force and presumably, most of the signatory states will eventually ratify it. Moreover, nations signing a 
treaty help to create international norms and consensus even if domestic politics present barriers and result in long struggles to ratify a treaty. The Land Mine Treaty opened for signature in 
1997, but now that it has entered into force “states may no longer sign it, rather they may become bound without signature through a one step procedure known as accession” (ICBL 2012). 
When the regression was run on the ratifying nations of the Cluster Bomb treaty, only the GPI 2008 variable is significant and it is significant at the .01 level. The CNTBT has not yet entered 
into force because key nations have not yet ratified it. Sources: Gallup World Poll 2008; UN 2012, ICBL 2012, CTBTO 2012, ICC 2012 
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APPENDIX BB  
 
U.S. AS OUTLIER 
 
Figure 1. GPI 2008 Rank by Type of Society with Trendline 
 
Notes: 1= Postindustrial; 2=Industrial; 3=Agrarian; Sources: Norris and Inglehart (2004, p.247); GPI 2008 
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Figure 2. GPI 2008 Rank by Type of State 
 
Notes: 1=older democracy; 2=newer democracy; 3=semi-democracy; 4=non-democratic; Sources: Norris 
and Inglehart (2004, pp.248-249); GPI 2008 
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Figure 3. GPI 2008 Rank by World-System Position 
 
Notes: 1=core; 2=semi-periphery; 3=periphery; Sources: Boswell and Dixon (1990); GPI 2008 
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Figure 4. GPI 2008 Rank by War Proneness 
 
Notes: N=44; In this data set, “years of periodic wars and on-going insurgencies are counted in half-year 
increments and added to totals of more conventional conflicts” (Sullivan 1991, p.46); Source: Sullivan 
(1991) 
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APPENDIX CC 
 
PEACE INDICATORS FROM THE LARGEST CROSS-NATIONAL POLLS 
 
Table 1. Rank orders of subjectively peaceful nations: national percentages of peaceful attitudes 
as measured by the largest cross-national polls. [case studies are in bold] 
2007 Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2005 World Values Survey 
Sometimes military 
force is necessary to 
maintain order in the 
world (% “Mostly 
disagree” and 
“Completely 
disagree”)  
Sometimes military 
force is necessary to 
maintain order in the 
world (% 
“Completely 
disagree”) 
Non-military 
priorities (% NOT 
assigning “strong 
defense” as 1st or 
2nd priority of their 
nation)  
Willing to fight for 
country (% claiming 
NOT willing to 
fight) 
Domestic violence 
(% saying that for a 
man to beat his wife 
is “never justified”)   
1) 59 Egypt 1) 29 Egypt 1) 97.2 Andorra  1) 75.4 Japan 1) 96.4 Andorra  
2) 58 Jordan 1) 29 Jordan 2) 91.7 Slovenia 2) 62.8 Iraq  2) 96.3 Argentina 
2) 58 Germany  1) 29 Germany 3) 91.3 Germany  3) 62.6 Germany 3) 93.6 Canada 
3) 53 South Korea 2) 25 Bulgaria 4) 91.2 Sweden 4) 58.1 Andorra 4) 92.5 Sweden 
4) 51 Slovakia 3) 24 Tanzania 4) 91.2 Uruguay 5) 56.6 Italy 5) 91 Italy 
4) 51 Bulgaria 4) 23 Slovakia 5) 89.2 Switzerland 6) 55.4 Spain 6) 90.8 France  
5) 50 Ethiopia 5) 22 Argentina 6) 87.9 Netherlands 7) 52.4 Netherlands 7) 90.7 Australia 
6) 44 Ukraine 6) 19 Uganda 7) 86.5 Italy 8) 46.9 Uruguay 7) 90.7 Georgia 
7) 40 Argentina 6) 19 Palestine Ter. 8) 84.6 Guatemala 9) 41.6 Chile  8) 90.5 Colombia 
7) 40 Uganda 7) 18 Ethiopia 9) 83.6 Mexico 10) 40.4 Argentina 9) 89.5 Netherlands 
8) 38 Lebanon 8) 17 Ukraine 10) 82.7 Peru 11) 39.6 Canada 10) 89 Poland 
9) 37 Poland 9) 15 France 11) 80.9 Norway 12) 39.4 Bulgaria 11) 88.5 Indonesia  
10) 36 Czech 
Republic 
9) 15 Lebanon 11) 80.9 Chile 13) 38.9 France 12) 88.3 Chile 
11) 35 Chile 10) 14 Czech 
Republic 
11) 80.9 France 14) 38.8 Serbia  13) 88.1 Norway  
12) 34 Japan 11) 13 South Korea 12) 80.1 Canada  15) 38.5 UK  14) 87.7 Spain  
12) 34 Tanzania 12) 12 Chile 13) 79.5 Spain 16) 38.2 Brazil 15) 87.6 UK 
12) 34 Palestine Ter. 12) 12 Malaysia  14) 78.3 New 
Zealand 
17) 37.1 New 
Zealand  
16) 86.5 Jordan 
13) 33 France 12) 12 Morocco 15) 77.8 Moldova 18) 36.9 USA  17) 85 USA 
14) 32 Malaysia 13) 11 Poland 16) 76 Serbia 19) 36.4 S. Africa 18) 83.4 Brazil 
14) 32 Bolivia 13) 11 Ghana 17) 75.9 Bulgaria 20) 35.6 Australia 19) 82.9 Finland 
15) 31 Russia 14) 10 Sweden 18) 74.2 Trinidad & 
Tob. 
21) 35.2 Zambia 20) 82.2 Russia  
16) 29 Ghana 14) 10 Canada 19) 74 Poland 22) 34.1 Switzerland 21) 81.3 Slovenia 
17) 28 China 14) 10 Bolivia 20) 72.8 Argentina 23) 32.3 Romania  22) 80.8 Trinidad & 
Tob. 
17) 28 Britain 14) 10 Russia 21) 72 Finland 24) 31.9 Trinidad & 
Tob. 
23) 80.7 Switzerland 
18) 27 Spain 14) 10 Kuwait 22) 71.7 S. Korea 25) 31.8 Moldova 24) 80.4 Uruguay 
18) 27 Canada 14) 10 Kenya 23) 70.7 UK 26) 30.7 Ukraine 25) 79.4 Romania 
18) 27 Peru 15) 9 Peru 24) 70.4 Romania 27) 30.4 Guatemala 26) 79.3 Vietnam 
18) 27 Venezuela 15) 9 Britain 25) 69.7 Brazil  28) 30.1 Georgia 27) 78.1 Turkey 
19) 26 Senegal 15) 9 Spain 26) 68.9 Japan 29) 27.3 S. Korea 28) 78 Cyprus 
20) 25 Mexico 15) 9 Nigeria 27) 68.5 Ukraine 30) 25.5 Slovenia 29) 77.6 Ethiopia 
21) 24 Kenya 15) 9 Senegal 28) 68.1 S. Africa 31) 25.0 Poland 30) 76.8 Mexico 
21) 24 Mali 16) 8 South Africa 29) 66.7 Taiwan 32) 24.5 Mexico 31) 76.6 Taiwan 
22) 23 Indonesia 16) 8 Japan 30) 66.4 Ethiopia 33) 23.1 Morocco 32) 75.2 China 
22) 23 Nigeria 16) 8 Ivory Coast 31) 65.5 Burkina 
Faso 
33) 23.1 Ethiopia 33) 74.9 Japan 
23) 22 Israel 16) 8 Venezuela 32) 64 Iran 34) 22.9 Peru 34) 74.6 S. Korea 
23) 22 Italy 17) 7 Mali 33) 61.8 Zambia 35) 20.7 Malaysia  35) 74 Iran 
23) 22 South Africa 17) 7 Indonesia 34) 61.2 Vietnam 36) 19.9 Egypt 36) 73.8 Bulgaria 
23) 22 Ivory Coast 17) 7 Italy 35) 60.2 Morocco  37) 19.1 Cyprus  37) 72.8 Moldova 
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24) 21 Morocco 18) 6 USA 36) 59.8 India 38) 18.7 Iran 38) 72.4 Ukraine  
24. 21 Sweden 18) 6 Turkey 37) 59.4 Australia 39) 18.6 India 39) 71.6 Germany 
25) 20 USA 18) 6 China  38) 57.7 Ghana 40) 16.7 Russia  40) 66.6 Morocco 
26) 19 Turkey 19) 5 Brazil 39) 57.2 Indonesia 41) 15.7 Finland 41) 63.1 S. Africa 
27) 16 Kuwait 19) 5 Mexico 40) 54 Malaysia 42) 14.7 Burkina 
Faso 
42) 61.2 India 
28) 15 Brazil 20) 4 Israel 41) 51.6 Turkey 43) 14.2 Sweden 43) 60.1 Ghana 
29) 14 Pakistan 20) 4 Bangladesh 42) 51.2 Mali 44) 13.5 Taiwan 44) 50.2 Rwanda 
30) 11 Bangladesh 21) 3 Pakistan 43) 51 China 45) 13.1 China 45) 48.5 Burkina 
Faso 
31) 10 India 21) 3 India 44) 49.1 Russia  46) 12.4 Norway 46) 45.2 Serbia 
  45) 47.1 Cyprus 47) 11.8 Mali 47) 43.3 Malaysia 
  46) 44.9 Thailand 48) 10.9 Ghana  48) 37.9 Mali 
  47) 43 Jordan 49) 10.1 Thailand 49) 37.5 Thailand 
  48) 38.3 Egypt 50) 7.7 Indonesia 50) 31.8 Zambia 
  49) 36.3 USA 51) 6.2 Jordan  
  50) 32.9 Georgia 52) 4.8 Rwanda  
  51) 32.4 Rwanda 53) 4.6 Vietnam  
   54) 2.8 Turkey  
Note: Case studies in bold. 
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APPENDIX DD 
CROSS-NATIONAL SAMPLE OF GOVERNMENT-APPROVED SECONDARY 
SCHOOL HISTORY TEXTBOOKS 
 
Chile 
 
Montero, Verónica Méndez, Carolina Santelices Ariztía, Rodrigo Martínez Iturriaga, and 
Isidora Puga Serrano. 2009. Historia, Geografía, y Ciencias Sociales (2° Educación 
Media). Santiago, Chile: Santillana del Pacífico S.A. de Ediciones. 
 
Rivas, Marina Loreto Donoso, Lucía Victoria Valencia Castañeda, Daniel Palma 
Alvarado, Rolando Eugenio Álvarez Vallejos. 2006. Historia y Ciencias Sociales (2° 
Educación Media – Años 2007 y 2008). Santiago, Chile: Santillana del Pacífico S.A. 
de Ediciones. 
 
Costa Rica 
 
Bolaños Herrera, Raquel, Emilia Gamboa Escalante, and German Vasquez Agüero. 2010. 
Estudios Sociales 10. San José, Costa Rica: BIS Costa Rica S.A. [Textbook A] 
Bolaños Herrera, Raquel, Emilia Gamboa Escalante, and German Vasquez Agüero. 2010. 
Estudios Sociales 11. San José, Costa Rica: BIS Costa Rica S.A. [Textbook B] 
Ortiz Estrada, Gustavo, Maria Norys Naranjo Obando, and Gilbert Vargas Ulate. 2008. 
Nuevos Horizontes 10-11. San José, Costa Rica: Eduvisión.  [Textbook F] 
Quirós Morales de Vallejos, Angela. 2010. Fichas de Estudios Sociales 10. 2010. San 
José, Costa Rica: Litografia e Imprenta LIL. [Textbook C] 
Quirós Morales de Vallejos, Angela. 2009. Fichas de Estudios Sociales 10-11. 2009. San 
José, Costa Rica: Litografia e Imprenta LIL. [Textbook D] 
Quirós Morales de Vallejos, Angela. 1998. Temario, Activadades y Practicas de Estudios 
Sociales Para Bachillerato 10-11. San José, Costa Rica: Litografia e Imprenta LIL. 
[Textbook G] 
Ulate, Gilbert Vargas, Carol Gonzalez Diaz, Warner Ruiz Chaves, Gustavo Ortiz Estrada, 
and Maria Norys Naranjo Obando. 2010. Continentes 11. San José, Costa Rica: 
Eduvisión. [Textbook E]   
 
El Salvador 
 
Ministerio de Educación [MINED]. 2009. Historia 2 El Salvador [Formato digital]. Plan 
Nacional de Educación 2021. San Salvador, El Salvador: www.mined.gob.sv. 
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Germany  
(Texts utilized in secondary schools in the Rheinland-Pfalz region) 
 
Bahr, Frank (ed.). 2011. Horizonte II: Geschichte fur die Sekundarstufe II in Hessen; Von 
der Amerikanischen Revolution bis zum Nationalsozialismus. Braunschweig, 
Germany: Westermann.  
 [Horizons II: History for secondary education in Hesse, From the American 
Revolution to the Nazis.] 
Sellen, Albrecht. 2010. Geschichte 2: Kurz & Klar. Stuttgart, Germany: Ernst Klett 
Verlag. 
 [History 2: Short & Clear] 
 
Ghana 
 
Gadzepko, Seth Kordzo. 2005. History of Ghana Since Pre-History. Accra, Ghana: 
Excellent Publishing and Printing.  
Prah, Isaac Kwesi. 2010. Government (3rd ed.). For Senior Secondary Schools (Designed 
for 
 Senior High Schools), Based on WASSCE Syllabus. Takoradi, Ghana: Saint Francis 
 Press. 
 
Guatemala 
 
Editora Educativa (EE). 2011? [no date, but curriculum in use in schools in 2011]  
Estudios Sociales 1 (Nueva Edició), Primero Básico, Séptimo Grado. Ciclo de 
Educación Básica. Guatemala City, Guatemala: Editora Educativa. 
Editora Educativa (EE). 2011b?. [no date, but curriculum in use in schools in 2011] 
Ciencias Sociales 2, Segundo Básico. Ciclo de Educación Básica. Guatemala City, 
Guatemala: Editora Educativa LA MARCA. 
Editora Educativa (EE). 2011c?. [no date, but curriculum in use in schools in 2011] 
Ciencias Sociales 3, Tercero Básico. Ciclo de Educación Básica. Guatemala City, 
Guatemala:  Editora Educativa LA MARCA. 
 
Norway 
 
Abrahamsen, Olav Arild, Ståle Dyrvik, May-Brith Ohman Nielsen, and Andreas Aase. 
2008. 
 Portal:Nyere Historie (Verdenshistorie og Norgeshistorie Etter 1750). Oslo, 
Norway: Bokmål/ Det norske Samlaget. 
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Figved, Paul B., Kåre Fossum, and Per Aarrestad. 1976. Historie 3: Grunnbok for 9. 
skoleår. Oslo, Norway: Bokmål/ J.W. Cappelens Forlag AS. 
Grimnes, Øhren, Eriksen, Wiig, Ertresvaag, Eliassen, and Skovholt. 2008. Tidslinjer 2: 
Verden og Norge (Historie Vg3). Oslo, Norway: Bokmål/ H. Aschehoug & Co. (W. 
Nygaard). 
 
United States 
 
Appleby, Joyce, Alan Brinkley, Albert S. Broussard, James M. McPherson, and Donald 
A. Ritchie. 2005. The American Vision [Florida Vision]. New York: McGraw Hill.  
Ayers, Edward L., Robert D. Schulzinger, Jesus F. de la Teja, and Deborah Gray White. 
 2009. American Anthem. Austin, Texas: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 
Bass, Herbert J., George A. Billias, and Emma Jones Lapsansky. 1979. Our American 
Heritage. Morristown, New Jersey: Silver Burdett. 
Bidna, David B., Morris S. Greenberg, and Jerold H. Spitz. 1971. We the People: A 
History of the United States of America (Teacher’s Edition). Lexington, 
Massachusetts: D.C. Heath. 
Bragdon, Henry W. and Samuel P. McCutchen. 1961. History of a Free People. New 
York: Macmillan. 
Brady, Marion and Howard Brady. 1977. Idea and Action in American History. 
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. 
Clark, Thomas D. (ed.). 1960. Freedom’s Frontier: A History of Our Country. Chicago: 
Lyons and Carnahan. 
Conlin, Joseph R. 1985. A History of the United States: Our Land, Our Time (Annotated 
Teacher’s Edition). San Diego: Coronado Publishers. 
Danzer, Gerald A., J. Jorge Klor de Alva, Louis E. Wilson, and Nancy Woloch. 1999. 
The Americans: Reconstruction through the 20th Century (Teacher’s Edition). 
Evanston, Illinois: McDougal Littell. 
Davidson, James West and Mark H. Lytle. 1984. The United States: A History of the 
Republic. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. 
Davidson, James West, and Mark H. Lytle. 1990. The United States: A History of the 
Republic. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.  
Davidson, James West and Michael B. Stoff. 1998. The American Nation (Annotated 
Teacher’s Edition). Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall. 
DiBacco, Thomas V., Lorna C. Mason, and Christian G. Appy. 1991. History of the 
United States. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 
Faragher, John Mack, Mari Jo Buhl, Daniel Czitrom, and Susan H. Armitage. 2004. Out 
of Many: A History of the American People (Brief Fourth Edition). Upper Saddle 
River, New Jersey: Pearson Education. 
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FEP. 1971. Perspectives in United States History (Teacher’s Edition). San Francisco: 
Field Educational Publications, Inc. 
Garcia, Jesus, Donna M. Ogle, C. Frederick Risinger, and Joyce Stevos. 2005. Creating 
America: A History of the United States (Teacher’s Edition). Evanston, Illinois: 
McDougal Littell. 
Garraty, John A. 1982. American History (Teacher’s Edition). New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich.   
Garraty, John A. 1991. The Story of America (Annotated Teacher’s Edition). Chicago: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich/ Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 
Giese, James R., Matthew T. Downey, and Mauricio Mazon. 1999. The American 
Century: A History of the U.S. in Modern Times (Teacher’s Edition). Belmont, 
California: West Educational Publishing. 
Goldman, Emma. 1910. “Anarchism: What It Really Stands For,” pp.45-47, reprinted in 
Nonviolence in America: A Documentary History (revised ed.). Staughton Lynd and 
Alice Lynd (eds.). 1995. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books. 
Graff, Henry F. 1986. America: The Glorious Republic, Vol.2: 1877 to the Present. 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 
Graff, Henry F., and Paul Bohanna. 1978. The Promise of Democracy. Chicago: Rand 
McNally. 
Graff, Henry F., and John A. Krout. 1961. The Adventure of the American People. 
Chicago: Rand McNally. 
Jacobs, William Jay. 1973. Search for Freedom: America and Its People (Annotated 
Teacher’s Edition). New York: Macmillan. 
Jones, Jacqueline, Peter H. Wood, Thomas Borstelmann, Elaine Tyler May, and Vicki L. 
Ruiz. 2008. Created Equal: A Social and Political History of the United States 
(Brief Second Edition). New York: Pearson Education.  
Jordan, Winthrop D., Miriam Greenblatt, and John S. Bowes. 1985. The Americans: The 
History of a People and a Nation. Evanston, Illinois: McDougal, Littell & Company. 
Lapsansky-Werner, Emma J., Peter B. Levy, Randy Roberts, and Alan Taylor. 2008. 
United States History (New Jersey edition). Boston: Pearson Prentice Hall. 
Leinwand, Gerald. 1975. The Pageant of American History. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. 
Lowman, Michael R., George Thompson, and Kurt Grussendorf. 1996. United States 
History in Christian Perspective: Heritage of Freedom. Pensacola, Florida: Beka.  
May, Ernest R. 1985. A Proud Nation (Teacher’s Edition). Evanston, Illinois: McDougal, 
Littel & Company. 
Norton, Mary Beth, David M. Katzman, Paul D. Escott, Howard P. Chudacoff, Thomas 
G. Paterson, and William M. Tuttle, Jr. 1998. A People and a Nation: A History of 
the United States, Vol.II: Since 1865. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.   
Pauline, Lawrence J. 1977. Our America. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. 
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Ritchie, Donald A., Margaret Altoff, and Richard Wilson. 1985. Heritage of Freedom: 
History of the United States. New York: Macmillan. 
Roden, Philip, Bruce Kraig, Robynn L. Greer, and Betty M. Bivins. 1984. Life and 
Liberty: An American History. Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company. 
Sandler, Martin W., Edwin C. Rozwenc, and Edward C. Martin. 1971. The People Make 
a Nation. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. 
Todd, Lewis Paul and Merle Curti. 1977. Rise of the American Nation (Heritage Edition). 
New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 
Ver Steeg, Clarence L. and Richard Hofstadter. 1971. A People and a Nation. New York: 
Harper & Row. 
Wood, Leonard C., Ralph H. Gabriel, and Edward L. Biller. 1979. America: Its People 
and Values (2nd ed. revised). New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 
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APPENDIX EE 
COVERAGE OF HISTORICAL EPISODES IN COSTA RICAN TEXTBOOKS 
 
Episode 
[Summary of 
Analysis] 
Textbook A: 
Estudios 
Sociales 10 
(2011) 
Textbook B: 
Estudios Sociales 11 
(2011) 
Textbook C: 
Fichas de 
Estudios Sociales 
10 (2010)  
Textbook D: 
Fichas de Estudios 
Sociales 10 & 11 
(2009) 
Textbook E: 
Continentes 11 
(2010) 
Textbook F: Nuevos 
Horizontes 10 & 11 
(2008) 
Textbook G: 
Temario, 
Actividades y 
Practicas de 
Estudios Sociales 
10 & 11 (1998) 
 
Death penalty 
abolished by 
Tomas Guardia 
(1882) 
[Minimal 
coverage; 
Motivations 
unclear; 
Opportunity 
missed to 
celebrate human 
rights policies] 
NA Mentioned in one 
sentence with little 
comment on 
significance or reason 
for it: 
“Manifestations of 
Liberalism.... General 
Tomas Guardia 
(1870-1876, 1877-
1882)... Abolition of 
the death penalty 
(1882)” (p.77). 
 
NA NA Covered in one 
sentence in a text box 
of Guardia’s 
accomplish-ments: 
“Abolished the death 
penalty in 1882” 
(p.94). 
“During the 
dictatorship, Guardia 
did not honor the 
individual rights and 
liberties of  Costa 
Ricans and he favored 
political subservience; 
nevertheless, because 
of his wife’s influence 
he abolished the death 
penalty” (p.306).  
 
NA 
Overthrow of the 
dictator Tinoco 
(1919), partly 
through nonviolent 
protest and 
nonviolent direct 
action [3 texts fail 
to cover; 1 text 
vaguely mentions 
overthrow by a 
“popular 
movement”; only 
1 text covers the 
nonviolent 
protests]  
NA Not covered. The 
omission is glaring. 
Tinoco is reduced to 
one sentence: “Flores 
was unseated by a 
coup d’état in 1917, 
led by his Minister of 
War, Frederico 
Tinoco”  (p.80). 
NA Not covered. The 
omission is glaring. 
Tinoco is reduced to 
one sentence: “[The 
gold standard] was 
eliminated during 
the Tinoco 
government (1917-
1919)”  (p.251). 
Not covered. There is 
no hint that Tinoco 
was ever overthrown. 
The text explains 
how Tinoco rose to 
power through a coup 
d’état and “exercised 
a dictatorial 
government, since he 
took over political 
and military powers” 
(p.104).   
Some of the factors 
contributing to 
Tinoco’s overthrow 
are covered, including 
the nonviolent 
demonstrations and 
direct action (p.319). 
Several details are 
omitted. Namely, the 
decisive role of the 
nonviolent protests is 
obscured and the 
grievances and 
motivations for the 
protests are not 
clarified by the text. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Event barely 
covered. The brief 
textbook style 
obscures the role of 
nonviolent protests: 
“...Tinoco... 
exercised a 
dictatorship from 
1917 to 1919. 
Tinoco was 
overthrown by a 
popular movement 
of workers and the 
middle class” 
(p.181). 
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Social Guarantees 
legislation passed 
in 1941, 1942, and 
1943 [Text B has a 
conserv-ative por-
trait; Texts E and 
F, D and G offer 
celebratory 
portraits] 
NA The reforms are 
linked to Rerum 
Novarum, but the 
reforming leaders are 
given less voice 
(quoted less) and at 
times, the 
presentation of the 
reforms is neutral 
rather than 
celebratory (p.93) 
NA Follows verbatim 
Textbook G 
(pp.264-267). They 
are published by the 
same publisher. 
Often follows 
verbatim Textbook F 
(they are published 
by the same 
publisher). 
Unlike other texts, it 
highlights  suffering 
and poverty that 
“demanded urgent 
reforms from the 
State” (p.333). In this 
text the reforms are 
linked to the term 
“Christian socialism” 
(p.333). The safety net 
is strongly praised. 
 
 
 
Social safety net is 
strongly praised and 
grounded in the 
Rerun Novarum, 
and advocacy by 
President Calderon 
and Archbishop 
Sanabria (p.195). 
“Arms Down 
Strike” and pivotal 
women’s march 
and occupation 
(1947) [4 out of 5 
(80%) of the texts 
do not cover the 
women’s march 
and occupation; 
only 1 text covers 
the events satis-
factorily] 
NA Motives, women 
leaders, and outcome 
of the strike as well 
as the pivotal 8,000 
strong women’s 
march and 
occupation are 
satisfactorily covered 
(p.96).  
NA This account 
clarifies and 
specifies some 
issues better than 
Textbook B, but the 
women’s march and 
occupation are 
ommitted (p.270). 
The “Arms Down 
Strike” is briefly 
described as “a 
national stopage 
where commerce and 
banks closed their 
doors to demand 
electoral guarantees 
from the government; 
primarily, to accept 
the declarations made 
by the electoral 
Tribunal” (p.124). 
The women’s march 
and occupation are 
ommitted.  
 
Strike mentioned 
briefly: Picado faced 
“a national strike in 
which commercial 
traders and banks 
closed their doors to 
demand electoral 
guarantees of the 
government” (p.337). 
The women’s march 
and occupation are 
ommitted. 
The text clarifies that 
the Arms Down Strike 
agreements were 
violated by the 
Congress on February 
28, 1948, when 
Congress annulled the 
presidential elections 
over against the ruling 
of the electoral 
Tribunal who had 
declared Ulate the 
winner (p.338). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On p.200, this text 
repeats verbatim the 
account given in 
Textbook D (not 
surprisng since they 
were produced by 
the same publisher). 
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Is abolition of the 
army (1948) 
celebrated? Are 
rationales given 
for abolition of 
army? (e.g., Rio 
Treaty, OAS, 
principled and 
pragmatic norms) 
[5 out of 6 texts 
highly praise 
abolition for both 
principled and 
pragmatic reasons; 
only 1 out of 6 
texts clarifies the 
Rio Treaty as part 
of Costa Rica’s 
security plan] 
NA Abolition is strongly 
praised and endorsed 
for both principled 
and pragmatic 
reasons (p.110, 
p.149). The Rio 
Treaty (p.192) and 
OAS (p.193) are only 
criticized, on the 
grounds that the U.S. 
has compromised 
their missions.  
Examples of how the 
Rio Treaty and OAS 
have helped Costa 
Rica’s security are 
not mentioned here. 
Abolition is 
strongly praised 
and endorsed for 
both principled 
and pragmatic 
reasons (p.96). 
The OAS and Rio 
Treaty are both 
critiqued and 
praised (p.148), 
but its important 
role in Figueres’ 
security plan/ 
history of Costa 
Rica is never 
mentioned. 
Abolition is 
strongly praised and 
endorsed for both 
principled and 
pragmatic reasons 
(pp.272, 279-280). 
But historical trend 
of small army is 
also noted (repeated 
verbatim from 
Textbook G). No 
coverage of Rio 
Treaty or OAS. 
Abolition is strongly 
praised and endorsed 
for both principled 
and pragmatic 
reasons (pp.128-129). 
Often follows 
verbatim Textbook F 
(they are published 
by the same 
publisher). This is the 
only text that covers 
Rio Treaty as part of 
Costa Rica’s security 
plan (p.303). The 
OAS is vaguely 
praised (p.304), but 
its track record is not 
covered. 
 
 
Abolition is strongly 
praised and endorsed 
for both principled and 
pragmatic reasons 
(p.341). The OAS is 
praised for promoting 
peace and security 
(p.174), but the Rio 
Treaty is never 
mentioned, and 
historical examples of 
OAS role not linked to 
the discussion . 
Abolition  is 
portrayed as 
relatively 
insignificant and 
merely “symbolic 
because in reality, 
after the fall of 
Tinoco’s 
dictatorship, the 
army was a small 
force” (p.202). No 
coverage of Rio 
Treaty or OAS, 
except for passing 
reference to OAS as 
helping Costa Rica 
in 1948 invasion 
(p.202). 
Invasions of 1948 
and 1955 from 
Nicaragua 
[Only 1 out of 5 
texts covers the 
1955 invasion; 4 
out of 5 texts 
cover the 1948 
invasion, but none 
mention Rio 
Treaty, and only 2 
mention OAS and 
U.S. role] 
NA The 1948 attack is 
covered, but 
intervention by OAS 
and U.S. is not 
mentioned (p.98). 
The 1955 attack is 
not mentioned. 
NA This text repeats 
verbatim (p.272) the 
account given in 
Textbook G (not 
surprisng since they 
were produced by 
the same publisher). 
The 1955 attack is 
not mentioned. 
Both invasions are 
very briefly covered 
(p.125). In neither 
case does the text 
explain how Costa 
Rica defended itself. 
Not covered 1955 is not covered. 
Details are vague: 
“In December 1948 
Calderon invaded 
Costa Rica from 
Nicaragua, but he 
failed due to 
intervention by the 
OAS, the U.S. and 
even from Somoza” 
(p.202).  
 
President Monge’s 
1983 Proclamation 
of Costa Rican 
Perpetual 
Neutrality 
[5 out of 6 texts 
cover; 4 texts link 
it to idealistic/ 
human rights 
motives; little 
context given] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Monge’s 
Proclama-tion 
is depicted as 
strengthen-ing 
democatiza-
tion in region 
(p.204). 
Monge’s 
Proclamation is 
depicted as a 
“fundamental 
contribution” to 
Central American 
peace (p.142). 
NA Monge’s 
Proclamation is 
linked to a history 
of Costa Rican 
leaders who “have 
proclaimed the 
necessity of 
peaceful 
coexistence” 
(p.279) 
Monge’s Proclama-
tion is only linked to 
a pragmatic outcome: 
it helped 
“internation-al 
assistance to return to 
the country”  (p.174). 
In one section, this text 
repeats verbatim 
(p.378) the account 
given in Textbook E. 
But text also links 
Proclamation to an 
ideal: “respect for the 
principle of self-
determination of 
peoples” (p.135). 
 
 
 
Not covered; it 
could have 
appeared in the sub-
chapter on 
Nicaragua pp.122-4. 
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Depiction of 
Chile’s nonviolent 
overthrow of 
Pinochet [All 4 
texts covering 
Chile’s Pinochet 
era and the 
aftermath fail to 
depict the 
nonviolent 
movement to 
overthrow 
Pinochet.] 
No nonviolent 
protest 
movement is 
described. 
Briefly depicts 
1988 
referendum on 
Pinochet’s 
continued rule 
and 1989 
election 
(p.198). 
Changes in 
Chile linked to 
elections only. 
NA  No nonviolent 
protest movement 
is described. 
Pinochet’s rule 
described and the 
1989 election 
(p.204).  
NA NA No nonviolent protest 
movement is 
described. Briefly 
depicts 1988 
referendum on 
Pinochet’s continued 
rule and 1989 election 
(p.223). Changes in 
Chile linked to 
elections only, not 
mass nonviolent 
resistance. 
 
On pp.120-121, this 
text repeats 
verbatim (with a 
few minor 
differences) 
Textbook C’s 
account (not 
surprisng since they 
were produced by 
the same publisher). 
1994 Panama & 
Haiti disband 
armies [covered in 
only 1 out of 7 
texts; Opportunity 
missed to 
celebrate diffusion 
of Costa Rican 
peace model] 
 
Not covered. Not covered.  Not covered.  Not covered.  Not covered. Not covered. Covered very 
briefly (p.124). 
2003-2004 
Coalition of the 
Willing and 
lawsuit against the 
President of Costa 
Rica [all 6 texts 
fail to cover how 
the Iraq War 
impacted Costa 
Rica.] 
The U.S.- led 
Iraq War is 
covered 
(pp.146-147), 
but its impact 
on Costa 
Rican politics 
is ommitted. 
Not covered (but 
Chechnia in 2006 is 
covered (p.187), and 
Israel-Gaza in 2005 
(p.189). 
The U.S.- led Iraq 
War is covered 
(pp.146-147), but 
its impact on 
Costa Rican 
politics is 
ommitted.  
The U.S.- led Iraq 
War is briefly 
covered (p.106), but 
its impact on Costa 
Rican politics is 
ommitted. 
Not covered (but 
Israel-Gaza conflict 
of 2008-2009 
covered). 
The U.S.- led Iraq War 
is covered extensively 
(pp.157-160), but its 
impact on Costa Rican 
politics is ommitted. 
 
NA 
 
Notes: “NA” = Not applicable because the textbook does not cover this period. “Not covered” = the textbook neglects to include this episode despite the fact that the text 
covers this period in-depth. 
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APPENDIX FF 
NETWORK INFLUENCES ON NONVIOLENCE OF RICKEY & ROBINSON,  
 
1945-1948 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: One-way arrows indicate influences via written word. One-way arrows with dashes indicate lectures 
heard by Rickey, but degree of influence on issue of nonviolence unknown. Two-way arrows denote 
personal friendship or mentor-mentee relationship (in the case of Jane Addams and Gandhi, and Gandhi 
and Tolstoy, and Booker T. Washington and Tolstoy these ties were limited to personal correspondence). 
Striped two-way arrows denotes probable or very probable mentoring or influence specifically on the 
subject of nonviolence, but no explicit evidence was found to support this. Dotted two-way arrows denotes 
possible influence on nonviolence, but no evidence has been found. For documentation of network ties, see 
Appendix I.  
  Clarence Darrow 
Branch Rickey 
William James 
Frank 
Tannenbaum 
 
Jackie 
Robinson 
Emerson 
Thoreau 
Jane Addams 
      Tolstoy 
Emma 
Goldman 
Booker T. Washington 
T. Osborne 
 Garrison 
Mott 
Gandhi 
Papini 
 
 
Jesus  
 
(via 
gospel 
writers) 
Clarence Darrow 
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APPENDIX GG 
 
DOCUMENTING NETWORK TIES OF BRANCH RICKEY 
 
 The main nonviolent influences on Rickey appear to be Jesus via the Gospels, Papini’s 
interpretation of Jesus, the William James essay “The Moral Equivalent of War,” said to be “one 
of Rickey’s favorite essays” (Lowenfish 2007, p.375), and the writings of and his friendship with 
Frank Tannenbaum.      
 Papini, an Italian philosopher and literary figure, led a very unusual life and eventually 
underwent a religious conversion to Catholicism. But in 1904 he met William James in Rome, at 
the  International Congress of Psychology: “This marked the beginning of an intense 
correspondence between the two thinkers” (Lachs and Talisse 2004, p.562). According to 
Lowenfish (2007), Papini also became a student of William James at Harvard (p.375). 
 Rickey’s personal relationship with Clarence Darrow is another probable link to 
nonviolence. Darrow was a leading proponent of nonviolence, and had written several books on 
the subjct. Clarence Darrow and Jane Addams, both strong advocates for peace and nonviolence, 
had a personal friendship (Library of Congress 1907). Specific evidence of a mentoring 
relationship on the issue of nonviolence includes the following. In Jane Addams’s Hull-House 
library it was observed that she autographed her name inside the front cover of the book Tolstoy’s 
The Christian Teaching (a translated version published in 1898), but on the opposite page is “the 
bookplate of Clarence Darrow, indicating that it was a gift of the famous lawyer and friend of 
Hull-House” (Cracraft 2012, p.22 n.20). This piece of physical evidence suggests that Darrow 
may have played a role in cultivating Addams’s interest in Tolstoy, a leading figure in nonviolent 
ideologies during this period in U.S. history.    
 In the preface of his book, Resist Not Evil, Darrow (1902 [1972]) writes that his book was 
“inspired by the writings of Tolstoy” who placed “the doctrine of non-resistance upon a 
substantial basis” (p.7). The quote on the title page of Darrow’s book is from Jesus on turning the 
other cheek (Mt. 5:38-39). But as Darrow makes clear in his autobiography as well as in his 
Foreword to the 1925 edition of Resist Not Evil, his confidence in nonviolence, or in “man’s” 
[sic] potential to “reach a state of non-resistance” (p.xxxv) dissipitated during World War I. 
Nevertheless, he maintained in the 1925 Foreword, “In spite of this change of view I am 
convinced that this book in the main is true...” (p.xxxv). 
 In 1907, while he was at Ohio Wesleyan University, Rickey heard a lecture by  Jane 
Addams (Polner 2007, p.50). The lecture did not address nonviolence, but it is possible that 
Rickey might have, at least to some degree, followed her peacemaking career thereafter, as she 
was frequently in the national spotlight as a leading pacifist. Rickey was no pacifict, as in 1918, 
he volunteered for combat duties in World War I (p.75). Although it seems his direct experiences 
of war in World War I might have pushed him somewhat closer to a rejection of war (see Polner 
2007, p.76), to my knowledge, this is entirely conjectural. Rickey’s main link to Addams would 
be indirect, through his personal contact with Darrow.  
 Jane Addams’ understanding of nonviolence was deeply influenced by Tolstoy’s 
writings, and Gandhi as well (Addams 1931). She and Gandhi maintained a personal 
correspondence, and she traveled to India but Gandhi was in prison and she could only visit his 
ashram (Gilsenan 2001). She also traveled to Russia and personally met with Tolstoy (Elshtain 
2002, p.204).  
 In addition, Tolstoy and Booker T. Washington engaged in personal correspondence 
(Saul and McKinzie 1997, p.180). In 1907, while he was at Ohio Wesleyan University, Rickey 
heard a lecture by and helped to host Booker T. Washington’s visit to campus (Polner 2007, 
p.50). Booker T. Washington, perhaps the most significant African-American leader and educator 
from 1895 until his death in 1915, embraced pacifism and denounced the Spanish-American War 
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and WWI. Though this side of Washington is largely neglected today, his pacifism was well 
known within the U.S. peace movement, and in 1913 “he was invivted to give a keynote address 
on peace and disarmament before the Fourth Annual Peace Congress in St. Louis” (Stanfield 
1993, p.49). Booker T. Washington’s Christian grounding in nonviolence has been briefly 
explored by Beck (1996). Hence, it is possible the Rickey might have heard Washington discuss 
pacifism and nonviolence at some point during his trip to Ohio Wesleyan.  
 The evidence that William James and Jane Addams influenced one another on the issue 
of nonviolence is found in the fact that they “shared the platform” at the International Peace 
Congress in Boston in 1904 (Cracraft 2012, p.75). James’s important concept of a “moral 
equivalent of war” was “probably borrowed from Addams (p.75).  
 Frank Tannenbaum had been a young activist with the IWW and as a result of his 
leadership of a direct action of homeless men, demanding shelter, was sentenced to a year in 
prison (Yeager 2011). He soon befriended a pioneering prison reformer named Tom Mott 
Osborne, and became a mentee of Osborne (Yeager 2011). Tannenbaum eventually became an 
academic, a researcher of prison conditions and advocate of reforms, and also researcher/ 
advocate in Latin American politics, race and the history of slavery in the Americas, and labor 
unions. Tannenbaum theorized and spoke out against cruelty in prisons (p.182). Obsborne had 
very strong connections through blood and family friendships to famous liberal Quaker 
nonviolent activists and abolitionists, including the pacifist activists Lucretia Coffin Mott (the 
sister of Osborne’s grandmother; Lucretia was a famous Quaker preacher, but Osborne’s 
grandmother was a Quaker activist as well) and William Lloyd Garrison (Osborne’s uncle was 
William Lloyd Garrison, Jr.). As a youth, Osborne and his family often visited with the Motts and 
Garrisons (Chamberlain 1935, pp.32-33). Moreover, Osborne deeply admired his Quaker 
ancestors: “He studied their careers and their philosphy, and could quote verbatim numerous 
passages from their written works” (p.34). Osborne was not a pacifist (see pp.373-374, where 
after joining the Navy as director of a prison, he proposed that his convicts fight in WWI; and all 
four of his sons were in the military as well (p.368)), but he did strongly oppose U.S. imperialism 
in the Philippines and as a result was denounced for not supporting the troops (p.409). 
Tannenbaum admired Osborne so much he wrote a biography on him, in which he compares 
Osborne to Saint Francis of Assissi, for his compassion and love of prisoners (Tannenbaum 1933, 
p.291), Osborne’s practical and applied efforts in humanitarian prison reform and personal 
encouragment of prisoners led one prisoner to call him “God’s delegate of hope” (p.308). It is 
probable that the personal contact between Tannenbaum and Osborne included discussions about 
nonviolent methods of conflict resolution, especially as concerned prison reforms. In any case, 
Tannenbaum (1921) clearly has inculcated nonviolent convictions and a nonviolent vision of 
social change by the time he wrote The Labor Movement: Its Conservative Functions and Social 
Consequences. In this book, he argues that the labor movement “makes progress pragmatic rather 
than violently revolutionary” (p.175).  He characterizes the labor movement as a path to avoiding 
violent revolutions, which are a “crude method of physical struggle and suffering” and a “crude 
process of social adjustment” (p.167). He argues against “the survival of the fittest” doctrine and 
points to “the poverty of the economic theory of competition, of struggle and of belief that men 
live by friction rather than by cooperation” (p.171). In his view, the labor movement “functions 
by reducing human friction, by the elimination of individual competition, by making the interest 
of one the interests of all on an ever larger scale” (p.171). One can hear in this some similarities 
to the take-home message Rickey derived from Tannenbaum’s book Slave and Citizen, and his 
conversations with Tannenbaum on how to overcome racism in the U.S. 
 Emma Goldman worked with Clarence Darrow on a legal case (Gornick 2011, p.95). In 
addition, Frank Tannenbaum came into personal contact with Emma Goldman during his days as 
a young activist in New York City: “he apparently spent hours in Goldman’s office of Mother 
Earth, and she was quite fond of him” (Yeager 2011, p.179). In terms of their thinking about 
nonviolent strategy/ ideals, we can consider the potential influence of Goldman on Darrow and 
794 
 
Tannenbaum as a cautionary tale. While Emma Goldman was never a pacifist, after the failed 
assassination attempt on Henry Frick which she and her partner Alexander Berkman had planned, 
she wrote on the importance of maintaining the unity of ends and means in social movement 
struggles (Ferguson 2011, p.296) – a classic theme of Gandhian nonviolence. Goldman 
repeatedly argued that anarachist philosophy was opposed to violence and publicly spoke out 
against violence (Gornick 2011, pp.48-49; Ferguson 2011, p.296). But she also expressed 
ambivalence on violent tactics. It is simply unknown how she argued concerning violent militant 
actions in the many “backroom planning sessions” she participated in (Gornick 2011, p.49). 
Gornick (2011) argues that after the Frick assassination attempt, Goldman “never 
again...endorsed political assassination, but neither would she condemn it...The question of 
political violence was one of the few that led Emma into a strategic quandry” (pp.48-49). In her 
autobiography, Goldman (2006) records her thoughts at the time of planning Berkman’s 
assassination attempt: “...did not the ends justify the means? Our end was the sacred cause of the 
oppressed...Yes, the end in this case justified the means” (pp.61-62). In light of Frick’s violence 
and injustice against unionized steel workers during the Homestead strike, it seems Goldman 
never stopped believing that Berkman’s assassination attempt was justified (p.49). Berkman 
himself waffled on the value of his violent act (Gornick 2011, p.48), but he was deeply 
disillusioned when the main anarchist paper in the U.S., the Freiheit, quickly denounced his 
“propoganda by deed,” as “useless...even harmful since the masses do not as yet understand us 
and our motives” (Berkman 2011, p.87). Soon after, and on account of this, Goldman physically 
attacked Johann Most, the editor of Freiheit, with a horse whip – outraged partly because she had 
heard Most “scores of times call for acts of violence” (Goldman 2006, p.73). Berkman did later 
argue that because a kind of political false consciousness is so deep in America, no American 
would approve of assassinating political autocrats here. Due to our democratic patina, political 
leaders are not preceived as an “enemy of the people” (Berkman 1912, p.417). Writing about the 
recent assassination of President McKinley, Berkman wrote, America’s version of democratic 
tyranny “cannot be reached with a bullet,” yet Berkman continued to argueu that his own 
assasination attempt – which aimed at economic tyrants rather than political - was “significant 
and educational” (p.417). Yet, in addition to the obvious counter-argument that false 
consciousness is just as pervasive in the environment of U.S. capitalism, this smacks of denial in 
the face of the evidence that Berkman’s assassination attempt provoked a widespread 
conservative backlash against the Homestead strikers and sympathy for Frick.  
 In this way, Goldman’s example may have served as a cautionary tale for leftists and 
radicals considering violent tactics in subsequent years. And, towards the end of her life, in 1928, 
Goldman wrote to Berkman that she would consider adopting the nonviolence of Gandhi and 
Tolstoy: “I feel violence in whatever form never has and probably never will bring constructive 
results” (Lynd and Lynd 1995, p.45).    
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